

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF SOCIAL WORK

SELECTED PAPERS
SEVENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING
WAR REGIONAL CONFERENCES
New York · St. Louis · Cleveland

1943



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FOREWORD

THE selection of papers for this volume of the *Proceedings* of the National Conference of Social Work was made under exceptional circumstances. In normal times one national conference is held each year. In 1943 exigencies of wartime transportation required the substitution of regional meetings. Three such meetings were scheduled—one in New York City in March, one in St. Louis in April, and one in Cleveland in May. Only the first two were held, but plans for the Cleveland meeting were completed and many of the papers were prepared. The programs of the meetings were in large measure identical as to topics and, in some instances, as to authors. The selection of material for the *Proceedings*, therefore, was made from manuscripts far more similar in substance and mode of treatment than is customary. A further difficulty was created by the decision of the Conference Executive Committee, born of a natural desire to effect all possible economies, that this year's volume must be smaller than its immediate predecessors. Owing to limitations of space, it has again been necessary for some papers to be reduced from their original length.

Responsibility for choosing Conference papers for publication rests with the Editorial Committee, which this year consisted of Florence Hollis (New York City), Edwin Eells (Chicago), Cordelia Trimble (Washington), Chairman; and included as *ex officio* members the General Secretary of the Conference and Editor of the *Proceedings*, Howard R. Knight, and the Editor of *The Social Work Yearbook*, Russell H. Kurtz. The President of the Conference, Fred K. Hoehler, is also an *ex officio* member, but he was prevented by duties abroad from participating in the committee's work; his place on the committee was taken by Robert P. Lane (New York City). Miss Hollis also was unable to attend the committee's meeting.

In accordance with Conference policy, adopted to keep the *Proceedings* within a single volume of usable size, papers read before associate groups affiliated with the Conference were not considered for publication. The Editorial Committee therefore reviewed all papers submitted to it which had been read at the New York City

and the St. Louis regional meetings, and those papers prepared for the Cleveland meeting which were forwarded to the Conference office. This volume containing forty-five papers is the result.

It will be readily seen that limitations of space prevent inclusion of many excellent papers. True at all times, this is particularly true when programs overlap as they did in the 1943 regional meetings. No one can be more conscious than the Editorial Committee of the high quality of papers it was forced to exclude as it exercised its best judgment in applying the tests of value for reference purposes, newness, practical usefulness to social workers, authenticity, historical significance, timeliness, and literary quality. The committee hopes that its choice nevertheless reflects the results of the Program Committee's careful planning, and that in later years this volume will give students an accurate understanding of the concerns of social workers in the seventieth year of the Conference's life and the second year of American participation in World War II.

The Conference remains, as it has always been, a forum for the free discussion of welfare problems. It does not engage in social action. Opinions expressed in any paper in this volume are therefore those of the author alone. Publication does not imply endorsement, nor exclusion lack of endorsement, by either the Conference as a whole or by the Editorial Committee.

This year again the contents of the *Proceedings* have been arranged under topics of reader interest, rather than in the order or under the headings of the Conference program. A consolidated program of all the regional meetings will be found in the Appendixes. It will be noted that the programs did not follow the usual division into five Conference Sections. Appearing also in the Appendixes are minutes of the Conference business sessions, the Conference Constitution and By-Laws, and author and subject Indexes.

The Editorial Committee expresses the gratitude of the Conference to all the authors who submitted their manuscripts for consideration, and to Mrs. W. Burton Swart who has again done so well the responsible and exacting work of preparing the manuscripts for publication.

CORDELIA TRIMBLE
Chairman, Editorial Committee

Washington, D.C.
August 1, 1943

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
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Bryan J. McEugart

OPENING ADDRESS

By THE MOST REVEREND BRYAN J. McENTEGART

IN THE last World War, the American doughboy picked up a French expression which stood him in good stead on many occasions. It was, "*C'est la guerre*." He used it to explain the unusual, the unexpected, and sometimes even the unexplainable. I am tempted now to use the same expression in regard to three unusual aspects of the New York meeting of the National Conference of Social Work.

"*C'est la guerre*"—that is why we open, not the annual meeting of the Conference, but the first of three regional meetings to be held in March, April, and May. These have been planned so that social workers across the country may not be deterred by difficulties of wartime transportation from discussing on a national basis the vast problems which the war has created, both at home and abroad. In May, the annual business meeting of the Conference will take place as scheduled in Cleveland.¹ In the meantime, our fellow workers in the East and in the West will be able to come together in New York and in St. Louis.

"*C'est la guerre*"—that is why we open with the President of the Conference thousands of miles away on a Government mission in North Africa, and there is found presiding one who was elected to the usually restful and more or less honorary position of First Vice President.

"*C'est la guerre*"—that is why the Conference opens without a presidential address. In deference to the feelings of past presidents, I hope no one will make any unkind reference to ill winds and the occasional blessings that are said to come from them.

And now, both as Acting President and as a native New Yorker, I want to welcome to our city the members of the Conference who

¹ This meeting was subsequently canceled.

have come to take part in this meeting. I sincerely hope that you will enjoy and derive great benefit from the fifty sessions which will be held here. The Program Committee and the Secretary and his staff have accomplished a remarkable feat in arranging for topics and speakers, not only for the New York sessions, but also for those to be held in St. Louis and in Cleveland. They deserve our unstinted gratitude.

This occasion is not without a note of sadness, particularly for us of New York. There are missing from among us two leaders whom social work can ill afford to lose, the well-beloved William Hodson and David Adie. Both accomplished great things for our city, our state, and our nation. With outstanding vision and ability, they gave the last full measure of their devotion to ideals that are most dear to all of us. The various groups with which they were affiliated have planned memorial services. I hope that all of us will be able to attend these services and thus reconsecrate ourselves to the principles of justice and charity among men for which both Bill and Dave lived, labored, and died.

The program of the New York regional meeting offers a wide range of topics and speakers covering the entire field of social work in wartime. As a background for these discussions and as a foreshadowing of future developments abroad, I am privileged to read to you a newsletter on social services in North Africa, which reached me only a few days ago from the President of the National Conference of Social Work, Fred K. Hoehler. He writes:

*To the Members of the National Conference of Social Work
Assembled in New York City:*

It is with real regret that I am unable to be with you for the opening session of the National Conference. This feeling is tempered, somewhat, by the hope that I can be an adequate representative of American social work in North Africa.

In this message to the Conference, I quite naturally think first of the irreparable loss which American social work has suffered in the death of Bill Hodson. The great personal loss which I experience is felt each day as I need his counsel and aid in working out plans we had developed together in Washington. Bill's wisdom and his experience in service to people have made a generous contribution

to the present and future plans for welfare service at home and for the task we must face abroad during the next three or four years.

In my brief time here I have had some chance to observe the work of Secours National and of the local public assistance offices. The Secours National serves all the departments in North Africa just as it served throughout metropolitan France. It is the national social work agency, receiving subsidies both from government and from private sources. It operates through local offices and is principally concerned with direct public assistance. The local public assistance office is, in part, financed by funds from Secours National and also in part, by funds from local sources. At the moment these offices have very limited means and are understaffed, but they continue to do a valiant job against tremendous odds. Most of the work is carried on by volunteers under a professional director. Another strictly public local agency is that known here as L'Assistance Sociale. This is a combination of public health nursing and social case work services. All its workers are trained nurses who have had a year or two of social case work training. It does an especially fine child welfare and assistance job and works under La Direction de la Santé Publique. The American Red Cross is here, too, and has had and will continue to have an important part in the relief job carried out for the citizens of North Africa.

It has been my good fortune from time to time to meet some of my old friends in social work, who are engaged either in the work of the Special Service Division of the United States Army or in the Red Cross service. Some, too, are in the combat forces or are serving as members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. Within a few days there will join the staff of my office a representative of British social work who is coming out as a member of the Leith Ross Organization of Great Britain, just as I am privileged to represent Governor Lehman's office.

Our job is principally one of helping the officials of a friendly government to meet the needs of thousands of persons who have been suffering from privation during the last two years. On every hand there is evidence of the devastation which follows the occupation of a country by an enemy army. Stocks of supplies have been looted, production has stopped, and people everywhere are in the midst of actual warfare or are living in the strictest war economy. There is an extreme scarcity of foodstuffs, clothing, and even the

simplest of normal consumer goods in every part of the country. Our Government and the British Government are doing a magnificent job in bringing food and clothing into this area for the use of civilians. This is being done in spite of innumerable handicaps and the necessity of giving priorities to implements of war. What we are able to send in, with that from Great Britain, is all that the people have, except for the grain and olive oil which the enemy has been unable to locate. A new crop of grain is expected soon, and everyone is looking hopefully to the benefits it will provide.

It would be a great inspiration to all of you to see the job which is being done in our milk distribution plan for children. Over two hundred thousand children will, within this month, be given their regular daily supply of milk. This plan has been developed through the American Red Cross, using the milk supplied by the Allied countries. Many of the very young children have never had milk, except on rare occasions, and this shows clearly in their lack of growth and their susceptibility to diseases of malnutrition. The director of Secours National tells me that beneficial results are observed after the brief period of a month.

The local rationing plan provides milk only for infants up to the age of eighteen months. Our distribution furnishes milk for those who are over eighteen months and up to fourteen years of age. We provide a more adequate milk diet through the local clinics, which, incidentally, are well staffed and well organized, for special cases among those who are ill.

I know how interested all of you are in the problems of the refugees in this area. I am serving on a commission which is concerned with helping to solve some of the problems of this group. Already, numbers of refugees have been released to work here or to join the armies of America, Great Britain, and Free France. We are hoping that others may have a similar experience soon and that we may send some refugees to Great Britain or to the United States and other countries. Many of these people have useful skills, and they should be put to work for democracy in a world at war. We have been able to make some items of clothing available in a few of the areas where these refugees live. Other materials, including clothing, blankets, and food, especially for the sick, will be provided soon.

It is inevitable that we must look to America and to American

social workers and to the social workers of Great Britain for the substance and the services for this job and for the others which will follow in the countries of Europe and the Far East.

To all of you I extend personal greetings, good wishes, and God-speed for your meetings in New York and throughout the other conferences which will follow.

Faithfully yours,

FRED K. HOEHLER

*Chairman, Relief and Rehabilitation Division
of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

February 19, 1943

A NONPROFESSIONAL VIEW OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AND MISSION OF SOCIAL WORK

By CHESTER I. BARNARD

I BEGAN thinking about this subject some twelve years ago when I was in charge of organizing the relief administration of New Jersey. In those days—much more, I believe, than today—in many quarters social workers were unpopular, and I shared somewhat the burden of that unpopularity because I very quickly found, in organizing relief work, that several varieties of experienced and trained social workers were indispensable to the successful carrying out of that undertaking. I also found that the legislature and labor and business groups were so unconvinced of the need for social workers and so ignorant, both of their merits and of their limitations, that they very nearly promised to destroy, either by the refusal of funds or by serious restrictions, the work in which we were all engaged.

In the years that have intervened, my acquaintance with those who are professionally engaged in social work has, of course, increased. I have sought to determine why the attitudes which have been ascribed to social workers, which, I think, did somewhat disappear but could easily return, have obtained in this country and what we ought to do about it, if there is anything to be done. What I shall discuss are the reasons for some of those attitudes and what might be done to correct a situation which, looking to the future, could easily be a tragic one for social work and, what is far more important, for society.

I think it would be well if occasionally those of you who are engaged professionally in social work could bring to your mind realistically that you are merely a special case of a more general activity, and that in some way your special work has to be integrated

with the more general work. I doubt if it can be successfully gain-said that the great bulk of social work in the past, as well as that of the future, was done, and will continue to be done, by those who are not professionals, or at least not professional social workers, and much of it most unconsciously. We have to find our place in the scheme of things in order to conduct ourselves appropriately, of course.

Perhaps I should follow these remarks with a brief definition of social work, sufficient for present purposes. Social work is that which promotes social living and group coöperation, that aids individuals and groups to behave effectively in their social environments, and gives relief to those who have been socially injured. Its ideal of accomplishment is the improvement of society and the higher development of individuals.

You may consider that statement to be inadequate, but I do not believe that you will take much exception to it. If you heed it carefully, you will see that there is an enormous amount of activity not known as social work being carried on in this country, which is social work if my definition is approximately a good one. It is carried on, first, by professionals who profess something besides social work and who would not admit, in most cases, that they were engaged in social work.

Since what I have called the ideal of accomplishment, the improvement of society and the higher development of individuals, is not the primary purpose—at least, not the primary purpose avowed for their efforts—they do not consider, nor do you, that they are engaged in social work. Nevertheless, their activities are almost exclusively determined by a process in which many mediating people coöperate, both with smaller and with larger social systems that have been created to carry on specific undertakings.

There is another group, overwhelmingly the larger, that is perpetually engaged in the business of maintaining coöperation, of aiding and training people to behave appropriately in the societies in which they find themselves, and, in their way, in trying to relieve those who have been injured by the impacts of society. This group, to an increasing degree, does its work as amateurs, or quite unconsciously as a mere result and effect of such techniques as they learn how to use by experience in education, in the training of children,

in the processes of recreation, and in the interchanges of fraternal association.

So there are three groups who do not understand each other very well, all of whom may have just a bit too much of the idea that they know more and are more competent than they really are with respect to the guidance and treatment of human beings.

As I have observed it somewhat from the outside, professional social work is conspicuous in taking the social aim as an end in itself. I do not for a moment mean that it is not a way of living or a means of livelihood for those who are engaged in it. I do not mean, of course, that the specific objectives of that effort are not most prominently on the minds of those who are engaged in it. Nevertheless, such meetings as those of the National Conference of Social Work, and many others, bring to the front the most important reason for your efforts—the incentive which puts the color into your work, makes it seem more than ever worth while—and that is the intention to improve our society, and our people as components of it. That is not characteristic of either of the other groups.

The second characterization of professional social work is that it is applied to fields of need where the other types of social work have not been available or have failed. Professional social workers, in doing their work, have come together, in the organizations of which they are part, to work in sectors which were not being covered, or for individuals who were not being touched by other organizations. These needs have somewhat restricted the scope of thinking of social workers, notwithstanding the social attitude of broad educational backgrounds which are conveyed to them.

Professional social work is also characterized by a broader knowledge and a larger equipment of techniques which, of course, professionals should have and in which they should be leaders. That equipment is weak in certain respects, where others are strong.

Finally, professional social work differs from that of other groups through the function of leadership. It is the business of professional social workers as a group—a business which is far from having been carried out to the degree that the good of the country would call for—to furnish the leadership, to tell the people what they cannot afford to neglect, to show by example to those who are inevitably engaged in the social work of other organizations what can be done

by concentrated collaboration on the problems involved in the social behavior of human beings.

Now, let me refer to some of the other types of social work which have not generally been included in your definition of it and which, not infrequently, have annoyed and concerned you, to your disadvantage. Let me start with the one which you probably like least of all—the social work of politicians. Human beings have to be dealt with as groups. We may have to specialize in our performances with respect to certain sectors, but if we are to understand the problems with which we must deal, we have to be concerned with all the life, in minor or major degree, of the people with whom we are dealing, and we ought to be concerned with the knowledge and the skills possessed by those who seem especially adept with respect to certain types of behavior of human beings. There are seamy sides to almost everything, including social work, and certainly including politics. I suspect that is due to the characteristics of the human beings who compose our society rather than to the politicians; but I learned, chiefly in connection with relief work, that the wisdom of politicians, with respect to the behavior of individuals and groups, is in many respects deeper and at the same time more constructive than that of other elements in society. Moreover, where political skill is combined with high idealism and firm honesty, as it often is, social work is carried out in the guise of political work that cannot be ignored in considering the mission and the opportunity of social workers.

I shall refer in passing only to the social work involved in the administration of justice, because some of the types of social work represented at the National Conference of Social Work come in contact with the work of the courts; but courts are social systems of a particular kind, involving the handling of human beings under strange, and often artificial, conditions. The successful carrying on of that work involves a kind of social work with techniques that I think can well be considered for application under other circumstances.

Let me touch briefly on education. The school is a social world of its own. It requires a particular kind of coöperation and collaboration, and the teacher is not merely a person who knows something about a subject, but one who is skilled in leadership, and the

manipulation of the social world for the time being is at his or her command.

It has always been shocking to me when social workers have indicated their surprise that I understand what social work is all about. As a matter of fact, their surprise was no greater than mine that they should be astonished, because they were talking about techniques of operation and collaboration, of indoctrination, of correction, of leadership, that have been a matter of course in my business experience for many, many years. It was then that I first began to recognize how far apart our roles are, and that those of us who are occupied with leadership, organization, and coöperation are doing essentially the same things, with only the superficialities differing.

Let me illustrate from a certain large telephone central office. For years it has employed a social worker under the direction of the chief operator. She is not called a social worker; it would be fatal to call her that. She does not think of herself as that. She thinks of herself as a personnel assistant, but she does both group and case work, and that is all she is there for. I could point out many other illustrations from this type of organization, and I venture to say that for the 300,000 employees of that system, there is actually more genuine social work carried on day after day, year after year, than for any other group of 300,000 people.

Perhaps there is no way to measure or check that statement; it is certainly my impression. Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, the executives who are responsible for the conduct of that business have not the remotest idea that they are having social work done and are paying for it, despite the fact that the personnel officer said fifteen years ago that his purpose was to secure the best development of the human beings employed by that organization.

Referring briefly to the armed forces, we may say that the Army of the United States is definitely engaged in an extensive piece of social service work, which it will not call by that name, I am sure; it ought not to do so.

I wonder how few people, both in the Army and in industry, realize the amount of case work that has to be done by supervisors and managers, and how effective some of it is in straightening out all sorts of problems, such as social difficulties, the effects of organizations on individuals, and of individual behavior on organizations. They are doing it day after day. It is only because we put so much

emphasis on technology and on finance that there is so little recognition of the tremendous aggregate of social work done by organizations of government and of industry, of the Army and the Navy.

It is important, I think, that social workers should understand that. I may be suggesting a course of education and training which is impractical. I do not think so, however, because what is needed to start with, as I see it, is an understanding of the reality of social work in these organizations, and then one can find a way to appreciate the techniques that have been developed that may be of some substantial advantage, in the course of time, in professional social work.

In the first place, professional social workers need to know, in an understanding way, the nature of the conditions in which most people are engaged most of the time, that is, in their employment. It has taken quite a long time for people to realize that any productive organization constitutes a society, more or less closed, involving many identical social problems that affect people, not only during the hours when they are employed, but also when they are just living, and enjoying their recreation.

There is need for a much wider understanding of the kind of social system people work under, not merely by professional social workers, of course, but by the employers as well. No one should get the idea that business is distinguished for social work; it is not. It is distinguished, however, for its understanding of organization, and I hope you will permit me to say that in my belief social workers, next to lawyers and doctors, are the least adept in the field of organization. This failing manifests itself in many ways.

I am trying to convey a picture of the broad situation which I think it is important for you to consider, even if you do not accept what I say. There is much, much to be learned from social work and its organization as it is carried on in the Army and Navy and in industry, and also in political organizations. It would be well, if that statement is correct, if there were some effort toward the broadening of usual interests, but it is in that field that you still should be the leaders. You will not be, unless you do broaden your interests so that you will recognize the high quality of some of the social work done by people who are not professional social workers, or who are not recognized as such. That is an important step to take in exercising your leadership in that sphere.

It seems to me important to bring about an integration of non-professional and professional social work. I am repeatedly asked, "Just what do you mean by that? How are you going to do it?" I am not talking about specific, concrete methods. I am talking about attitudes. If I could get some thousands of business administrators to understand and properly appreciate the work professional social workers are doing, that would be sufficient integration for a start; and, if I could get you to understand the high quality of much of the social work done in those organizations, that would be an integrating attitude, and as far as I should ever attempt to go. You would do the rest.

There is another and still more important sector of American social work which you have to integrate and which will test your professional capacity, test it very seriously, in the next five or ten years. I call your attention to the enormous amount of amateur, or volunteer, social work that is being done. The volume of it is a reflection, in my opinion, of the success of professional social work, because in very great measure the message which you have been carrying and the examples which you have been setting have moved people to attempt to emulate you. Consider, for instance, social work in fraternal organizations—attempted social work, some of it may be. Consider the work that is done in organizations like the American Legion, or that which is carried on by many amateur associations in one place or another. Its volume is increasing. It is increasing because, as the needs of our society become more complex, the needs for social adjustment, for collaboration, and for all the other terms, suddenly become greater, and the tragedies perhaps also become proportionately more numerous. Whatever the cause, I think you must be impressed, particularly in connection with the work of the Red Cross and of the United Service Organizations, by the enormous extent to which certain kinds of social work are being done by amateurs or volunteers.

Volunteers are sometimes very difficult, I know, and they sometimes think social workers are equally difficult. I suppose you ought to understand them better than they should understand you. Adjustments are effected not by knowledge so much as by relative position, interest, and ambition, and the state of one's nerves, but professional social workers cannot ignore, and indeed must learn from, that vast volume of amateurs engaged in social work.

I suppose there is only one amateur out of a thousand who produces something of importance. I suspect too that in the beginning of some other sciences it was the amateur, the volunteer, the non-professional, who did the job. We think in the U.S.O. that we are not overstating the facts when we say that some of our volunteer, nonprofessional work for the armed forces is superior to any that has been developed by the professional organization. I think that possibly is so; as a matter of probability, it should be so. Have you noticed what happens? As soon as you get hold of a good person, the best person, you put him in the toughest place. You can do that with professionals, but not with volunteers, and so the circumstances are favorable; they are "naturals," and their interest is persistent, and they have ability and character and imagination. The lack of preconception very often leads to results which we cannot afford to neglect, and that group of volunteers, which I hope will continue to grow and expand, needs the leadership of professional social workers who need to learn more how to give that leadership.

That is the mission, as I see it, of social work—not the accomplishment of a concrete job but the leadership of the innumerable workers who do it for the love of it and without whom there would be neither money nor resources to get the job done.

The opportunities of social work, I believe, depend upon the maintenance of a stable society. We must not take too easily for granted that this society is stable. The world society is in a state of utter disorganization. Our physical wealth is running out in huge amounts day by day. We are becoming poorer. Perhaps new sciences, new skills, will enable us quickly to overcome the loss of all the tools of peace that are rusting and wearing away and which will not be ready for use if the war lasts long. If so, while we might have a great deal of instability in society, we would also have a problem which would make the cost of social work, even though it may be cheap in the end, seem like an expensive and an impossible luxury. Already, in education, there are many sectors where the work is not going forward, but backward, and in the course of not too long a time the effect of that retrogression on the stability of our society would be important.

I do not think that in considering the opportunities of the future you should have too much in mind the fact that professional social work, like administration and management, is overhead, and that

to justify its support it must be efficient and effective, and that there are too little means and too many difficulties in the way of making it efficient and effective. Taking the optimistic view, I believe that we will finally come through without upsetting our society, that we will be sufficiently productive so that we can stand the overhead of social work, and that the people will continue to see the justification for it in results for them and for their society, not just for the social workers' society. If we can do that, then your great opportunity is that of leadership, to tell the people that social work is worth while doing, to make them conscious of the thoughts that can be corrected by collaboration and coöperation, to teach the techniques under which hard things are made easy, and to indicate those dangers which are to be avoided if one seeks to avert disaster.

These are the opportunities of social workers, and these opportunities will have been realized when the professional social workers, in small numbers to be sure, like the engineers, the lawyers, or the administrators, are also taken to the top of the general management of our affairs, whether in business, or in government, or in other connections. Already there have been hopeful signs of progress. I recall the fine work done by Harry Hopkins in managing the great Federal Emergency Relief Administration. I refer to a prime minister whose early work was social research in the labor field, Mackenzie King. I think of Bill Hodson, a fellow whom I would have put in any position that was important; he was able. I think of the personnel man, doing a specialized piece of social work in a particular industry, who is now one of the leading executives of that industry. These are examples of people who have come up through the special experience and view of social work, and who have brought the status of that work and the influence of it upon the thinking of our times into better stead.

THE MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER

By WILLIAM HABER

THE MANPOWER problem during 1943 is going to be felt in every home and every plant and every farm and every school in America. We are only now beginning to appreciate the nature of the undertaking which was begun at Pearl Harbor. We are beginning to realize that total war means just exactly what the word "total" says. It will bring its weight to bear upon every man and woman, every boy and girl. Substantial adjustments in our ways of working and in our ways of living, in the place of employment, in methods of hiring, in the role of women in our society, in the role of youth, and in family relationships are inevitable.

We are committed to raise a large army, an army of nearly eleven million people—the largest in our history. We are committed to provide, by the end of this year, the largest industrial army in our history to produce implements of war—something like twenty million people engaged in the production of munitions and in essential supporting industries. We are committed to produce the greatest agricultural crop in our history to feed ourselves, to feed our troops, to feed the troops of our allies, and to feed the population of the territories we hope to occupy by the end of 1943.

We are committed, finally, to maintain our civilian economy, not on the present basis, not on a luxury level, but at least at the bedrock minimum necessary to keep the economy of the United States as an efficient, functioning, going concern.

In meeting these commitments, we recognize that there is not enough manpower for everyone to have all he wants. There is not enough to permit waste. There is not enough for anyone to be idle. So the major manpower problem of 1943 will be the problem of rationing manpower, to make certain that the scarce skills are available to the people who need them most, and to make certain that

those who have a prior claim upon the manpower of America have that claim satisfied before those who have a secondary claim.

Looking back to Pearl Harbor, we can see that a great deal has happened:

1. We have put 7,000,000 people into the armed forces of the United States. Think what that means. We have taken from the communities, from the schools, from the farms, from the factories, 7,000,000 men. At the time of Pearl Harbor there were about 3,000,000 Americans in our armed forces. When writing a history of this mobilization, I think we shall put at the top of the record the work of our selective service boards. By and large, we are building the greatest armed force in our history with relatively little disruption to our ways of working and living.

2. We have put 11,000,000 additional men and women into war industry without the compulsion of law. If you want a test of the effectiveness of the voluntary method, just stop and think: When Pearl Harbor was upon us, we had 7,000,000 people working in the various war industries; today there are 18,000,000.

3. In spite of many difficulties we produced, in 1942, 28 percent more agricultural commodities in this country, measured in gallons of milk and bushels of wheat, in tons and barrels of this or that, than we produced in the record years of 1935 to 1939.

4. We have maintained our civilian economy. We have rationing of gas and food and rubber, and of other goods, but I think no one can say, thinking in national terms, that we have cut the American standard of living even to a wartime economy basis.

We are aiming to provide 20,000,000 workers for war industry in 1943, to provide nearly 11,000,000 men for the armed forces, and to provide 9,000,000 workers for agriculture, plus an additional 3,000,000 at the peak of the harvest. Finally, we have pledged to provide some 23,500,000 men and women to maintain our normal economy. These are facts and figures, what we are out for and what we have done.

This remarkable record was not achieved by anybody in particular or by any agency in particular, certainly not by the War Manpower Commission. It is a tribute to the devotion of American workers, to the adaptability of American management, to the capacity of our democratic institutions to change and to adjust.

In our great aircraft plants on the Pacific coast, I have seen in

plant after plant that about 45 percent of the personnel are women. I have seen shipyard after shipyard, which employed women on production jobs only to an infinitesimal degree in the last war, with 10 and 15 percent of their workers women. The program is for 30 percent of the employees of the coastal shipyard industry to be women.

So much for what has happened. The second problem concerns what is ahead before the end of 1943 and before the end of the war.

One thing is definite: the easy period of manpower mobilization is over. It is difficult to refer to unemployment as a great national asset, yet that is exactly what it was when Pearl Harbor was upon us. We had seven or eight million unemployed, and, in retrospect, that was a great national asset.

Now we have reduced unemployment to the irreducible minimum, 1,000,000 people. A labor force of the size of ours cannot have less than a million unemployed, because that unemployment is merely the definition of normal changes in jobs. We have virtually exhausted our reserve of young men. We are dipping rapidly into our reserve of young girls. We have tapped partly, but by no means completely, our reserve of women. We have only begun to touch our reserves of handicapped workers; 2,000,000 more could be put to productive work. We have not yet taken full advantage of part-time workers, as the British have done, but we have made great records in a few cities.

We know that from now on the going will be much tougher. How tough? Once again look at a statistic or two. In thirty-six labor market areas in the United States—not only in cities, but in the entire industrial labor market area—the manpower situation is as tight as a drum top. That is to say, the demand for labor in those particular communities exceeds the supply by nearly nine hundred thousand people who will have to be moved into those communities. In other communities in the United States the situation is getting tight and will become tighter.

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that there are seventy-nine communities in the United States which have substantial unemployment. One fifth of all the unemployed—200,000 people—live in the city of New York. This illustrates the crux of our problem. War production is highly concentrated in a relatively few war production areas. Two kinds of tanks are manufactured in four cities; half of our aircraft is produced in seven cities. Our manpower

supply, on the other hand, is dispersed over the length and breadth of this country.

In 1943 we need to mobilize 6,400,000 people for our labor force and for our armed forces. That is what we need in order to carry out the program which has been passed on to the Manpower Commission.

Where are these people going? Four million three hundred thousand are going into the Army and Navy and Marine Corps and Coast Guard. One million eight hundred thousand are going into the munitions industries. Three hundred thousand are going into the civilian activities essential to the support of the war program.

Where are they coming from? The figures are particularly significant, because they tell what our job is. Five hundred thousand have come from among the unemployed since January 1, 1943. Several hundred thousand more will come as a result of the forty-eight-hour week; that is to say, the adoption of the minimum forty-eight-hour wartime work week will make that number available for transfer to other work, either within their regional industry or in some other essential industry. Two million seven hundred thousand, then must be people who are not now working.

That is one measure of the recruiting job which war manpower agencies all over the United States have to accomplish. We must recruit and bring into the labor force 2,700,000 people who are not now gainfully employed. Over 2,000,000 of these will be women who are now at home, raising families and providing for the necessities of family life.

Finally, and perhaps most difficult, these 2,700,000 men and women are being asked to change their jobs, to leave what they are doing, and to undertake what they should be doing to meet the war program.

So much for the statistics, which indicate the chief problems we are meeting in 1943. We have, first of all, the problem of recruitment. We have got to get into the towns and cities of America and take out men and women, youth, older people and handicapped people, and those partially employed, and mobilize them for the great industrial army of America.

Our biggest challenge lies in finding ways and means of getting those 2,000,000 American women who are not now working to go into war industry. That is going to be an extremely difficult prob-

lem. We do have great reserves of womanpower in America. There are 7,000,000 women in this country under forty-five years of age who do not have any children under sixteen years of age. Therefore, you might say, there is an untapped reserve three times the number we need.

It is important to recognize that these people are needed in particular areas and that the reserves are dispersed over the length and breadth of this country. We do not believe, for example, that a national registration of women on a compulsory basis will accomplish much, because it would not tell us how to get the surplus womanpower in Mississippi to Mr. Kaiser's shipyard in Portland. It would not tell us how to get the surplus womanpower in Georgia to the Boeing aircraft plant in Seattle. Indeed, a national registration of women might do more harm than good, because it would arouse and intensify desires and create tremendous enthusiasm, and we would find that tens of thousands of women would have registered and would, week after week, and month after month, wait to be called. Demoralization and discouragement would be the result.

We prefer to approach the problem on a distinctly local rather than a national basis. We recruit the women in Seattle, for instance, first of all. We then spread out in an ever widening circle, until, if necessary, we have gone to Mississippi.

Our second most important manpower problem is that of labor turnover. How important it is, cannot be exaggerated. I have been in plants which have recruited 50,000 workers in the last six months, and at the end of six months they actually had fewer people employed than they did when they started recruiting. I have been in plants where they are hiring 10,000 new workers every month, and losing 12,000.

One of the reasons for the alarming increase in labor turnover has been the tremendous increase of women in war industry. We have got to face that fact. The factors are easily discernible. We talk about an eight-hour day. In every city I have been in, women work eight hours a day, but they travel anywhere from one and a half to three hours going to and from work. So, we have an eight-hour day only in a rather meaningless sense; it is actually a ten- or an eleven-hour day. Now, when a woman has additional family responsibilities, such as young children, breakfast to prepare before her husband

goes to work, and dinner to prepare after work, an eleven-hour-day introduces household problems that we did not contemplate.

The second factor is this: Great numbers of women have gone to work in our war industries with the enthusiasm that the situation warrants. However, despite the psychological satisfaction derived from sharing in our great national effort, they have found that the work is hard. It is tiring and often monotonous. War work is no picnic to a woman unused to factory employment.

Third, there is a factor which is the responsibility of management itself. We have dumped tens of thousands of women into our great industries with inadequate induction and inadequate supervision. Many of them are not fully utilized. Some have become discouraged.

Rationing is another factor, and the fifth factor is child care. I list these largely as an answer to the easy solution that so many suggest: "Why don't you pass a law saying it's illegal to quit?" You will overcome labor turnover only when you deal basically with the causes which are responsible.

The British have been able to handle it. They have had more time; perhaps, also, they have sensed the necessity better than we have. I feel that in the near future we will set aside special hours several evenings a week in all stores exclusively for workers to shop. Perhaps we shall even have to give every woman worker one afternoon a week for shopping. Perhaps we shall have to provide noon meals in all factories, substantial meals to reduce the necessity for shopping on the part of war workers. Perhaps we even ought to attach to factories in many of our communities sufficient facilities for buying prepared foods so as to reduce the problem of shopping.

Certainly, we shall have to do something more than we have done about another factor, that of housing. In plant after plant the employer states that a great deal of the turnover is due to the fact he has only single dormitories. The men come alone, and after a month they go back to their families.

The third manpower problem of 1943 is the problem of transfers. It is not easy to say to a person who has worked for fifteen years in one industry and has built up seniority rights and vacation rights and special privileges that he must get out. But the war may require that he give up everything and take a job in an industry which, for all he knows, one year or two years hence, will be history. Nevertheless, the response has been tremendous. The United States Em-

ployment Service, with its 1,500 local offices all over the United States, did a remarkable job in placing 10,500,000 people in 1942. They will exceed that record in 1943 by a great deal. The local Employment Service offices have been calling in the men who filled in occupational questionnaires under the selective service system. They say to an accountant, for instance, whose record indicates that ten years ago he used to be a molder or a welder, that he ought to change jobs. In August, 1942, 10 percent of the people who were interviewed took our advice and changed jobs; but that was hardly enough. In December, there were 36 percent; that was much better, but still not good enough. So, we began to develop additional devices to encourage voluntary transfers. We created a list of nondeferable occupations and said to all men of military age, "If you have dependents and work in a nondeferable occupation, the dependents will no longer be a cause for deferment." That stimulated tens of thousand of transfers all over the United States

Our program is essentially voluntary, but we recognize the importance of indirect sanctions. We adopted a program for a national forty-eight-hour week, and we say to employers, and to a worker who is attempting to secure a deferment, that a forty-hour work week is prima-facie evidence that that plant has surplus labor. Otherwise, why was he only working forty hours a week? Then, through the work-or-fight principle, we introduced another stimulus to voluntary action. And yet, even on the work-or-fight principle, the nondeferable occupation, and the forty-eight-hour week, we have found that we had to create pressures, and indirect sanctions, and do a bit more than just ask. In fact, as somebody very properly said, we have rapidly developed a system of manpower mobilization in the United States that may properly be called "compulsory voluntary action."

The British have a much better term. They call it "compulsion by consent." The British National Service Law, it is important to know, is 95 percent voluntary. If they have to move 80,000 workers from one section of the country to another, they announce that they need 80,000 workers. They arrange with unions and management and locate 95 percent of the workers they need. The other 5 percent get an assignment order and a railroad ticket. It is "consent" when there is 95 percent acceptance and support. Now, that is what we have in substance developed. In 1943 we shall have to expand to a

very great degree our indirect measures in order to get 2,700,000 people to change their jobs.

So far, mind you, we have gotten workers out of less essential activities by controlling raw materials or facilities or supplies. Now we have to get people out of these industries, not merely because of a lack of materials or facilities or supplies, but primarily because we need the workers.

Of course, it is extremely important that we keep clearly in mind that we cannot contract the civilian economy too much. There is a point beyond which it will be hazardous to contract our facilities. We know, for instance, that in Seattle laundries are just as essential as ships; and in Los Angeles restaurants are just as essential as planes. It is imperative to make certain that there are enough workers for laundries and restaurants, just as there are for planes and ships.

The war program is what is essential. I, for one, choose to look at everything as being essential. I choose to consider that all our 62,000,000 workers are engaged in activity of a war effort, whether they are makers of bombs or of anything else, provided we can say that without those activities the efficiency of the whole economy would suffer.

We are engaged in determining what is the minimum number of people that we need to provide us with housing, food and clothing, medical service, and other indispensable necessities. We think we can take 2,700,000 men and women away from what they are now doing to do what they ought to do. Some day, however, the contraction of civilian activities will reach a limit.

The fourth manpower problem is that of training. We have no more trained people waiting to be called, and there are no more skilled people waiting to be transferred. Most of the people we will recruit into industry from now until the end of the war will need to have some kind of training.

The next question is, "How are we going about solving the manpower problem?" It is clear that the manpower problem is not a Washington problem; it is a community problem, and the community is every town and village in America. The manpower problem is not in the Manpower Commission's office; it is in Mr. Kaiser's yard in Portland. He needs 40,000 more workers. It is in the Boeing plant in Seattle, which has told us how many more people it needs

every single day for the next 200 days. It is in every factory and on every farm and in every mine and logging camp. The manpower problem will not be solved until the right man, properly trained, is available in each camp and in each mine and mill and on each ship at the time he is needed. The job has to be done in each community. How are we going about it?

The great debate going on in Washington, and in every corner of America, concerns compulsory manpower legislation. The Gallup poll states that a majority of the people want it. The preponderance of opinion seems to be this: The Government drafts the boys into the Army, takes them out of their jobs and away from their homes and away from their businesses and sends them to the four corners of the world to obey orders and, if necessary, to give their lives for the preservation of our institutions. Therefore, says this point of view, why shall it not also say to every man and to every woman, "You are not needed in the armed forces, but you are assigned to this job and you can't quit." There is no doubt that that point of view has tremendous currency throughout the United States, and quite understandably.

On the other side of the argument are great numbers of people who are not necessarily opposed in principle to national service legislation. I think that is generally true of most of the people who have spoken against it. They say that the question is not primarily one of passing a law, but that the American people do not have to be coerced. Witness the fact that 18,000,000 people have already responded. It was not in all instances a response to the high wages; in millions of cases, it was a patriotic impulse which put these people into war industries.

We face the question whether we shall proceed on the basis of voluntary mobilization, giving clear-cut leadership and counting on the American people to respond, or on the basis of compulsory legislation, with the right to issue orders assigning people to go where they are needed and to stay there until they are moved elsewhere. So far, the voluntary system has done the job fairly well. We have some troubles: we are short of copper, we are short of lumber, and we may have some tight situations in agriculture. We have difficulties here and there, but by and large the voluntary method has done the job—voluntary, with a little bit of "persuasion." These indirect pressures have their limitations. We give the copper worker his

choice of working or fighting, but if he chooses to fight, we do not like it. We do not want him to fight; we want him to work. So there is a great limitation on the effectiveness of the work-or-fight principle.

In four or six months we shall know whether the urgency of our problem is such that we shall need more than voluntary response and indirect pressures to mobilize our manpower. We will not have much difficulty in getting people for the shipyard and aircraft jobs, but we will have difficulties in getting workers for laundries and restaurants and for the mines and for the logging camps, and for the other "dirty jobs."

We have proceeded on the principle that management and labor, working together with the Government, are prepared to stabilize the labor market. In sixty American communities they have set up stabilization agreements which are rapidly becoming effective instruments for controlling job migration. How effective, and whether effective enough, will be determined in the next few months.

It is my conviction that manpower mobilization is a social work problem just as much as it is an engineering problem. From the viewpoint of social work, we shall have to compromise with standards for the duration to meet our manpower problem. The standards of housing, the standards of child care, the standards of recreation, and the standards of medical service must be compromised. Even if we had enough resources to make such compromises unnecessary, there would not be enough time.

We must guard against the increasing delinquency of youth. Many of our truant officers and many of our social service employees have been taken away, and we have taken many skilled workers from the job of handling group recreation and juvenile delinquency. We will have to expand rapidly our community facilities for child care, and whatever the responsibility and whatever the cost, we have little time to lose.

We shall have to be on guard concerning medical and hospital service. There is already a great danger to public health because of the depletion which has taken place in our resources for the protection of health.

Group and community organizations are coming out of this war. We have for the first time brought into active community life millions of people who have been community isolationists all their

lives. People in social work or in public welfare work will have an opportunity to recapture this tremendous interest for postwar participation.

We might learn something for postwar purposes from the principle of rationing. We might say, for example, that until the minimum standard for all our people has been met there will be no surplus for anybody. The wartime rationing principle will not necessarily be discarded when the war is over.

Finally, we can learn a great deal from what the great American industrial system has already done in the war. We are putting 62,500,000 people to work, building almost overnight the greatest production record in history. We can put that number of people to work after the war producing food, clothing and shelter, education, and recreation to achieve a standard of living we have never thought possible.

ABSENTEEISM AND TURNOVER

By CHARLES P. TAFT

THE BASIC problems of the war lie in tools and materials, manpower and leadership. We are blessed with many natural resources, but even though we have various substitutes for the materials which we no longer have in abundance, we cannot waste any of them. For manpower and leadership there can be no substitutes. Every resource and capacity of every man and woman is essential to win this struggle for the survival of all we believe in as the foundation of living for human beings.

We collect scrap and we ration materials and tools. We produce bombers and fighters and gasoline and escort ships and rubber. To save materials and time and do the job better, we invent new tools, and test them with extraordinary precision. We take every possible measure to keep the machines going. Parts are carefully salvaged and kept as reserve units.

We have used the same process of conservation and supply in connection with our military manpower. Our fighters get good food, carefully planned. They get clothing adapted to the conditions they face. Their bodies are toughened. Their health and efficiency are watched by our most skillful doctors; and their morale is kept at the highest point by thorough indoctrination, by well-planned recreation, and by leadership, personal guidance, and service. We have the best-trained and cared-for Army and Navy in our history.

But the Army and Navy cannot exist for a day without our civilian economy. Civilians produce and transport the food and clothing and provide much of the shelter. Civilians produce and transport the guns, planes, ships, ammunition, and supplies. The civilians who produce and transport the implements of war must themselves have food and clothing and shelter, and that makes the civilians who serve them necessary.

Men in uniform and civilians have families. Unless their families are decently cared for, the best army and the best civilians will "soften up." That happened in Germany in 1918, and in France in 1940. Services to families are essential.

If morale, and recreation, and intelligent educational processes, and personal guidance and service are necessary for men in uniform even at the front, they are equally necessary for civilians. Men in uniform and civilians alike are people, and it is of the essence of our war effort that we believe in people and their importance. They are more important than the machines they run. You cannot do without the machines, it is true, but the machines are worthless without men and women behind them.

We have solved the problem of how to deal with machines. We may not have all the answers, but we know how to get them. Dealing with people is different. We cannot afford to let barriers grow between any groups of our people. Soldiers at the front complain about soldiers at home. Soldiers at home complain about men on the farms. Men on the farms complain about men in the factories. Voters complain about Congressmen. They all complain about draft dodgers in Government jobs.

Certainly we have a right to be proud of our heroes and of their citations and their sufferings. Certainly there are draft dodgers and armchair soldiers, just as there are occasional cowards at the front. But they are mighty scarce. The vast majority are doing obscure, hard, unpleasant, day-to-day tasks, and doing them well. Everyone is doing a better job than he ever did before. Everyone must do a still better one. We cannot have unnecessary turnover or absenteeism. It will take the last effective ounce of our energies to win this war.

What are they like, these people in the necessary civilian economy, and exactly what is happening to them? In February there were 50,900,000 people working and, say, 8,000,000 in the armed forces. That total of 58,900,000 compares with the total of 45,000,000 employed at the time of the census in 1940. In other words, 14,000,000 people who were not regular workers three years ago are now either in the Army or in industry. Five million new workers will go into industry in 1943. No wonder many have not yet acquired good work habits.

There is a much higher level of education among workers today than there was twenty-five years ago, and they need it in order to

perform the various kinds of necessary skilled and semiskilled operations. That should mean a more efficient selection by employment departments and a more detailed study of the individual in order to adapt him to the job. Now that our production must increase, and we have less manpower, that type of job analysis and personnel study becomes absolutely essential, but it is not always available.

With increased hours and with new employees who have not acquired stability there is always an increase in absences. What are the facts?

The only way to know the facts is to analyze the causes of all absences. Some companies keep careful records; many keep none; and few companies operate according to any standard system. In March the War Manpower Commission set up a standard system of questions which would, among other points, seek to know if the absence was due to illness of the worker or his family, to lack of care for children, to transportation, to housing or the weather, to fatigue, or to personal business. Absence on authorized vacations should also be included, for its effects are the same and its purpose is related to the other causes or their prevention. The point is that in dealing with people who are away from work there is no virtue, and much confusion, in describing the absence by the term "absenteeism," when it is intended to convey opprobrium. What we are concerned with is a difficult problem, as complicated as human nature, and we cannot approach it successfully with annoyance or anger, to say nothing of prejudice.

Fortunately, the word "absenteeism" is losing its popularity. Investigations reveal that in a surprising number of cases causes beyond the control of the worker were responsible for absence from the job. In seeking methods of bringing about utilization of our full resources of human energy, we recognize that the responsibility is shared by the worker, by the employer, and by the entire community. Plant managements, on the whole, are conscious of the rate of absence in their organizations, and they are beginning to get the facts and are taking intelligent steps to get at the root of the problem.

Illness has always been one of the major causes of absenteeism. Before the war probably 80 to 95 percent of absenteeism was due to this one cause. At the Cincinnati Milling Machine Company, for instance, one of the largest in the world, the rate in 1939 was 2.6

percent—or 6.6 days per employee per year. Something like five or more days of that absence average was caused by sickness. Of the sickness rates over the country about 15 percent were formerly due to accidental injury in the plant, or to occupational diseases of various kinds. The balance was caused by illness or accident originating outside the plant. Accident rates have gone up some, but generally speaking, those figures are probably not far off today.

Are any of those absences due to malingering? Probably there were always a few malingerers, and no doubt there are more today. But the existence of such a fact does not mean that the remedy may be easily found.

Absence rates have gone up, but illness is probably the cause of not over half the total rate today, on the average. At the Cincinnati Milling Machine Company, the absence rate went from 2.6 in 1939 to 3.8 in 1941, and to 5.4 in 1942. The 17 days per man in the 1942 figure included only 5.5 days—or about one-third—for sickness.

Some wider averages have been taken. A study of shipyards from April, 1942, to January, 1943, showed an absence rate of 7.5 percent, although variations were wide. A study of copper mines in Montana showed a rate of 8.5 percent; air frame and propeller plants showed an average of 6.4 percent. Various manufacturing plants, mostly in the East, showed rates of from 4 to 6 percent, which perhaps may be taken as the average, although it is about double the prewar rates in the same plants.

A number of elements are apparent on more detailed analysis. Women are out for longer periods of time than men. Still, a curious fact developed at one plant: in general, while the afternoon and night shifts showed a higher rate of absence than the morning shift, women on the afternoon shift were off less than men on the same shift, and less than women on the morning shift. Women are absent for more extended illnesses (over eight days) than men; the rates in 1940 were 153 per thousand compared with 96 per thousand for men.

Rates vary among departments within the same plant. Rates vary by days of the week in relation to pay day. In Cleveland 151 plants showed an absentee rate of 6.6 percent on Monday morning. Pay day on Friday always brings the lowest rate, but in a plant with an average of 3.5 percent absent, the rate for pay day never got below 2.5 percent.

The best record anywhere is around one percent. The important fact is that few plants have reached that minimum, but many plants have shown that intelligent efforts can produce sizable reductions. Those efforts are aimed at conditions in the plant, as well as at conditions outside the plant, and they take into consideration the psychology and morale of the workers. They have to be a combination of vigorous discipline, of correction of bad conditions, and of an intelligent educational program to connect the war and the job.

The efforts in the plant have to begin with good discipline. By that I do not mean punitive measures, although they are required to some degree, but the enforcement of work habits intelligently explained, directed toward safe procedures, toward job analysis and maximum results for force applied, and toward simple controls. A man should not be allowed to quit easily and to get another job without having to explain his change of employment. The freezing orders of area war manpower committees have no sanctions; the blacklist is not actually enforced. But the worker has to explain, and that keeps him from moving about so much.

Some companies require a person absent because of illness to report for a check-up by the doctor, or a nurse is sent to the house. Through this precaution serious illness unsuspected by the worker, may be discovered. Another system requires that an absentee must get his timecard from the foreman when he comes back. Such a process discourages unjustified absence.

All big plants provide safety programs and good medical care. However, a surprising number could profit from the type of survey carried on by the Public Health Service or by the State Industrial Hygiene Division, or by the Labor Department or state factory sections, or by the Army, Navy, or Maritime Commission safety operations. The small plants, which employ by far the larger number of employees, usually are badly in need of service. That entails coöperative effort and community organization, and there is not nearly enough of it. The provision of such service is a field in which councils of social agencies have done far too little, although the absence of the service produces far too many family crises with which the agencies have to deal.

Increasingly, industrial plants are giving attention to the importance of proper nutrition, but there is much to be accomplished, both in the plant and in educating the housewife as to what belongs

in a lunch box. "Greasy spoon" restaurants flourish, either because local health departments are understaffed, or because they are nonexistent in the areas where some of our biggest plants have been established.

Health education and good leisuretime opportunities for essential relaxation are recognized as necessities in the minds, but rejected by the emotions, of many people. "Look at the money they make—they can take care of themselves" is what some tough, win-the-war administrators say. Yes, but if the opportunities are not there or if the town is swamped by a population ten times its previous size, what good does money in the pocket do anyone? Gin mills and gambling joints always find locations, while legitimate commercial entertainment cannot squeeze in, and voluntary organizations face the prejudice against the "war workers with lots of money who have upset everything."

Better management practices, including more efficient scheduling of materials and production can help greatly. Workers must be fitted to the jobs, and their hours must be adapted to their strength and capacities. These are people we are dealing with, men and women and youngsters, too, and they need intelligent treatment.

It is becoming more and more important that industrial workers be given the assurance that doctors and hospitals are available. We could supply the armed services with doctors and still have an average of one doctor per 1,500 civilians if the doctors were evenly distributed, but they are not. In many places, the average is one doctor to a population of 5,000, and in a few communities there are no doctors at all. However, the Procurement and Assignment Service of the War Manpower Commission is improving such situations by transferring doctors, and in some cases, as a last resort, the Public Health Service has sent in its own men in uniform. We are way behind in our knowledge of health education. People do not know how to keep physically fit, and when they become ill, hospital beds are scarce, and doctors and nurses are even more so.

All the duties that a wife assumes at home may become hopelessly neglected when she has to go to work. Shopping, the use of ration points, household chores, personal business, and care of children are difficult to manage, and handling them takes not only personal planning, but a lot of community planning.

Housing and transportation difficulties have become gradually

more familiar to the public in recent months, but I believe that in most places we are solving that problem. Then there is the matter of education. Schools may seem far removed from the war effort, but people will not stay in war plants if their children cannot be in school.

There are undoubtedly unjustified absences. Closing the bars on Sunday in one community cut down absences on Monday by 61 percent. Many workers, with greatly increased income, are paying their debts; others, earning more than they can spend, lay off because they have no need of more money. Still other workers lay off because they "feel like it." Such absenteeism must cease, and it is ceasing rapidly as management and community go to work intelligently on the problem.

The first step is to impress the worker with the importance of war production, and to stress how close to the front his job really is located. The personal attention of plant executives to the absence problem, and a clear statement to the worker that every hour of his time is valuable, is the next step. The provisions within the plant, by management, for health, safety, and time saving and the united attack on the problems of decent living for every worker's family in the community must be identified as a war production drive.

Some plants emphasize penalties, but those methods, such as the Hitler pay table, can go much too far. Some plants provide prizes, and that system also can go too far. Incentive payments are successful in some plants, but they should be carefully established through wholehearted labor-management agreement. We do not have to buy patriotism.

When we come to the essentials of the problem of absenteeism, we find that it is like any problem of morale in war. Only a small proportion of our population of 135,000,000 can ever get to the front, but nearly everyone of the 135,000,000 can perform an important service of some kind in the drive for victory. Get that feeling to every American in every war plant and we can let our enemies do the worrying.

TRAINING AND THE WAR EFFORT

By JOHN J. TESSARI

WHILE training represents only one part of the manpower problem, it is certainly a crucial one. To any nation at war, its manpower asset is effective only to the extent that it functions at maximum capacity in furthering the war effort. The right man in the right job at the right time, putting forth more than the job demands and never less than his level best, is the goal we must achieve.

If excellence of performance in all jobs by all workers is fundamental to ultimate victory, then training to improve performance on the job is of vital importance. Skill in doing any job is acquired only through proper training. Well-trained workers on the production line laboring to meet production quotas of war materials and well-trained soldiers on the fighting line using these materials to best advantage against the enemy are of equal importance in this struggle for survival. The final outcome of the conflict will depend as much upon production excellence as upon military genius. We can lose this war if we do not produce.

In the first thirteen months after Pearl Harbor, the total labor force plus the armed forces was increased from 56,000,000 to about 60,000,000. These figures include the expansion of the armed forces from a little over two million to almost six and a half million. This initial expansion in our labor force was accomplished with relative ease. For the most part, the additional workers came from the ranks of the unemployed. Out of a total increase in our labor and armed forces since June, 1940, of 11,000,000 persons, about 6,000,000 came from the unemployed group. The manpower problem until quite recently, therefore, was primarily one of taking up the slack.

There were instances of labor stringencies in certain areas to be sure, but in the main, the supply of people ready and willing to

accept jobs was adequate. This does not imply that all persons who sought work were qualified or that the phenomenal expansions in certain war industries were not accompanied by severe dislocations. On the contrary, the whole history of the first thirteen months was characterized by a feverish race to gear ourselves quickly to a war-time economy. As we mobilized a fighting force we also had to build a production capacity to supply it. All-out production for war meant learning new jobs and new skills for thousands of workers.

Witness the tremendous expansion in American aircraft construction and shipbuilding as two clear examples of the kind of production miracles this war has produced. In January, 1940, employment in the aircraft industry totaled only 77,000, while today more than 1,600,000 workers are engaged in this vital industry, and the total is still going up.

The growth of the shipbuilding industry has been equally astounding. On the West Coast alone, the number of workers employed in building and repairing ships has increased from about 43,000 in 1940 to about 500,000 in January, 1943. By December, 1943, an additional 100,000 workers will have to be found to meet production goals of the West coast yards alone.

The primary industries, such as mining, smelting, and milling, which provide the basic materials for fabrication into ships and aircraft, as well as the countless other contributing industries which provide the necessary production machinery and supplies, were also obliged to expand in proportion. The end product, a ship, a plane, a tank, and the countless other requirements of modern mechanized warfare, is the result of well-planned and carefully coördinated activities from the source of the raw materials to final inspection of the finished product. To increase the output of any product, therefore, requires corresponding adjustments throughout the whole industrial process.

The unprecedented demands for workers among all war industries during the past year were met with no small amount of dislocation. This was inescapable, for while manpower is widely scattered, production centers are concentrated. The inevitable result was labor shortages in certain areas and labor surpluses in others. This condition brought about one of the greatest migrations in the history of our country. The extremely difficult and complicated social problems that followed are quite familiar to everyone.

The War Manpower Commission gave early recognition to this phase of the manpower problem through the establishment of employment stabilization programs and through other means. The results to date in the areas where these programs are in operation, as reflected in reduced in-migration of workers in critical areas and controlled migration of workers between jobs in war industries, are most gratifying. Efforts are also being made by other Government agencies to deal with this important problem.

While war industries and the armed forces accounted for most of the manpower requirements of 1942, agriculture also faced serious labor problems. The loss of manpower from rural areas for military service, together with the even larger numbers who left the farms for higher paying jobs in war industries, created critical farm labor shortages, especially during the harvest season. That agriculture was able to come through in spite of this handicap, with production in excess of its quota, is a high tribute to the ingenuity and resourcefulness of our American farmers.

The production achievements which characterized our first year at war, to a large extent, were made possible because countless thousands of workers learned how to perform new jobs. Workers skilled in peacetime occupations, we soon learned, were ill prepared to fill jobs in munitions and other war production plants. The overwhelming majority of war workers had to be trained for the tasks to which they were assigned.

The conversion of the automobile industry provides a good example. In this case we had a highly developed, thoroughly efficient industrial organization faced with the problem of changing over from normal operations to production for war. In spite of the fact that their workmen were all highly skilled in the jobs they formerly performed, nearly all of them required some training or retraining to carry on with the new work. To achieve this transition from peacetime to wartime skills required the combined efforts and facilities both of industry and of the public training programs. The initial retraining of the original working force alone took months to complete. The process of upgrading and improving the skill of workers now on the job and training new workers for beginning jobs to take care of replacements and expansion is still going on.

The necessity for continued training of workers at all levels of employment from the beginning job to the highest skilled job in the

plant will continue for the duration. There are two fundamental reasons why this is true. First, the production requirements for modern war are constantly changing. Experiences on the field of battle are translated into improved equipment design, which result in frequent changes in production processes. A change in production often means learning new jobs for large segments of the working force.

Second, the requirements for increased production to carry on an all-out war, while we are at the same time producing for the home front and for our allies, present an insatiable demand. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that our capacity to produce be developed to the highest possible level. To achieve this objective will mean using every worker at his highest skill in the right job. This requires continued emphasis on training.

How the training part of the manpower mobilization job to date was accomplished is a story in itself. It required the creation and development of highly specialized training programs in every conceivable wartime occupation at all levels of performance. It brought into play for a common purpose the entire training facilities of industry, of the public and private schools, as well as of the several Government training programs.

The Bureau of Training in the War Manpower Commission was created to direct and coördinate the several agencies of the Government engaged in training workers for war industries. It is composed of six constituent training agencies and two training services, of which one is a visual aid program and the other a professional and technical service designed to help bring about full utilization of colleges and universities in the war effort.

The combined agencies now a part of the Bureau of Training represent in round figures about a two-hundred-million-dollar program organized exclusively to service the training needs of war industries. Each agency operates under a special congressional appropriation to provide a special type of training service. The constituent agencies are the Apprentice-Training Service, the National Youth Administration, Engineering, Science, and Management War Training, Training within Industry, Vocational Training for War Production Workers, and Rural War Production Training.

Within the framework of the constituent agencies and the coöperating vocational schools and colleges are more than 300 colleges

and universities; about 2,500 vocational schools and 1,500 production shops are operated by the National Youth Administration. These agencies are equipped with 170,000 training stations, each of which can accommodate three persons a day on a three-shift basis. They have well-established coöperative arrangements with more than 17,000 war plants for the conduct of pre-employment and supplementary training, both in plants and in vocational schools, as well as for the training of foremen, supervisors, technicians, and specialists.

Two of our agencies are concerned only with in-plant training of employed workers. These are known as the Apprentice-Training Service and the Training within Industry Service. Both programs are concerned with improving the skill of workers on the job, but they achieve these objectives through two entirely different methods.

The Training within Industry program concentrates entirely on the training of foremen and supervisors in war plants. This service, which is composed of men recruited directly from industry, offers four specific programs. Each one is short and intensive, designed to improve the performance of supervisors and plant training directors in discharging their responsibilities. They include:

1. Job instruction training, which gives the supervisor practice in how to "break in" men on new jobs
2. Job methods training, which shows the supervisor how to simplify and improve methods of doing a job
3. Job relations training, which gives the supervisor pointers and practice in how to work with people in a way that gains coöperation and promotes teamwork
4. Training of training directors, which gives intensified coaching in how to operate and improve complete, plant-wide training programs

The programs for supervisors require only ten hours, while the program for training directors takes forty-eight hours.

In addition to these specific services, Training within Industry also provides advisory assistance to war plants in inaugurating and improving training programs carried on within the plant. In doing this the service frequently recommends other training services available to employers with which they may not be familiar.

Since its inception on July 1, 1940, Training within Industry has trained more than 500,000 foremen and supervisors in 9,000 plants

throughout the country. These supervisors, it is estimated, direct the efforts of more than 5,000,000 workers who have benefited from the training received.

The Apprentice-Training Service carries on important work with employers in planning and developing long-range apprenticeship programs as well as organized programs for upgrading employed workers. The principle of apprenticeship is well established in American industry and represents one of our greatest sources of highly skilled workmen.

While long-range training in the trades is the principal emphasis of the Apprentice-Training Service, this organization also has redirected and streamlined one part of its program to meet the vast and urgent in-plant training needs of war industries. A new activity, known as the Advancing Worker Program, has been added. This program involves making careful studies of individual plant operations with plant officials to determine logical programs of advancement for individual workers who are willing to improve their skill. Frequently, the analysis may result both in dilution of highly skilled jobs for which workers cannot be found and in an organized program for upgrading of the men already employed. Through this method, it is sometimes possible for plants to carry on without impairing production even though a full complement of highly skilled workmen is not available.

In establishing either apprenticeship or short-term training programs, it is a fundamental policy of the Apprentice-Training Service to recommend, as a first step, the creation of a joint committee on which management and labor are equally represented. Up to now, more than 1,200 such committees have been organized. Their influence on war training is far-reaching. Many of them have been instrumental in bringing about understandings that have avoided costly and time-wasting labor disputes.

During the last ten months of 1942, more than 11,000 shops or plants were assisted by the Apprentice-Training Service with apprenticeship or short-term training programs. The total number of apprentices in training during the year is estimated at 127,000. As a part of its over-all Advancing Worker Program in the plants 50,000 specialists were trained last year.

The two principal war vocational training programs are known as Vocational Training for War Production Workers and Rural War

Production Training. Both are operated as a part of the Bureau of Training through the United States Office of Education. Their programs are carried on in coöperation with state boards for vocational education, which in turn work through local educational authorities.

The training of new workers for war jobs in industry and agriculture and the provision of supplementary technical training to improve the skill of employed workers have been the major contributions of the vocational schools. But this has been only a part of their task. The vocational schools have also aided labor and management in war industries by providing short, intensive courses for plant foremen, supervisors, plant managers, and executives.

The vocational schools are widely distributed. They have a tremendous amount of equipment and first-class instructors who work closely with the war plants to see that the training given exactly meets their needs. They represent an outstanding gateway through which, with the aid of the United States Employment Service, millions of inexperienced men and women have found their way into war plants and, once there, to the better paying and more responsible and useful jobs.

The program of Vocational Training for War Production Workers started in June, 1940, when the stringencies in labor supply, which are now so marked, were in their developmental stages. For one thing, there was a sizable group of unemployed. The pre-employment refresher courses of that time were designed to make more usable many of the unemployed skills which had been permitted to lapse into disuse through the years of the depression.

The pre-employment courses of this program today are largely serving a different purpose. The unemployed, for all practical purposes, are no longer with us. The function, then, of the pre-employment courses is to provide training for workers, largely women, who had never before been in the labor market, and to provide training for workers transferring from less essential employment to war industries.

The supplementary courses, too, have experienced an evolutionary development as the nation moved from defense to war. In the defense period, supplementary courses served the function primarily of providing training during out-of-work hours for workers, already employed in war industry, who were desirous of preparing them-

selves for more advanced work—in a word, upgrading. Now more and more employers are paying their workers to take this training.

Quite recently, a new type of supplementary training has come into general use, particularly in tight labor market areas. As the supply of people available for enrollment in free but uncompensated pre-employment courses dwindled, employers soon realized that their source of trained workers was drying up. Together the employers and the schools worked out a method for overcoming this problem. The scheme they evolved is briefly this:

The employer hires inexperienced workers recruited by the United States Employment Service and sends them to the vocational schools for short, intensive training before they are assigned to jobs. The course of instruction is carefully planned by the employer and the vocational schools to include only what the worker will need to know before he starts on the job. For some kinds of work only a few days of training may be necessary, while for others the training may take several weeks. Frequently, the plant will loan the vocational school some of the necessary equipment with which to train as well as a limited number of their shop foremen to serve as instructors. This kind of a combination program is highly desirable, for it brings together the production "know-how" of the plants and the training "know-how" of the vocational schools into a closely integrated program. The plan also eliminates the possibility of overtraining or undertraining workers by insuring that each worker will be placed, as soon as he is ready, in the specific job for which he is being prepared. A further advantage is provided in the fact that all the trainees are on the pay roll while they are being trained. The public vocational schools, since the beginning of their participation in the war training program, have trained about 5,000,000 workers who are now manning jobs in war industries. Almost half of these were trained in 1942.

The Rural War Production Training program is designed further to equip rural out-of-school persons, both mechanically and technically, to meet the needs imposed upon farm and rural communities by the necessities of war. These skills and abilities are vitally needed by those engaged in achieving the "food for freedom" production goals set up by the Secretary of Agriculture.

The current appropriation act permits paying the costs of vocational courses in the production of farm commodities and in the

repair, operation, and construction of farm machinery and equipment. As a result, the program was broadened this year to include courses both for youths and adults in the repair, operation, and construction of farm machinery and equipment as well as fourteen courses in the production of food commodities.

At the present time, the United States Office of Education, in co-operation with the Farm Security Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture, is engaged in coöperating with state boards for vocational education in the establishment of farm labor training programs, wherever they are needed. In this development, the FSA is engaged in the functions of recruiting, transporting, and subsisting adult workers who have agreed to move to commercial farms and produce essential farm commodities, while the United States Office of Education and state boards for vocational education are providing the necessary training programs for these workers.

The program is developing rapidly throughout the areas of farm labor shortage. Since December, 1940, when Congress first moved to make this training service available to rural communities, state boards for vocational education, through which all these training courses operate, have approved and conducted, up to January 1, 1943, 50,000 courses for 650,000 enrollees throughout the forty-eight States, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii. Since July 1, 1942, 197,000 have been enrolled, and on January 31, 1943, 101,000 were in training. It is interesting to note that in 1942 the number of women who enrolled in the courses increased by 51 percent, and on January 31, 1943, there were more than 15,000 women actively participating in the Rural War Production Training program.

The National Youth Administration is another training agency which operates as a part of the Bureau of Training program. The character and activities of this agency have been completely changed since the depression. In the past two years, it has transformed itself from a "welfare" to a "warfare" agency. Except for the fact that it is still a youth program, almost everything about the NYA is now different.

Early in 1940 the NYA began to divest itself of all peacetime trappings and to devote its full energies and resources to the job of training workers for war industries. By July 1, 1942, the transformation from a social program to a wartime training agency was com-

pleted. At the present time, the NYA is operating 1,500 well-equipped war-production training shops strategically located at 650 points throughout the country. In these shops are 40,000 work stations where approximately 60,000 young men and women are preparing to take their place in war industries. They are receiving training in such occupations as arc welding, machine shop practice, sheet metal work, aircraft mechanics, radio operation, and a wide range of other essential work. The majority of the NYA shops are located within easy traveling distance of, or in immediate proximity to, the centers of industrial activity. Some of the shops are located in areas where labor remains relatively plentiful.

There are three features in the NYA training program which merit special attention. First, the NYA is the only Government training program which is equipped to house trainees while they are preparing for jobs in war industries. There are 254 of these residence facilities scattered throughout the country with a capacity for providing board and room for 35,000 persons. These centers have been established to make training opportunities available to young people from areas where sparsity of population or lack of adequate transportation does not permit the operation of local training programs.

At the resident work centers, the young people are housed in dormitories and are furnished food, necessary medical care, and emergency hospitalization. After working hours they divide their time between supervised recreational activities and the performance of various odd jobs required to maintain the center. When a youth completes his training and is ready for employment, he is usually transferred to another NYA workshop near the war industry where he will be employed.

This facility for transferring trained workers from areas of labor supply to employment outlets is unique with the NYA. The expense involved in travel is borne by the NYA and, if necessary, the youth is housed in a NYA induction center until he reports for work. This part of the program is carried on in coöperation with the United States Employment Service, which determines where and when these transferred NYA workers are needed.

The third feature of the NYA program is its principle of training through live production work. Other training programs are doing this to a limited extent, but it is universal throughout the program of the NYA. Each NYA shop is set up along industrial lines and is

operated as a production shop. The work is carried on under skilled foremen who have been trained in the techniques of imparting their "know-how" of the job. In using production as the vehicle for training, every precaution is taken to make sure that the emphasis is placed on training and not on volume of production.

Beginning with simple jobs, each youth progresses at his own rate to more advanced work as he gains familiarity with the use of tools and machines. Before he progresses to the next step, each job performed must come up to specifications and pass the same inspection as that required for a factory-made product. The articles produced are made for the benefit of war agencies such as the Army, Navy, Government arsenals, and the Maritime Commission. In spite of the fact that production output is secondary to training, the combined efforts of all the NYA shops have produced a tremendous volume of useful equipment.

Examples of the types and quantity of articles produced by the NYA include: 40,000-20mm. shells, 15,000 ship ladders, 60,000 ammunition boxes, various kinds of radio equipment, portable field kitchens, as well as a long list of other needed equipment. Most of the job orders turned over to the NYA are regarded as "nuisance orders" by industry.

Since June, 1940, when the NYA first launched its war training program, it has trained more than 1,000,000 workers. As young men of military age were called into active service, the NYA placed increased emphasis on the training of women. At the present time, almost 50 percent of all the NYA trainees are young women.

The War Manpower Commission has been active in mobilizing the facilities of colleges and universities for the war training programs. At the present time, the Commission's college program is carried forward under the direction of the Division of Professional and Technical Training of the Bureau of Training. This organization coördinates the activities of the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training program, coöperates with the armed forces in the development of specialized training programs, and promotes ways and means for increased training in various professional and technical fields such as engineering, medicine, physics, pharmacy, chemistry, mathematics, nursing, teaching, etc. These activities are closely coördinated with the needs of war industries and of essential civilian requirements.

The Professional and Technical Training Division serves as liaison between the War Manpower Commission and the War and Navy Departments in the utilization of colleges and universities for the several forms of specialized and technical training programs needed by the armed forces. It is estimated that the Army and Navy will utilize the colleges and universities for training approximately 300,000 enlisted men in 1943.

Since October, 1940, the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training program, which operates through the United States Office of Education, has enrolled over 874,000 men and women in courses of college level essential to the war program. In its present program, Engineering, Science, and Management War Training is sponsoring nearly 8,000 short, intensive training courses in engineering, chemistry, physics, and production supervision in more than 200 colleges and universities throughout the country.

Within the four fields of training authorized for this program lie more diverse kinds of training than one might at first imagine. Courses ranging from basic technical training, such as engineering, drawing, and inspection, to complex studies such as X-ray diffraction analysis of metallic structures have been successfully conducted.

Most of the enrollment in all courses has been from employed workers who are training for positions of greater responsibility. It has been found that for any given year the number of persons requiring college level war training is about 4 percent of the total number of persons employed in war industries. With increasing manpower stringencies, a trend toward more training in advance of employment, particularly for women, is becoming apparent.

On the professional level both the number and percentage of women employed in certain war industries is gradually increasing. This trend is clearly reflected in the enrollment in Engineering, Science, and Management War Training courses which, significantly, is now about 20 percent women. Women are responding to the call for trained technicians. One West coast aircraft plant, for example, has now in training in these courses about 250 women, and estimates that the plant can use about 125 newly trained candidates each month. These women are carefully chosen by the company and paid while attending the course. As the number of men withdrawn from industry for military service increases, it is anticipated that the proportion of women in the courses will increase rapidly, perhaps to

50 percent or more. Many of the men enrolled will be from age groups not liable for combat service.

Over-all national figures indicate that both industrial and agricultural manpower problems will become more acute in 1943. The needs of the armed forces have first claim, and their demands will be met. To meet the manpower requirements of the armed forces, the essential war industries, and agriculture will require the addition of roughly 6,400,000 persons to the labor force. In 1943, in other words, we expect to add more than 4,000,000 persons to the armed forces, about 2,000,000 to war industries, and several hundred thousands to essential nonagricultural industries. With manpower already one of our scarcest resources, the mobilization of an additional 6,400,000 persons for the war effort presents an extremely critical problem.

Where, you ask, are these additional workers coming from? According to the best available estimates, half of the number required, or about 3,000,000, must be supplied from workers now employed in less essential civilian activities. Another 3,000,000 must be secured by bringing women into industry, many of whom never worked before; by persuading older people who have retired to go back to work; by giving jobs to handicapped people and to minority groups which are at present underemployed. The remaining few hundred thousands must be picked up by further reductions in the unemployed group.

By far the largest single source of workers will be women now classified as homemakers. They must be persuaded that their services are needed, and employers must be persuaded to accept them. The war program offers women, not only a great challenge, but also a great opportunity to render invaluable service. There is no longer any doubt as to the ability of women to make good in war work. The War Manpower Commission is convinced that if women are given proper training they can perform successfully as high as 80 percent of all war jobs, and perform them as efficiently as men. In a recent analysis of ninety-seven important war occupations made by the Bureau of Employment Security, it was found that women could fill seventy-seven of them.

The employment trends for a number of important war industries bear out this contention. A few examples will suffice: In the aircraft industries the percentage of women to men ranges from 25 to 65

percent. At the Hercules powder plant in New Jersey, 400 women are making gunpowder. All the navy yards are employing increasingly large numbers of women for various types of work. Even in the shipbuilding industry, women are undertaking tasks which until recently appeared impossible to them. The Kaiser yards alone employ more than 1,000 women to do welding and other essential jobs.

To meet established schedules, manpower will move into the armed forces at the rate of 12,000 a day. At the same time, workers will have to move from one section of the labor force to another, and from outside the labor force into the ranks of munitions and other essential industries at the rate of more than 17,000 per day. Each of these workers as he changes from one job to another, or enters factory employment for the first time, becomes for a while one of the great army of learners. For a time, he or she is doing a new job. They are working at jobs they must master before they can put their energies to maximum use.

Think of perhaps 13,500,000 men and women engaged this year in learning new tasks, in learning their first skill, or acquiring the additional skills that will mean advancement to a new job or a new responsibility and you will have a pretty good picture of the job that lies ahead for industry and the training programs.

THE WORK OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

By *WENDELL LUND*

A REPAIRMAN has an idea which increases production on a drilling job by 465 percent. A worker's wife learns how to pack vitamins into her husband's lunch. A woman threading screws is made to see them as essential to the action of a tank in Africa. A gang leader designs a fixture which saves 100 man-hours a day.

These are results achieved by labor-management committees. What are labor-management committees? Why were they set up and how do they operate?

The war crisis called into action the inherent bond among the men who gather under the roof of any industrial plant, be it a converted alley garage or a great institution covering thousands of acres. That bond is the American love of, and pride in, the machine, and it is an affection and pride shared by management and labor alike.

The reasons for this are obvious. We depended upon machines for our material wealth in peace. We are doubly dependent upon them in war. This feeling for machines is fundamental with us. Our ears are trained for the meaning of a cough in the motor. We have sons who can identify the plane in the sky by the sound of its engine. In our understanding of machines, our respect for them, our keen ear for their humming and throbbing, we are the lineal descendants of that character in the celebrated song, the railroad switchman who "knew by the engine's moans, that the man at the throttle was Casey Jones."

Against such a background it is natural for us to have labor-management committees. It would be unnatural if they had not come into play in this war. Labor-management committees have been the

vehicle for sifting individual ideas and actions and then transmitting those that are worth while.

The typical American working man is one who thinks with his brain while, at the same time, he is working with his hands. This productive thinking is organized by means of labor-management committees. Such creative and practical thinking is vital at this time when every ounce of effort must be utilized with the greatest effectiveness to speed our production.

The basic reason for labor-management committees, therefore, is the recognized value of the workers' creative ideas in producing more in less time despite limited facilities and materials and an actually decreasing supply of skilled manpower. Of equal importance is the increased output which results from better teamwork, higher morale, and a greater sense of individual responsibility.

Third comes the usefulness of the committees in promoting on-the-job fitness of each worker. Finally, the labor-management committees symbolize the American democratic way of meeting emergencies. They hurl into the Fuehrer's face the voluntary self-discipline and creative initiative of free men.

Those are the major reasons why Donald Nelson turned to labor-management committees to get the extra productive effort so needed today.

The war precipitated this action; but we should not forget that labor-management coöperation had been evolving, slowly, perhaps, but steadily, throughout the nation even before the war. In the twenties one of the most significant developments was the Baltimore and Ohio plan for labor-management committees. In 1925 the Baltimore and Ohio plan was adopted by the Canadian National Railways. The plan has endured in both organizations to this day, which is ample evidence in itself of the workability of the labor-management committee system.

Concurrently, there were many other efforts at labor-management coöperation in the twenties and thirties. Outstanding examples of labor-management coöperation in this country before the war include the United Textile Workers and the Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company at Salem, Massachusetts; the Hosiery Workers Union and the full-fashioned hosiery industry of the North; the United Mine Workers and the Rocky Mountain Fuel Company; the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers and millinery associations in New

York and New Jersey; the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the men's clothing industry in several cities; the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and the dress manufacturers of New York City; the United Electrical and Radio Machine Workers and the Westinghouse factory at East Springfield, Massachusetts; the Die Casting Workers and the Doehler Die Casting Company of Pottstown, Pennsylvania; and the Steel Workers Organizing Committee and several manufacturers in the steel industry.

Such is the background of collaboration during the "normalcy" of the twenties and the depression of the thirties. Across the seas, meanwhile, there had been many outstanding examples of labor and management working together. The most noteworthy began under the stress of war. In characteristic manner and in the best Anglo-Saxon tradition, the British faced the industrial relations problems of World War I by appointing, in 1916, the Whitley Committee to examine methods for securing a permanent improvement in industrial relations. Among the findings of that committee was a recommendation for the establishment of works committees representative of the management and of the workers in certain plants. This report is the first instance in which a government recommended and sponsored joint labor-management production committees.

When the present war broke out, representatives of British labor and management were brought into consultative roles in government agencies. As pressure for greater production grew more and more severe, labor-management committees began to emerge as the recognized machinery to stimulate better factory organization and related methods for increasing output and improving production.

Beginning in March of 1941, provisions of the British Essential Works Orders accelerated the formation of joint bodies to assist in the application of the orders in industrial establishments. Government, management, and labor unions encouraged the development, not merely in private companies, but also in industrial establishments operated by the Ministry of Supply.

Joint production committees are charged with specific responsibilities under the Essential Work Orders. Committees are expected to consult with, and advise on, matters relating to production and increased efficiency. These include maximum utilization of machinery, upkeep of equipment, improvements in production methods, effi-

cient use of the maximum number of production hours, elimination of defective work and waste, efficient use of supplies and of safety precautions and devices. Many committees also deal with problems of training, with canteen facilities, transport services, shopping schedules, etc. Significantly, the Essential Work Orders last year also assigned to joint production committees specific responsibilities to minimize unnecessary absences from work or persistent lateness.

It is essential that the public understand that the war production drive through such joint committees is not new or revolutionary. It is typically democratic and tested by time. As contrasted with the Nazi idea of centralized domination, the war production drive (of which labor-management committees are one phase), puts the challenge up to the men and women in overalls, and to management in office and shop. What Donald Nelson said on March 1, 1942, amounted to this:

We must get more production out of what we have on hand. We know that the ones who are doing the job are the ones who can best decide how to do it better. So we in Washington ask you in the factories to organize your own machinery, to tackle your own individual problems, solve them with your own wits, and whenever you get a first-rate idea, tell us about it, so that others may have the opportunity to use that idea to increase their share of America's output of planes and tanks, ships and guns.

Mr. Nelson's appeal, of course, raised in narrow minds a fear that labor would ask too great a share in the field of management, or, similarly, that labor's role in collective bargaining might be dwarfed or supplanted by the influence of committee collaboration. Mr. Nelson pointed out the fallacy of both fears, to which the structure and functioning of labor-management committees constitute an adequate answer.

From the beginning of the war production drive the program has been entirely voluntary. It requires the assent of both labor and management in any plant to form a production drive committee. The Government's role is simply to call upon both parties to cooperate in the interests of greater war production and to assist both labor and management in their coöperative efforts.

Wherever a single union is recognized as the bargaining agent for an entire plant, that union makes the selection of labor's representatives. Where recognition has been won by several unions in a plant,

usually a single joint production committee is established to include representatives from the various bargaining agencies.

The size of any committee is self-determined, and depends upon the characteristics of the plant. The main committee usually consists of from six to fourteen members, divided equally between management and labor representatives. There are also subcommittees which are useful in carrying forward the work of the main committee by bringing the objectives and program of the war production drive even closer to the man on the bench.

Plant efficiency is emphasized by all labor-management committees. The value of plant efficiency suggestions developed through the labor-management system is incalculable. Thousands of such suggestions have been adopted within individual plants, and several hundred suggestions have been deemed worthy of national recognition, which involves pooling such ideas for possible use wherever applicable.

Production ideas have demonstrated the practical inventive genius of the worker in overalls. Let me mention two recent examples:

At Detroit, where the Packard Motor Car management and the United Automobile Workers (C.I.O.) join in a committee, a forty-year-old gang leader designed a lifting fixture to simplify the removal of the carburetor elbow from the supercharger without damage. This idea applies to teardowns and penalty runs on aircraft engines. Formerly, in teardowns after testing, several bushings were damaged to such an extent that it often took 100 extra man-hours to reassemble the engine. The new fixture eliminates the possibility of this damage, eliminates the penalty runs, and saves 100 hours per day.

At St. Louis, where the Curtiss-Wright management and the International Association of Machinists (A.F. of L.) have formed a joint committee, a shear operator doubled the production rate on one operation by discovering an arrangement whereby stringers used in large airplane wings could be put through the router and the band saw in the same operation.

Plant efficiency work is closely linked to the suggestion system, which takes full advantage of the principle recognized by the war production drive that "the man on the job usually has ideas for improving it." Most committees either use a suggestion box or ask

the individual workers to bring or send their suggestions directly to the committee.

Suggestions which are accepted by the major committee in the plant may be granted the "award for production idea" by the labor-management committee. The committee is also asked to send the best ideas to Washington, where they are reviewed by a representative board. The originator of an idea selected by the board will be granted a "certificate of production idea," and the best of all are considered for "a citation for production idea" by Donald M. Nelson, as Chairman of the War Production Board.

Conservation of materials is of paramount importance, and of course it is part of the plant efficiency program. Shortages have obviously complicated committee efforts to push up production. You have seen the sign "Time Is Short." We should have equally prominent signs saying "Materials Are Scarce" and "Manpower Is Precious." Whatever can be done to save machine or labor time is important in the war production.

Likewise, whatever can be done to make more out of less will go far toward solving what has been the most serious of our bottlenecks—the prodigious amount of raw materials needed to make the machines of war. Workers have suggested many ways of saving materials. Here are three of them:

At the Milwaukee works of the International Harvester Company, where management and the Pattern Makers' League (A.F. of L.) and a Federal labor union (A.F. of L.) have set up a committee, a pattern maker suggested the removal of excess finish and excess stock on castings to the amount of 20,000 pounds of steel. The change was approved by the Government arsenal at Rock Island.

At the Cadillac Motor Car Division of the General Motors Corporation, Detroit, where management and the United Automobile Workers (C.I.O.) have a joint committee, a welding technician devised an adapter for a welding-rod holder. This adapter enables the welder to use six to eight rods continuously down to a small fraction of an inch. The estimated saving at Cadillac alone is 60,000 pounds a year of critical material.

At Peoria, Illinois, where the Caterpillar Tractor Company and the Pattern Makers' League (A.F. of L.) have established a committee, a repair and assembly man suggested that all the lead and bab-bitt plugs used to fill up holes drilled for special attachments in the

side of frames of tractors be eliminated. His idea saves approximately 600 pounds of tin per year and the man-hours needed for the operation.

The labor-management committees have been of the greatest aid in removing individual restrictions on output. In the days when work was scarce, wage earners were always afraid that they would work themselves out of a job if they produced faster; likewise, wherever incentive systems were in effect, they were afraid that basic pay would be re-evaluated. The incentive of helping to win the war has done more to overcome "feather-bedding" than most of us realize. Certainly, labor-management committees afford an excellent opportunity for frank discussion of any restrictive practices which grew up in the days when labor surplus constituted a serious national problem.

In every phase of the war effort it has been difficult to make the individual realize that a routine or obscure job actually is most significant. Throughout industry many workers are obliged to continue doing the same sort of job they did before the war. Standing at the same old bench, they do not realize the fundamental change in their activity; the same old part, once destined for an electric washer, today is on its way to a gun turret.

It has been part of the morale activities of the labor-management committees to seek out these routine and monotonous jobs and see that something of the war's great drama was imparted to them. They have been made to stand out in relation to a finished plane or tank or ship or gun which will go into action on the fighting fronts. In this phase of morale building, plant rallies at which returned servicemen have appeared have been of striking value.

Sometimes the committees have to explain why previously important work must be suspended because of changes in military requirements. Another important phase of morale activity is to explain delays due to lack of machinery, raw materials, or component parts.

Labor-management committees have coöperated in the nationwide scrap drives. Workers need little urging to work in scrap-collection drives when they are aware at first hand of shortages of vital materials. National publicity campaigns are important in scrap drives, but it is the silent and idle machine which carries the plea most eloquently to the worker . . . machinery that is not running because the needed scrap was lacking.

Car-pooling systems were long ago instituted by progressive labor-management committees. Arrangements for public transportation facilities are also carried forward by the men and women who know that absenteeism and fatigue will ruin any production effort if workers are tired out by excessive transportation delays. Many workers commute twenty or thirty miles a day each way, and a substantial number travel even twice that distance.

Housing problems confront many committees. One of the most unfortunate failures on the part of community and management has been found in the erection of huge war plants in already overcrowded districts, or in barren wasteland where housing and other community facilities were nonexistent. Labor-management committees are seldom able to solve the entire problem, but they can make substantial progress toward arousing community action to minimize the difficulties.

Labor-management committees have tremendous potentialities in the promotion of health and safety. More than two hundred subcommittees have already been established to deal specifically with such matters. The work of one such subcommittee in a gun mount factory in New York demonstrates an awareness of specialized health problems.

An urgent in-plant problem for this committee was the high incidence of oil dermatitis among the workers, which was seriously impeding production. The committee invited all the plant foremen to discuss the problem. The result was an educational program for the men who work with cutting oils, emphasizing the need for personal cleanliness as well as the importance of keeping the machines clean and changing the oil frequently. The committee recommended that the plant make available an abundance of nonabrasive soap, constant hot water, and a locker room with shower baths. Protective skin creams are supplied to the workers, and the committee, with the approval of the management, is making inquiries about prices and specifications of apparatus which strains and sterilizes cutting oils and thus keeps the bacterial count down.

At one meeting this subcommittee concentrated on the need for better understanding of nutrition among the men and their families. The city health department and the nutrition department of the local Red Cross chapter assisted the committee in planning a mass meeting for 200 workers' wives. At this meeting, booklets on vita-

mins, food values, balanced meals, cooking methods, and similar subjects were distributed. Two moving pictures were shown, one emphasizing the importance of milk in the diet and one on the "hidden hunger" which results from a defective diet. The women were then invited to register for lecture courses on nutrition under the auspices of the city health department and the Red Cross.

This committee also made recommendations that canteens be established to sell fresh fruit, milk, tomato juice, and hot coffee to maintain energy during the long shifts; that vitamin wafers be sold at cost; that the factory restaurant be converted into a cafeteria with a shift arrangement for lunch periods to prevent overcrowding; and that a pack-lunch service be provided through the cafeteria.

The most practical demonstration of the value of labor-management committees comes, perhaps, in the recent decision of the several government agencies concerned that the basic approach to overcoming absenteeism must be made through plant labor-management committees. Practical people know that absenteeism can be cured only by effective correction of the causes. Illness and accidents are among the major causes. Harsh words cannot put an ill or injured man back to work, but committees can educate management and workers to eliminate the causes.

Sometimes the causes are transportation difficulties, wretched housing, lack of shopping facilities after work hours, lack of time to register for rationing or to appear before draft boards, excessive fatigue from poor working arrangements. In a few cases, it is indifference, and sometimes it is unwise indulgence in food or drink. The recruitment of people hitherto unable to get jobs or of women who have heavy home responsibilities is another source of absenteeism.

Our analysis indicates that absenteeism can be classified in three groups: the unavoidable, the preventable, and the inexcusable. Labor-management committees throughout the nation are being called upon to tackle all causes of absenteeism within the preventable and the inexcusable categories. This can and will be done under committee leadership so far as causes can be corrected within the plant. Whenever community action is needed to correct other causes, the representatives of labor and management on a community or district basis will take the lead in asking community action.

This war is different from other wars in that postwar problems

are being considered even as the fighting is in progress. There is a disposition to hold fast to any gains which may have been made in the national unity. Results encourage us to believe that the closer understanding between management and labor will endure, that it is now a vital factor in winning the war, and that it also will be a vital factor in the peace to come.

THE COMMITTEE ON FAIR EMPLOY- MENT PRACTICE

By LAWRENCE W. CRAMER

IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 8802, issued June 25, 1941, the President declared that "there is evidence that available and needed workers have been barred from employment in industries engaged in defense production solely because of consideration of race, creed, color or national origin to the detriment of workers' morale and national unity." He expressed "the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders."

Ample additional evidence has reached the Government that needed workers have been denied employment or have been employed at less than their full skills solely because of their race, creed, color, or national origin. It is clear that the morale of several loyal and patriotic racial and national groups has been seriously affected by the discrimination to which they have been subjected. They are repeatedly urged to participate in, and contribute fully to, the war effort. They respond, as do other patriotic Americans, only to find all too frequently that their participation is not wanted. Repeated frustration undermines their morale, raises doubt as to the validity of the stated objectives for which we are at war, and breeds disunity.

There are in the United States 13,000,000 Negroes; 11,000,000 foreign born, of whom approximately 5,000,000 are aliens; 5,000,000, Jews; 3,000,000 Spanish-Americans; and smaller numbers of Chinese, Chinese-Americans, Japanese, Japanese-Americans, Filipinos, American Indians, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and others who in greater or lesser degree face discrimination in employment.

These are population figures including men, women, and chil-

dren. By no means all the potential workers in these categories are excluded from employment or limited to employment at less than their full skills, but there are no authoritative estimates of the total number. Even in the most easily identifiable group—the nonwhites—no reliable statistics are available. A recent War Manpower Commission estimate reports that 600,000 Negroes are unemployed, but there is no indication of how many of this number are employable in war industries.

All criteria indicate, however, that there is a substantial waste of available manpower and skills resulting from discrimination in violation of declared national policy. If for no other reason than the practical necessity arising out of manpower shortages, there is need for vigorous, prompt, and effective action in eliminating irrelevant considerations in matters of labor supply. Any plan of action must, of course, take into account the deep-rooted and emotional character of certain prejudices. At the same time, there must be recognition of the fact that these prejudices are the raw materials of wars and must be greatly decreased or eliminated, if we are eventually to emerge into a period of prolonged world peace.

With the exception of the colored races, it is true that various national groups have been incorporated in the body politic without reference to their origin and without special legal or political arrangements to protect their minority rights. Negroes and Asiatics have, on the other hand, in considerable degree been dealt with as though they were considered a permanent minority element. In certain sections of the country, special political arrangements set them apart for differential treatment.

This practice, however, does violence to our basic constitutional concepts which envisage only one class of citizens with equal rights. The conflict between our basic political philosophy and sectional practices must be and can be resolved only in accordance with the historical pattern developed in our treatment of other and more temporary minority groups. Supreme Court decisions in recent years have made it increasingly clear that our constitutional doctrine of individual rights must prevail against any prejudices. A similar clarification is becoming evident in the political and economic scene. This underlying fact is basic to any consideration of the problem of racial or religious discrimination.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, "help wanted" advertisements frequently

called for "white" mechanics, or "Gentile" factory workers, or even "Protestant white Gentiles." Defense training courses were often administered to exclude Negroes, Jews, Spanish-Americans, aliens, foreign-born citizens, and members of certain religious denominations. Negroes had a phrase for it: they were "the last hired and the first fired."

Recognizing the growing demands for labor and the development of potential labor shortages in particular areas, the National Defense Advisory Commission in 1940 and the Office of Production Management in 1941 took a number of affirmative steps to eliminate discrimination against Negroes through the issuance of appeals and the organization of an office to facilitate their integration into training programs and industry. Congress, also, took action. In appropriating money for defense training, it stipulated that "no trainee under the foregoing appropriation shall be discriminated against because of sex, race or color; and where separate schools are required by law for separate population groups, to the extent needed for trainees of such groups, equitable provision shall be made for facilities for training of like quality."

Old patterns were, nevertheless, slow to change. Negroes called attention with increasing vigor and bitterness to the special disabilities to which they were subjected within the framework of a democracy. In response to their growing protest the President issued Executive Order 8802, reaffirming "the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color or national origin" and creating the Committee on Fair Employment Practice to assist in carrying this policy into effect.

In a survey conducted in September, 1941, the Bureau of Employment Security found that of 282,245 job openings expected by February, 1942, Negroes would not be considered for 51 percent, with a higher percentage of exclusion in the more skilled occupations. This, despite the fact that the failure to use locally available Negroes has in certain instances delayed production, compelled employers to recruit labor from distant areas with attendant intensification of housing shortages and increase of labor turnover, and caused underemployment of vocational training facilities.

It might have been expected that our entry into the war would have brushed aside the luxury of "prejudice as usual" as it did the

complacency of "business as usual." The evidence does not, however, support this assumption. Reports for certain industries for July and September, 1942, although revealing a slight increase in the use of Negroes, disclose also the slight extent to which they have been admitted into these industries. In July, 1942, Negroes constituted 2.9 percent of total employment in aircraft manufacturing, in September, 3.1 percent; in explosives in July, 3.3 percent, in September, 4.5 percent; in guns in July, 3.4 percent, in September, 3.9 percent; in tanks in July, 2.2 percent, in September, 3.1 percent. Of a total enrollment of 1,524,590 in pre-employment training courses between July, 1940, and July, 1942, 5.6 percent were Negroes. They constituted 1.6 percent of the enrollees in supplementary training during this same period.

Moreover, it has been advisable to grant deferment because of their occupations to only a negligible number of Negro selectees. General Lewis Hershey, Director of Selective Service, declares:

The number of Negro registrants deferred because they are engaged in occupations necessary to the national health, safety, and interest has been relatively small. They represented to September 30, 1941, only 1.6 percent of registrants placed in Class II-A. The proportion of Negroes deferred and placed in Class II-B by reason of their being engaged in the work necessary to national defense is even smaller. It is only 0.65 percent of classification.

From October through December, 1942, 1,727 individual complaints alleging discrimination were received at the headquarters of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice. The incidence of these complaints was as follows: 71.6 percent from Negroes and other non-Caucasians; 16.3 percent from aliens; 8.7 percent from those alleging discrimination because of creed; and 3.3 percent from those alleging discrimination because of national origin. Since the issuance of Executive Order 8802 the volume and distribution of complaints have not varied significantly.

There are differences in the degree of discrimination to which Negroes and other non-Caucasians are subjected in various sections of the country, but everywhere they meet one or more of its forms. Everywhere there is exclusion, or near exclusion, of Negroes from the supervisory, professional, and administrative classifications, except in organizations owned and conducted by Negroes themselves. In certain areas Negro men have gained considerable acceptance, but

Negro women are excluded, or are limited to menial or custodial functions. The volume of complaints reaching the Committee is, however, by no means an accurate index of the degree to which discrimination is practiced. There has, for instance, been a relatively small number of individual complaints from Negroes in the Southern states. Surveys do not reveal that Negroes are not discriminated against in the war industries in the South. Their failure to complain is related to factors other than the nonexistence of discriminatory employment practices.

Negroes and other non-Caucasians do not get jobs commensurate with their skill in many instances because of the policies and practices of labor organizations. In a report of the Tolan Committee in 1941, there are listed nine unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor which, by constitutional provisions, bar nonwhites from membership. Another A.F. of L. affiliate, the Weavers Protective Association of America, requires that members must be "Christian, white." The Tolan report lists also seven unions of the Railway Brotherhoods which bar nonwhites from membership.

By excluding nonwhites from membership, unions which have closed shop or preferential shop agreements with war contractors effectively prevent the employment of nonwhites in disregard of the "duty . . . of labor organizations" laid upon them by Executive Order 8802 "to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries without regard to their race, creed, color or national origin." In only a minority of cases have they granted work permits to non-whites allowing their employment in closed shops.

On the Southeastern railroads, exclusion of nonwhites or their exclusion from certain classes of employment is encouraged or accomplished by "percentage" or "nonpromotable" clauses in union agreements or by a tacit understanding. The percentage clauses generally provide that no more than a stated proportion of employees shall be nonpromotable men. Not all nonpromotable men are Negroes, but all Negroes are nonpromotable men. Their nonpromotability excludes them from positions as engineers and conductors and, in some cases, as switchmen, yardmen. Thus the accredited bargaining agents on these railroads, declared by the courts to be competent to act as bargaining agents for all workers whether or not they are members of the unions, not only prohibit certain workers from

becoming members of their organizations, but also enter into, or use their bargaining power to compel the adoption of, agreements which deny certain of these workers seniority and promotion rights which are of the essence of the agreements. The percentage clauses are intended to deny and do, in fact, accomplish the denial of, employment on the railroads to many needed workers solely because they are Negroes.

Where management and organized labor combine to exclude workers of a particular race or color, the problems of securing compliance with Executive Order 8802 become especially difficult. Fortunately, this type of case is the exception. Wise labor leaders recognize that the arbitrary exclusion of any substantial proportion of the working population from organized labor's ranks leads to a weakening of the labor movement itself and constitutes an invitation to certain employers to use unorganized workers at low wage scales, or for strikebreaking or similar purposes. Both the A.F. of L. and the Congress of Industrial Organizations have officially opposed race discrimination within their organizations. In each of them, the national officers have assisted in working out satisfactory adjustments of particular cases. The Railroad Brotherhoods, on the other hand, have not taken such a position and apparently act on the opposite policy.

On September 3, 1941, the President drew attention to another area of employment discrimination which affects Negroes particularly. "It has come to my attention," he wrote to department heads, "that there is in the Federal establishment a lack of uniformity and possibly some lack of sympathetic attitude toward the problems of minority groups, particularly those relating to the employment and assignment of Negroes in the Federal Civil Service." At that time the employment and assignment of Negroes in the Federal civil service were characterized by their relegation to custodial and service functions. In April, 1942, Negroes constituted 9 percent of all Federal employees, but 62 percent were in custodial classifications. The proportion of service employees to the total number is roughly about 7 percent. Making all allowances for the lack of educational advantages available to Negroes in certain areas, that factor alone did not account for this concentration. Indeed, the Social Security Board reported at this same time that 1,050, or 11 percent of its

employees, were Negroes, of whom 872, or 83 percent, were in clerical, administrative, or fiscal classifications.

Presidential intervention has been effective in bringing about a noticeable modification of Federal employment practice. By November, 1942, the proportion of Negroes had risen from 9 percent to more than 17 percent of total personnel in the Washington service, 48 percent of whom were in clerical, administrative, fiscal, and professional classifications. In the field service Negroes still constituted only 5 percent of total employees, of whom 38 percent were in custodial classifications.

The emphasis placed on vocational training by the ever increasing demand for skilled or semiskilled labor reveals an additional area in which Negroes are at a special disadvantage. Negroes have received strikingly less opportunity to secure defense training than have whites; fewer courses are available to them, and less money is being spent than the proportion of Negroes to whites would indicate.

The grant-in-aid character of the defense training program has occasioned special difficulties in dealing with these conditions. Attempting to fix responsibility for the failure to carry out the mandate of Congress and the specific direction of the President has required a high degree of skill and perseverance. The result of the failure is clearly evident, whether responsibility lies with Federal training agencies or with state or local educational systems. Thus, statistics on defense training furnished by the United States Office of Education for eighteen "separate school states" and the District of Columbia indicate that as of January 31, 1942, there were 4,630 segregated training courses within the area. Of these, 4,446, or 96 percent, were for whites only, and 194, or less than 4 percent, for Negroes. According to the 1940 census, Negroes constitute over 20 percent of the population in this area. The provisions of Executive Order 8802 indicate that it was the intention to place initial responsibility to correct these conditions on Federal training agencies. It directs that "all departments and agencies of the Government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production shall take *special measures appropriate to assure*¹ that such programs are administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin."

Sixteen percent of the complaints reaching the Committee on

¹ Italics not in original.

Fair Employment Practice are submitted by noncitizens. Except when he is the butt of xenophobes, the alien is not the victim of prejudicial discrimination as is the Negro. He suffers rather because of the excessive caution of employers who believe it unpatriotic or dangerous to employ an alien on war work, or because of their unwillingness to take the steps necessary to secure consent to employ an alien. There is little selectivity in the denial of employment to aliens because of the country of their origin. Canadians, Englishmen, Germans, Austrians, Italians, and Mexicans suffer alike.

This situation has arisen out of certain statutory enactments and their administrative interpretation and elaboration. The act of Congress of July 2, 1926, declares that no aliens employed by an aeronautical contractor "shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications or the work under construction, or participate in the contract trials without the written consent beforehand of the Secretary of the department concerned." Subsequently, by act of June 28, 1940, similar restrictions with respect to the employment of aliens in the execution of secret, restricted, or confidential contracts were established. Substantial penalties were imposed for violation of the acts. The act of 1940 expired on June 30, 1942. Except for the penal sanctions, its provisions have been continued in force and effect by administrative regulation of the War and Navy Departments.

Administrative regulations and interpretations developed under these statutes were not peculiarly appropriate for war industries expanding under lease-lend and wartime demands. They have, however, given some justification to employers for believing that the Government objected to the employment of aliens on so-called classified and aeronautical contracts. The rule of *stare decisis* applies in some degree to administrative regulations and interpretations. As a consequence, many wholly loyal workers with vital skills have been denied employment in war industries solely because of their lack of United States citizenship. Nationals of the United Nations, as well as nationals of enemy and enemy-dominated countries, have been turned away by want ads specifying "only United States citizens need apply," or by the summary refusal of war contractors to consider aliens for employment. Even nationals of the United States who are not citizens, such as Filipinos, have been denied employment on this account.

Numerous statements by heads of departments and by the President, calling for a "sane policy regarding aliens and foreign-born citizens," failed to correct widespread misconceptions. On July 11, 1942, the President found it necessary once again to state the Government's position. He declared,

persons should not hereafter be refused employment or persons at present employed discharged solely on the basis of the fact that they are aliens or that they were formerly nationals of any particular foreign country. . . . There are no legal restrictions on the employment of any person (a) in non-war industries and (b) even in war industries if the particular labor is not on "classified" contracts which include secret, confidential and restricted aeronautical contracts.

Citing the provisions of the 1926 and 1940 statutes, the President declared further,

the laws of the United States do provide that in certain special instances involving Government contracts an employer must secure from the head of the Government department concerned permission to employ aliens. There are no other Federal laws which restrict the employment of aliens by private employers in national war industries. There are no Federal laws restricting the employment of foreign-born citizens of any particular national origin.

It cannot as yet be said that all loyal, qualified aliens are accepted for employment with enthusiasm. There is, however, a more general understanding of the Government's policy. The problem now relates more particularly to the volume of paper work and the length of time necessary to secure consent to employ an alien.

Few aliens may hope for employment in the Federal civil service. The rules and regulations of the United States Civil Service Commission bar applications from persons who are not citizens of the United States, or who do not owe allegiance to the United States, from open competitive examinations. A noncitizen may be appointed through a noncompetitive examination only if the department or agency desiring his services has specific authority to employ noncitizens. The annual appropriation acts for all Federal departments and agencies, except the Navy Department, contain specific provisions forbidding them to expend the appropriated funds for the employment of any noncitizens other than citizens of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, with only minor exceptions relating to employment outside the continental United States, employment of military personnel, and employment by certain agencies of the Government.

The Military Appropriations Act for 1943 does, however, permit the employment of nationals of the United Nations whose employment is determined by the Secretary of War to be necessary.

In the Southwest there is visible evidence of discrimination against "Latinos." They are subjected, in some parts, to segregation, are restricted to heavy and menial types of work, and are paid less than "Anglos" for the same work. Often they are nonpromotable men. Denied equal educational opportunities, they are later refused skilled and semiskilled work because they are not trained or because they have learned only Spanish in their segregated communities.

Slightly less than 10 percent of the complaints submitted to the Committee allege unequal treatment because of creed. Most of these are from Jews. The pattern of discrimination against Jews varies greatly in different sections of the country and is strongest in the Eastern and Northeastern seaboard states. Want ads specifying "Gentiles only" and application forms, calling for the disclosure of the applicant's race and religion, have served as effective means for excluding Jews. It may be noted that the Government has eliminated the question of race and religion from its own application forms and is ready to require its removal in all war industries.

Orthodox Jews and other Sabbatarians create a special problem in a civilization which observes the first day of the week. Some have been dismissed or have been denied employment by war industries or Government agencies because of their conscientious scruples against working on Saturday. In war plants which operate seven days a week, it is as practicable as it is sound personnel policy to arrange work schedules so that employees may exercise their preferences regarding religious observances. The War Department has admirably met the problem by permitting absence from work for "those whose conscience leads them to spend certain holy days in religious devotion" and by authorizing rearrangements of schedules.

The refusal of Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag because the tenets of their creed hold such action to be idolatrous has, in a few cases, caused loss of employment. In most of them, other workers have been responsible for dismissals because they regarded it unpatriotic to refuse to salute the flag and objected to working with "unpatriotic" persons.

Non-Caucasians, Jews, and aliens are most frequently the victims of discriminatory specifications in want ads and in requests to em-

ployment services. Employment agencies, public and private, usually supply what their customers want. Except in New York State, private agencies in their advertisements freely provide Nazi propagandists with convincing evidence of the discriminatory character of employment patterns in this country.

As the importance of the United States Employment Service as a recruiting agency for war industries increases, its policy toward discriminatory job orders becomes more crucial. Under existing instructions, its officials have been directed to seek withdrawal of discriminatory specifications, but if a prospective employer demurs, to fill the order as given. This instruction is declared to apply except in states which by law prohibit race or religious discrimination. Efforts to secure its modification to conform with Executive Order 8802 have so far not been successful.

Many persons who profess respect for individual Jews or Negroes or Italians, nevertheless, condone measures which operate to the disadvantage of all Jews or Negroes or Italians. This attitude departs considerably from our constitutional doctrine of individual rights guaranteed and protected by law. Yet it is one of our proudest boasts that under our constitutional forms, the rights of individuals and of minorities are safeguarded against encroachments by the majority.

Workers do not, of course, have a legal right to a job in any particular war industry. They do, however, have a right to be considered for employment without discrimination. Executive Order 8802 declares that "all contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against *any worker*² because of race, creed, color or national origin." A war contractor thus has a contractual and legal duty to refrain from refusing employment or denying equal conditions of employment to any worker on any of these grounds. The Committee on Fair Employment Practice conceives its purpose to be the enforcement of this right.

Because it has dealt with the problem of discrimination in employment as a denial of the exact and equal justice which is basic to American political concepts, the Committee has been effective beyond the limited powers granted it. It has sought to supply moral

² Italics not in original.

leadership, holding that proposals for solutions based on political expediency offer nothing but the trail of disaster leading from Munich.

Racial, religious, and national prejudices are deep-seated, charged with emotion, stubborn, and irrational. Racial and religious wars have been frequent in history. Modern, total war is a concomitant of the rise of national states. Our enemies have made it painfully clear that the issues of race and religion and the survival of national states are of the essence in the present struggle.

The same passions which are aroused and inflamed in the international conflict lie at the bottom of domestic and internal tensions. They are no less real there than they are internationally. They cannot be dismissed by a refusal to recognize their existence. They cannot be made harmless except through statesmanship and moral leadership. Permanent solution of these domestic tensions can be achieved within the framework of our democratic system only when human and individual rights are made effective and operative without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin. It is the task of leadership to assure this victory at home.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AGENCIES IN THE MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INDUSTRY

By J. WESLEY McAFEE

ONE WHO assumes an executive position in a business organization necessarily occupies a dual position concerning civic problems. He is, first, a private citizen subject to certain community and charitable obligations to which he responds in proportion to his particular civic consciousness. In addition, he is primarily responsible to others for the efficient management of the property which they have entrusted to him. Large organizations are generally conducted through corporations whose stocks and other securities are owned by great numbers of persons. The executive is a sort of trustee for these people and for the employees who expect to make a living out of the activities which he heads. In the first of his two capacities there are no limitations on him except his own desires and conscience. In the second, he must decidedly be responsive to considerations beyond his personal inclinations. He is obliged to consider, not only what is good from a social standpoint, but also what is wise from a business point of view. In committing a part of the resources of his business to social advancement he must, since he is using the funds of others, give thought to whether he should make the decision, or whether he should leave it to the real owners of the funds, that is, the security holders, to decide for themselves, after they receive the net proceeds of the operation, what their responses will be.

Likewise, when, as a corporate officer, an executive takes a position on a public question, he is, I think, to some extent duty bound

to consider what stand his obligations to those for whom he is acting will permit him to take. I have talked to businessmen who feel that the energies and resources of business institutes should be devoted solely to the purpose for which they are formed and that only individuals should engage in those activities which involve the welfare of the community generally. The number who subscribe to this view is not great and is, I believe, becoming less all the time.

The more wholesome view is: (1) that a healthy, sound community has a direct relationship with the efficient management of industry and that, aside from any philanthropic considerations, the furtherance of efforts in behalf of the general good is sound business; and (2) that a business organization has certain social obligations of its own; that in return for the privilege of engaging in commercial activities, of soliciting customers, of making a profit from their custom, and of utilizing the facilities of the community, there is imposed a definite obligation which should be responded to regardless of whether or not any direct monetary return is contemplated.

There are essentially two problems for the social agencies in the present mobilization of manpower: (1) the effective organization and use of the individuals available; and (2) observation of the results of such mobilization upon the lives of the individuals and the progress of the community.

There is no question in the minds of intelligent businessmen that the social agencies occupy an important and, in some phases, a dominant position on both of these problems. On both points maximum achievement depends on factors with which the technically trained social worker is peculiarly equipped to deal. The success of the worker, however, in dealing with these subjects will depend upon influences beyond his training and experience. Some of these influences come directly from, and are controlled by, industry. Consequently, the success of the efforts of the social worker will depend to a substantial extent on his ability to secure the confidence and coöperation of the community generally, including the business organizations.

It seems to me that there is an undercurrent of antagonism between business and the social agencies. This we cannot afford, now or in the future. In general, I have found in social agencies the feeling that businessmen are cold to their endeavors; that they are generally uninformed on social problems; that they are overly con-

servative; and that the profit motive is far too dominant in their thinking. On the other hand, many executives characterize the social worker as visionary, impractical, and, sometimes, radical. The charge is made that many are overly zealous and allow their enthusiasm to carry them into fields beyond their profession which they are not qualified to treat with sound judgment.

The differences, in my judgment, however, are more fundamental than the thoughts expressed. Each, either by nature or by habit, refuses to understand or, at least, to view sympathetically certain principles of the other. Both groups refuse to recognize that these fundamental differences exist and pretend to themselves that they do not have an understanding of, and sympathy for, most of the objectives of the other. The most casual appraisal of the characteristics and aims of the typical social worker and of the typical businessman points to the source of their differences and, if rightly considered, should go far in permitting the two groups to work together harmoniously.

Let me call your attention first to the fact that the social worker by the mere fact of choosing his profession has disclosed certain innate characteristics. It is perfectly obvious that the choice was not based on any ambition to accumulate wealth, position, or power. The choice bespeaks generally a devotion to the service of others, a strong consciousness of the great need for such service, and a determination for unselfish accomplishment. Thus we have, not only an idealist, but an enthusiastic one. Then, after he has embarked upon his career, he continually comes in contact with the most tragic by-product of industry, the unfortunate individual who, either from his own failings or from other causes, is not able to stand alone in modern competition. Continuous contact with individuals and localities which present the most unfortunate aspect of industrial organization is not calculated to encourage appreciation of the more commendable parts or to give a balanced judgment of the whole.

It is not easy for one endowed with a high degree of idealism to be practical; his chief interests are beyond practicability. Like all enthusiasts it is difficult for him to maintain an unprejudiced attitude. There is always the danger that he is viewing, not the world we have, but the one he wants to make. Being willing himself to give up very largely the prospects of fortune and leisure, it is not unnatural that he should be impatient of those who are influenced

by more mundane considerations. He is likely to forget that though "man may not live by bread alone," man does require a certain amount of sustenance.

In contrast, let us look at the ordinary businessman. He has achieved leadership because he is acutely alive to commercial considerations. No doubt he was stimulated by an ambition to accumulate wealth to a greater or less degree. Success requires an ability to estimate accurately existing conditions. Most of his judgments and actions are controlled by repeated estimates of cost and expense. If he is conscientious, he is aware of his obligation to those who rely upon the success of his efforts. They are: (1) those who work under him; (2) those who have established the business by advancing the funds; (3) the customer who rightly expects that he will continually strive to supply more and better goods at a lower price. With these responsibilities he must be cautious of the unknown, slow to accept change, "hard headed," as we sometimes say.

Thus the businessman and the social worker, in order to coöperate, should approach each other with a full understanding of the respective obligations and outlook of the other. The businessman must bear in mind that most advancement comes from those who look ahead, beyond that which is determined presently to be practicable. The social worker must be conscious of the fact that when we strive for a better world, we must exercise sufficient practical judgment to maintain the one we have.

Now, let us examine some of the undertakings to which this coöperative effort can be applied. In the mobilization of manpower, industry attempts to obtain the service of every person who is available. The social worker may quickly demonstrate that this attitude is not sound. For example, efforts to take as many women as possible into commercial employment, if not limited to a reasonable extent, tend to defeat the very plan of mobilization. We are well aware of the effects on the home and on the children when mothers are unable to make satisfactory arrangements to care for their maternal and household duties. Discouragement and unhappiness which result when both husband and wife try to carry too large a load may contribute greatly to absenteeism. In many cases intelligent social work undoubtedly could provide a plan which would relieve these situations.

Many of those who are considering the problem of absenteeism

from the standpoint of industry are coming to believe that, to a great extent, absenteeism, loafing, and inefficiency are linked with a background of individual social maladjustment. There is little doubt that industry could profit greatly today if in the past it had taken a more active leadership in the problems with which social agencies have been dealing. It is not too late now. Some industries are already seeking professional advice and assistance in studying and correcting these costly situations.

Not long ago I visited a locality in which there was a great deal of labor unrest. I was informed that it is one of the worst localities in the country from the standpoint of work stoppages. Many of the companies are national concerns who have gotten along well with their employees in other places. I learned that these companies used the same policies and, in general, the same wage scale in this locality, but with far different results. I viewed the section in which most of these workers lived. It was flat, drab, uninteresting country. The grime and dirt with which the whole area was covered gave it a particularly discouraging appearance. I discovered that vice and gambling proceeded uninterrupted, and that the administration of local tax collection was attended by graft and extravagance.

On the average, the people in that locality were probably as patriotic as those in any other town. Wages were on a comparatively good level. The trouble came, then, from those factors which make a human being a disgruntled, dissatisfied, and belligerent individual. Probably, they were not aware of the real cause of their unhappiness and dissatisfaction and seized upon any convenient grievance as a vent for their general resentment. I wish there were some way to know what would happen if that town were cleaned up and made a good community. Can there be any doubt that the dollars so spent would be returned many fold?

A businessman told me of an experience his company had in a locality where an extremely dangerous race situation had developed. His company had many Negro employees, and needed all the manpower it could get, both Negro and white. The feeling became so intense that not only was the quality of the work and the number of man-hours affected, but sporadic violence was common. There was a real prospect of general riot. This man had an inquiry made into social conditions. He obtained professional advice and took the leadership in supplying deficiencies in the community's social

needs. Among other things, he fostered the establishment of a Boy Scout troop in the Negro section. Additional recreational facilities were provided. Needs of individual families were investigated and supplied. The result was amazing. It was, however, brought about so gradually that few workers were aware of a change until their attention was directed to conditions as they had existed a comparatively short time before.

Business has, to some extent, had the foresight to seek the assistance which social agencies are equipped to supply. I believe this tendency will grow. This war has made us realize the true elements of national greatness. It has influenced us to think more diligently of the problem of increasing our national efficiency. It is encouraging, sometimes, to be able to think of something pleasant, and it is decidedly pleasant to think that if we can produce these great quantities of war goods, we can some day produce equal quantities of peacetime goods. It will be a problem for all of us to find out how we can not only produce, but how we can also effectively distribute our products.

One of the prospects for valuable social work has to do with labor relations. In war or peace, strikes are socially bad. Regardless of who is at fault, a strike is costly, and not only to those involved. From the standpoint of business the agencies can best further their work in this field by establishing and maintaining a nonpartisan attitude. By assuming such a role they can do much to supply data and present arguments calculated to influence the party at fault.

Despite the troubled needs of the moment we must, if victory is to mean anything, be continually looking forward. Postwar planning must engage all the energies left from wartime production. Not only must there be planning, but there must be preparation and current activities in anticipation of the carrying out of plans for the future. Probably it is in this connection that the social agencies have the greatest value.

It is generally felt that industry is doing a good job for the country. On the whole, industry has responded more patriotically to this war than it has to past wars. War fortunes are not being accumulated overnight. Annual statements recently released show a general increase in volume of business and a decrease in net earnings. Despite commendable accomplishments it behooves industry to realize that it is contributing along with other factors to the growing psycho-

logical and physical burden of our people. Every device which can palliate the effects of present-day stress and strain on the individual must be utilized. The ordinary businessman is aware that he has neither the experience, the time, nor the energy to make much of a contribution in this regard. It presents a great challenge and a great opportunity to the social agency. Now is the time to show that the social worker does not fritter away his efforts on impractical objectives. His contribution to the efficient mobilization of manpower will be watched with interest. His efforts to correct and prevent child delinquency, to contribute to public health, and to point the way to an improved social organization will have much to do with preserving this grand old country.

The absolute necessity of some coöperation between industry and social agencies during these times cannot help but be productive. It will take time to eliminate many of the faults in the attitude of each, but the trend is already in that desirable direction.

SPECIAL WELFARE SERVICES TO FAMILIES OF MEN IN SERVICE

By ROBERT E. BONDY

THE AMERICAN people are resolved to assist the men of the armed forces and their families in meeting the problems arising from the men's service in the armed forces. They are determined that none shall suffer. They look to government—Federal, state, local—to provide the basic necessities of life. They look to voluntary effort to supplement the services of government and to be the good neighbor.

People affected by the catastrophe of war are regarded with special concern by their neighbors. The nation itself is believed to have a responsibility in the matter. War does not occur because your town or my state goes to war, but because the nation goes to war—and in these days the families themselves go to war when the men do. Their service to the nation is a very special service. They merit, of course, the regular services and facilities of the community, but their special service calls for special consideration. They are deliberately placed in a special class. As the bulwark of the nation, it is natural that special provision should be made for them through legislation as well as through the special welfare services of voluntary agencies.

The principal Government benefits to families of service men are allowances and allotments, insurance, emergency furloughs, pension provisions, and protection under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act. By act of Congress approved June 23, 1942, the United States Government provides for payment of allowances to dependents of men in active service in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard who are serving in the four lowest pay grades. These grades range from private to sergeant in the Army, and from ap-

prentice seaman to petty officer in the Navy. A new selectee or volunteer without prior service is normally in the seventh grade, as a private in the Army or as an apprentice seaman in the Navy.

Every serviceman in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh paygrades is given an opportunity to apply for an allowance for his dependents immediately after he has been inducted. All grades above the four lowest grades were covered by previous legislation providing allowances for quarters and rations for dependents. The provisions of the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act are administered by the Office of Dependency Benefits for dependents of men in the Army; by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, for dependents of men in the Navy; and by the Commandant, Marine Corps, and the Commandant, Coast Guard, for dependents of their respective personnel.

Family allowances for dependents of men in service on June 1, 1942, accrue from that date, provided application was made by the enlisted man on or before December 22, 1942, and he requested that payment be retroactive. In all other cases, allowances are paid from the first day of the month following the date on which the serviceman's application is filed with his commanding officer or the dependent's application is received in the Office of Dependency Benefits.

Dependents are divided into two classes. Class "A" dependents include wives, children, and divorced wives who have not remarried and to whom alimony is payable, Class "B" dependents include parents, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers, and sisters. Allowances for Class "A" relatives are mandatory if claim is filed either by the man in service or by his Class "A" dependents. Allowances for Class "B" dependents are optional with the man in service and may be stopped by him at any time.

Class "A" relatives do not have to prove dependency. They must, however, prove relationship by submitting a certified copy of the record of marriage, birth, adoption, etc. Class "B" dependents must prove that they are dependent upon the serviceman for a substantial portion of their support, and they also must prove their relationship to him.

The family allowance payable under the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942 consists of a sum deducted from the enlisted man's pay plus a sum contributed by the Government. The total depends upon the number of the man's dependents and their rela-

tionship to him. If there are Class "A" or Class "B" dependents only, the pay deduction will be \$22 per month; if there are both Class "A" and Class "B" dependents the pay deduction will be \$22 for Class "A" and an additional \$5 for Class "B." The amount contributed by the Government will be:

Class "A"	
Wife, no child	\$28
Wife, one child	40
Each additional child	10
One child, no wife	20
Two children, no wife	30
Each additional child	10
Former wife, divorced to whom alimony is decreed	20
Class "B"	
One parent	\$15
Two parents	25
Each additional dependent, grandchild, brother, or sister	5

If the serviceman files application, he is allowed six months to furnish documentary evidence of relationship or dependency. If the application is made by the dependents or by any person acting in their behalf, certain evidence must accompany the application, such as date of birth of minors, proof of marriage to the serviceman, and divorce and guardianship information where pertinent.

Payments will be mailed each month by Government check, and may be made to the dependent directly, or to the person designated by the serviceman, or determined to be the proper person by the head of the service department. Payments by the Office of Dependency Benefits are on a current basis for all applications properly submitted. Payments of benefits are begun before the serviceman completes the furnishing of documentary evidence of relationship or dependency. Delays in receipt of payments are generally due to improperly submitted applications, failure to submit documentary evidence, or to misunderstanding either by the dependent or the man on how to make application. At the request of the War Department the Red Cross is submitting field reports on Class "B" applications.

Allotments made by servicemen may continue for one year if the man is missing in action, interned, or captured. Where the man had

made no allotment, or had made one insufficient for reasonable support of dependents or for payment of insurance premiums, the Government department concerned may set up an allotment or increase the amount indicated by the serviceman. When the man has been officially listed, the War Department notifies the emergency addressee of the allotment provisions, and suggests that those who consider themselves eligible dependents ask the local Red Cross for assistance in applying for such benefits.

A Federal act of October 8, 1940, establishes a new system of insurance, called National Service Life Insurance, for persons in active service in the Army and Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard of the United States. This insurance protects only against death and is payable only to a restricted class of beneficiaries. No benefits are payable to the insured on account of permanent and total disability, but payment of premiums may be waived for six consecutive months or more in the event of the total disability of the insured.

The insurance is first issued as a policy on the five-year-level premium term plan and may be converted to the ordinary life plan, or the twenty-payment life plan, or the thirty-payment life plan at any time after one year, and must be converted within five years from date of issue. Persons entitled to purchase this insurance may secure policies in any multiple of \$500, but for not less than \$1,000 nor for more than \$10,000. Any eligible person may be granted the insurance without medical examination upon application and payment of premiums, or within 120 days after entrance into active service, whichever is the later date. Any man desiring to apply should inquire of his commanding officer or of the Red Cross field director. The insured may designate one or more beneficiaries but only in the following classes: wife or husband, child, parents, brother or sister. When a man dies in service benefits are available to the dependent, including provisions for burial, death gratuity, flag for burial, headstone, and accrued pay.

Pensions are payable for disability or for death due to injury or illness occurring in active service since the beginning of World War II, on or after December 7, 1941. Discharge from service must have been under honorable conditions and the disability incurred, in line of duty and not due to the claimant's own willful misconduct. Rates for disability pensions range from \$10 for 10 percent disability to

\$100 for total disability. There are also special rates for anatomical loss or loss of use of feet, hands, or eyes. In an effort to profit by World War I experience, filing of pension claims before discharge is being emphasized by the Red Cross.

Widows, children, and dependent parents of persons who die in service, or who die later through disabilities incurred in line of duty, may receive pensions. Remarriage ends all further rights of a widow, but not those of her children. Children's pensions stop at the age of eighteen except under certain conditions. Death pensions range from \$30 to \$40 for a widow, according to age, with additional amounts for children, varying from \$8 to \$15 according to age.

Dependent parents' amounts vary according to whether or not insurance benefits are being received. The maximum is \$45 for one parent, or \$25 each; the minimum, \$20 for one, or \$15 each. The lower amounts are paid where these plus the insurance payments being received equal or exceed the maximum rates.

The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of October 17, 1940, protects men in the military service from injury to their civil rights while in service. Provisions of this act are important for the families of the men. Such provisions include appointment of an attorney to represent the man's interests when he cannot appear in court; protection against eviction of a serviceman's family under certain circumstances; protection in installment purchase matters; protection against sale of property for nonpayment of taxes; coverage of commercial life insurance against lapse; and suspension or relaxation of certain requirements as to homestead and other rights on the land.

Maternity care for wives of men in military service and medical care for their children is provided by state public health agencies with Federal funds under the Social Security Act. Many times these funds are supplemented by those of private agencies.

When a serviceman is needed at home because of death, serious illness, or other real emergency, a furlough may be granted if military reasons do not prevent. The commanding officer usually asks the Red Cross field director to verify the illness or emergency and the need for the man's presence at home. The field director confers with the home chapter by wire. While discharge from the service because of dependency is infrequently given, provisions exist for such discharge in cases of unusual hardship.

Along with these important Government services and benefits for families of servicemen are those made available by private organizations, the principal one of which is the American Red Cross because of its semi-governmental status and nation-wide organization. The Red Cross program relating to service to the families of men of the armed forces is called Home Service. Each Red Cross chapter, and there is a chapter in every county of the country, 3,755 in total, has a Home Service Committee responsible for this activity. Home Service is directed in about one third of the chapters by professional workers and in the balance by specially trained volunteers who are under the supervision of Home Service field representatives of the national organization.

The primary responsibility of Red Cross Home Service is to assist the servicemen and ex-servicemen and their families in meeting those needs which arise from the man's service in the armed forces. Home Service in Red Cross chapters carries out the following functions:

1. *Communication and information service.*—Assistance with communications between servicemen and their families and with inquiries in regard to their welfare; information concerning regulations and legislation affecting service and ex-servicemen and their dependents

2. *Reporting service.*—Coöperation with the military and naval authorities by obtaining social history material required for medical treatment, and by making reports on home conditions needed by commanding officers in deciding questions of discharge, furlough, or clemency

3. *Claims service.*—Assistance to disabled ex-servicemen and their dependents and to dependents of deceased men in presenting claims for government benefits

4. *Family service.*—Financial aid for special needs not covered by public funds and basic maintenance when public relief is not available; consultation and help toward meeting those family difficulties which do not require financial aid; referral service enabling the client to use the resources of other organizations providing services not within the Home Service program

These functions are discharged by the Red Cross itself and are not transferrable to other organizations. There is clearance with other agencies for data available in records. These specialized serv-

ices are available to clients of other agencies, and information and communication services are available to agencies directly when such assistance is needed by the agency itself.

The function of family service is discharged by Home Service to the extent that any private family agency can meet family needs. Clients eligible for public relief will be referred to public welfare agencies, Home Service continuing with nonrelief services or supplementary financial assistance when needed. Clients ineligible for public relief, or for whom such is not available, are considered the responsibility of Home Service. In coöperating with other agencies offering specialized services (such as medical, psychiatric, and vocational services, and child placement), Home Service works jointly with these agencies when combined services are necessary, or makes referrals when their service can meet the needs presented. Cases currently active with other private family agencies may remain with those agencies, or representatives of both agencies will confer on individual cases to determine which agency will provide continuing family service.

Closely associated with Home Service in the chain of Red Cross services to the armed forces is Military and Naval Welfare Service. This unit of the national organization has responsibility for all Red Cross activities in military and naval posts, stations, camps and hospitals, and in offices of the Veterans Administration. A professional staff covers all such units at home and abroad. These staffs furnish the important link with Home Service in the chapters which makes it possible for the Red Cross to fulfill its congressional charter obligation "to act in matters of voluntary relief and in accord with the military and naval authorities as a medium of communication between the people of the United States of America and their Army and Navy."

The problems arising from the man's service in the armed forces for which Home Service is available cover a wide range. His wife or mother may be critically ill and the man's presence at the bedside may be desired. His wife or some other member of the family may require surgical attention, or a baby may be expected shortly. Taxation or legal questions may be worrying the family at home. The family may not have heard from the man in service for some time and is concerned regarding his welfare. Perhaps the allotment that

the man wrote his family about before he went overseas has not been received.

Oftentimes service on these problems involves two-way communication between the Home Service worker in the chapter and the Red Cross field director in the camp. Many times the chapter is merely the channel through which the family is just in touch with the public or private agency that can give the service required. Home Service does not displace other agencies or resources but makes full use of them. It helps the family if it is eligible to obtain Government benefits, and it assists when other resources do not exist.

Other organizations have established special welfare services to families of servicemen. United Service Organizations—Travelers Aid gives its traditional service to travelers who may be relatives of servicemen. Its information and referral services in camp and defense communities provide short-contact service to the family that may journey to the camp community to be near the serviceman or to the defense community to secure employment. Referral agreements exist between the Red Cross and Travelers Aid in such situations.

In legal matters the American Bar Association, through its national defense committee, has designated individual lawyers in various communities to furnish legal assistance for servicemen and their dependents. Legal aid societies render similar service.

Army Emergency Relief and the Navy Relief Society are organized within the services, particularly at Army and Navy posts and stations, to render assistance to servicemen and their families. Working arrangements exist between these societies and the Red Cross to utilize their full resources and avoid duplication.

Family welfare societies in many communities have extended their regular services to make special facilities available to families of servicemen. Coöperative agreements have been drawn up by the American Red Cross with the Family Welfare Association of America, with the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, and with the American Public Welfare Association. In these agreements the basic responsibility of the Government for the relief of persons in need of basic maintenance is recognized, as is the designation of the American Red Cross by the Army and Navy as the official agency to render service to the men in the armed forces and to their families. It is agreed that there must be full use of the resources of all organizations.

It should be stressed that the regular welfare services of the nation, including the social security system and the public welfare program, are fundamental to any plan of special welfare services for families of men in service. The regular and the special welfare services form a total program that assures adequate service to the men and their families.

SOCIAL CASE WORK IN RELATION TO SELECTIVE SERVICE AND THE REJECTEE

By LUTHER E. WOODWARD

AS SOON AS the Selective Service Law was passed social workers throughout the country expressed an active interest in making the resources of the social work profession available to the Government in many communities. The size of the mental health and social problems which developed during World War I were recalled, and much interest was shown in measures that might prevent misfortunes such as those which occurred twenty-five years ago. We remembered that in July, 1918, General John J. Pershing sent a cablegram to Washington from Chaumont:

Prevalence of mental disorders in replacement troops recently received suggests urgent importance of intensive efforts in eliminating mentally unfit from organization of the new draft prior to departure from the United States.

At that time few Americans had gone "over the top," but already war neuroses were occurring at an alarming rate.

We recalled also that as a result of World War I, the Veterans Administration had to build eighty-five hospitals with a total bed capacity of approximately eighty-one thousand, and that more than half the patients now being treated by the Veterans Administration are neuropsychiatric cases—a total, in 1942, of 34,457 out of 67,112 hospitalized veterans, and of these, 22,998 are recorded as "not service-connected" disabilities. This fact alone points to the need of careful screening by the selective service system.

On the basis of the experience of the last war, it was expected that 5 percent of all enlisted men and trainees would give evidence of some type of mental or emotional disorder prior to induction or

would show it shortly thereafter. (Two percent of those examined were excluded because of neuropsychiatric disorders, and an additional 3 percent were later discharged because they were found to be suffering from such disorders.) It seemed evident that a more careful selection would need to be made than was made twenty-five years ago. As was well stated in a recent article in *War Medicine*,

Modern warfare is intense and amazingly fast. Static warfare has given way to ever moving, dynamic combat. Dive bombers, massive tank divisions, giant high explosive bombs, the concentrated firing power of automatic weapons, the use of paratroopers and commandos—all call for men with stable nervous systems. It is quite correct to say that the soldier of today in the field of combat is being subjected to strain and pressure that have not been equaled or even approached in any previous war. The degree of efficient teamwork which modern mechanized warfare demands, and depends on, leaves no room for a weak link that will snap under pressure, with resultant tragedy to an entire unit.¹

As an English writer with long experience in the Royal Army Medical Corps aptly puts it, "Whereas in the last war the soldier had to adapt himself to discipline, in this he has to discipline himself to be adaptable."² This means that only the fairly intelligent and stable person can measure up to what is required.

Social workers throughout the country early recognized that social case records would furnish valuable material for determining the proper classification of registrants and that the use of social case work skills would be a most valuable adjunct in classification, but no provision was made in the Selective Service Law for the use of social workers, except as may be implied in Section 623.33 of the selective service regulations which provides:

(d) Local boards, with the assistance of the examining physician and such agencies that may be designated by the State Director of Selective Service, should seek from any source possible, information bearing on a history of mental disease in the family of the registrant or social maladjustment, poor work record, other mental or personality disorders of the registrant, or any physical condition which might cause the armed forces ultimately to reject the registrant.

¹ Lieutenant Colonel Leland E. Stillwell and Major Julius Schreiber, "Neuropsychiatric Program for a Replacement Training Center," *War Medicine*, III, No. 1 (January, 1943), 21.

² Major R. F. Tredgold, M.D., D.P.M., "Invalidism from the Army Due to Mental Disabilities: the Aetiological Significance of Military Conditions," *Journal of Mental Science*, LXXXVIII, No. 372 (July, 1942), 444-48.

In this connection it perhaps should be recalled that the selective service system was established many months before Pearl Harbor, with a view to procuring men for a peacetime army. These men were to serve one year in active training and then enter the Reserve, to be called upon as needed during the next ten years. With the advent of Pearl Harbor the country was plunged precipitously into global war, and the selective processes had to be greatly accelerated. While standards for admission were reduced considerably with regard to physical requirements, requirements as to mental and emotional stability were raised rather than lowered.

Although the Selective Service Law made no provision for the systematic use of social case workers, a considerable amount of experimenting has been done in various localities, and the medical division at national headquarters has been consistently interested in obtaining the help of social workers in making social and health histories available. Doubtless greater use would have been made of social workers had it been possible to surmount two particular difficulties: the large amount of autonomy possessed by each of the 6,403 local boards in the country, and the overburdening of local board members and clerks. Presumably, the giving of a large amount of autonomy to local boards was sound at the time the law was passed. There was then much isolationist sentiment, and it was believed that the operation of the selective service system would be more completely acceptable if it were administered by citizens of local communities. With the declaration of war and the need to speed up the selective processes, this local autonomy appears to have militated against quick and effective functioning of new directives from national headquarters, especially the recommendations of the medical division with regard to the responsibilities of the local boards to assemble social and health data that would assist in the proper classification of registrants.

Social work as an aid in the selective process is most needed in reference to registrants who have personality handicaps or are suffering from mental or emotional imbalance. These conditions, naturally, do not easily lend themselves to accurate diagnosis, especially if the time available for examination is exceedingly limited. Such conditions, however, are apt to be mirrored in the man's social and health history.

It is to be noted that without any appreciable amount of social

work assistance in many states the selective service system has screened out sizable numbers of men for neuropsychiatric reasons. Up until March, 1943, 9,222,000 men had been called up for examination by selective service local boards and were either rejected or forwarded to induction stations for pre-induction examinations. Of that number, 702,000 (7.6 percent) were rejected primarily because of nervous and mental diseases or disorders. Psychoneuroses were the cause of half the rejections; psychopathic personality accounted for another 4 percent; and the balance were rejected because of psychoses, of which schizophrenia was the chief, alcoholism, sexual perversion, epilepsy, and drug addiction. These figures do not include an approximate 270,000 (3 percent) who were rejected because of inability to meet the educational standards of the armed services.

While the selective service system thus rejects as mentally unfit a higher percentage than was anticipated on the basis of experience in World War I, these figures obviously do not tell the whole story. Many men have been inducted and partially trained, only to break down in service because of a mental or nervous condition. During the two-year period, November 1, 1940, through November 31, 1942, 60,103 men who had been inducted through the selective service were discharged on a certificate of disability, and additional numbers were discharged for inaptitude or for the "convenience of government." Of the 60,000 discharged on certificate of disability, approximately 32 percent represent discharges because of mental or nervous disorders. This means that from this group alone approximately 19,000 men passed a local board examination and an induction station examination, and subsequently broke down in service before any substantial portion of our Army had seen action.

In one experiment a group of 1,750 registrants who had been classified in Class I-A were examined carefully by a group of psychiatrists. By the criteria of these specialists only about one third of that group were considered fit for full military duty.³ This proportion may seem somewhat impractical in view of the Army's great need for men, but a study of 2,508 veterans of the present war who had been discharged from the armed services and sent back to the state of Illinois before August 1, 1942, yielded an estimate of 40

³ Ernest E. Hadley and others, "An Experiment in Military Selection," *Psychiatry*, V, No. 3 (August, 1942), 371.

percent as the proportion of men who were suffering from mental and emotional disorders sufficiently serious to incapacitate them for military duty; 6.2 percent were so ill that they had to be hospitalized.⁴ Several other studies have arrived at similar conclusions. Estimates from reliable sources place the probable number of discharges for mental and emotional reasons in the calendar year 1943 at more than one hundred thousand. The need for more careful screening is thus obvious.

Moreover, several retrospective studies which have been made of series of men discharged from the armed services indicate that there was available in their communities social and health data regarding many registrants which might have been used prior to their induction. For example, in an analysis of sixteen men discharged from the Army to a hospital in one community, it was found that five had previously been patients in a hospital for nervous and mental disorders; four were well known to social service agencies; and significant data regarding an additional six men could easily have been obtained in a social worker's interview with a member of each man's family. In other words, there were precursors of maladjustment in the records of fifteen of the sixteen men.⁵

In another study in the same city, of twenty-three men who were hospitalized after discharge from the Navy, two had previously been in a hospital for the mentally ill; five had received psychiatric treatment; and there were significant accessible and social data regarding twelve men, leaving only four cases in which there were no predictive factors.⁶ Still another study, of 200 consecutive admissions to a psychiatric division of an Army hospital, showed that 50 percent had histories of previous mental disorder.

Another study, of forty-eight men who suffered mental breakdowns in one Army camp over a six-month period, showed that two had previously been hospitalized for mental illness; three had been treated in a psychiatric clinic; six were known to social agencies; and significant personal or family information regarding seventeen others could have been easily solicited by social work procedures.

Of ninety-three men who were sent to a psychiatric division of a

⁴ Conrad S. Sommer, M.D., and Jack Weinberg, M.D., "Discharged Veterans of World War II in State Hospitals and in the Community," *Diseases of the Nervous System*, IV, No. 3 (March, 1943), 70-74.

⁵ *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, December, 1942, pp. 199-200.

⁶ *Ibid.*

large county hospital after discharge from the armed services, 10 percent had previously been patients in that same psychiatric division. In a series of 124 discharges admitted to the psychiatric division of another large city hospital, 17 percent had previously been patients in that psychiatric division, and an additional 14 percent had been under psychiatric treatment elsewhere. It is the opinion of the psychiatrists in these two hospitals that 75 or 80 percent of these men who suffered mental breakdown in the armed services—mostly during the training period—could have been detected if the usual brief psychiatric examination had been supplemented by good psychiatric social work histories.

An appropriate question is: "What can social case work offer to reduce this number of mental and emotional casualties?" Much is being done in many places. Psychiatrists serving at induction stations are unanimous in their desire for social work assistance. Without exception they express the opinion that the limited amount of time available for the examination of each man makes it impossible to do a thorough screening without the aid of social history material. Rejections for mental and emotional reasons vary from 4 to 15 percent. It is certainly not by accident that the states with the higher rates of rejection are those which provide more adequate psychiatric examinations and make use of social history material.

The method by which social work is brought to the assistance of the selective service system necessarily varies from state to state. Much depends on how social work is organized in each state and where social and health data are recorded. For example, some states have a well-kept, central index of people known to mental hygiene institutions and agencies, correctional institutions and agencies, and other social agencies within the state. On the other hand, some states have almost no centralized information, with the result that all the data has to be obtained from the local communities. Clearance of potential I-A registrants against state mental hygiene, correctional, and other indices results in the discovery of many of the men who would be the poorest risks in the armed services.

The second device used by social workers is the local social service exchange. These exchanges can usually identify between 30 and 50 percent of the potential I-A registrants, but the percentage on whom agencies are able to supply truly significant data to the exchange is much smaller. For example, in one series of selectees coming up

consecutively for pre-induction examination the social and health agencies registered with the exchange could provide significant data for only 3.6 to 8 percent—and by “significant” we do not mean sufficient to justify IV-F classification, but rather that it was regarded as valuable by the induction psychiatrists. In a few states from 12 to 20 percent of the registrants are identified through state files, but in most states clearance against state indices gives significant data on only 0.5 to 3 percent of the men of draft age. State clearance, plus investigation through social service exchanges and community agencies, in several states yield data which warrant either IV-F classification, or at least careful psychiatric study, of about 6 percent of all registrants.

While 6 percent is a small percentage of the total, it is apparently worth while to use both of these devices as an aid in selection. From a humane point of view, from the viewpoint of military efficiency, and from the standpoint of economy it is worth while. While the exact costs of registration, classification, induction, and board at the reception centers are a governmental secret, it is reliably reported that the per-capita cost of getting a man from his initial registration to his assignment in the armed forces is a sizable figure. More important than the saving in dollars is the obvious saving of manpower achieved by screening out before induction those who cannot adjust to the Army but who can continue to do acceptable work in civilian industry.

The various studies of discharges and of consecutive series of inductees suggest the likelihood that if maximum screening of the unfit is to be done it will be necessary for skilled investigators, presumably social workers, to interview persons who are not known to institutions or social agencies. The figures suggest the likelihood that for every man concerning whom really significant data is available, another man can be “spotted” through social work inquiry of members of the family and former employers. It seems impractical to consider having all potential I-A registrants interviewed by trained social workers; there is neither sufficient personnel nor available time for interviewing all the draftees, even if it were permitted.

In some communities trained social workers are made available to local boards to make investigations of certain men selected by the board. In some boards the social workers have access to the questionnaires of all registrants who are being considered for I-A classifica-

tion and can thus select additional men who may need investigation. This method of operating keeps the job an encompassable one and probably catches most of the cases in which the social workers' assistance is needed for proper classification.

Social workers can also be used helpfully in making psychiatric social investigations of men selected by the psychiatrists at induction stations for further study. The Army regulations permit a three-day deferment for the purposes of socio-medical study or hospital observation. In one state a psychiatric social worker is available in each urban center and a public health worker, in each rural county, so that reports may be obtained within forty-eight hours. In one large city, where a volunteer social worker is attached to each local board, the psychiatrists at the induction center send back to the local board for further study those men about whom they have some question and on whom diagnosis cannot be made without a history. The social worker then takes the history, and the man is returned for re-examination after the history has been sent to the psychiatrist.

Under present regulations only a limited number of conditions are recognized causes for rejection by the local selective service boards. In the psychiatric field these conditions are: history of treatment for mental disorder; verified epilepsy; enuresis continuous from childhood; aphonia (loss of speech) or stuttering so severe that the registrant cannot make himself understood or cannot repeat orders; and sex perversions. The use of social workers in aiding selective service results in the elimination at the local board level of men suffering from these manifestly disqualifying defects and thus prevents loss of employment, unnecessary trips to induction centers, and the very real embarrassment which occurs when farewell parties are given in anticipation of an induction which never occurs. Those men who are not eliminated at their local boards must undergo a physical and mental examination by the Army induction board, where a history of previous behavior is essential for an adequate psychiatric evaluation of questionable cases.

A service which is perhaps even more appreciated is the help which social workers can give to men who are about to be inducted and who face problems which they feel unable to solve, especially in the short time available before they enter the armed service. These problems are of all sorts. Sometimes men have to arrange for their families to take smaller quarters or to live with relatives, and

yet they are bound by a lease which seemingly cannot be broken. Other men expect to become fathers in the course of a few weeks or months and are reluctant to leave their wives.

In such situations the case worker can often render a greatly appreciated service, although of necessity it has to be of a short-term nature. Many an expectant father goes off to the service with a clearer mind and a happier heart because a case worker has helped to make the necessary arrangements for his wife. Case work help may secure proper health care for some families, with the coöperation of the Red Cross. Upon recommendation of the social worker local boards frequently are willing to grant deferment for one or two months so that the man can, with the social worker's assistance, put his affairs in order and insure a minimum of discomfort to his loved ones.

Figures already quoted indicate that approximately one million men have been rejected thus far for educational inadequacy or for mental and emotional difficulties, not to mention the millions who have been rejected for purely physical reasons. Many of these men are shocked to discover the extent and seriousness of their defects and are considerably distressed because of their rejection. Where social work help has been made available to local boards, case work help to rejectees can be organized at the local board level. Whether or not the man receives service depends upon his initiative in seeking such help. Most of those who were eager to get into the service and are greatly disappointed at their rejection more than welcome an opportunity to discuss the matter with an understanding case worker.

In at least a few communities service to rejectees is set up at the induction centers. The project as it is working out in the induction center of Milwaukee is described by Miss Dorothy Paull in a report approved by the Committee on Service to Rejectees:

The object of the service is to acquaint men and boys rejected for military service because of physical or mental disabilities with the medical and welfare resources in their own communities. Each man is given an opportunity to talk over his disappointment, his health problems, and his family or employment problems with a medical-social worker acquainted with services existing not only in Milwaukee but the entire state. It is, in other words, chiefly a counselling or referral service.

When the work was started December 14, 1942, it was expected that only a limited number would take advantage of it. To the surprise of all concerned, the great majority of men have not only indicated a desire

to talk over their problems, but will talk as long as the interviewer is able to listen, and will often wait several hours for an interview if necessary. In the first seven weeks 1,960 men were interviewed, or an average of 40-50 men per day. About one third were from Milwaukee County and the rest from other parts of the state. Approximately 60 percent of the Milwaukee men had been known to agencies. Almost 30 percent of the men interviewed were married men.

The army is prevented by law from giving out specific medical information. Each rejected man was given a note offering an interview, with the cause of rejection noted in code, so the worker's knowledge of reasons for rejection was obtained chiefly from the men themselves. Nervousness or emotional instability is the leading cause of rejection. Many types of psychiatric diagnoses are included in this group. Approximately 16 percent of the men interviewed were rejected because of nervousness, as they expressed it. Ear conditions are the second cause for rejection, approximately 12 percent being rejected for this reason. Hernia comes third with 8.3 percent, and heart conditions fourth with 7.7 percent.

Over half of the men report that they have family physicians and are urged to return to their own doctors. The great majority of referrals, therefore, are sent to the medical profession. Practically all men interviewed are employed and indicate a desire to attend to their own medical needs. Some, though employed, have heavy obligations or are indebted for past medical care for themselves and family. Some of these are referred to health or social agencies to work out a plan for medical supervision for the whole family.

Those from Milwaukee County who do not have a physician, and are able to finance their own medical care, are referred to the Milwaukee Physicians' Service Bureau. Those from outside Milwaukee County, without private physicians, are referred to the public health nurses in their own communities to obtain names of physicians.

Those not having a physician and unable to finance care are referred to health agencies. Out in the state the great majority are referred to the public health nurses or local health departments. Approximately 300 men with specific problems have been thus referred.

At the time of the referral the man is given a card of introduction to the agency. With his permission a brief referral report is sent through the mail the following day so that the agency will be expecting him and will contact him, should he be unable to reach them.

A very valuable and vital service has been rendered to men rejected because of tuberculosis. Through the coöperation of the public health nurses several men have been admitted to sanatoria for study and treatment within ten days after their examination at the induction station. Half a dozen others are now in the process of admission. Fifty-four men with pulmonary findings have been referred to public health nurses for help in arranging further study.

Generally speaking, medical care is available in almost every community either through the medical profession or a health agency.

Emergency service has been given boys who have broken down emotionally at the induction station. Several of these have proved to be rather serious cases and Milwaukee County men have been referred to the Milwaukee County Guidance Clinic, where they and their families are receiving the expert guidance of a psychiatrist. One boy from out in the state became disoriented and confused, so great was the shock of the rejection. Although he had been showing signs of mental breakdown for several months, neither his family nor his teacher had recognized his far-away stare and seeming confusion as serious. A local case work agency in his home town was notified of his condition and he was met at the station and immediately placed under expert psychiatric care.

Immediate value seems to result from an opportunity to talk over their first shock of rejection. This is particularly true of the younger boys, by whom rejection is considered a stigma. All of their friends are going into service. They dread the questions that will be asked. This is particularly true of the boys rejected because of nervousness. Not infrequently a boy will ask what he can tell his friends—he feels it is effeminate to be classed as nervous.

When a boy is told of heart disease, kidney trouble, or tuberculosis for the first time, he is naturally frightened. He does not know whether to continue in his present work, nor whether he needs to consult a physician. Just expressing his fears and doubts helps him to formulate plans. It is quite evident from letters received that many men are seeking medical attention who would probably not have done so had it not been for the interview.

Employment problems are also confusing. Many of the men have severed all connections contrary to the repeated advice of the selective service system, other men or women have been trained to replace them, and they do not know what to do. Some say, "I like my job but how can I go back? They gave me a farewell party and present last night. I can't go back. Maybe I'll go to California and work in an airplane factory." Many men have a keen desire to get away from their home town. A large proportion of this group quickly see the folly of escape and after discussing their chagrin are able to see the importance of the man behind the line. An effort is made in all such cases to help the man accept his diagnosis and rejection and to show him that the man on the front line would be helpless without supplies provided by the man behind the line. Those who do not have jobs or have a legitimate reason for changing are referred to the Wisconsin Employment Office nearest their home, as is recommended by the War Manpower Commission.

Well over a hundred men have now been referred to case work agencies for further study of their nervous problems. The case work agencies will in turn refer many of these to psychiatrists. Psychiatry and mental

hygiene are still such new fields to many, especially those from rural areas, that they are startled at the mention of such service. Therefore, the majority of men rejected because of nervousness are referred to case work agencies.

A considerable number of letters have been received from men in various parts of the state indicating that they have appreciated the service and are attempting to carry out suggestions. It is too early to know what percentage of all those referred to agencies have taken advantage of the service. Reports are also beginning to come from nurses and social workers in regard to referrals.

Unfortunately resources are not always available.

A typical story is that of a young man, twenty-five years of age, married with one child. He is in business for himself, intelligent, healthy in other respects, but nervous. His family had always been in comfortable circumstances. He had anticipated going to college, but in his last year of high school his father died suddenly. When seventeen, he left high school, took over his father's business, and became the sole support of his mother and two sisters. The girl of his school days—the only girl he had ever gone out with—had lost her mother several years earlier. Later her father died suddenly, leaving her alone. While he realized that marriage was financially unwise, he decided to go ahead with it. Thus his responsibilities increased during the depression years. Now, just as he is beginning to get on his feet, he discovers he is nervous and irritable. Instead of looking like a boy of twenty-five, he looks like a man of forty. He has stomach trouble, probably associated with his responsibilities and worries.

There is neither case work nor psychiatric service in this man's community. This is only one individual, and one type, of young man in this group of rejectees—fine-grained, conscientious, self-respecting men and boys for whom expert advice at this time may prevent serious mental and physical breakdowns later. Their mental problems are very real, and often complex. They need expert counsel, as well as sympathetic help. And expert counsel means the observation and guidance of psychiatrists and psychiatric social workers. Well-intentioned, but untrained people, trying to help these men, may only serve to increase the seriousness of their problems instead.

It is our conviction that no greater public service could be given to Wisconsin by men and women interested in our national morale than in working for the establishment and extension of mental hygiene and guidance facilities, on a professional basis, in the more rural sections of the state.

THE SCREENING OF SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES

By ALLAN STONE

THE LACK of available social histories and the limited amount of time which the examining psychiatrist has at his disposal have resulted in the induction into the armed forces of many thousands of men who are suffering from psychiatric disabilities of one kind or another. It has been established that the psychiatrists at the induction stations throughout the nation have been seriously handicapped by this lack of necessary background information and by the pressure of processing large numbers of inductees.

In the short space of time allotted for the psychiatric examination of the selective service registrant it has often been impossible to determine with complete accuracy the existence of psychiatric disabilities—disabilities which may come to the fore after induction. How many men with epilepsy, syphilis of the central nervous system, low mentalities, emotional instability, psychoses, or neuroses have been passed by the induction boards it is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy. It is safe to say that the figure is large.

While it is true that many men with such disabilities may be able to adjust satisfactorily to civilian life, the problems put before them by their entrance into, and service in, the armed forces may cause an intensification of the disability, or a complete breakdown. Our experience has clearly indicated that in many instances inductees with a history of a psychiatric disability have broken completely in army life. These same men, it was often found, had been making fairly satisfactory adjustments to civilian life prior to their induction. The transition from civilian to army life, the regimentation, and the

fear of combat duty were factors which led to their complete breakdown. In some instances they inflicted bodily harm on themselves and on fellow soldiers and civilians. The result is that many of these men now require institutionalization, and the remainder have had their chances for a recovery seriously handicapped. The damage done to the individual is immeasurable, and the army gains nothing from his service. The cost of care of such men who have suffered acute mental breakdowns while in the armed forces is estimated at from \$30,000 to \$50,000 per man. It is clear, therefore, that from a social and a financial standpoint, adequate psychiatric screening of such men, prior to their actual induction, is tremendously more economical to the services and to the community than the care necessary after the breakdown occurs.

Communities throughout the country are now beginning to receive in ever increasing numbers men discharged from the armed forces because of mental breakdowns. Social agencies in each community have known many of these men and their families and have been acquainted with the past history of existing disabilities.

If the examining psychiatrists at the induction stations were supplied with data bearing on the case history and the psychiatric disabilities occurring in the registrant or his family, their ability to make a closer check of the fitness of the registrant would be greatly enhanced. An important phase of this selection is the securing of social data bearing on the registrant and his family. Authorization for the use of these data is found in the selective service regulations, but there is no provision for the personnel to carry out such a program.

Here, then, is a program which social work agencies, both public and private, can easily organize and put into operation. This program of furnishing the armed forces with such pertinent data as the agencies may have in their possession is a direct and tangible contribution which social work as a whole can make to the war effort. There is a growing interest in this program, and in a number of areas it is already under way and is proving to be of definite value.

This interest on the part of those in the field of social welfare has been sharply accentuated by some of the more tragic examples of mental breakdown of men in the services. The loss in manpower, so vital to the war effort, cannot be too strongly stressed.

One case from the files of a state hospital in Minnesota can easily

be matched by innumerable cases of a similar type. It is cited here to emphasize the importance of extending the selective service screening program to as many areas as is possible. A farm boy, twenty-three years of age, had been making a favorable adjustment on the farm prior to his induction into the armed forces. There had been, however, some evidence of a previous maladjustment, while he was in high school. A condition which may be safely described as an episode of catatonic behavior caused the boy to be hospitalized for a number of weeks, and although he cleared promptly, he discontinued his schoolwork and returned to the farm, where he made a favorable marginal adjustment. In December, 1941, he was selected for service and went through the usual induction into the Army. The local selective service board was undoubtedly aware of the fact that the family was considered somewhat unstable and that an older brother was already an inmate of a state hospital, but no mention was made of these facts. The patient went into the Army, only to have a rather severe period of excitement and subsequent catatonic behavior about six weeks or two months after his induction. The result was his eventual discharge from the Army, suffering from dementia praecox, and he was returned to his home county. From there he was sent to a state hospital, where he is at the present time.

This appears to be a needless waste of a farm worker, resulting in another social dependent for the state and a considerable amount of futile expenditure of energy on the part of the Army medical officer, as well as in the placing of another financial burden on the Government. It is but one of the many illustrative cases which have resulted in an increased interest in the extension of an adequate screening program.

Of the several programs which have been put into operation in scattered areas, each has been adjusted to the particular social agency situation. In St. Paul the program for furnishing data relative to psychiatric disabilities of selective service registrants has been established with the approval and coöperation of the state selective service headquarters. The medical officers of the Fort Snelling induction station are making full use of the case summaries that are furnished them. The program is officially a part of the St. Paul Council of Social Agencies. An executive committee, composed of psychiatrists, welfare administrators, and case workers, is responsible for the general policies and operations of the program, while the

Case Work Committee is responsible for the review of case histories and the preparation of case summaries for the induction station. This latter committee is composed of psychiatric social workers, case workers, and psychologists drawn from the case work agencies in the community. The psychologists render valuable aid in the proper interpretation of test scores. The screening program operates as follows:

The Minnesota selective service headquarters has ordered the local boards in St. Paul and Ramsey County to furnish the screening committee with identifying information on each registrant in Class I-A. This information is prepared on standard cards and is sufficiently complete to permit the proper identification of the registrant. These identification cards are prepared by the local boards from four to eight weeks prior to the induction of the registrant.

The cards are then submitted to the Central Registration Bureau of the County Welfare Board. This bureau is a social service exchange for all health and welfare agencies in the area. A record of registrations for commitments of local residents to state hospitals and correctional institutions is also available here. The bureau clears the registrant's card against its master files and notes on the reverse side of the identification card any institutional registrations of the draftee and his family. Experience with this screening program has revealed that the Central Registration Bureau has a record of registrations for 67 percent of the families in St. Paul and Ramsey County. While the reasons for these registrations have not been analyzed, it is safe to state that the depression of the thirties was one of the major factors which contributed to this high percentage of families known to social agencies in the community.

As the next step, the Case Work Committee sends a standardized social agency report form to selected family and children's agencies, guidance clinics, and health and welfare agencies which know the registrant or his family. The report forms, one or more of which may be sent out for each selective service registrant, are completed by the case workers in the several selected agencies. Major headings of information called for by the report form are: psychological reports, history of neuropsychiatric disabilities, health history, police and court record, personality traits, school history, employment history, and family history. The agencies have been requested to return the reports to the Case Work Committee within a period of three

days in order that continuity and coördination with the induction program can be maintained.

The Case Work Committee then reviews all report forms, and when it determines that sufficient data are available relative to psychiatric disabilities of the registrant and his family, a brief case summary is prepared, outlining the available and verified information. These case summaries follow the general pattern of the social agency report form. The summaries are placed in plain envelopes marked "For the use only of the Neuropsychiatric Department, Army induction station," and are sent to the local board for transmittal to the induction station at the time the registrant reports for induction.

Proper steps have been taken to insure that the information contained in the summaries is kept confidential. The summaries do not become an official part of the registrant's file but are retained at the induction station. The confidential nature of the material has been respected by all persons and officials involved in the screening program.

The selective service screening program went into operation in St. Paul and Ramsey County on January 1, 1943, and has met with an enthusiastic response from the health and welfare agencies in the community and from the Army medical officers responsible for this phase of the induction process. The program has just recently been set into operation in Minneapolis, and plans are being made to extend it to other areas.

In four and one-half months of operation in St. Paul the names of approximately 4,600 Class I-A registrants have been processed. Case summaries have been prepared for the use of the induction station in 6 percent of the cases. On a random sample of twenty-three registrants for whom summaries had been prepared, the induction station took the following action:

Thirteen registrants were rejected for service because of a neuropsychiatric disability.

Eight registrants were accepted for service where the summaries indicated minor disabilities insufficient to warrant rejection.

One case was reported as a possible, but not a diagnosed epileptic, and was rejected on the basis of an epileptic condition after a more thorough examination at the induction station.

One case was rejected on the basis of a physical disability and was not seen by the examining psychiatrist.

Therefore, in fourteen out of twenty-two cases actually seen by the psychiatrist the registrants were rejected for military service with the assistance of the summaries prepared by the screening program.

Under the demands of the induction program now in effect, the responsibility for the screening out of men with psychiatric disabilities cannot be placed solely on the shoulders of the examining psychiatrists at the induction station. Equal responsibility rests squarely with those in social welfare who have access to the information which the medical officer unquestionably needs and welcomes. He is eager and willing to have placed in his hands that information which will guide him in making a more accurate evaluation of the registrant's ability to make a satisfactory adjustment in the armed forces.

Bear in mind, however, that in spite of the desire of the examining psychiatrist for available pertinent data, neither the Army induction station nor the selective service system is in a position to go into the local community to organize the machinery for obtaining the information. The mere issuance of a directive will not bring about the operation of an adequate screening program by morning. Rather it remains for those who have worked in and with social agencies to evaluate their community resources and to organize the screening program. They know their community organizational problems, they know the operational procedures of the health and welfare agencies, and they know what data are available in agency files for the use of the induction station.

How, then, does a community proceed with the organization of a screening program such as has been described? What steps must be taken in bringing the importance of the program to the attention of the health and welfare agencies and institutions? What additional burden does this program place on the already seriously overburdened professional staffs of the agencies? And what does the program cost the community in terms of dollars and cents?

The selective service screening program should be presented for consideration to the local council of social agencies, for it is the council which can encourage the adoption of the program and can assist materially with the general planning and guidance necessary to the program. The Council of Social Agencies officially sponsors the screening program in St. Paul, while in Minneapolis the council has designated the Family Welfare Association through its depart-

ment of services to the armed forces to be responsible for the program operation. If the program is to succeed it must secure the full coöperation of all those agencies which may have data bearing on the neuropsychiatric problems of the inductees from that community.

Two and one-half years of a rapidly expanding armed force, together with the thousands of cases of the induction and enlistment of men who have broken mentally while in service, have fully convinced everyone in the field of social work that a more careful examination of the inductee is of vital importance. The tragic cases of mentally broken men who have been returned to the community are more illustrative of the problem than any description could be. Experience in the establishment of the screening program has indicated that the staffs of the social agencies are anxious and willing to assist in its operation.

This leads directly to a consideration of the additional burden this program places on the already overburdened staffs of the agencies. First, the agency and its staff members must give serious consideration to the values of the screening program in relation to the other services which the agency is now performing. How can this service to the armed forces be geared into agency operation? It must be frankly stated that original planning for the program contemplated the use of the professional workers' time on a volunteer basis. Much volunteer time is still being given in St. Paul. However, as the program progresses and as its value to the armed forces and to the community is being daily demonstrated, it is becoming more and more a regular function in an increasing number of agencies.

What does the screening program cost the local community? If measured in the terms of the saving of an individual from a complete breakdown and the prevention of another lifetime case for a mental hospital, the program costs nothing; rather, large dividends are forthcoming. Measured in terms of the cost of the discharge of the man who has suffered mental breakdown in the service and in hospitalizing or institutionalizing him, the cost to the local community is negligible. Experience has shown that the actual outlay of funds for the operation of the program is very slight when compared to the other services the agencies are offering. It has not been necessary to establish an elaborate staff to operate the program, since the agencies in many instances are willing to assist in meeting the necessary costs of its operation.

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIPS

By FLORENCE HOLLIS

IN SPITE of the fact that we have now been at war for over a year we are still just beginning to understand some of the effects of our industrial and military mobilization on individual human lives. Changes have not come suddenly and dramatically as we expected at first. Just as our armies had to mobilize slowly and industry had to go through a period of trial and error, so social work has only gradually begun to find its place in the war, begun to understand its dual role—on the one hand, helping the individual citizen to make his maximum contribution to the war and, on the other, assisting him to bear more easily whatever changes the war may bring to his life. Just as the military or industrial leader must first understand the problem that confronts him before he can plan to meet it, so the social worker must learn to estimate the real nature of the difficulty with which he must work. There is just as much danger in overestimating a problem as there is in underestimation. Likewise, it is foolish to assume that a problem is strange and new when it is merely a new arrangement of familiar forces and conditions.

Our first step, then, must be one of observation and study. What do our case loads show to be the effects of the war on marriage relationships? It was with the hope of answering this question that I read early this spring a series of case histories of marriage conflict coming from cities in various parts of the country. While this was not a study of sufficient breadth or depth to warrant conclusive statements, it did yield definite impressions. But let me emphasize the focus of this paper. First, it deals with the impact of the war on marriage relationships, not on general family life. It is impossible in a nation at war for any family to be unaffected by the changing

currents of community life—economic, physical, sociological, and psychological. What effects are these national currents having on the relationship between husband and wife? Second, it discusses, not “war marriages,” but marriages that were established before the war and had therefore begun to show their quality under peacetime conditions.

We know that the war effort has two main phases—the industrial and the military. Each has its own effects on civilian life and each must be considered separately in its impact on marriage. Though we are sometimes loath to admit it, there is no denying the fact that industrially the war has brought some definite advantages. Certainly today there is a job for almost everyone who wants one. There is no question but what this in itself has had a favorable effect on many marriages. While we may doubt whether financial distress alone causes serious marital conflict, it can scarcely be denied that it frequently increases existing conflicts. During the depression we learned what money and a job mean to a man or a woman. To both, the ability to earn money is a symbol of adequacy, and money given by a husband to his wife usually represents an expression of his love and his wish to care for her. Furthermore, the absence of money causes a series of physical and social privations which, in turn, make it more difficult for people to tolerate each other if they already have reason for mutual irritation. Conversely, under present conditions of employment, possession of an adequate income may increase the tolerance of a husband and wife for each other's foibles.

The Foley family provides an interesting illustration. Mr. Foley is a good-natured alcoholic. Typically, he married a rather motherly, dominant, capable woman who has alternately loved and nagged, while he has alternately deserted and returned to his ever growing family. Mr. Foley was a skilled workman, but he had long been unemployed. Although he had been drinking less during the last few years, he had little initiative in looking for work. Shortly after Pearl Harbor he secured work in a shipyard. After a brief period of employment he became ill and was absent for about a week. The illness may well have been psychological reaction to his new responsibilities, and in ordinary times his faint effort toward self-support would thus have ended in failure. However, his work was really needed, and he was welcomed back. Mrs. Foley, meanwhile, had gained considerable understanding of her husband. She took every opportunity

to show her appreciation of the usefulness of his work and pointed out to him his importance to the war effort. As she commented to the case worker, "To hear me talk you'd think he was winning the war by himself."

It has been interesting to watch Mr. Foley's use of his money. At first he wanted it all for himself, for he had not had a new suit for years and had had no spending money. Gradually, however, he reached the point where he was willing to contribute a fair proportion of his wages to the upkeep of the home.

This is a familiar pattern. Before the depression case workers had considerable success in helping the motherly but dominant woman to use her warmth and strength to support her husband rather than to weaken him. In depression years we lost some of our skill and confidence in this approach because so often industry could not absorb the borderline worker, and eventually the wife's unrewarded patience wore thin as the husband's half-hearted efforts to get work met continual rebuff. We need to pick up these skills again. The current of events is with us now, and many borderline workers may be recruited for useful war work and kept on the job if supportive help can be given to their family relationships.

The Foley case also demonstrates the increased prestige value of manual work. Most marriages run more smoothly if a man and his wife feel that he is doing something worth while. A marriage is not made or broken on that score alone, but it is one of the valuable props of successful family life.

Another generally beneficial effect of the war has been the increase in wage rates. This, of course, has been very uneven in its effects. Many workers have not had substantial wage increases and find themselves at a greater disadvantage than ever with rising living costs. It cannot be concluded, however, that this generally healthy and desirable trend has in all instances favorably affected married life.

Mr. Martens, for example, was employed in a useful and necessary job by a utility company. He was adequately paid and had opportunities for advancement and security for the future. However, his friends were making more money in war industries. His contribution to the war effort would be no greater in the job to which he wanted to shift; he would merely be exchanging postwar security for more immediate benefits. The case worker encouraged him to

stick to his work. Nevertheless, the pull of high wages was too strong, and he made the shift. While he was learning the new job his pay was low, and the financial burden became so heavy that he threatened to desert his family. First the public agency and then the private family agency supplemented his wages. Finally his wife took a job in a hospital, in spite of the fact that she had eight young children. From our point of view it was a foolish choice, but for him it was a necessary one. It then became the job of the case worker to help make the situation a workable one and to keep it from disrupting a marriage that in many respects was satisfying.

A counterpart of this situation arises when the wife rather than the husband presses for higher wages. When she sees that other women's husbands earn more money, a wife's latent dissatisfaction with her husband's position may flare up. If the husband is not willing or able to make a change, his wife's pressure may cause him to lose satisfaction in his job. His pleasure in taking care of her and the children may disappear, and bickering and quarreling result.

Still another variation of the wage problem occurs in the man who measures his own success in terms of contrast between his own earnings and those of other men. Regardless of the adequacy of his income, if he does not share in boom wages he becomes restless and irritable. Again the marriage relationship may suffer.

Likewise, long and irregular work hours may be an additional factor in increasing general anxiety and irritability. The average person experiences considerable difficulty in adjusting to the night shift, particularly if there are children in the family so that it is not easy to maintain quiet. For the anxious person it is doubly hard. In situations where marital strains already exist these industrial pressures undoubtedly lessen the man's ability to work out a comfortable relationship.

Many other current industrial pressures deserve mention—employment in dangerous work, long hours of daily travel, employment at distant places involving family separations, family migration to boom towns with their overcrowding and inadequate facilities. All these additional burdens make it more difficult for husband and wife to deal with whatever tensions may already exist.

Inherent in this whole discussion of marriage relationships is the concept of multiple causation. While there is usually a central, fairly unified core of the trouble (and I would agree with those who

believe that this is primarily a matter of personality pattern rather than of external conditions), there are also often contributory factors that either augment the degree of central conflict or tend to lighten it or make it more bearable. It is an adolescent notion that a marriage is either ideally happy or a failure. Most marriages fall somewhere between these two extremes.

If we were to make a point scale for rating marital happiness, as some sociologists have done, we should find a distribution all along the line from "very unhappy" to "very happy." Those at the bottom of the scale would in all probability not come to the attention of the social worker until they were in the process of dissolving their marriages. It would be in the middle group that our assistance would be needed—people who value each other yet cannot live together without conflict. In some of these marriages the satisfactions just barely outweigh the frustrations; in others, the reverse is true. It is quite possible that these people will never reach the very top of the scale of happiness, but they may, under favorable conditions, achieve a reasonably secure and satisfying marriage. Under other circumstances they may drop so far down the scale that the relationship might better be dissolved. This difference may be brought about by a change in the fundamental core of the problem, but it may also be effected by a lightening or deepening of some of the contributing causes of dissatisfaction. It is here that working conditions enter into the problem. The feeling of doing useful work, prestige, money—these are contributing factors that may not only affect the central problem itself, but also provide surrounding satisfactions that may increase tolerance for other irritations. On the other hand, dissatisfactions and fatigue are likely to have the opposite effect.

One of the dominant trends of this war is the increasing employment of women. What the general effect of this will be on marriage is hard to say. If Pearl Buck is right in stressing the consciousness of boredom and uselessness in the average middle- and upper-class woman we might expect that her entrance into industry would increase a woman's sense of well-being and, in turn, her ability to contribute to a healthy marriage. There seems little reason to doubt that this is often true.

We know, however, that in our complicated society, with its traditional concept of employment as a masculine prerogative, a woman's working may have symbolic meaning for her husband and

may be a threat to him if he is not altogether secure in his masculinity. There is certainly a real question as to whether a mother can carry a double load without becoming so fatigued that she is unable to carry her share of mutual living, either physically or emotionally. This depends, of course, on a variety of factors, including health, natural energy, and the extent of home responsibilities.

There were several illustrations among the records of increased marital conflict resulting from the entrance of a wife into industry. This was particularly true where the woman's earnings were higher than her husband's or where her general work adjustment was more successful. The records also demonstrated some of the effects of work opportunities for women in marriages in which there was already considerable conflict. In each instance greater employment opportunities meant the practical possibility of separation without too severe financial privation.

Mrs. Jamison was critical of her husband's inability to find better paying work. Actually he was not a very bright person, and her great pressure served only to make him frantic in his efforts and thus even less capable of succeeding. Treatment consisted, in part, in helping Mrs. Jamison to become clear about her feelings and also about the reality of her husband's limitations. The fact that she would now have little difficulty in supporting herself brought her face to face with the question of whether her dissatisfactions did, in reality, overbalance the positive values of her marriage. Surprisingly enough, she found that she did not want to leave him. With this realization she engaged much more wholeheartedly in really learning how to live with her husband. She learned to appreciate his efforts and refrained from urging him to accomplishments beyond his powers. Subsequently, Mr. Jamison found employment and carried through a training program in line with his abilities. While this result might not have been impossible without the presence of work opportunities for Mrs. Jamison, the process was undoubtedly accelerated by this factor.

In other instances industrial conditions made possible actual periods of separation in which both husband and wife learned that there were more positive values in their marriage than they had realized. Each brought to the subsequent reconciliation greater willingness to try to make a go of their relationship.

On the other hand, there were instances in which work oppor-

tunities made it possible to carry out plans for permanent separation in marriages that clearly were not workable. It is true that even in normal times these women might have found a way of carrying out their plans, but self-support is not easy when a woman is untrained and has a small child. Many marriages are prolonged by this practical difficulty until more children are born, and independent self-support becomes almost an impossibility.

It is obvious that the marriage tensions that existed in these typical situations were not created, though they may have been accentuated, by war conditions. In the overwhelming majority of cases conflict had existed for some time and had arisen from other factors. Individuals who were already having marital troubles made use of war conditions to meet their own needs. The roots of the trouble, however, lie elsewhere. This was to be expected. The experience of the last war as of this one demonstrated that when emotional breakdown occurred in men in the armed forces a history of previous emotional instability was usually found. Is it surprising that we find a parallel situation in marital conflict? It would be contrary to expectations only if we thought that such instability was caused primarily by environmental factors. If we are inclined to believe that marital maladjustment can be traced fundamentally to the personalities of the two people and the drives that originally led them to choose uncongenial partners, then this is the expected finding. This fact has implications for case workers. It means that in trying to help in these situations we are dealing primarily with the same elements as in peacetime, although they may appear in different guises. The more clearly we recognize this the more easily we shall orient ourselves to the client's need.

Many married men enlisted in the armed forces when enlistment was a possibility, others have already been drafted and many more will soon be called. What is the impact of this on marital relationships?

No one would deny that many married men did enlist for strongly felt patriotic motives and entered the Army or Navy despite the fact that their affectional ties at home were strong. It is equally true, however, that there is a group of men for whom enlistment provided a welcome escape from wives with whom they found it difficult to get along. Sometimes the enlistment was impulsive, as in the case of Mr. Muncy, who took his first steps toward enlist-

ment after a quarrel with his wife. He actually hoped and expected that she would stop the proceedings by claiming dependency, but she was angry, too. Now both are sorry. Both made desperate attempts to have him released, for she was pregnant and in a highly emotional state, but it proved impossible. It is hard to know what the ultimate effect on this marriage will be. The fact that both people were involved in the step may make it somewhat easier to bear. There had been ups and downs in the marriage before, and it may be that a period of separation will not be without its advantages.

In contrast, Mr. Gerson's enlistment was more deliberately planned. He had been separated from his wife for some time and had come to the definite decision that he did not want to return to her. Army service was not so much the means of freeing himself from an unsatisfactory marriage as it was a factor in carrying him over a difficult period of readjustment. He made an excellent adjustment to military life and was happier than he has been for years.

Another type of behavior appears in these records. Frequently, there are cases in which a wife reports her husband to the selective service board for nonsupport, thus causing him to be drafted. Case workers have long been familiar with the angry, punishing wife who wants the judge to "teach her man a lesson" by sending him to jail. Now she possesses a weapon of no mean power. Sometimes she uses it as a threat; sometimes she actually does cause her husband to be drafted. She usually does not face the possibility of his being injured or killed, but rather thinks of the "wonderful discipline," and hopes "it will make a man of him." It is surprising how completely some of these wives have rationalized their action. Whether this will hold if their husbands are wounded or killed or whether they then will have extreme guilt reactions remains to be seen. It will probably differ with the individual and depend on such factors as the degree of suffering the wife has experienced through her husband's previous behavior, the degree to which she loves as well as rejects him, her capacity for repression, and her usual methods for handling anxiety. In most instances the man will return uninjured. The result is then likely to be merely that the marital difficulty has gone through a period of suspension. In all probability, the same forces will again be at work, and in all likelihood the previous situation will repeat itself.

The most common situation of all remains to be discussed—that

of the married man who is drafted in the natural course of events. Since the material from which this discussion was gathered entirely from agencies dealing with civilians it will be possible to discuss only the woman who is left at home. Here we have a wide range of reactions depending partly on the personality pattern of the wife and partly on the type of relationship that existed in the marriage. Since most marriages are a mixture of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, almost every wife whose husband enters the service has a sense of severe loss, a sense of deprivation and of frustration. The healthy, socialized responses to an inevitable loss are grief and sorrow. Under the sorrow there is anger at whatever forces and circumstances have brought about the separation, but since nothing can be done about it, the energy finds expression in tears or is turned against the self in depression. A period of low spirits, and even of some confusion, is normal and may help in the ultimate reorientation of energy. People vary in the degree to which they show their feelings or allow themselves to be conscious of them.

I do not want to exaggerate this suffering. The separation is not complete. There are letters. During the training period there are short furloughs and perhaps visits to the camp. It is true too that the great majority of men in the armed forces will come home safe and sound. Nevertheless, the sense of loss is severe, and the threat of total separation cannot help but be felt. I stress this because we must not be Pollyannish when we try to help people through this difficult time. If a woman is grieving we need to give her a chance to act out and live out these feelings, not try to smother them in admonitions to be "brave."

There is, however, a second step in this process of adjustment—the reorganization of energy, turning it out again, away from the self into new channels that give a goodly measure of substitute satisfaction. Some women will already have well-developed channels for their energies; others will need help in finding new ones. For many, entrance into industry may be a part of the solution; and a very useful part, for through this they will advance the war effort as well as contribute to their own peace of mind. In this process of readjustment the case worker can be of great assistance. Because she understands the grief, she can give her client time for emotional recovery. Then, because she understands the need for reorientation

and knows community resources, she can hasten the process of re-adjustment.

We have been talking of the well-balanced person who makes a rapid recovery. This will not be possible for everyone. There are also the neurotic and slightly neurotic ways of meeting loss. There are people who have a high state of anxiety, others who become deeply depressed and seem unable to recover. Others throw their emotions outward, feeling that there has been discrimination and accusing the selective service boards of unfairness. We must remember that we are dealing with severe deprivation—a traumatic external blow. Even slightly neurotic people will have strong reactions, and, if we judge by symptoms alone, will seem to be even more sick than they really are. This is not to deny the fact that deeper neuroses will be reactivated and that psychiatric help may sometimes be necessary. There are all degrees of severity of neurosis, from the slight emotional disturbances found in almost everyone to severe clinical-type neurotic patterns. The degree to which emotional disturbance shows in behavior is dependent both on the degree of internal difficulty and on the severity of external blows. This particular type of situation in which a person is thrown off balance by a severe blow is one for which case work is particularly appropriate. It requires a combination of ability to encourage free expression of feeling, skill in fostering the development of a degree of insight, a realistic approach in helping a person to become interested in reorienting his energies, and resourcefulness in helping to carry practical plans into effect.

The Army Emergency Relief referred Mrs. Kennedy to an agency, mentioning a letter from her husband begging for help for his wife who had written that she was contemplating suicide. Mrs. Kennedy, when first seen by the worker, was sitting with her head on her arms in a crowded waiting room and seemed bewildered when called by name. During the ensuing interview she talked freely about her despair over her husband's leaving three months before. She described their idyllically happy marriage of a year and a half's duration, marred only by the loss of their first child four months before Mr. Kennedy's induction. After her husband was drafted, Mrs. Kennedy found a job. However, she had been absent more than she had worked because she constantly felt so ill and discouraged. She had grown to dislike their small apartment; furthermore, she could not

really afford to maintain it. Yet she could not bring herself to make other plans. She had cut herself off from her family because they were always urging her to be brave and to forget her troubles.

In subsequent interviews, Mrs. Kennedy at first listed all the reasons for her inability to move, seek health care, go to work, or visit her friends. Then slowly another side of her marital relationship began to emerge. She had found that Mr. Kennedy had been attracted to a young girl several months after their marriage. Although others were aware of his infatuation, she had not learned of it until she was fairly well along in her pregnancy. The double barb of his infidelity and her own ignorance caused her to become sharp-tongued and cold. However, her inability to be self-supporting made separation seem impractical. Then their child's death drew them together again, only to have Mr. Kennedy drafted four months later.

It was after she had poured out these painful experiences that Mrs. Kennedy was able to consider her present situation realistically. Finally, she was able to go to the doctor and her health improved. This enabled her to return to work, where she not only found financial security, but was able to renew old friendships. Her mother's illness provided an easy re-entrance into her family group. Finally, she arranged to store her furniture, and room with friends.

There were several other illustrations of women who were caught in their grief and anger and unable to move forward in making practical plans. In every instance part of the case worker's help lay in her ability to free the person so that she could unload the burden of feeling. This was linked with, or followed by, assistance in practical planning. In some cases, a further step in treatment lay in encouragement of self-understanding.

When we speak of the development of self-understanding we do not mean insight into deeper motivation of conduct. What a person does need is insight into the ways in which she is handling her sense of loss and frustration. If she is turning anger against herself, she needs to see this. If she is unrealistically accusing a selective service board of unfairness, she needs to recognize this. If she is expecting special favors from the world to make up for her loss, that too needs to be understood. If she is acting like an angry child, this too is something which she should recognize. All this must be delicately and sympathetically done. These actions are the results of inner suffering. However, if the women concerned are reasonably well

balanced emotionally, they will be able to understand themselves and, as they do, they will find more useful ways of expending their energies.

It is exceedingly important that we learn how to help women to adjust to the drafting of their husbands. We are now moving into that phase of the war in which married men will be drawn into the services on a larger scale. They cannot put their best into their new jobs if their relationships with their wives are strained, if letters from home are full of troubles and complaints. Neither can the wives carry their extra burdens if they have not found a way of working out their feelings concerning the separation.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR AS SEEN BY THE SOCIAL WORKER

By *ELEANOR CLIFTON*

THE SOCIAL WORKER has always been in a particularly advantageous position to observe what is happening to the individual in mass situations. During the depression when people suffered by the thousands and mass methods for immediate financial help had to be employed, social workers held firm to their conviction that the victims of the disaster must also be individualized and given the understanding and help that their particular needs indicated. If it had not been for this constant awareness and activity on the part of the social work group, the casualties would have been infinitely more serious, and the functioning of many who are now contributing steadily and effectively to the war effort would have been permanently impaired. Now that another and a much graver crisis is facing our citizens, social workers are again doing their part.

Throughout our lives, our adjustment depends upon what we bring to situations and what they require of us. If we are weak, confused, frightened, or unhappy, even the normal demands of life may prove too much for us. If, moreover, we are faced with a situation too harsh, too cruel, or too terrifying, even the healthiest of us may find adjustment difficult. The job of the case worker has usually been to find out where the real difficulty in adjustment lies—in the individual, or in his situation, or in both—and to direct help accordingly.

We know that the war situation is an inescapable reality which cannot be changed or lessened and which affects everyone to a greater or less degree. If social workers are to help people weather the strains, hardships, and hurts that it involves, their task must be to understand

what is happening to the particular individual or family, to estimate all available resources and strengths, and to help the individual or family to use these or to find new resources to meet the increased problems of living.

Some of the effects of the war situation upon family life are universal and within the average person's capacity to tolerate. We are all faced with the frustrations and irritations of food shortages, higher living costs, priorities, rationing, and increased taxes. Many of us are adjusting, perhaps with a little grumbling, to the anomalous situation of more money but less to buy and to the teasing conflict between our desire to "play fair" and our competitive urge to get as much butter—or meat as the woman next door. Whether we are wage earners or homemakers, or both, we are tackling new problems of planning. Such problems are manageable in proportion to the total resources of a family as, for example, the adequacy of the income, the intelligence and ingenuity of the housewife, the readiness of the entire family group to be flexible and adjustable, and so forth. Where income is inadequate or marginal, rising prices may mean, not pot roast instead of steak, but no meat at all, and an actual fear of being hungry. When the mother of a family is mentally dull or confused, she will need more help than can be found in the newspaper or in other mass instruction if she is to find her way through the mazes of point rationing. If the members of a family have previously known severe deprivation, materially or emotionally, they will react with anxiety to the present shortages and limitations. We all know of unloved children who hide extra food and cling desperately to possessions as substitutes for the affection which they miss. It is not difficult, then, to understand the apprehension of such a child grown up, in the face of scarcity of food or clothing. The hoarder may be delinquent, or he may be erecting a bulwark against old fears. The social worker can do much to help people accept the rightness and justice of Government plans and rulings that affect household management, because she can adapt her interpretation and assistance to each person and each family, taking into careful account individual problems and needs.

Such adjustments are relatively minor ones in comparison with others that confront the nation's families. The family is a unit that has deep and lasting value to all its members. Whether the ties are happy or unhappy, constructive or destructive, fragile or strong, they

exist for all of us and, even when broken, tend to persist symbolically. The family group is held together by a network of associations, and a degree of balance often evolves even within a group which is individually unadjusted and unhappy. When the family balance, whether healthy, precarious, or faulty, is disturbed, the effects are observable and must be reckoned with if a new integration is to be achieved. The following case illustrates a common war hazard to a family whose balance, though far from ideal, is to them vital, and to be maintained.

Mr. Lane is an advertising solicitor for a popular magazine. His wife is not employed outside the home. There are two children—John, aged ten, and three-year-old David. The Lanes first came to the attention of a family agency three years ago through John's teacher, who found the child a serious behavior problem. She described him as uncontrollable and said that he engaged persistently in sex misconduct and stole from the other children. A study of the situation by the social worker and a psychiatrist revealed that the child's problem was of long duration and was clearly related to strain between the parents which had been increased by the father's unemployment and a period of public relief. The man was infantile, unable to face any difficult situation, and apparently related himself to John only as an irritable disciplinarian. The mother, who was sturdier in coping with the host of family problems, was still quite inadequate to tolerate and help John. The psychiatrist felt, however, that there were enough strengths in the mother and enough that was positive in the relationship between the parents to warrant an attempt at direct treatment of the child, with such coöperation as he could develop in the parents as he proceeded.

John has been under treatment for over two years. Progress has been slow, with many setbacks. However, as the child has gained, the mother also has gained in her acceptance of him with more warmth and less anxiety. The father, who had shown less capacity to change, fortunately succeeded in leaving the rolls of the Works Projects Administration for an adequately paid job in his own field. His restored confidence made it easier for him to give John some of the attention which it was clear the little boy had been struggling to gain by fair means or foul. Recently, Mrs. Lane came to the case worker with a new worry, the possibility of her husband's induction. "We don't talk about it before John," she said, "but it's

on our minds constantly. My husband says maybe he should give up his job and take essential work—perhaps on a farm, since he has no trade. He could never in the world do farm work. He isn't strong physically and he has always lived in the city. But what can we do? It seems as if his going would be the end of John. He is so terribly important to the child, especially now that he has come to feel proud of him and more like a father. I don't believe I could bring John through by myself. It frightens me to think of it." We know well that the country's needs may have to supersede the needs of one upset little boy. If that means that Mr. Lane must leave, we shall be there to help Mrs. Lane hold the faltering line of her broken family.

Where men have already left their families, we have seen widely varied reactions in those left behind according to the ties and balances that already existed in the group. Mr. McCarthy leaves for a city 500 miles away to take a defense job. His wife, always the directing person in the household, but warm in her feeling for her husband and the children, accepts philosophically the total responsibility for the family. It never occurs to her that controlling the youngsters might be a problem. Of course, they miss their father. He was a good pal, and the children often recall wistfully the games he played with them. Meanwhile, they all go on, secure with one another and maintaining the relationship with their father by the frequent exchange of letters and little gifts and an occasional reunion. The gap is there, but the fundamental integrity of the family is not impaired.

Mr. Burns is an officer in the Merchant Marine who through the years has often spent long periods away from his wife and little boy. Mrs. Burns, during his absences, always turned to Edwin for the companionship and affection she missed. Edwin's cot would be moved into his parents' bedroom and he would have his mother's undivided and constant attention. His father's return always cast him into exile in his own little room. His resentment toward his father flared up anew at every shore-leave, and his alternate gratification and deprivation resulted in serious maladjustment in school. A family agency case worker was called into the situation, and both Edwin and his mother were making progress toward a healthier adjustment when the war broke out. Twice Mr. Burns was rescued from a torpedoed ship, and the child reacted so violently to his father's

danger that psychiatric treatment had to be secured for him lest he break down completely.

Mrs. Lewis says proudly that she got her alcoholic husband into the Army, and it is heaven without him. Her adolescent daughter, however, reproaches her constantly for having sent her father away and expresses her resentment by rebellion against any control.

Mrs. Graham encourages her husband's enlistment, places her small children in a foster-home, and goes to work, happy to be free from the role of wife and mother against which she has secretly rebelled for years.

These are but a few of the results we have seen where husbands and fathers have left their families. Reactions are as varied and as numerous as were the reactions to their presence.

It is not only the absence of the man that creates new problems for family groups; the balance may be disturbed in other ways. Many mothers are turning from homemaking to outside work. Superficially, such a decision often appears to be a patriotic response to the nation's need of manpower. Actually, there are individual motives that are co-existent, related, or entirely different. Many of our nation's families have known years of deprivation and are understandably eager to enjoy again the satisfactions of an adequate income. The wife's salary of \$30 a week added to her husband's earnings may make possible a comfortable apartment, recreation, and appetizing food, attractive clothing, or other advantages that have long been lacking. She may honestly feel that such advantages will compensate her children for being cared for by a housekeeper or spending their days in a nursery school. In other instances, the mother has special skills or training, takes particular pride and satisfaction in her ability, and finds it logical and natural to return to her chosen field when her husband's entering the service reduces the family income.

In these cases, not only has the wife's work a practical value, but the extra activity may be her way of dealing with anxiety and loneliness. If this is so, we can understand her need to keep busy. Other wives, as we have pointed out, are obviously using outside work as a channel through which they may escape from the dissatisfactions of homemaking and child care. Perhaps many of these women could seek release only under the socially acceptable pretext of fulfilling a patriotic duty. Their masculine strivings may have been more or

less unconscious but, once allowed to break through, impel them to assume with keen satisfaction the role they have long wanted. Whatever may be the woman's real motives for leaving her children to go to work, we shall see effects upon the children themselves. Where the father is absent from the home, the added loss of the mother, even for a few hours, may make the child's situation a frightening one for him. Little six-year-old Janet, whose young deserted mother has taken a defense job and left the child to the kindly but casual care of the landlady, whispers to the worker, "I'll tell you a secret. When my mother is away and I don't know where she is, I cry. She says she's at work, but I don't know where she is and I get scared." Even, or perhaps especially, the rejected child will find in his mother's absence a confirmation of all his fears of being unloved and deserted.

A family's balance may be upset by the new role of young people in the war. Many seventeen-year-old boys and girls are earning higher wages than their parents, whose lack, or loss, of special skills has already relegated them to the ranks of the irregularly employed or low-paid. The parents' feeling of inadequacy increases in the face of the young person's growing independence. Other problems are emerging in regard to the induction of the young sons of families. Many of today's young men are "depression children" who grew up at a time when normal opportunities for self-support were missing. Some of these young men appear to be psychologically ready for freedom. The parents, on the other hand, may have found the youngster's prolonged dependence so satisfying that they cannot release him, but must cling to him even in the face of an inescapable necessity and his own readiness to yield to it. When the boy himself finds the sudden and inexorable emancipation frightening and when he is in acute conflict between his desire to be acceptably brave and his fear of the dangerous unknown, the clinging of his parents is especially destructive. He is likely to feel that by growing up, as his country demands, he has somehow proved false to his parents—an intolerable dilemma.

All adolescents must cope with the upsurge of their own emotional drives, and in addition they must now cope with the tensions created by war. The normal adolescent's plans and hopes for the future now all carry a warning and burdensome "if." Such building as they attempt in the direction of education, careers, and marriage must be

done in interrupted bits, or unsoundly, or not at all. Time is short for the everyday concerns of life. School is "baby stuff" to many a sixteen-year-old whose slightly older brothers and friends are fighting on the sea or on distant battlefields. Love, to many an adolescent girl, is something to be seized at the moment in casual affairs or hasty marriages. The boys with whom they would normally develop mature love relationships will soon be gone, and they seize greedily from a fleeting present what they fear they will miss in an uncertain future. Delinquency is often a response by the young person to tension and uncertainty.

Younger children react to the war situation according to the degree of balance and security in their family setting. The child of today, besides being subjected to the loss of parents and to the other strains in family life, is exposed to considerable knowledge of the actual dangers of war. He hears on the radio news of disaster, he sees in the newsreel pictures of bombings and battles, he participates in air-raid drills in school, and he sees his familiar street strangely darkened by blackouts. He wears around his neck an identification tag. He has heard of the evacuation of children in other countries, and wonders whether he too will have to leave his mother.

Where parents are warm and affectionate and have a degree of personal security and serenity, the child seems to tolerate unbelievably well the threats of danger from without. If his mother lets him express his apprehension and confusion and if she is able to reassure him with answers to his questions and promises that she will stand by if danger comes—if, in short, his little world is safe—he can weather as much of the larger world's storm as he must. We observe panic and tension in children only where there is manifest fear on the part of parents, where the children are unloved, or where the parents mistakenly evade discussion of the war in an attempt to spare the children anxiety. Even little children are quick to sense unvoiced worry in those around them.

Sally, a little six-year-old refugee, was acutely upset by the school air-raid drills. She resisted coming to school, and cried violently when her mother left her. Though of superior intelligence, she did poor work, and her mother, at the suggestion of the teacher, went to a social agency with the problem. Sally had always been a good child and she loved her kindergarten. What had happened? We began to explore the situation, and after a few talks with the parents

and with Sally we found the clew. The family, though not yet in physical danger, had had to leave Europe when Sally was three years old and make a new life in a friendlier land. The adjustment had not been too difficult; the father found work, and they made friends and lived comfortably. Then came the news of Pearl Harbor. "We were visiting friends," the father told us, "and the word came over the radio. Of course, our first thought was, 'Now it's happening here.' We didn't think we showed our worry, but Sally got sick at her stomach, and that night she had a high temperature." Her reaction to the air-raid drill in school that week and her inability to face the school situation were immediately understandable. The concern of the parents over the threat to their new-found safety had to be allayed before the child once more functioned happily and effectively.

Another child, Cecilia, had developed from a timid, frightened eight-year-old into a happy, competent girl of fourteen. The case worker's treatment had resulted, not only in Cecilia's better adjustment, but in the mother's increasing capacity to provide the child with the security she needed. After we entered the war the mother was asked how Cecilia and her little brothers were reacting to the situation. She answered, "Oh, the children aren't scared. They're just crazy to do something to help. And that Cecilia! Well, you know we all say a little prayer every night for our country. The other night we heard a siren somewhere. Up jumps Cecilia from her knees, turns off the light, and runs back to her prayer as if nothing had happened. She's cool as a cucumber, that one."

We cannot leave this necessarily sketchy picture of what the social worker sees of people's reactions to the war without a discussion of what the social worker can do. A person's reactions to war are not brand-new ones. If we examine them, they are basically his old familiar reactions to his life situations, heightened, perhaps, or revived, or disguised. It should, therefore, be possible in many instances to predict what the point of stress in a particular family or individual may be and what reaction will follow. For example, we can often anticipate what a wife's reaction to her husband's entering the service may be if we know how she has felt toward him previously. Whether her reaction will be guilt, grief, resentment, or fear, we can be prepared from the start to help her endure and

handle it. Similarly, we can evaluate a parent's capacity to help children through the present crisis. There will be certain strengths on which we can count, and certain weak spots where we shall have to support or supplement what the parent is able to give. We can be prepared for the special anxieties of the father or son who enters the service, and can see that he receives regular assurance of our interest in the family he has had to leave. The fact that the social worker knows him and continues to accept him as a part of the family group will often prove one of the resources that a man needs to face loneliness and danger with courage.

Much of what we do as social workers in wartime will be our usual jobs. Our tested and tried techniques will be valid for people harassed by war just as they have been valid for people in every sort of trouble through the years. This does not mean that we should cling literally and stubbornly to a predetermined idea of our function. New community needs may make new demands upon us, and we must be available and flexible.

If our agencies are family service agencies, our doors must be literally and figuratively open to all the families that need us in our communities. A nation is only as strong as its families, and if we can help those families, one by one, it will add up to a tremendous contribution. I should like to see social agencies wrestle with a problem that has long been with us and is today especially unfortunate. I refer to the common impression that our services are related to an underprivileged or inadequate or even faintly disreputable group. We began to live down this reputation during the depression when trouble came to a cross section of the whole population and financial need was no respecter of persons. We even, in some instances, changed the names of our agencies to something less narrow and less distasteful to the average person than "Charity Organizations" and "Welfare Societies." We have made a beginning, and our clients are now more nearly representative of our communities as a whole, but we still have far to go. Today, especially, when every family in the community is affected by world disaster, it is vitally important that anyone in need of advice or help can come freely and without apology to those who are trained and competent to give such service.

Helping others to keep or regain their mental, physical, and spiritual health for the long struggle that lies ahead will take all our own

strength and resourcefulness. We, too, feel deeply and painfully the tensions of a war-torn world. Our much-vaunted detachment has given place to something sounder and better—a human concern for those who are more sorely tried or more bewildered or more frightened than we, and a willingness to give unstintingly of our skill to help our neighbors and our country.

WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM NATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN DAY CARE

By *LEONARD W. MAYO*

DAY CARE defies precise classification. It cannot be tagged and filed away neatly in the orthodox manner under the caption of "case work," "group work," or "community organization." It is all of these and more. It is closely related to public health, education, and industry, and it deals with a wide variety of groups in the community, some of which have had no previous contacts with social work or social workers. It is this hybrid characteristic of day care, perhaps, that has puzzled us more than any other one aspect of it. As a profession, social work is much more adept at handling problems that fall within one or two functional areas, and we are frankly puzzled by one that is difficult to define and to classify and that sprawls across many fields. The organization of day-care facilities requires the application of community organization skills primarily, but the practice of day care calls into play the combined skills of the child welfare and family case worker, the group worker, and the recreation and day nursery expert. Day care is not entirely comparable to foster care as we now know it, it is not institution service, and it is broader than ordinary day nursery care in that it deals with a wide age range and requires the use of a variety of facilities.

It is difficult to determine the need for day-care facilities in a given community because we have not yet developed adequate case-finding methods, particularly with respect to the school-age child. The Office of Community War Services (formerly the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services), the United States Children's Bureau, and the Child Welfare League have generously provided information on recent studies of need made in over three hundred

communities. Most of these are concerned with children under six years of age and have to do with the number requiring care, the facilities provided, and their organization and administration; counseling service; the relation of day-care facilities to local, state, and Federal services, and the like.

The Buffalo study, for example, made in February, 1943, revealed 1,900 children under five years of age in need of day care; the Seattle survey made three months earlier brought to light 1,260 children of the same age group requiring service; the Cleveland and Trenton studies, conducted at approximately the same time, indicated 800 and 300 children, respectively, in need of day care; and the Wichita survey, made in January, 1943, revealed 600 children under the age of five in need of day care. In 1942 San Diego set up day-care centers in every six or eight blocks, in certain sections of the city, in order to meet the heavy and rapidly increasing demand.

These studies were made on a sampling basis but with a fairly careful door-to-door check. A rough estimate would indicate that the known need for day-care services for children under six might be figured roughly at about one tenth of one percent of the total population of the industrial cities studied. It should be pointed out, however, that since these studies were made, most industrial cities have experienced a substantial increase in population and in the number of women employed. It is obvious that one of the first lessons to be learned from national experience in day care is the necessity for more effective methods of foreseeing and estimating the need in various age groups.

One of the most effective methods of determining the amount and type of day-care facilities required is the skillful use of consultation services. The house-to-house interviews carried on under the block organization of civilian defense in some cities is supplementary to, but not a substitute for, skilled consultation service.

One of the difficulties experienced in the use of consultation services by social agencies arises out of the fact that many parents wish to avoid contacts with "welfare" groups. It is frequently preferable, therefore, to establish such services in schools, public libraries, churches, and the like, where parents normally go with their children. Although no instance has yet come to my attention in which a social work consultant has been placed in a school or in the person-

nel office of a plant, this would seem to be practical whenever the coöperation of plant and school officials could be obtained. If social work is to play a really effective role in day care, it must operate through other groups to a larger extent than has previously been necessary in any aspect of child welfare.

There are some who would have the schools accept responsibility for the day care of all ages of children on the assumption that it is actually more an educational than a social work problem. Day care has many facets. It is, in a literal sense, a community problem involving education, social work, industry, and labor. Each should play whatever role the local community decides upon, provided that the natural and primary role of any one partner is not preempted by the others. That is, the primary role of the school is education, not child care in the social work sense of that term. The primary role of industry is production of goods, not the education and care of children. The primary role of social work in day care, as I see it, is the provision of consultation service, care of the pre-school child, and close coöperation with public schools in providing facilities and supervision for the school-age child.

The problem of selecting, training, and maintaining adequate personnel is difficult. Many communities have established training courses, of from two to six weeks in length, open to college graduates or to others with a good experience record. It is obvious that most of the staff used for day-care centers cannot be professionally trained, because of the great demand for them in other jobs. It is important, however, to make the best possible selection, to see that decent wages are paid, and that some training and adequate supervision are provided. Whenever possible, therefore, the administrators and supervisors should be particularly well-equipped and competent people.

The auspices for day care and the cost of maintaining day-care facilities are twin problems which require careful study and on which there is some significant and interesting national experience. Forty-three states have state-wide day-care committees, thirty-four of which are under the auspices of state defense councils. Of the remainder, some are under the auspices of the state department of public welfare or education, and one or two are quite informal, having been appointed by either the commissioner of welfare or the

governor, but apparently without close administrative relationship to either one.

It is highly unfortunate that confusion, delay, and uncertainty have characterized the attempts on the part of the Federal Government to assist in the financing of day-care facilities. It is well to remember, however, that in many instances the same confusion and lack of coördination have been present on the local level.

The main difficulty has resulted from the fact that while one Federal agency has had most of the funds, the experience necessary for the task of proper financing and supervision of day-care projects has resided in other agencies. Specifically, the Federal Works Agency has had the funds under the provisions of the much discussed Lanham Act, while the United States Children's Bureau and the Office of Education have the experience, the status, and the established relations with their corresponding state departments which make them the logical channels through which such funds should be administered. Further than this, the Coördinating Unit on Day Care, set up months ago in the Office of Community War Services and operating under a definite directive, has been vested with responsibility for national leadership. Thus, the main funds and the main leadership have been hopelessly divorced. The Lanham Act, moreover, has not been administered in accordance with the precedent established by the Social Security Act, and there is ample evidence that basic principles of community organization have been violated in urging communities to make application without the benefit of careful surveys to determine need.

Laymen, social workers, and educators, who have the long view in child welfare, must look critically upon any move that would violate the principle of Federal aid established by law in the Social Security Act, and with even greater disfavor upon any tendency to duplicate or compete with established Federal agencies already providing day-care leadership. The Office of Community War Services, the United States Children's Bureau, and the Office of Education have worked assiduously to complete a satisfactory plan of integrated action and service. They are aware that they have not reached perfection but they have made substantial and encouraging progress. A bill now before a Senate committee will provide funds to the Office of Community War Services, if it becomes law, and thus enable that office to use the logical channels of the Children's Bu-

reau and the Office of Education in providing assistance to states and localities.

On the local level, most communities of 50,000 and over have organized day-care services under a representative committee of the local council of social agencies or of the community chest which, in turn, sustains a loose but coöperative relationship with the corresponding state-wide committee. A recent and highly important development is the organization of neighborhood committees, in areas where day-care needs exist, on which a real cross section of the neighborhood serves. Both local and state committees are most effectively constituted when they include representatives of management, labor, schools, churches, and civic groups, in addition to social work.

The operation of day-care facilities on the local level is, generally, under the auspices of schools, social agencies, day nurseries, churches, and, in some instances, of industry. For the most part, provisions for children under six years of age are to be found under the auspices of day nurseries, settlements, and other social agencies, while the school-age child is generally cared for by schools, or in centers run in close coöperation with schools.

It is estimated that the cost of maintaining most day-care units is approximately a dollar per day per child. It is generally conceded that parents should bear about half of this, although a sliding-scale policy based on individual ability to pay is rapidly gaining favor. The general opinion, furthermore, is to the effect that industry should contribute to the maintenance cost of day-care facilities, thus sharing that responsibility with the parents and the local, state, and Federal agencies. National experience shows the necessity for more extensive studies of unit costs and for a real sharing of costs by all the interested groups. There is evidence that even though localities were to obtain relatively large sums of money through Federal aid, every dollar invested by a Federal agency must be matched by at least ten local dollars.

The Manpower Commission estimates that six million more men and women will be required for the armed forces and for industry within the next year. If this is true, or even partially true, hundreds of thousands of mothers must be brought into the labor market. Day-care facilities in many parts of the country, therefore, face an inevitable expansion. This gives added impetus to the establish-

ment of a wide variety of facilities to meet the needs of all types of children in every community where day care is needed. The development of foster day-care provisions is just getting under way in a relatively few communities and should be pushed vigorously wherever possible.

We must keep in mind, however, that until and unless the Government stipulates otherwise, the mothers of young children must be spared the necessity of leaving their homes. This means that minority groups, men over fifty years of age, and other potential workers who are still ignored in some communities must be utilized to the full in order to permit the mothers of young children to carry on their highly important functions in the home. We dare not mortgage the future of our children because a community is still indulging in the luxury of discrimination, maintaining pools of idle workers, or fighting the forty-eight-hour week. If we were asked to make a choice between a universal forty-eight-hour week and a universal draft of the mothers of young children, we would not hesitate a split second.

One of the most serious problems in day care is the care of the school-age child. Many parents assume, erroneously, that as long as their children are able to attend school, they need no additional supervision. Such parents overlook the fundamental importance of after-school hours in the life of every child. In many instances the noontime hour, when children need companionship and well-prepared food, finds them returning to a cheerless house and an ice box lunch, or worse. The security a child feels in the presence of his mother when he returns from school cannot be overestimated. Recently, a high school girl of fourteen was listening to her parents discuss the possibility of the mother going into industry. She was silent until the conversation touched upon hours of work. Then she interrupted in a worried voice, "Mother, you can't be at work when I get home from school!" There was a wealth of meaning in those words: a desire for security, an expression of her own rights as an adolescent, and the conviction that her mother should be available at a certain important hour of the day. The stability and security of home life thus represented are part and parcel of all we are fighting to preserve. We dare not regard them lightly.

In conclusion, national experience in day care indicates the need for:

1. Strong representative local leadership, with the cost shared by local, state, and Federal groups
2. Clarification of Federal policies of leadership and financial assistance (with state and local participation in the clarification)
3. More effective methods of determining needs and costs
4. Skillful counseling service made available at points and under auspices convenient and congenial to parents
5. A wider and more intensive interpretation to labor and management relative to the use of day-care facilities
6. Careful selection, training, and supervision of personnel
7. Protection of the mothers of young children and development of more extensive plans for the school-age child
8. The promotion of foster day care for young children

The experience of the last two years in the organization and operation of day-care facilities and the establishment of working relations between them and other community services and activities may well be a significant step in a new era in social work; an era marked by a closer integration of social services and their extension into economic groups and areas of community life where, in the past, social work has been neither understood nor practiced. Indeed, the present experience with day care as a function which cuts through so many fields may carry us still further. It may show us that there is far more of the generic in every segment or aspect of social work than we have yet realized. No profession can lay claim to a scientific approach until it has fully grasped that concept and applied it, both in practice and in planning.

DETROIT'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE WARTIME CARE OF CHILDREN

By IRENE E. MURPHY

"DAY CARE" is the popular term that we have coined since Pearl Harbor to describe a new reality in our way of life. For years, day nurseries have been recognized as necessary social agencies, but our war economy has greatly increased the number of working mothers and hence the number of children needing care.

There is an unfortunate tendency to blame the mothers who have gone into war industry for their eagerness to leave their children so that they may earn money. We should remember, first, that these women are desperately needed on the assembly lines, and second, that this may well be their opportunity to save for the next "rainy day." Those women may still remember the depression, and the public censure directed at those who had not saved enough money to tide them over the bad years.

The setting and psychology of Detroit's experience with war production and women workers are much the same as in other communities, though perhaps our problems are more intense in some respects. We may describe the Detroit area as that part of four different counties that encompasses and feeds the 185 war plants. It contains about three million people, thirteen percent of whom have come to the area within the last two years. So acute is the housing shortage that at least twelve thousand families are forced to use beds by shifts, or to wander from one shelter to another, or to live in tents or trailers.

Industrially, we are still going up the hill toward peak war production. We are in low gear and almost running out of fuel—that is, labor. We must look to (1) more in-migrants, for whom there are no homes; (2) more mothers; or (3) child labor. These are un-

pleasant choices. Without conscription, we must use the workers who want to work and who apply for the jobs. These workers are now women, many of whom are mothers.

Fourteen billion dollars worth of war goods have been placed on contract with the Detroit area manufacturers for 1943. This is 15 percent of the nation's war bill. Prorated, this means more than one million dollars worth of war business per hour around the clock. The child-care item, as we compute it at present, is one tenth of one percent of the 1943 war bill for the Detroit area.

How many employed mothers are there in the Detroit area? We frankly do not know, in spite of many surveys conducted under various auspices. Probably there are from sixty thousand to a hundred thousand working mothers, and some thirty to forty-five thousand children who need day care. Industry is obviously the best source of statistics concerning employed mothers and their children; but questions asked by employers are too often answered incorrectly. An application blank is not an oath, it is an application for a job. One Detroit plant, employing more than two thousand women, has given us our most reliable data, month by month. A social worker interviews each new woman employee, to discover whether the plant shifts, hours, and regulations are going to fit into her domestic situation. This plant neither recruits mothers nor denies them jobs, and women know this.

The cumulated data from this plant for the first four months of 1943 show that two out of five women employees have children under sixteen. Half of the children were under five years of age. Half of the children were cared for, during the mother's absence, by fathers or other relatives. The other half were cared for by domestics, neighbors, friends, nurseries, or had "self-care" or "casual care." The "self-care" or "casual-care" children amounted to 12 percent of the total number of children recorded. Within those four months the ratio of mothers increased from 33 percent to 40 percent; and the average number of children, from 1.5 to 1.8 per mother.

There is a wide gulf between what might be termed the statistical need for child care and the parental demand for child care. What we, as social planners, call child care is a new commodity to parents. They do not know its function, its necessity, its program, its types, its costs.

It is difficult to adjust family life to the bizarre daily schedule of a war factory area. The war plants have three shifts. The day shift, from 7 A.M. to 3 P.M., is reserved, by union contract, for workers with seniority, and these workers are usually men. Women, being new workers without seniority, are assigned, first, to the shift from 11 P.M. to 7 A.M.; next, to the shift from 3 P.M. to 11 P.M. It can generally be said that the mother employed by a war plant either quits or starts her job at midnight. Add an average of two hours for transportation and four hours for home duties, and there remain but ten hours for sleep and recreation.

The wages of employed mothers range from \$18 to \$35 per week in clerical, retail, and service jobs. They range from \$28 to \$60 per week on the "night-time," or factory, jobs.

The Wayne County Council of Defense, whose Chairman is also Director of the Council of Social Agencies, appointed fifty people to the Office of Civilian Defense Committee on Day Care of Children in February, 1942. The committee has the usual diversity of interests. Professional social workers are not in the majority. The chairman and vice chairman are school executives. The chairmen of the four subcommittees are from the fields of public education, private education, and public welfare, and from the Congress of Industrial Organizations. It is my impression that in the months since the committee was appointed labor, the child development field, and the United States Employment Service have been the most articulate and insistent on action in behalf of children. Public education has been as flexible and responsive as lay members of boards of education permit. Public health and public welfare have offered supporting collaboration. Private family and child welfare agencies have been conservative about assuming new functions. Churches, parent-teacher associations, and lay groups tend to be conservative but not obstructive. There arises, from time to time, heated criticism from without the committee about its program, which is "breaking up the American home by letting mothers shift the care of their children to the community while they greedily earn money for pleasure or luxuries."

The C.I.O. has formed its own county-wide child-care committee, not as an insurgent break from the OCD committee, but as a corollary to it. The war manufacturers have also formed a child-care subcommittee within their newly formed Automotive Council for

War Production. The C.I.O. committee works with and through the OCD committee. The manufacturers' committee works separately, and so far is only at the survey stage.

Labor has its own specific demands for the care of its workers' children. It has direct, forceful techniques of action. We feel that it is an added well-directed and effective voice in behalf of children. Labor's interest and action are uniquely characteristic of Detroit. We find that most of our philosophical conclusions and blueprints of program have either been initiated or defended by labor. In general, Detroit has emphasized group care of children under centralized public school authorities. We have lagged in developing our foster care programs and our central informational services. Our emphasis on group care under school authority reflects, again, the philosophy and effort of our labor groups. Labor wants government to be responsible through its public agencies for developing new services for workers. Labor has feared foster care or privately sponsored nursery schools because they cannot be supervised or subsidized by the worker's petition and ballot.

Group care of children in schools.—Five boards of education in Wayne County have received approval of Lanham Act funds with which to operate seventy-nine nursery schools and forty-three "canteens"—a total of 122 child care centers to accommodate 4,200 children. In addition, thirty-seven nurseries and two canteens operating under private auspices accommodate 1,000 children. There will be, then, 116 public and private centers for preschool children and forty-five for those of school age, a grand total of 161 centers accommodating 5,600 children with an average enrollment of thirty-five children per center. Nurseries admit children two, three, and four years of age; canteens admit children from the age of five, before and after school. Tax-supported centers will be 80 percent of the total.

The five Lanham programs will be uniform in hours and fees, with the suburban towns following the patterns set by the Detroit Board of Education. Nursery schools will operate twelve hours a day, six days a week, fifty-two weeks a year. Canteens will operate six hours a day in the school week (before and after school), twelve hours on Saturdays, holidays, and in summer vacations. During the summer, school-age children may attend club activities, academic classes for credit, or both.

Fees, it is assumed, have been so fixed that they will match the 50 percent Federal contribution. Nursery school fees will average six dollars per week, canteens, four dollars per week. Itemized, these fees are built up from meals priced at a quarter and supervision at five or ten cents an hour.

If there were an immediate and regular capacity of paid enrollments these fees would net the 50 percent to match the Federal Lanham funds. In other words, it is possible, but completely improbable, due to the incomplete use of the centers and to absence, illness, and withdrawals, that parents' fees will constitute 50 percent. Experience indicates that fees will provide but 25 percent of the total costs. This brings up the question of further subsidy. Will Lanham funds take up the slack, or will state or city government add a subsidy?

Individual foster care.—Foster care is an integral, interweaving service with group care. The inquiring mother does not categorize her need. She wants care for her children.

In our area we approve foster homes by means of state, county, and city procedures. There can be too much, as well as too little, procedure in approving foster homes. Whatever procedures are adopted for the emergency should be based on the fact that parents are still responsible, and that they should give their final approval to the foster home for which they are paying.

Centralized information service.—We are convinced that a centralized informational and referral service is a first essential in a community program. For twelve months we tried to offer this service on a decentralized plan. We designated twenty agencies as official information centers, distributed geographically throughout the county. Giving information concerning this extra day-care function was secondary to their own jobs. Information could not be kept current. Mothers wanted facilities that were not on the list. Agencies started referring them elsewhere, until in a one-day census we estimated that about four hundred phone calls were being made by mothers in a search for information and facilities.

To correct this we created the Children's War Service, the equivalent of a \$25,000-a-year agency. Its director is paid from the President's emergency fund and is responsible to the State Social Welfare Commission. The staff, consisting of four professional children's workers and two clerical workers, is paid with a War Chest appropri-

ation. The agency is housed in the Detroit Board of Education, and it serves the county. Its operating policy is aimed at conserving family life on a part-time basis and preventing full placement or separation of children from parents. We agree with Britain's conclusion that a child's security depends more on whom he is with than on where he is. We feel, so far, that relationship between parents and children should be maintained at all costs, even for a few hours a day.

In planning part-time care for children of working mothers we are confronted with at least nine dilemmas:

1. If you deter mothers from working, you are taking the position of shrinking rather than increasing the labor force, and in effect are saying you prefer in-migration or child labor.
2. If you insist that the mother of a child under two should not work, you find that the 1943 selective service regulations are so conditioned that she is the one who is most likely to have to work.
3. If you plan on daytime care you find that new woman workers are most likely to work on night shifts.
4. If you plan on night care during the mother's actual working hours you will find that a child sleeps half a night in a foster home bed, the other half in his own bed.
5. If you plan for caring for the child a whole night in a foster home, there remain only four to six hours a day when he might be with his mother.
6. If you press for day shifts for mothers you find that you are opposing the seniority basis of union contracts and are asking manufacturers to run the assembly line on a basis of family status rather than on skill.
7. If you seek foster homes or visiting homemakers you find that you are seeking a diminishing supply with an increasing demand.
8. If you feel that parents should pay 50 to 100 percent of the costs of good child care you are likely to constrict the use of something that is only effective if it is widely used by all the children who need it.
9. If you open a new child center you find difficulty in filling it to capacity quickly, although you are swamped with calls from just a mile beyond, or for hours of service that just miss the ones you have established.

This will-o'-the-wispish quality of day care is the factor that is

both challenging and frustrating. Its eventual solution may have to take us much farther afield than we had originally thought; into such fields as twenty-four-hour service; or revision of war production assembly lines on a basis of family status rather than skill; or, lastly, the full conscription and utilization of childless and older women of all races, with allotments to younger mothers that will really compete with industrial wages. These are large public issues requiring solemn debate and action, both by national and local communities. They cannot be solved by the popular conception of a day nursery as implied in the words "day care."

HELPING TO PREVENT SEX DELINQUENCY

By *ELSA CASTENDYCK*

ALTHOUGH sex delinquency may be more prevalent in wartime, it was with us before the war began and will continue to be with us when peace comes. If we recognize that we are dealing with a problem that is as old as the human race and that grows out of the elemental drives of men and women, we shall be less likely to place the blame upon wartime conditions and to think only of the immediate measures required to meet present emergencies rather than of the long-time objectives and the means of achieving them.

Those who worked in this field during World War I and are working in it in the present war will be quick to point to striking differences in the two situations. Sociologists agree that the period between the two wars has witnessed a gradual weakening of the fabric of family and community life. Many factors, both environmental and psychological, have contributed. The lowering of morale after World War I, the prohibition era, followed by the depression years, and the era of prosperity that accompanied the defense period are suggestive of some of the underlying reasons. These sociological and psychological changes have been far reaching in their effects. Not the least of them are the increased freedom in personal and social relationships between the sexes and a more liberal—to many, a more wholesome—point of view on the part of the public with respect to these freer relationships. The removal of some of the taboos of the past and the advance in medicine have made it possible to bring the problem of sexual delinquency into the open and to meet it more realistically than was the case twenty-five years ago. But the breaking down of sex taboos has created new problems as well. We know that this new freedom means greater sex experi-

mentation and less reserve among young people. The result is that the man seeking the means of sexual expression is no longer limited to the prostitute and "pick-up" girl, as was the case in the past war. Instead, opportunities are more likely to be found in his own social group.

Another change lies in the virtual disappearance of segregated districts. Because of police activity, prostitutes who formerly plied their trade in red-light districts have been scattered and now may be found in every part of a city. This has complicated the problem of control through the usual repressive measures since it calls for vigilance on the part of the police over a much wider area. It has brought the problem to the very doorsteps of the community's homes, thus challenging a wider range of interest and action on the part of the citizens themselves.

Although promiscuity and sexual delinquency cannot be said to be confined to wartime, several factors in a wartime society are, of course, conducive to their increase. Certainly, the physical and emotional turbulence of normal adolescents is heightened by the atmosphere of wartime living, which is characterized by restlessness and excitement, breakdown in social and normal standards, pressures upon adolescents to assume adult roles and their own desire to be adult, the glamour of the men in uniform, and the girls' romantic notions about "service" to servicemen. These are some of the psychological factors. To them can be added certain wartime community deficiencies, such as school programs that are dull and uninspiring, failing to satisfy the need for adventure; widespread employment of youth, often under conditions that put a strain on physical and social well-being; the preponderance of commercial recreation, some of which is definitely harmful; and the lack of basic services to reinforce the home and assist young people in finding an outlet for energies generated by the heightened tempo of wartime society.

We have a tendency to think of promiscuity and sexual delinquency as problems presented by girls only, but boys are equally involved. Most of the wartime factors leading to an increase in sex delinquency operate on boys as well as on girls, although their responses to them may differ. We must remember that sexual delinquency is produced by men and women, and measures to meet it must take this into account.

One of the most perplexing obstacles to determining the steps to

be taken to remedy the situation is the present lack of accurate information as to the extent of the problem and the types of girls and boys involved. There is, perhaps, no way of measuring the actual extent of the problem, since the incidence of venereal disease, the number of children born out of wedlock, the arrests on moral charges, and the number of girls' cases brought into the juvenile court provide only indices rather than exact measures. Several possible dangers arise from this lack of information. There is a tendency to assume that conditions existing in one community are true of another; this may lull a community into a false security, or may galvanize it into an activity not justified by the actual conditions. In either case the results may be unfortunate.

Lack of knowledge may also lead to misinterpretation of such information as is available. For example, one of the frequently quoted explanations of the increase in the number of girls appearing in juvenile and police courts is that the police, in attempting to control and stamp out prostitution, are arresting and taking to court girls who are caught in the dragnet of a clean-up campaign. Although these girls may have been found in places that are under suspicion, such as roadhouses or cafes, they are not necessarily delinquent. Similarly, publicity based on inaccurate or fragmentary information about exceptional situations sometimes leads to a distorted picture of conditions, which, when used as a basis for community action, may result in a program unsuited to the actual needs.

One of the imperative requirements for the support of preventive or corrective programs is an informed public, but if the citizens are aroused to action and later find that the situation is not as represented, their reaction may be a loss of confidence that will result in their doing nothing about conditions that actually do exist. The tendency of communities to entrust to the police all responsibility for the enforcement of laws relating to prostitution, and the unwillingness of citizens to believe that prostitution exists in their communities, could be lessened if more accurate knowledge of conditions were available.

It is not only the community program that may be affected by sweeping statements and misleading information. Individuals are likewise affected. Widespread publicity on the extent and dangers of the problem may lead to such fear and suspicion on the part of parents and young people that normal, wholesome association of

boys and girls is denied or avoided. Other individuals may be swept into delinquency by bravado or by a breaking down of reserve because the practice seems general.

Since it is impossible to obtain statistics on the extent of promiscuity, we must look to other sources for estimating its prevalence and for learning something of the kind of individuals who are involved. We are told by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that in 1942 the number of arrests of young girls under twenty-one increased 55.7 percent over the number in 1941. From the same source comes the information that prostitution among minor girls has increased 64.8 percent in 1943 as compared with 1942, and that arrests of boys under twenty-one for assault have also increased. Such statistics as are available to the Children's Bureau on delinquency cases disposed of in juvenile courts also show a marked upward trend with respect to the cases of girls.

From the War Department we learn that the incidence of venereal disease among men in the armed forces has reached an all-time low for a wartime period. These statements appear to be contradictory. It is necessary, however, to recognize that the statistics of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the juvenile courts are useful in representing a trend rather than an exact picture of what is happening. Such statistics are influenced by many factors, among which are community standards, pressures put upon law-enforcement officers for action, and the availability of resources other than the courts and police for treatment. The low incidence of venereal disease among the armed forces is undoubtedly affected by the vigilance and efforts of the Army and Navy in reducing venereal disease through education as to the dangers of infection, warning against prostitutes and "pick-ups," and provision of measures for prophylaxis. The important point, then, is not the figures themselves, but the recognition that a problem does exist.

We have failed to recognize that probably one of the first steps that need to be taken is the clarification of some of the terminology related to the problem. What do we mean by "sexual delinquency"? By "prostitution"? Who is a "prostitute," and how does she differ from the "sex delinquent"? The fact that this last term is now commonly used to describe girls only, rather than members of both sexes, has definite implications that we should not ignore.

As we read field reports and talk to persons dealing with this prob-

lem, we are struck by the youth of the girls reported as sexually delinquent. The young girl who has come from a small town or rural community to the teeming life of an industrial city or camp area, who, because of loneliness and need for attention and affection, yields to the demands of a comparative stranger—repaid perhaps by a meal and drinks, or perhaps by even less in material rewards—is she a prostitute? We do not differentiate either in our definition of the term or in the legal treatment accorded the two. We need to be more aware of the fact that words do not merely express ideas; they also create ideas and attitudes. An excellent example of this is the language of some of our laws relating to sex misconduct. The words “lewd and lascivious conduct,” which are included in the laws of some states, are used indiscriminately to describe the behavior of the youthful and unsophisticated delinquent and of the hardened prostitute alike. Such terminology is associated with degradation and has a demoralizing effect, both upon the girls and upon those who administer the laws.

Having clarified our thinking as to terminology, we must next consider some of the measures and methods that need to be employed in the prevention of sex delinquency. The line between prevention and control is not clear-cut; “control” itself is one of the means of preventing further practice and the initiation of the inexperienced into vice. Promiscuity of the kind practiced by the girl who makes it a vice, a profession, or an avocation and that practiced by the underprivileged and lonely girl who frequents cheap restaurants and dance halls as a means of getting attention can be, and in some places is being, controlled by the activities of the police and of social workers through special services to meet the needs of the individuals involved. However, the first duty of the police—that of locating and controlling danger spots—cannot be accomplished without adequate laws for the licensing and supervision of such places as restaurants serving liquor, dance halls, and roadhouses; the patrolling of streets and parks; and vigilance as to the practice in hotels and rooming houses. The tracking down of the “vice lords” who live on the proceeds from prostitution must also be pursued with vigor and force.

The efforts of the social workers will, of course, include the wide variety of services needed by a group that varies as do all human beings. Medical care and psychiatric treatment for some, and ade-

quate living arrangements, vocational training, and opportunities for most, are some of the indispensable services. These are aspects of the problem of protecting young people that are obvious and are accepted as needed. Unfortunately, resources in personnel and facilities are lacking in many places. To some extent, this is because of personnel shortages resulting from the drain of police officers and other specialized persons into military and other war services, but it should be recognized that a lack of adequate programs existed before the demands of the war were felt by communities. The basic reason for these inadequacies is, no doubt, a lack of informed public opinion.

We should be dealing with the problem inadequately if we failed to call attention to the type of girl whose sexual promiscuity is primarily a manifestation of a deep-seated neurotic maladjustment. She finds assurance or satisfaction in repetitive sexual delinquency because it relieves her fears or helps her to gain status in her own eyes. Such cases require the services of a skilled psychiatrist and are not likely to respond to the opportunities offered by environmental treatment. Fortunately, in the total number of young persons, such cases are not frequent; but the presence of even one goes far in creating an attitude of hopelessness regarding the outcome of treatment.

The tasks of community housekeeping outlined above are only half effective if they are not paralleled by resources for meeting the needs of the young people. Programs that absorb their energies and their leisure time are urgently required. We are told by our British friends of the need of young people of Britain for exciting and active recreation during the blitz, of their dancing continuously for many hours, often until almost exhausted. They apparently thus found relief from the emotional tension and physical strain thrown into an even higher pitch by the bombing. Fortunately, our young people have not had to face such extreme conditions, but the implications are quite evident. Recreation programs must take into consideration the need for activity; they should consider, too, the variety of interests represented in the groups of young people and should provide for those for whom physical activity is impossible or distasteful. There is also the requirement that the program be flexible enough to adapt to rapid modification as the character and interests of the group change; for in these days of rapid shifts in population

and added pressures static and unimaginative programs will have no appeal.

In the field of recreation it is axiomatic that the quality and success of the program will be in proportion to the interest, skill, and energy of the leader. The problem of finding satisfactory leadership is not easily solved, although new resources for leadership are being developed in various citizen groups. As professional and trained leadership becomes less available, wider use of volunteers is a natural result, often to the benefit of the program. However, volunteers cannot be effective leaders unless they understand adolescents and recognize the ephemeral and fleeting quality of their interests.

We have mentioned the large number of young persons leaving school for employment. Some of these boys and girls have reached the educational level to which their intellectual capacities limit them. Others could, no doubt, profit by further schooling. But school programs often fail to provide the thrill and excitement of a job—particularly one that appears to be helping the war effort. The job may be harmful if the working conditions threaten health and welfare. Certainly employment of young girls in cheap restaurants, taverns, roadhouses, and bowling alleys can be classed as harmful. This again becomes a matter of law enforcement.

In our eagerness to see that community conditions are favorable and that the needed outlets for youthful exuberance are provided, we must not overlook the important role played by the family. We have long recognized the importance of family security and stability, and most of our American effort is designed to help families to become secure and stable. We know that the emotional instability of the adolescent has a greater chance of development into stable and secure adult life in a home that embodies these characteristics. We know, too, that to a large extent the values and standards of adult life will be determined by the way in which the girl or boy is brought up. What girls or boys select from the community, depends, in the last analysis, on how they have been reared. The girl or boy who is secure in family relationships, who is emotionally stable, who has been brought up with a solid foundation of what is decent and worth while, is not so likely to be tempted and harmed by the tavern and cheap restaurant as is the adolescent who has not had these essentials. The girl who hangs around the street hoping to be picked up is the girl who has not found in her family relations the love,

attention, and admiration—in other words, the emotional satisfactions—she is looking for. She is the girl who is susceptible to the blandishments and sweet words of the man looking for a “pick-up,” be he soldier or civilian. It is not only the standards of morality that a girl has been taught to believe are right, but those that she has absorbed and made part of her being since early childhood that will, to a large extent, determine her behavior. The interests and types of activities of adolescence are dependent to a large degree on the kind of life led up to adolescence. It is this quality of family life that is threatened by war and its concomitant forces. Our task, then, is to do all in our power, as part of the war effort, to safeguard the security and stability of the family; to facilitate readjustments necessary when families are transplanted from one community to another or when they are temporarily broken up; and to provide community facilities to supplement home care and supervision when mothers are employed.

Social workers have in the past been in touch with families in which maladjustments and economic needs existed, and they have tried to cope with the situation. Yet in this war period we find large numbers of deprived adolescents. Is this, then, a contradiction of the claim that social services are useful? I think we must recognize that we are still seeking more adequate measures for strengthening the social and economic security of the family and that the accomplishment of this purpose is dependent upon our basic economic and political life and the philosophy that underlies it. The social worker's role is obviously to provide the interpretation needed to go forward in reaching this goal.

The activities of the police in stamping out prostitution are bringing many more girls and women to their attention. There is a growing awareness on the part of the police of the need for services—particularly for girls—that are not found in the police department. As a result, they are turning to social agencies, frequently in vain. Sometimes the policies of agencies militate against their giving services to adolescents. The requirement that the client himself must seek help has undoubtedly been a factor in depriving some people of services, and this is particularly true of adolescents. The inarticulate youth who has little knowledge of what can be asked or expected of agencies may not be in a position to make a request. Another difficulty lies in the fact that both the individual social

worker and the agency tend to find the solution within their own fields. The uneven distribution of work among agencies in some communities, particularly among private agencies, can sometimes be accounted for by the failure of an agency to recognize the character of the problem and the particular contribution that it can make to its solution. If these charges are true, and there is ample evidence that they are, agencies need to give thought to how they can be met. The coördination of intake, the pooling of resources, and the examination and possible revision of policies that are limiting the scope of agencies are among the possibilities to be explored. Certainly, no one organization can meet the situation single-handed. The problem of sexual delinquency is but one aspect of the broader problem of delinquency as a whole; the causes of delinquency and the means of attacking it cut across many phases of community life. The application of this basic principle will aid materially in the provision of the measures required to meet peacetime as well as wartime needs.

A third difference between the present situation and that existing in World War I lies in our greater knowledge of the dynamics of human conduct. Since we do know more today about effective methods of directing and controlling behavior, we shall be extremely remiss if we fail to apply that knowledge to the protection of our young people. The present need is urgent; yet the problem pertains, not to the present alone, but, in some respects, to our whole future as a nation. What we make of the problem today will determine what we shall face in the postwar world. Children are young only once. We have before us the chance either to build worth-while values firmly into their lives, or to allow the destructive forces of a war-sick world to exert their full influence.

THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN WARTIME

By MARY L. GIBBONS

THE WARTIME influences on children are many and varied. They are both new and old and an intensification of the old. They are not always negative, but are positive and neutral as well. The vast amount of interpretation which has appeared in national magazines and in the press reflects the fact that these influences have become matters of national interest and concern.

Basically, the causal factors in juvenile delinquency might be classified as physical defects, mental defects, emotional defects, and community defects. All delinquency, whether peacetime or wartime, stems from one or more of these factors. It should be evident that our approach to this growing problem of war-connected juvenile delinquency and the task of organizing community forces to combat it can be little different from our approach to any other welfare problem of similar importance. The first step, of course, is to get the facts.

The fundamental task of getting the facts will differ in various communities, as will the total job of organizing the community forces, for it is obviously related to the powers, responsibilities, and resources of the agency which seeks to effect such organization and the community to be organized. It is not possible, therefore, to illustrate such organization in terms of a common denominator that will apply to any and all communities. However, it is possible to describe what one state—New York—has done, in coöperation with the local welfare districts, to organize this task on a state-wide basis. The essential principles and practices involved are so basic in character

that they could be applied in every state and in almost every community.

With the coming of war, child needs began to expand or intensify. Peacetime economy broke up, and a war economy began to supplant it. Soon there were war-production centers, with shortages of housing, hospitals, medical care, sanitation, schools, transportation, recreation, and labor. The manpower problem inevitably became a womanpower problem in some centers. Day care of children of working mothers became a growing need. All these impacts of war affected home and family relationships in one way or another. In some sections of the nation a situation in which all the members of a family were working, except the young children—who were forced into part-time home life—was no longer unusual. Thus the background for rising juvenile delinquency began to appear.

Wherever the pressures of war exist, there the number of juvenile delinquents has been increasing. Even in communities unaffected by the war industrially, new delinquency, and a higher rate of delinquency, shows itself. Children exhibit the restlessness and anxieties of the times, especially when they have not been given a place in the war effort which might constructively expend this restlessness and relieve these anxieties. Boys mistakenly emulate the essential toughness of military heroes in antisocial conduct that approaches delinquency and crime; and young girls' misguided patriotism results in serious trouble through loose associations with men in uniform and with others.

All of us began to realize, once again, that war seriously affects those who play the smallest role in it—the children. Normal family life—the all-important birthright of every child—is threatened, damaged, or ended altogether. The father goes to war, and his guidance in the home is lost. The mother goes into industry, and the children are deprived of a great part of family living. Both parents are out of the home, and family life is reduced to a part-time basis, if it exists at all. Youngsters receive pay checks for the first time, and some of them head straight for trouble. Without normal family supervision and restraints, children are exposed to delinquency, neglect, and conditions which lead to their placement in foster homes, institutions, and training schools.

One cannot discuss this problem without recognition of the moral or ethical concepts which underlie the care and protection of chil-

dren and which do much to set the whole pattern of home life. Without such a foundation, the rearing of a child will be without direction and without substance. The validity of what we live by and the standards of the home obviously play a great part in the character and conduct of children. Much of the strength and spirit of the human personality stem from this, and it is equally clear that much of the antisocial conduct of children and of adults can be traced to the breakdown or absence of religious training.

Community agencies concerned with these problems of children are likewise subject to war impacts. Military inductions and enlistments, better-paying jobs, work more directly related to the war effort, and slashed budgets resulting from the mistaken belief that such activities on behalf of children are "nonessential" crack the important second line of defense for the protection of children. The first line of defense—the home—has already been smashed for thousands of children. We find, then, a shortage of trained children's workers, or of child-care facilities, or of both. We find an acute shortage of personnel in the children's courts and in the probation agencies, with the result that some children are committed to training schools and correctional institutions without adequate consideration of their cases because commitment seems an easy solution when no one is available to get all the facts in a given case. We find shortages of teaching personnel, with seriously overcrowded classes and teachers unable to give needed attention to children, especially to those who show abnormal or delinquent traits and tendencies. Churches and their educational programs are adversely affected in a variety of ways. We find public and private agencies whose personnel problems are such that they cannot operate with that degree of effectiveness which would enable some children to be released from foster care and from institutions and returned to their own homes.

In the spring and summer of 1942 the number of children committed to three New York State training schools under the jurisdiction of the New York State Department of Social Welfare increased so rapidly that the facilities were overcrowded. This was typical of what was happening elsewhere in the nation. We temporarily closed two of the schools to new admissions, and planned additional staff for the third to provide for expected needs. The attention of children's court judges was promptly drawn to the situation, and they were urged to use to the utmost local resources and to practice care-

ful selective use of state institutions so that the schools might be reserved for the children in greatest need.

While the increased institution commitments reflected, to some extent, a wider development of delinquency, neglect, and other problems, it was likewise a reflection of the decreasing availability of local community resources to cope with these problems. From time to time there would be claims that the problems of day care and of other war-related children's needs were acute in various communities. In most instances we found that there was no factual basis for such rumors, and in other instances we were able to work with the community in so planning, organizing, and extending the facilities as to provide for any existing or imminent intensified need.

When the rise in admissions to our state training schools occurred, a suggestion was made that a new institution be built or additional facilities be commandeered. This suggestion was not accepted for several reasons. First, we wanted to establish the basic facts as to what the trends in juvenile delinquency were before we reached a decision as to what was to be done about them. Second, we knew that, to some extent, curtailment of public and private agencies was bringing to the institutions some children who should be cared for in their own communities. Third, we realized that, in a measure, the crowding of the state institutions obviously meant that the communities, which have the basic responsibility for the protection of their children, were not effectively exercising that responsibility. If they had been, their preventive work and other child-care programs would have avoided the commitment of many of the children. Moreover, more jobs and better pay made it possible, in some communities, for the localities to establish or to expand needed child services under a plan by which most parents could pay, in whole or in part, for services they sought for their children. Fourth, even if the suggestion were practical, in these days of construction priorities and scarcities, our job was not to build more institutions to provide for an increasing number of juvenile delinquents, but so to organize, use, and expand our social agencies and community resources so as to minimize the influence of factors which create delinquency. In other words, it was clearly our obligation so to direct and employ our efforts and resources as to combat the increase in delinquency, rather than be driven into accepting the socially and financially expensive policy of permitting children to be devastated

by war pressures, and then merely build enough institutions to hold the casualties.

The decision to investigate the trends of war-related juvenile delinquency was made. The whole situation was then placed before our board for consideration in May, 1942. The board formed a committee to study the problem, and a preliminary survey was launched immediately, using the facilities and resources of the Department of Social Welfare, which extend into every locality of the state. Official children's court and probation statistics, correctional and reformatory data, our own field reports and state institution records, special reports from war-production areas, and other material obtained from public and private agencies were collected, studied, analyzed, and interpreted.

Our study revealed a pattern of delinquency typical throughout the nation. In thirteen war-industry counties, delinquency cases disposed of by children's courts increased 22.4 percent in the first six months of 1942 over the average for the first six months of 1938-40; neglect cases increased 39.4 percent; delinquency and neglect cases committed to institutions increased 46.3 percent; the number of children admitted to foster care for the first time in their lives increased 33.5 percent; the increase in foster care was relatively greater in private cases placed directly by parents or relatives—77.6 percent above normal in 1942; and the increase in the number of children placed through public agencies was 22.8 percent above normal.

This situation is a challenging one, the more so because it is directly related to conditions in the war-industry areas and because it is persistently similar in most communities in those areas. The increases in delinquency, neglect, and foster care seem generally to be greatest in communities which have been most extensively affected by wartime conditions, such as expanded and new war industries and military and naval depots, or which have been affected over the longest periods of time. Of course, in communities with well-organized social resources it has been possible to repress the full effect of the adverse influences. These facts should, therefore, serve to warn communities where the effect of war conditions is only beginning to be felt that such serious influences endanger normal child growth and development. These facts should also indicate to each community that its social resources, whether existing or potential,

can be mobilized to protect children and to minimize the social effect of war upon children.

Having obtained the essential preliminary information which indicated the need for several New York State communities to strengthen their child welfare programs, we proceeded to plan the organization of the community to meet these problems. Obviously the first step was to disseminate the information we had gathered, to see that every community obtained a copy of the study, and to focus community attention upon the whole problem.

The care of children is basically the responsibility of the local community; so also is the awareness of local conditions which adversely affect, or threaten to affect, the welfare of children. The State Department's report was largely an over-all, state-wide picture, except for the detailed statistics regarding war-industry areas. Aside from broad educational objectives, our preliminary report was not related to the individual needs of each community. It had to be supplemented, strengthened, and completed by the individual community's information, facts, trends, and developments.

To complete this project, to obtain a record of the experience of each individual community, to crystallize the social leadership of each community, and to focus the community's attention and efforts upon the problem, the board used public hearings. It planned a series of such forums in strategic locations throughout the state, giving every county a chance to be represented, through its public and private agencies, at a regional meeting and to present its facts, opinions, and comments about juvenile delinquency trends within its own borders. Invitations to attend these hearings and to give testimony were issued to public officials and to business, industrial, religious, labor, education, and social work leaders.

The hearings were eminently successful. Scores of community leaders appeared and testified, others sent statements for the records, and the press devoted considerable space to the discussions. Verbatim reports of the testimonies are being sent back to the communities for amplification, for supplementary data where necessary, and, in general, for completion and approval of the official record. It will be accompanied by a listing of the problems noted locally, the locally made recommendations, and the trends appearing in all the hearings. The Department's area directors will ask the proper public officials, or the Council of Social Agencies or some similar

group, to call together in each community, a committee which is representative of the cross section of the agencies that took part in the hearings. This committee will be responsible for supplementing the material presented at the hearing; agreeing on the division and order of importance of the problems involved; listing the potential and new resources that need developing; and outlining a plan for meeting the existing problems. The objectives of such committee activities would be: (1) to provide an occasion for further stimulating joint local thinking and action by asking the community to share in preparation of the report; (2) further to test the public hearing device as sound procedure for the initial step in State Board of Social Welfare committee studies designed to prove informational for board members; and (3) to stimulate local action to meet broad problems while they are still in a formative or developing state. The value of the state's leadership must ultimately have as its criterion of effectiveness its ability to encourage joint local thinking and action on matters which the state considers of vital importance.

Thus, from the initial public hearings, through collection and weighing of the material, and through planning to meet the problems of delinquency, the project has been indeed a joint coöperative undertaking of the local communities and the state. At every point, the responsibility of the local community for the welfare of children has been stressed, the state's willingness to assist in aiding the community to meet its problems has been emphasized, and the fact that the final decision on all matters relating to the community's program will rest with the community has been underlined.

While this task of organizing the community to meet war-related juvenile delinquency has not been completed, and no definitive evaluation of it can yet be made, it is possible to comment on certain aspects. The attention of the state as a whole and of the individual communities in particular has been focused upon the war-connected trends of delinquency. Almost every possible contribution to the discussion of the problem has been made through the public forums established for this purpose. An adequate and extensive cross section of the agencies and individuals responsible for the welfare of children received and accepted invitations to present testimony and comments at the regional hearings. Public and private agencies affected by war-economy developments were given an opportunity to interpret these factors and their implications to the

public, and subsequent opportunities were realized as public interest was aroused and the press published further information about the problems. The professional workers and citizens were brought closer together, and the possibilities of community-wide planning and action were encouraged and developed. Misconceptions about juvenile delinquency undoubtedly were cleared in some measure, and a broader and better basis for understanding was laid. For example, although there was a feeling that juvenile delinquency in some communities was serious, public testimony indicated that it was not. On the other hand, in some communities where there was a belief that war-connected delinquency was not a problem, evidence showed that it was, and seriously so. The vital task of guarding the welfare of children undoubtedly was recognized, and the mistaken concept of such work as nonessential was seen to be fallacious. Formation of committees and groups and other community-wide approaches to the problem were encouraged. Thus, the basic objective of getting the community to think about its situation, to gather the facts and to weigh them, and, finally, to formulate a plan for action has been realized in some substantial measure. That, we we feel, is a significant step forward.

This study by a state department demonstrates, however, the work of only one agency. The problem of war-connected delinquency, national in scope and myriad in its ramifications, requires a total community effort of many agencies on national, state, and local levels. Above all, it requires leadership and coöperation and coördination. It calls for leadership in the community to stimulate interest in the problem, to ascertain the facts, to coördinate the work of the public and private agencies through an agreed-upon pattern of action, and to effect that coöperative effort through which each agency—social welfare, health, education, church, civic, industrial, business, labor, all who have a part to play—can make its most telling contribution. Let us remember that the solution to this problem cannot be found in any one field of action or in the facilities of any one agency; for the impacts of war upon the child are so varied in origin and in reaction that the combined and coördinated effort of all community agencies is essential if we are effectively to minimize and avoid these impacts on children. Every agency has a part to play, a vital part, in the over-all community job. Each agency can deal most pointedly with a particular facet of the problem.

Working together under a strong leadership and a sound program, they can attack the whole problem simultaneously and at every point, with a reasonable hope that it can be met adequately. Here is a task that requires a total community effort. Here is an opportunity for all—parents, social workers, educators, clergymen, industrialists, labor leaders, businessmen, civic workers—to meet a growing need in America, to perform a service for children that will be of benefit and value for many decades to come.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS IN WARTIME

By BEATRICE McCONNELL

NEVER before in the history of this country have industrial leaders and Federal and state governments been so deeply concerned with increasing the labor supply, because never before has there been so acute a need by the whole country of the things that can be produced only by the help of human hands—war *matériel*, food, services. At the same time, I believe there has been no period in our history when our people everywhere were more concerned with the preservation of that intangible thing called democracy—the free participation of the individual in his own government.

In both these concerns the 9,500,000 boys and girls of this country between fourteen and eighteen years of age are of vital importance. They amount to one in every fourteen of our population. These are crucial years in the education of a citizen of a democracy, years when the child achieves independence and learns to stand on his own feet. These adolescents are going through vital physical, emotional, and mental changes. What happens to them now affects for good or ill their social adjustment during their whole adult lives. Already, a large number of young people under eighteen have been drawn into the labor force of the country, many of them in violation of child labor and school-attendance laws. Already, there are most disquieting questions as to the serious loss of education and a rise in juvenile delinquency among children in their teens. The effect of the war on adolescent boys and girls, as shown in the rising tide of child and youth employment and its implications, is becoming an increasingly important element of the social change caused by the

war, to which all social workers must devote their attention and their energy.

The industrial upheavals brought about by the war are unprecedented in our history. In February, 1943, according to National Industrial Conference Board reports, factory employment reached 16,000,000, the highest on record. Thirty-eight out of every 100 civilian workers were in factories as against thirty-one in 1930. In May, 1942, the Bureau of Employment Security of the Social Security Board reported that there were "3.6 million unemployed workers and no widespread labor shortage as yet," though it was predicted that by 1943 the demands of the Victory program would require "full utilization of female labor." Nonagricultural employment reached an all-time high of 43,000,000 in November and December of 1942, with many new women workers and many school children and youth doing vacation work. Since that time the number of new workers entering the labor force has not kept pace with the mounting millions needed for the armed forces. In April, 1943, nonagricultural employment stood at 41,600,000, although the number of the unemployed—that is, of persons who are looking for work but are without employment—had fallen to less than a million, perhaps approaching an irreducible minimum.

The trend in the employment of children under eighteen years of age has risen sharply in the past two years. Going back to 1941, before Pearl Harbor, employment and age-certificate records show that more than twice as many children between fourteen and eighteen years of age were certified for full-time or part-time work in that year as in 1940. This increase continued in 1942, when reports received by the Children's Bureau indicated that approximately a million young people between fourteen and eighteen years of age obtained certificates for full-time or part-time work, and that for the first time since the Bureau has been receiving comparable reports for both age groups, the number of fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children increased proportionately more than the number of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. For the whole country, the increase for fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children was 250 percent over 1940 and 100 percent over 1941. For sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds the increase in 1942 over 1940 was 293 percent, and the increase over 1941 was 73 percent.

Some states, where war contracts have been concentrated and the

pressures on adult labor have been particularly strong, have seen a much more rapid flow of children into employment. For instance, the 1942 rate of increase for children between fourteen and eighteen years of age was 439 percent over 1940 in Indiana, and 431 percent in Illinois. In Kansas the increase in 1942 over 1941 was 499 percent. The general picture is the same for the whole country; in few states was the increase in 1942 over 1940 less than 200 percent, and in many it was much larger.

The first three months of 1943 showed an increase of 115 percent over the first three months of 1942 in the number certified for full-time or part-time employment, and again comparatively more fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children were entering employment than sixteen- and seventeen-year-old workers, an increase of 173 percent for the younger as compared with 107 percent for the older.

The actual number of minors between the ages of fourteen and eighteen at work full time or part time, as distinguished from those entering employment, has been roughly estimated, on the basis of sample surveys, at about 3,000,000 in July, 1942, when many children were doing vacation work, and at about 2,000,000 in January, 1943. Of these 2,000,000 there were 500,000 children fourteen or fifteen years of age. About one in every ten children aged fourteen or fifteen years was at work, as compared with one in twenty-five in January, 1941. In the next older age group (sixteen and seventeen years of age) the proportion of young workers was much greater—nearly one third of all sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds in January, 1943, compared with only about one-tenth in January, 1941. None of these figures include the uncounted thousands of children under fourteen at work in stores, on the streets, on farms, and in many other miscellaneous jobs.

At the same time, the number of high school students is dropping sharply. High school enrollment for 1940 was estimated at six and one half or seven millions, and the United States Office of Education reports an estimated decrease of 5.5 percent between October, 1941, and October, 1942, on top of a decrease of 3.2 percent from 1940 to 1941. Thus the number of boys and girls in high school even in the fall of 1942 was at least half a million fewer than two years previously, and the tide from school to work has continued to rise during this school year. Many schools report a much more

rapid decline in enrollment between 1940 and 1942 than this average of nearly 10 percent.

The need for education and training of youth is basic to the conception of a democracy. This need is more acute in view of the demands of the highly technical warfare of today and the difficult problems of the postwar world that will face this generation of young people. The prevalent use of the schools as a major source of untapped labor supply is as shortsighted as a policy of using the seed corn for food in a period of poor harvests. A normal supply of well-educated, alert, and socially intelligent citizens able to cope with difficult situations must be maintained. This is essential in a democratic form of government where all authority, policy making, and government operation must come from the people. The training ground for this type of education is the school, not the unregulated and unsupervised employment that many of these young people are substituting for school. The situation we face is that of labor-supply demands which in many cases call children and young persons into full-time or part-time jobs before they are physically or mentally ready for the burdens and responsibilities of wage earning and before they have had an opportunity to secure the education adapted to their needs and capacities; expose them to employment conditions that are dangerous, that undermine their health, or subject them to unwholesome influences, or that require long hours of work permitting no time for the recreation that is a part of normal growth.

Social workers recognize fully that in the total war this country is waging, life cannot be "as usual" for either young or old. The number of adolescent youth who will leave school to enter full-time employment will inevitably increase. But no one should tolerate wasteful expenditure of this source of labor. If the nation is to receive from its boys and girls the help that is most needed, their services must be used in ways consistent with their actual maximum contribution to manpower needs, consistent with protection of their health and welfare, and consistent with the utilization and development of their aptitudes and abilities. To accomplish this end requires sound judgment, a clear view of the facts, and determined action. If such a course is not followed, it will not be possible for these young people to give to the nation the contribution it will need from them in the near future.

A beginning has been made through the action of many national and state groups dealing with welfare problems in establishing guideposts for a labor contribution of youth that will not sacrifice health and education. One of these is the War Manpower Commission policy on employment of youth under eighteen years of age, issued January 30, 1943. It is based on the premise that:

The first responsibility and obligation of youth under 18 even in war-time is to take full advantage of their educational opportunities in order to prepare themselves for war and post-war services and for the duties of citizenship. It is essential that young people have the fullest possible opportunity consistent with the war effort to complete their education. Those with special aptitudes and capacity for further training should continue their education in order to develop their maximum abilities applicable to war and post-war needs. In most cases youth under 18 can best contribute to the war program by continuing in school and, when their services are required, accepting vacation and part-time employment.

It also recognizes the principle that children under sixteen should be drawn upon only when qualified older workers are not available, emphasizes the need for observance of state and Federal laws, and outlines certain standards for employment. These are, briefly: (1) fourteen years as the lowest age minimum for any employment, sixteen years as the minimum for factory work, and eighteen years as the minimum for hazardous or injurious work; (2) safeguards for keeping fourteen- and fifteen-year-old youths in school and preventing excessive part-time employment; and (3) special protection for boys and girls of sixteen and seventeen to avoid too great physical strain, including a maximum eight-hour day, forty-eight-hour week, and a six-day week and limitation of their employment to hours not detrimental to health and welfare. For working children also attending school, it is stipulated that school and work activities shall not involve undue strain, that combined school and work hours, at least for children under sixteen, shall not exceed eight a day, and that if adjustment of school programs is found necessary to allow emergency short-time employment, certain precautions shall safeguard the children's educational progress. For the problem of young persons under eighteen years of age recruited for agricultural work requiring them to live away from home, provision of adequate supervision is urged, together with suitable living conditions, proper sanitary facilities, and health protection.

Viewed in the light of recognized sound labor policies for all adults and of the physical needs of growing boys and girls, these standards do not seem unreasonable even in a period of war pressures for labor. Yet actual practices fall far below these standards, and will fall still further unless a forceful stand is taken against them.

To prevent the kinds of child labor and youth employment that result in injury to health, loss of education, and social maladjustments in later life, a bulwark of child labor and school-attendance standards has been built up through law and administrative rulings, particularly in the last fifty years. However, all too prevalent today is a shortsighted view that recommends relaxation of child labor restrictions and postponement of education until the war is over. Some advocates of this policy are sincere and merely mistaken; some are selfish, taking advantage of the emergency to attain ends previously sought in vain. Whatever their aims, their influence has been powerful.

In the first five months of 1943 forty-four legislatures met in regular session, and many measures were introduced to relax or modify laws for the protection of young workers. In 1943 also, state and Federal administrators, particularly those having some discretionary authority under child labor laws, have been subjected as never before to demands of various groups affected by the labor stringency for modification of existing legal standards affecting young workers.

The whole story cannot be told now. It is clear, however, that the situation confronting state and Federal officials and organizations interested in the welfare of youth is becoming increasingly serious. Though there have been a few gains, no major advance has been made.

On the side of lowering standards, six states passed acts relating to the release of children from school for work on farms, three with no adequate safeguards to insure observance of minimum-age requirements and good supervision. Five states lowered the minimum-age standard for work as pin boys in bowling alleys. One of these laws, however, has been declared unconstitutional because of a defect in its title. Three of them permit children to work until 11 or 12 o'clock at night. In one state children of fourteen years, or of twelve years on a provisional permit, may now be employed until midnight and as early as 5 A.M. on and from any vehicle delivering

milk or cream, an occupation involving definite accident hazards. One state provides that minors under sixteen may work at any hour of the night, provided a permit is obtained. There have been relaxations also in a few states as to employment of minors sixteen and seventeen years old in hazardous occupations, and a number of states have lengthened hours and permitted night employment for workers of these ages.

Yet there is a brighter side to the picture. That community groups can mobilize action against regressive bills is shown by the fact that many such bills proposed in 1943 have been defeated. There is still opportunity for wise guidance of legislative proposals. It is also possible, if some relaxation of standards is found necessary, to include provisions insuring that they will be lowered only in case of genuine labor needs and under proper safeguards. This has been done in some of the laws enacted in 1943. For instance, New Jersey created a special emergency committee on child labor to make recommendations to the Commissioner of Labor with respect to lowering standards in the maximum-hours field for minors sixteen and seventeen years of age permitted by new legislation this year. However, unless stemmed by concerted public opinion determined to find adequate labor reserve where possible without resorting to child workers, these pressures may wipe out a quarter of a century of progress.

For the rising tide of illegal employment that is reported from all over the country there are many causes. Employers are eager to get help and are tempted to accept the services of youths without too much care as to whether they are violating state or Federal laws. They do not stop to make sure that the child is of legal age, giving themselves the excuse that the work is necessary to the war, without realizing the price the child and the community may pay in the end. With three, four, and five times as many children employed as before the war, with staffs overburdened with other duties and even reduced, enforcement agencies cannot cope with the situation successfully. In spite of drives against violations in retail stores, factories, bowling alleys, restaurants, and other establishments, much of this illegal employment passes unnoticed until a serious accident makes "news." A boy fourteen years of age engaged by a butcher as delivery boy was put to work at an electrical meat grinder and had his hand severely injured; a boy of sixteen working in a laundry had his arm snapped off by the centrifugal dryer he was trying to

operate; a boy of thirteen was killed by being drawn into the bowl of a dough-mixing machine. Sometimes school officials have been aroused to make surveys that reveal such bad child labor conditions that they also reach the newspaper-reading public. In nine Connecticut high schools, 1,003 of 4,748 children working after school hours were illegally employed under the state law; in Kansas over one hundred children in one school were employed after school hours without certificates. Violations of the child labor law in Illinois increased 56 percent in the last three months of 1942 as compared with the first three months of that year.

Inspectors are finding increasing numbers of children working contrary to the child labor provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In the period from July 1, 1942, to March 31, 1943, the proportion of establishments inspected by the Children's Bureau in which violations were found, increased to 44 percent from 31 percent in the corresponding period a year previously. Of the total number of children (2,828) found illegally employed in this nine-month period 17 percent were under fourteen years of age.

Increasing numbers of these young workers under eighteen years of age are entering manufacturing, including war-production plants. In 1942 more than a quarter of a million boys and girls sixteen and seventeen years of age received certificates for full-time or part-time work in factories of different types. They are working in shipyards, on the assembly line in aircraft factories, in factories making machine tools, rubber goods, clothing, textiles, and electrical appliances. Both sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds and children under sixteen are working in trade and miscellaneous service industries as messengers, delivery boys, stock boys, and sales clerks in retail stores, ushers in theaters, pin boys in bowling alleys, bus boys, waiters, soda jerkers, helpers in garages and filling stations, as newsboys, in domestic service, and as office workers. Particularly for the younger boys and girls—those under sixteen—and for many of the older group, little of the employment they enter gives any worth-while training for adult earning life.

Though thousands are leaving school for work, many boys and girls are at work in jobs outside school hours; some for only a few hours a day, others for regular shifts of seven or eight hours. In many cities, from 30 to 40 percent of all high school students are

part-time workers, and in some schools the percentage is as high as 50 or 60 percent. Many school children younger than fourteen are also employed.

A reasonable policy of permitting a combination of school and work for children to help meet wartime manpower shortages must be predicated on the assumption that the need for the labor of these school youth is certified by the proper official authority; that the work is suited to their age, strength, and abilities; that the hours of work are reasonable in view of their physical and educational needs; and that proper safeguards are maintained for their educational progress. Reports from many sources indicate, however, that the flooding of school children into the employment market is not limited to areas of acute labor shortage and that, for the most part, it is uncontrolled and unregulated and is carried on under conditions detrimental to the health, education, and general welfare of the young workers. The result may be failure in schoolwork, or, finding the double burden too heavy, the child may become irregular in attendance and finally drop out of school entirely.

Long hours, work at night, and unsupervised employment are having serious effects, not only upon the education and health of children still in school, but upon their conduct, whether they are doing so-called part-time or full-time work. This is particularly significant in view of rising juvenile delinquency. Preliminary figures for 1942 made available to the Children's Bureau by juvenile courts located in areas containing almost one third of the population of the country show that the number of cases of delinquent boys in the courts increased 8 percent in 1942 over 1941, and the number of girls' cases increased 31 percent. Although employment is not the major cause, it may well be a contributing factor in this increase. In some cases the conditions of employment predispose to delinquency; in others, new-found independence for which the child is not prepared tempts him to reject parental and school controls. The truancy that often results from unregulated employment outside school hours is frequently a forerunner of delinquency.

Types of employment, often undesirable, in which young girls are used include work as car hops, as ushers in theaters, and as waitresses or performers in honky tonks, dance halls, and restaurants where liquor is sold. Employment late at night, whether in bowling alleys, theaters, restaurants, or elsewhere, often subjects both boys and

girls to bad influences that they are not prepared to resist. Employment at irregular hours may make impossible the family supervision that is needed by the immature. Without experience in the use of money, they may spend their earnings on harmful types of commercial amusements. They are freed from the normal protective influences of home and school before they have the necessary training and judgment to act wisely in difficult situations or to make the distinction between harmless fun and unsocial action.

Another aspect of this problem that is of concern to social workers is the effect on health of long hours, night work, wartime pressures for speed, and the industrial hazards to which young people are exposed. Many of these young persons, particularly in war-production work, are entering jobs formerly filled by mature, older workers. They are still in adolescence and comparatively immature in emotion and intelligence. They are more susceptible to industrial accidents, and probably to industrial poisons, than older, more experienced persons. Children's Bureau inspectors under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as state labor department reports, disclose many such accidents: a sixteen-year-old boy who had lost one finger and injured two others in operating a woodworking machine; a stock boy, fourteen years old, fatally injured by a freight elevator in a shoe factory; a thirteen-year-old boy employed in threshing who received severe injuries when he was caught between the tractor and threshing machine; a sixteen-year-old boy fatally injured when helping to move a freight car near the tippie of a coal mine; a boy seventeen years of age employed in a sawmill who lost a finger when the saw caught his glove and pulled his hand into the saw.

There is admittedly a safe and appropriate part that children and young persons can take in the tremendous production job that must be done in the present crisis. But this part must be planned if it is to safeguard children and make the most effective use of their contribution. For some school children, part-time employment, if properly restricted, can give satisfaction in contributing to the war and can also be of some educational value. Again, young persons can take an important part, particularly during vacations, in helping American farmers reach food production goals, but their labor will be used wastefully if they are not old enough and sufficiently well developed physically to work efficiently and without harm to their health.

These conditions of wartime child labor have already affected adversely many young people of the generation just coming into manhood and womanhood. The injurious effects have extended to their health, their conduct, their future earning power, and the possibilities of their making satisfactory social adjustments. These conditions are already creating social problems that we will be called upon to meet, perhaps are facing at this very moment. One of the important duties of social workers is to substitute protection of youth for neglect. Prevention is much easier and much more effective, and can be much wider in scope, than remedial measures after the damage is done. It can be accomplished only by hard work, by planning, by educating public opinion, and by seeing that the people who have it in their power to influence conditions—employers, parents, children, teachers, legislators—know what is going on and what will result if the picture is not changed.

Employers must be convinced that if the country is to use children of this age group constructively, and if they are to make their best contribution to industry, it must be through planned programs that insure suitable employment, reasonable hours, and safe working conditions. Women, it is found, need special adaptations of employment conditions to do their best work; even more do young people. Boys and girls are influenced to take full-time or part-time jobs because they want to do something that seems to them to serve more directly the winning of the war than does staying in school, and this motive must be met by the substitution of a stronger one. Children, and parents too, must be convinced of the importance of education in the ideals for which the war is being fought and of the country's needs for what the schools can give. To stay in school must be made "the patriotic thing to do."

When school children are used to meet agricultural emergencies, every effort must be made to see that school programs are adjusted so that lost schoolwork can be made up. The farm work of children in vacation must be guided and supervised.

Much harmful employment can be prevented by care in issuance of employment certificates, to see that the child is of legal age and that the employer understands the law and is willing to comply with it. Adequate inspection services can discover and stop employment under conditions that undermine health and good conduct. At the same time, the schools can help by giving guidance and supervision

to children who take part-time jobs and to those who leave school for work. However, this can be done only if the staffs for administration and enforcement of child labor and compulsory school-attendance laws and school-placement services are strengthened.

Trained social workers have a great responsibility in informing and influencing public opinion to take these necessary steps. This may often be done through committee functioning, which is a powerful means of pulling together various interests, including employers themselves. Examples are the committees on state and local defense councils initiated by the Children's Bureau Commission on Children in Wartime. Committees can be effective in discovering what is happening to the young people of a community under the press of war emergency, particularly with regard to their leaving school and the kinds of work they are doing, and in informing the public of these conditions and advising them of action that should be taken.

Professional social leaders can also develop latent community leadership and can encourage volunteer services in making and carrying out plans for the wise use of children in industry and for keeping children in school. We can influence the acceptance of community responsibility for seeing that older persons are willing and available to undertake essential employment without the use of children under unacceptable conditions. We can stimulate communities to examine more closely the possibilities of other sources of labor, particularly for short emergency periods, in order to prevent the interruption of schooling or the imposition of too heavy work burdens for children.

During the depression, social workers bore the brunt of action in meeting crises of industrial collapse and mass employment. We cannot fall behind now when an even greater crisis confronts the youth of America.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION IN RURAL CHILD WELFARE SERVICES

By *BENJAMIN E. YOUNGDAHL*

THE PROCESS of community organization, perhaps more logically called social welfare organization, can be used in any functional area in social work. It is a method which is and may be used, not only on the local or community level, but on the district, state, and national levels. It can be said that the important differences in organizing a rural community as compared with an urban area are due largely to differences in culture setting. Social work in a rural area is different from social work in the city partly because of the greater emphasis that must be given to the method of community organization in relation to the other methods of case work and group work. Rural resources are relatively meager, and social work has just begun to be introduced to rural counties. As a preliminary step, it is often necessary, first, to get community support for a case work or group work service and then to create or develop the necessary resources. To do this we utilize the method which has been called community organization. In broad principles, the process of community organization is the same whether it is practiced in rural areas or in urban centers; whether it is practiced on a local, state, or national level; or whether it is used in child welfare, family welfare, or even in fields outside social work, such as education. Nevertheless, the actual mechanics of the job in a rural area are quite different from those in a city; major differences in culture and in social attitudes are not unimportant.

In plain words, the question is how to organize, plan, and coordinate social services for children in rural areas. Who is going to do the job of initiating programs or of changing existing relationships, and how is this job to be done? What are the methods, tools, and

techniques that might be used to get for children in rural areas the protection and the opportunities which are theirs by virtue of their birth? A process is a method of operation, and no method among the several used in social work is more important in child welfare services in a rural area than community organization.

Today, in some places, there are waste effort and motion, duplication, confusion, and controversy because of a lack of an integrated public welfare organization and integrated welfare philosophy. Examples of such lack of integration can be found in some of our states, in local communities, and even in Washington. We are traveling in the right direction, but we have not yet reached the point where we can say that on the national level, in each state, and in each county or district we have one department of public welfare giving various related social services to human beings.

We need first to clarify our terminology. What is child welfare and what are child welfare services? An arbitrary differentiation between these two terms on the basis of source of funds seems illogical and most certainly is confusing. To say that those services which result from expenditures of Federal funds are child welfare services, while those which result from expenditures of state and local funds are just child welfare has the effect of invalidating the coöperative nature of the venture. Bookkeeping systems and accounting procedures are necessary, but they should be created to serve programs rather than the converse.

The White House Conference* on Children in a Democracy told us that children are well off if their parents are well off, that children have food if their parents have food, that children have a roof over their heads if their parents have, that children have educational, health, and other opportunities if their parents have jobs and have the wherewithal to give their youngsters the things they need. We are told by the final report of the White House Conference that "material existence, growth, and fulfilment depend for the child, first, on the resources of his family, and second, on the economic vitality of the commonwealth of which he is a member." From this one might conclude that all welfare programs are child welfare programs in a very real sense, and that while some services to children are necessarily and wisely specialized, the line of demarcation between services to children and services to human beings in

general can be drawn too finely. Our basic interest is to help children and not to build up separate or pocketed programs or organizations.

Due to the lack of an integrated approach to the whole area of public welfare and to an unintegrated administrative machinery, some states have two or more field staffs going out to the counties, one in child welfare and one in public assistance. Not infrequently, a competitive spirit exists which is often not a rivalry in excellence, but a petty type of organizational rivalry for power. Child welfare workers have been known to say: "We can't integrate with that outfit; why, some of them don't even have college degrees." Public assistance workers have been heard to comment: "The farther we can keep away from those impractical idealists and high-hatters, the better jobs we can do for our clients." In the eyes of each, the other group is tainted with something or other. My own comment is that "it taint right," if our measuring stick is effective service to the greatest possible number of children.

One hears both public assistance and child welfare workers say that Aid to Dependent Children is not a child welfare program. Such a concept usually springs from an unintegrated administrative organization. Such an approach to the potentially powerful and helpful ADC program involves jurisdictional disputes which have little justification among labor organizations but even less so in social work.

Among the more than three thousand counties of the country there are not a few small rural units that have one citizens' committee for public assistance and one for child welfare services. Is it any wonder that we have difficulties making the public understand? It is not that we are opposed to specialization; it is not that we are opposed to some concentration in training; it is not that we would want to put square pegs in round holes; it is, rather, that if we would be of greater service to children or to the aged or to families, we would relate our own little speciality to the whole and we would remember that children live in families and communities, and that they prosper in relation to the prosperity of those families and communities.

In 1942 all the social agencies primarily interested in children in St. Louis County, Missouri, got together to study the over-all services which were being given and possible methods of improving them. While this county is on the periphery of a large city, it does

have some distinctly rural parts. One of the principal conclusions of the study is that there is a need for administrative integration among the public agencies now doing child welfare work. Another conclusion suggests the need for a closer working relationship and a logical division of responsibility between the public agencies and the private. Most rural counties do not have private social agencies, so this is not a problem; and of course some rural counties are so small as to suggest the wisdom of joining all forces in some way to make a common impact on problems involving children. In discussing this matter of integration one need not be courageous to suggest that we could well think of coöperating actively with such agencies as health groups. A current experiment between a public health agency and a private family agency in one community in St. Louis County is now giving proof of the validity of this suggestion. The two have rented a building together and are giving an over-all health and welfare service in a particularly backward community. The important thing is to avoid a narrow or too segmented an approach to problems that are very closely related.

But an integrated administrative framework is hardly enough. What good is the shell or body if it does not have a pulsating heart? Barren indeed are pretty charts of organization if the administrative philosophy does not continuously and persistently give emphasis to the end of all our efforts—human beings. With an acceptable administrative philosophy our programs will include mechanics, but they will constitute only the means to an end.

The process of community organization includes interpretation, fact-finding, and education. All this type of activity, however worth while, falls short unless it is accompanied by some sort of purposeful effort to get action. It is not enough to say that the children of X County need protection against neglect or that health, educational, and other services should be provided. We must have some specific proposal that needs to be interpreted and carried through. Generalities, however fine sounding and acceptable, are not helping children.

It is when we get into specific applications of our general principles that we tend to fall down. We readily agree with the statement in the general report of the White House Conference that "in the use of federal and state grants the same standards should be applied to minority groups as to others and that this should be a specific legislative requirement." When it comes to action to get such legislation

introduced, or even to apply these standards under existing laws, we shrink from the task and, like soap bubbles, our ideals burst into nothingness. We are often told that children in relief families do not get enough food. In most parts of the country that is true, but try to get even social workers interested in attending a legislative hearing or in writing a letter to their own representatives to give a plug for higher appropriations! The response is not always heartening.

In short then, child welfare services can be promoted in rural areas far more effectively under an integrated administrative framework and with an administrative philosophy that implies constant and persistent emphasis on people as human beings—children and their parents, brothers and sisters, whole communities. Moreover, the administrative framework and the relationships established among specialized services will determine, in part, whether or not the attempt to give services to children in a rural community will be effective. These principles are equally applicable to the national level and to state and local communities.

Now let us consider the necessary steps that should be taken as we set out to promote rural child welfare services. While the immediate and long-range objectives vary considerably, community by community, it is possible to set down a broad framework of five steps for initiating and maintaining a certain service or services. The first step is an analysis or a determination of the needs of children in a given area. This means that some kind of a survey, study, or piece of research must be done in advance. In a well-organized state agency, situations in the various counties are pretty well known on a continuous basis. However, in rapidly changing times the needs of children change too. One county that was previously pretty well taken care of now finds itself in the midst of a war-plant area or near an army camp. Some kind of a factual statement suggesting the specific needs of the moment should be drawn up to use as a starting point. The statement may need elaboration at a later time, or it may suffice to get the service inaugurated. The main thing is to have something that defines the needs and that has some factual basis. In a technical sense, this step in the process is preliminary to the actual community organization job as such, but I should like to state emphatically that the earlier the community leadership can be brought into the planning, the greater the chances for success of the project.

It is true that someone has to begin the process in order to get the community leadership interested, but we must not forget the general principle that a person tends to be interested in the thing that he has helped to plan.

Who actually does start the process? Whose interest in children is responsible for the initial step? After all, a worker from a state agency cannot just barge into a county seat and push a lever. The initial request for some rural child welfare service may arise in several ways. The county court or board of county commissioners might see the need and request the service, although this is rare, due to the financial liabilities that might result. However, it is not uncommon to have the first suggestion come from some county official, such as the juvenile court judge, or from some civic organization. While it is far better to have the request originate with some citizen or group in the community, it must not be assumed that a state department or a county welfare office has no responsibility merely because the citizens do not seem to see the need or do not have a sufficient interest to do something about it. Perhaps they do not know the facts; if they were given the information, they might develop an interest.

Nevertheless, somewhere there must be a seed of interest in the community itself. Of course, seeds can be planted by human beings, and so a community interest in children can be planted and watered. A state child welfare worker may have several cases which bring her into a county on a special mission. As she works on her problems, she makes contacts with neighbors, with the superintendent of schools, and with other community leaders. As a seed grows and multiplies, so a single case can be used to focus the attention of the professional leaders of the community on the wider problem of which the case is only one illustration. A single seed, then, may become a blossom whose pollen affects, not just one case, but a whole community. To put it in another way, case work can result in community organization and, conversely, community organization can bring about case work. As a matter of fact, in rural areas the two are usually inextricably intertwined and inseparable.

After the needs have been set down in writing, the second step involves an examination of the existing resources in the community. Is there a psychiatric service available? What specialized case work services do the present social agencies give? What about recreation

facilities? We need a complete community survey which, when joined with the first statement, will show that some action is indicated. This community survey could be done by a small group of volunteers under the supervision of professional people. These volunteers should be a representative group whose leadership has been tested and whose interest has been made known. A worker unacquainted with the county might develop this small group from a list of names supplied by a welfare agency or by one or two widely respected community leaders.

The third step is the development of a plan or a proposal. We now know the need and the resources. What do we want? Who is going to pay for it? Who is going to be the governing body or the sponsoring body? What are the relationships among the various agencies that might be involved? The plan or proposal should be fairly specific, and at least some of the community leaders should have had a part in its preparation.

The fourth step in the process is perhaps the most difficult. It involves the education of the whole community and the formal acceptance of the plan by the responsible agency or agencies concerned. Before we can get intelligent acceptance we must get understanding. It might be possible to get reluctant acceptance without understanding, but such approval rarely endures. In carrying out this important step it is necessary to use many different tools whose emphasis would vary community by community. The success of this step is dependent in no little measure on the degree of citizen participation in the various planning stages.

The fifth step in the process is the last, but it never ends. It is the execution of the plan. If the proposal involves the employment of a specialized child welfare worker, the process of community organization has barely begun. One of the chief functions of that worker is to broaden understanding, to continue to incite interest through performance of the task, and to develop new and larger resources for children. Even where a specific objective has been obtained and a satisfactory service put into operation, there is the job of keeping the public well informed and of maintaining the support.

These steps should not be conceived as a fixed pattern. No community is precisely like any other community, and no worker has exactly the same capacity as another. The best plan must take into consideration the three variables: the specific needs of children in

the particular area; the community itself and its resources; and the capacities and aptitudes of the worker. The same end might be reached in different ways by different workers. Regardless of the method utilized, the end of all our efforts, services to children, must be constantly in the forefront.

There are many ways of carrying out these various steps. We have already set down one fundamental principle, that of getting as many people as possible to participate, not only in the interpretation and solution of the plan, but early in the planning itself. The person who has participated from the beginning not only understands better, but has a vested interest in the plan's success.

It is assumed that before citizen leaders are even approached, the existing welfare officials and agencies should share in the discussion, and their approval and support be obtained. To approach a community with divided professional support is, at best, often a waste of time and at worst, disastrous. If the need is widespread and the nebulous plan has the possibility of affecting the entire community, it might be desirable first to call together a coördinating council. Such councils are permanent organizations in some rural areas, but if they do not exist a loose body might be created for this particular purpose.

The question of what citizen organizations to use is sometimes a perplexing one. If one is chosen and another is neglected, the plan might not get the support of the whole population. On the other hand, if all the organizations are asked to come in jointly, there is a danger of lack of interest on the part of any group. Each organization likes to be able to say in its annual report that it was responsible for this and that specific accomplishment, and any diffusion of responsibility tends to delimit that possibility. No specific plan applies in all cases, but a method tried in one community was highly successful and deserves mention.

Spurred on by a high rate of juvenile delinquency, a juvenile court judge began to promote a recreational program. All organizations and social forces in the locality were brought together and a plan evolved whereby a joint committee, composed of representatives of all groups, acted as a steering committee. Each organization was given a specific responsibility or a segment of work to do. One group took over sponsorship of a Boy Scout unit; another, of the Girl Scouts. One assumed the responsibility for providing a skating rink,

and still another agreed to plan a community recreation house. The whole plan was integrated into a composite whole, but each group had a definite task, the successful completion of which justified a little backslapping. This simple but interesting method tended to create a healthy rivalry. It has the merit of widespread group participation without the disadvantage of diffusion of interests.

In a community that has a completely integrated public welfare program, the public welfare board or commission often organizes into subcommittees, one of which usually specializes in child welfare. With such a setting, this committee obviously should be used as the spearhead for any new plan or proposed service. The individual community and organization setting must determine the specific approach.

I have the feeling that we do not use rural newspapers to the extent that we might. A part of our hesitation is due to fear and a part, perhaps, to lack of experience. Rural newspapers can be of tremendous help to a child welfare program, and they constitute one of the best tools and resources in the process of community organization. The first step is to get the confidence of the paper's editor. A visit to the newspaper office by way of introduction is often helpful, but the timing of that visit is important. It may be wise to wait until a few community leaders have given their support. The wife of the editor of a rural newspaper is usually a good resource, and consideration should be given to the possibility of using her on a steering committee or of calling her in at the outset of the effort.

When the time does come for the publicity door to be opened, it is far better for someone who has been active in the planning to write the stories and ask the newspaper office to use them than to have the story told orally to the editor and have him write it. For one thing, it is likely to be more accurate. However the approach is made and the interest gained, the support of the rural paper is almost, if not quite, essential to the success of a widespread community effort. Of course, if a newspaper is unsympathetic at the outset it is always possible to bring community pressure for a change of heart on the part of the editor. After all, newspaper editors need subscribers—and advertisers too. And the needs of children are more important than the convictions of a newspaper editor, however sincere they may be.

While the word-of-mouth method of disseminating information has definite advantages, it can be reinforced by printed materials. A leaflet, a flyer, or a pamphlet presenting very simply the needs of children might provide the stimulus for speeches by community leaders, sermons from the pulpits, and numerous other contacts. The League of Women Voters has proved beyond doubt the value of broadsides and similar printed material. Factual information attractively presented on the printed page has a power which few other tools of promotion possess.

Finally, there are few "don'ts" and cautions that might be enumerated:

In almost every rural community there is a woman who jumps on every band wagon. Usually she has some ability, but often she is eccentric. Rarely does she carry intelligent community support, for the people know her for what she is, a publicity seeker and a social climber. Beware of that woman!

Don't forget the little tricks of the trade of how to make friends and influence people. A civic or fraternal organization that donates money to a given child welfare service would appreciate, and deserve, regular information on how its money is being spent. Periodic reports to the donors and an occasional special letter or visit of appreciation are necessary techniques if we expect the flow of funds to continue.

Don't become discouraged with the first setback. If you do, start analyzing yourself, your own convictions, and the sincerity of your interest in the job you are supposed to be doing. It is not easy to introduce anything new, and most rural areas have embedded attitudes concerning children and social welfare programs. Remember that an evolving support based on solid information and performance is far more lasting than a quick emotional acceptance.

The process of community organization in rural child welfare services is essentially social planning for children. It involves the development of community interest and support and the active participation of citizens in the planning and the promotion of programs. It includes the coordination and integration of existing resources and the creation of new ones. It results in a cooperative enterprise in which all the resources of a community—actual and potential—are brought together and woven into a composite pattern.

The weavers are the members of the community, but in the background is the guiding hand of the worker.

As "there are many paths that lead to God" so there are many possible approaches to the goal of a decent life for children in rural areas. No phase of human welfare has greater possibilities of enlisting public sympathy and intelligent support; no area is more important; and none possesses greater dangers and hazards. It is possible to carry on a racket under the guise of child welfare; it is possible to have ulterior motives under its banner. The worker who is involved in the promotion of a program for children should be particularly sensitive to such motives and should be able to differentiate between the person who has a sincere interest and the one whose interest is merely the means to some personal end. There is nothing so despicable as the use of defenseless children for a selfish purpose, but nothing more commendable and, perhaps, closer to the Divine than the efforts to give children a chance to live and to have the opportunities which should be their inheritance.

WAR AND THE BRITISH SOCIAL SERVICES

By J. J. MALLON

UPON the social services of Great Britain war fell with an impact which both strained and stimulated. There was, of course, some little compensatory easement. Few unemployed were left to claim insurance benefit or unemployment assistance. Supplementary old age pensions also fell in number because shortly after the beginning of the war, industry found jobs even for some of the aged. But if the services connected with unemployment contracted, all other social services expanded or assumed additional duties; for the war called for many new services.

First came the vast operation of evacuation. Out of London went the schools, with 400,000 children and perhaps 12,000 or 13,000 teachers. The children of less than school age and their mothers, where the consent of the mother could be obtained, also departed. So did thousands of expectant and nursing mothers. So did thousands of the very old and frail. This nightly exodus was magnificently contrived and carried out. There were hitches, of course. For example, one bachelor friend of mine who had volunteered to house half a dozen of the "old and frail" was embarrassed by the arrival at his domicile of some nineteen expectant mothers! On the whole, this emigration of great magnitude and complexity was well planned and accomplished. But think of the character and number of the tasks which the transference imposed upon the health and education services.

The school medical service is intermixed with the other medical services, and doctors, whose work in the schools was only a part of their total work, could not leave London simply because the school children (or 85 percent of them) had left it. Health organization in

the reception areas had to be provided or strengthened. Similarly with education. The London County Council could move its school children. It was less easy to move its school buildings. The alternative was to find in the reception areas available buildings suitable for educational uses. No easy task. But the provision of buildings, though difficult, was much less difficult than other necessary provisions.

Children are in school only for a few hours each day. What was to be done out of school hours with the more than a million children who were moved away from their homes and their families? Other questions proved to be even more pressing. Vast numbers of the children who had moved from the cities—the “danger areas”—were “billeted”; that is, they were forced upon families in the country areas who, willy-nilly, had to make room for them in return for a small billeting fee. Where a mother as well as a child, or children, had to be billeted, difficulties were multiplied.

That the thing was done at all, that, before the “blitz” began, hundreds of thousands of families opened their doors, at acute inconvenience to themselves, to mothers and children, different in speech and manners and behavior from their hosts, and that these often ill-assorted companions got on well together, is a tribute to the adaptability of the human species, but still more a tribute to the devotion and skill of the social service intermediaries who presided over this great and unprecedented mating of town and country and persuaded, *inter alia*, mothers to live together, to share a cooking stove or a bath or a wash basin, to practice domestic equalitarianism, and to forget or not to notice the strangeness of the idiom which each had to hear from the other.

Unfortunately, in the interval which elapsed before serious air raids began, this careful work of evacuation and settlement was largely undone. Mothers and children yearned for their own homes and, in increasing numbers, returned to them. The teachers in the reception areas found themselves high and dry and were compelled to follow the children. Alas! In the absence of teachers and children the school buildings had been put to other uses. Rearrangement took time, and while it was in process tens of thousands of children spent their days in the streets. Of course, emergency action was taken, and the teachers and clergymen and settlement workers and others gathered together all the children they could influence. But

the absence, wholly or partially, of a large number of children from study and school discipline for longer or shorter periods was a grave matter causing serious injury to morals and manners.

Air attacks in force began on London in August, 1940. Once more the school population moved to the country, and once more problems of health and housing had to be handled. The magnitude of these problems is indicated by the necessity to examine medically each child before evacuation. Each child had to be provided with adequate and suitable clothing. In one respect, the second evacuation was easier than the first. The terror was now raging over London, and houses were being damaged by tens of thousands each week. To transfer as many as possible to conditions of safety was seen by everybody to be an urgent work of mercy. Nevertheless, the strain imposed on the health and education authorities and on the Assistance Board, which dealt with the numerous financial troubles of *evacuées* and "billetees," was of the heaviest.

Soon, however, the strains of the social services in the danger areas overtopped the strains due to evacuation. In London, for example, shelters were provided for several million inhabitants. Rest centers, in which temporary accommodation was given to those who had lost their homes, were in three grades: the first grade, fully staffed, ready for action; the second grade, equipped with a staff within call if its members should be required; the third grade, were buildings suitable for use and capable of easy equipment and staffing. Shelters and rest centers both proved unequal to the emergency. The fact is that Britain prepared for day raids of short duration, and actually experienced night raids of long duration. The shelters, in fact, not only had to protect, but to provide board and lodging. That is to say, the shelterees came to the shelters, not only for safety, but also for food and sleep. Remember that in one spell London had fifty-seven all-night raids, during which it was impossible for hundreds of thousands of workers to obtain food from restaurants. Hundreds of thousands of workers were compelled by circumstances to travel from work to the shelter, to meet their families at the shelter, and to have supper there, and sometimes also breakfast. So the shelter had to include canteens and beds. They had eventually to include also medical services with Red Cross and first aid stations. Good missionary work was done in the shelters for health and nutrition. For example, when there was a risk that diphtheria might decimate the

child population in the shelters, the mothers were advised on the wisdom of inoculation, with the result that in a few months 2,000,000 children throughout Britain were immunized. On the question of food in the shelters it is possible to be jocular. When foods were various we advised the shelterees to prefer certain foods to others; we extolled soup and milk and the balanced diet. But soon foods ceased to be various, and we praised potatoes and carrots, which were always abundant. We displayed a lighthearted notice which stated that carrots would not only cure nightblindness, but would increase beauty. A young woman who had read this notice asked, after scrutinizing me, whether I had tried carrots. I evaded the implication of her question by saying that I regarded my night blindness as incurable.

The behavior of a mixed population forced to endure intimate association for long intervals in circumstances of ugliness and boredom is certain, if no corrective is applied, to deteriorate. In the shelters in London we tried the corrective of community singing and afterward brought in professional entertainers. People tired of these and turned to books and newspapers. Later on, small groups were formed to act or read together. Finally, shelter and welfare superintendents were appointed in each area to systematize and inspire the efforts of the shelterees to entertain themselves and to improve the conditions of the shelters. These welfare superintendents were successful. In what is hoped will prove to be their period of highest development, the shelters left little to be desired.

When the history of the raids on Britain is written, tea will emerge as the drink of solace and consolation. When the homeless came to the rest centers for temporary accommodation, they were given tea. Some food, of course, if required, but many of the shocked and desolate women had for the time being no stomach for food. Tea was different. "What's that, old dear"—one woman at a rest center said to another—"lost yer house and all yer belongings? 'Ave a cup of tea." The benignant cup was, of course, taken and brought, as always, some lessening of woe. The first duty of the rest center was, then, to provide this blessed anodyne. Its next was to see that its clients were not suffering from any sort of serious shock. In any case these clients were urged to rest.

At a later stage the clients would meet the representative of the Assistance Board and receive such monetary aid as they needed.

Then the representatives of the local authority, acting with the Ministry of Health, would discuss rehousing, in or away from London. When new accommodation was found, the homeless would be conveyed to it. In the rest center, as in the shelter, several government departments combined to provide the complex services that the circumstances required; the voluntary agencies worked with the officials, and the unpaid and untrained supplemented the efforts of the civil servants and the professional social workers. It was a happy and, in every way, an effective association.

The services so far mentioned have had to do with expectations and consequences of air raids and bombings. In a middle position are the services of the Citizens Advice Bureau which, though mainly concerned with the upset caused by the raids, have a much wider range of usefulness, and advise on almost anything. The Bureau explains regulations, helps to fill out troublesome forms, directs whoever is in trouble to the most likely source of aid, assists in the search for missing relations, and generally plays the part of the good friend and neighbor. As the Bureau works hand in hand with the Poorman's Lawyer, it is able to give legal as well as general advice. The Citizens Advice Bureau at Toynbee Hall claims that at some time during the war it has been in touch with every household in the Borough of Stepney, the population of which when war began exceeded two hundred thousand.

This Bureau has gained great renown because it possesses a mobile equipment. When such cities as Bath and Exeter were raided, the intrepid woman who runs the Bureau traveled through the night and at daybreak was hard at work informing and advising the many who had suffered and were puzzled and numbed by their misfortune.

The other services that call for mention may be divided into (1) services rendered to the worker; and (2) services rendered to the citizen as such and to the population as a whole. The Ministry of Labour has been a good friend of the worker. The Ministry has seen that all large factories are provided with canteens. It has inspired the other relevant ministries to provide day nurseries for the children of married women who assist the war effort in munitions. It has subsidized the Committee for the Encouragement of Music and Drama and other such bodies to carry music into the factories and plants engaged in war work. It has built handsomely equipped hostels for the workers who are employed in country places away

from the danger areas. It has appointed welfare workers in profusion so that everything shall be done to mitigate industrial strain and fatigue and remove grievances. Everyone speaks well of the Minister and of the Ministry of Labour.

Everyone speaks equally well of the Minister and the Ministry of Food. Long ago Lord Woolton was a social worker himself. This Minister has developed an attractive radio technique. He so talks to us on the air that we begin to think that scarcity is better than abundance. We begin to think that we are better off without foodstuffs than we should be if we had them. We are persuaded that there is something highly moral in doing without what we cannot obtain. Lord Woolton's control of our food supplies may be epitomized in this: he has aimed at equality, tempered by the more favorable treatment of those who have a claim to such treatment because of the arduousness of their work or because of their age or of their condition. The best-fed members of the British population are the manual workers, all of whom may enjoy good and cheap meals in the work canteens or in the hostels, or in the British restaurants where midday meals are provided at the cost price of food before cooking. Lord Woolton has added to his other services that of furthering the education of the British public, both in regard to nutrition and to cooking. As the result of the classes and demonstrations organized by the Ministry of Food throughout the country, it may be claimed that the standard of housewifery in Great Britain is higher than it has been since the great tradition of British housewifery and cooking was lost in the squalor and upset of the Industrial Revolution.

A word should be added on the general question of the relation of the government in regard to social work and the voluntary agencies. In the past it has been broadly true that these agencies received no financial support from the government. Organizations of boys and girls, the social settlements, societies aiming to help various sections of the population, and a great variety of other such bodies existed on funds provided by their sympathizers. For the time being, at least, this is no longer the case. Under the pressure exerted by the war the voluntary agencies have been glad to accept, and the government to provide, monetary assistance. The departure from ancient custom is likely to remain; for the British taxpayer cannot hope after

the war that the demands on his pocket will be greatly reduced. The number of postwar commitments forbid such optimism.

The Beveridge proposals, a great rehousing and rebuilding scheme, and the far-reaching reorganization of our national education will involve the assumption of new and costly burdens. It follows that the voluntary agencies will find the raising of the money required for their activities harder than before. One need not fear, however, that the receipt of financial assistance from the Exchequer will mean any deterioration in the quality of the work of the voluntary bodies or any restriction of desirable or necessary freedom. The technique of help without undue interference has been already worked out and applied in regard to many educational institutions, and there should be no trouble in a wider application of the technique.

I may summarize by saying that the war has widened the scope of social service in Great Britain, has vastly increased the number of social workers, and has led to a financial conjunction between the state and the social agencies which is likely to continue.

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE

By JOHN P. PETERS, M.D.

WHEN I was asked to discuss the present state of health insurance in this country, I demurred for two reasons: first, because I lack the detailed information necessary for a comprehensive, quantitative survey of the recent growth of the insurance movement; second, because I have no confidence in the value of such a survey. Almost I am inclined to agree with those who would abolish the term "insurance" because of the comfortable concepts that have grown around it. Sometimes I am tempted to scrap the term "social security" because of its complacent sound. At least, I should have the people educated to know that cash indemnity benefits can never assure them adequate medical care, but only the privilege of subsisting while they survive. Money can be provided by subsidy or by group prepayment systems; but an adequate return for this money in medical service can be assured only if attention is given to perfecting machinery by which this service is to be administered.

Modern medical care cannot be provided effectively to the people at large under the present system of individualistic private practice with fee-for-service payment. It requires the coördinated and intelligently guided efforts of highly trained experts with diversified skills, aided by complicated and expensive technical equipment and assistance. But the public continues to think in terms of distribution of physicians, of mere opportunity for exposure to a doctor, and to express its thoughts solely in terms of dollars and cents. A comprehensive system of medical care can be secured only by public subsidy, with or without the aid of insurance. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the immediate widespread imposition of a health

insurance system with cash benefits might, by reversing the present movement from offices and homes to hospitals and medical centers, retard, rather than advance, the progress of medicine.

In the present emergency, medicine, like every other pursuit, is in a critical position. It is obvious that the demands of our military forces and the needs of the civilian population cannot both be met without some changes in our traditional method of providing medical care. In fact, the very foundations of conventional practice are being blasted. Nevertheless, as in every other walk of life, pressure is being exerted to preserve the present system. Indeed, the disposition of medical resources has been entrusted to those who have a vested interest in its preservation. Those who are intelligently striving for a reorganization appropriate to the times are warned that reconstruction should wait upon the termination of the war. They are told that attempts to change the social order during this struggle can only lead to dissension that will divert energy from the one point at issue, the successful prosecution of the war. Granted that we are fighting for no positive ends, but merely for the extermination of an evil, we shall still do well to take steps to increase our efficiency, even at the expense of some outworn traditions. For this reason it seems pertinent to consider the problem of national health in relation to the present situation.

Failure to grasp the implications of modern medicine is particularly evident in the popular discussion of the shortage of physicians brought about by the demands of the military forces. Rural communities, already undermanned with physicians, have especially suffered, not because the draft boards and the Procurement and Assignment Agency drew most heavily on these communities, nor because the rural physicians were necessarily more vigorous and patriotic, but because they had less to lose and the pay of an Army officer had more attractions for them. These men cannot be equitably withdrawn from the military forces, nor can others be constrained to take their places unless steps are taken to remedy the conditions that led the initial incumbents to leave: the lack of opportunity to practice medicine of high quality and to grow in their profession.

A similar problem is presented by the mushroom communities which have sprung up about our infant war industries. Even if state licensure regulations and local medical organizations did not

impose barriers to the free movement of physicians into these areas, competent physicians already established elsewhere cannot be persuaded to move voluntarily if they must depend on the chances of unregulated private practice without the facilities and contacts that will allow them to maintain their professional standards.

The military authorities order physicians as they would material commodities, in terms of numbers, the only qualification being age. This in itself poses a question of the first importance and will prove the most compelling reason for a reorganization of medical practice. The faculties of the leading medical schools have been heavily drained, especially of their younger men who are best trained in science and most in step with modern trends. The impression that this deficiency can be met by enlisting the services of the older men in the community is erroneous. Dr. Diehl, a member of the directing board of the Procurement and Assignment Service, recently said:

Such suggestions [that medical teaching during the war might be done by practitioners who are over military age or are physically disqualified for military service] reveal a failure to realize that medical teaching has become very much of a specialty and that in many schools younger men not only carry most of the teaching load but are the most effective teachers. . . . Furthermore, most practitioners are too busy these days to assume much, if any, more teaching responsibilities. It is essential, therefore, that some of the effective younger teachers who are devoting all or a large part of their time to teaching be retained on the faculties of the medical schools.¹

Despite this recognition of the exigencies of the situation, there is no clear evidence that the indiscriminating rapacity of the Army and Navy will be checked. Although the faculties are reduced to skeleton staffs, the remaining members are forced to teach on an accelerated schedule students who enter with less premedical training. In addition, many of them are serving on special committees or are conducting research on problems directly connected with the war.

Their students, with an abbreviated medical course and a hasty internship, are seized at once, the majority to become battalion medical officers. Few of them have contact with medicine in any form for months; the battalion medical officers will be alienated from real medicine for the duration. They are robbed of that part of a med-

¹ H. S. Diehl, "Medical Education and the Procurement and Assignment Service," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, CXXI (1943), 635.

ical education that permits those who are superior to acquire distinction, to learn special skills, to contribute to the progress of medicine. To me, it seems a shortsighted policy by which the military forces, for the sake of mere numbers, are sacrificing quality in an expert branch of the service where quality is a prime requisite. If this war is not quickly ended, they, as well as the civilian population, will feel the lack of highly trained specialists. This was recognized by Edward C. Elliott, Chief of Professional and Technical Training of the War Manpower Commission, when he said in a recent speech:

At best, it must be admitted that we have proceeded in an uncertain, catch-as-catch-can fashion. If the war is not to be too prolonged, we shall muddle through. On the other hand, if the war is to continue for three, four, five years, then we may be self-convicted of shortsightedness for not devising formulas for a better balance of supply and needs and for not insuring a continuous flow of trained men and women for the essential service of a nation at war.²

This is an unbelievably naïve confession. The words "catch-as-catch-can fashion" and "muddle through," of course, have a disarming emotional appeal to the sentimental Anglo-Saxon; but they do not exactly engender confidence. The admission that we shall suffer from lack of experts if this war continues more than two years is damning indeed, when it is reflected that the accelerated program will hardly begin to bear fruit until this period has elapsed, and, as far as medicine is concerned, will only be in full flower at the end of six years. The quality of medical manpower is, therefore, being wittingly compromised for at least a third of a generation.

Be this as it may, how are these young physicians to be absorbed after the war? Deprived of their full rightful educational heritage in medicine for the sake of their fellows, are they merely to be thrown into the *mêlée* of competitive private practice? The effect on medicine would be deplorable. Or must they abandon their chosen profession, truly an inequitable reward for service?

Last, but far from least, what of the progress of medicine, the new discoveries that make the promise of medicine so much greater than its practice? The public is far from enjoying the full benefits of what has already been achieved because these cannot be made avail-

² E. C. Elliott, "Education and the War," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, CXXI (1943), 631.

able under the present system. But the benefits are potential at least, and the potentialities are growing under the continuing efforts of the medical scientists. The public takes these things for granted, like the manna from heaven, or, if it pauses to think at all, gives thanks to foundations and proprietary drug firms. The leaders of organized medicine point proudly to the high estate of American medical science as the noblest product of the competitive system of practice. Actually, the private practitioner contributes far less to the productive offices of medicine every day. More and more is he being relegated to the lowly position of distributor. Medical investigation requires organization, equipment, and technical assistance. More than any of these, however, it requires that imaginative, intelligent persons, highly trained, be given opportunity for continuous education. These perquisites office practice cannot give. Scientific medical investigation is conducted almost entirely by full-time salaried workers in institutions.

The public has been given the impression that discoveries originate through the offices of corporations and foundations which pose problems to be solved by technicians. Actually, these organizations can do nothing except provide material resources. Success depends altogether upon their skill or good fortune in selecting persons who can put these resources to the best use. This, in turn, demands that the educational system furnish a continuous stream of trained candidates from which selection can be made. Failure and waste begin when the inexpert attempt to direct investigative work or to divert it too much from its natural channels into paths of expediency. When they tamper with the educational background of science they blight the plant of discovery at its roots. Nevertheless, we have seen fit to entrust medical education and the ultimate control of medical science to the military authorities, who have had no particular experience and certainly no brilliant career in these fields, working in conjunction with an agency that represents almost solely the interests of the distributing practitioners. Only a remote advisory function, under direction that was nearly accidental where it was not self-elected, has been left to those who are really competent investigators with imagination, critical judgment, and an appreciation of relevance.

The disruption of the normal progress of scientific investigation is, like every other distortion of normal life, accepted with com-

placency. The public is advised to be content to let these matters wait until the end of the war or to let them survive as well as they may in the face of obstruction, as if they belonged in the class of luxury products. This is an utterly false conception. It is imperative that these activities be augmented, not curtailed, at this critical juncture. A discovery that increases the effectiveness of medicine is worth more to the health of the military and civilian population than a host of distributing hands. Moreover, investigations should not be limited to the obvious problems of military warfare. Morbidity and mortality from usual peacetime causes do not cease during the war, and create as great disability and disorganization as battle casualties. Moreover, they may be far more amenable to prevention and remedy.

The tempo of scientific research has become so accelerated, and the body of scientific knowledge is already so vast and complex, that the average practitioner cannot comprehend a large proportion of what he is called upon to do. The gap between his knowledge and the facts is continuously growing. Isolated from educational contacts and enmeshed in an inefficient distributing system, he has neither the time nor the opportunity for the self-education that would enable him to fill this gap. He is forced to work more and more with rules of thumb gleaned from addresses heard at medical meetings or from articles published in some of the more popular journals. The easiest course, he finds, is to rely upon the advertisements or to succumb to the blandishments of the salesmen of firms that manufacture proprietary drugs and instruments.

It may seem that I have taken advantage of this opportunity to discuss irrelevancies; that I was asked to discuss insurance, not to vent my spleen gratuitously upon the medical conduct of the war. However, all these matters are most pertinent to the subject. In the first place, this crisis has stirred up thought and activity about the problems of medical care. It has accelerated the movement toward insurance or prepayment systems in the search for a solution. But, in this movement the public has labored under the same misconceptions about modern medicine that have governed the military authorities. It has displayed the same preoccupation with distribution to the neglect of quality. It has permitted control of its medical destinies to be consigned to the inexperienced and to those who have a vested interest in the preservation of the existing order. Almost all

the projects that have been undertaken have conformed to the present pattern of practice, usually retaining the fee-for-service method of payment; none has made any provisions for education and investigation. Many of these projects are directly connected with the war effort; all of them are affected by it. To expect profit from the destruction of war may be overoptimistic; nevertheless, it does put us under compulsion to increase efficiency. This compulsion should be intelligently used to remove conventional barriers to progress.

As our medical manpower is being diverted to the military forces, the problem of meeting the needs of the civilian population has become acute. There is great doubt whether the Army and Navy require or can effectively utilize as large a proportion of physicians as they are demanding. Certainly, great numbers of doctors in service are being held inactive for periods of time that seem excessive. The military authorities should not be permitted to waste or hoard resources. Success of our efforts depends upon the maintenance of supplies as well as the prowess of our soldiers and sailors. However much the military demands are reduced, some shortage and maldistribution of medical services at home will remain. If the quality of medicine is to be maintained or improved, then steps must be taken to establish experiments in the practice of medicine along exemplary lines.

The direction that such experiments should take has already been demonstrated. Well-balanced groups with integrated facilities should be established about hospitals in industrial and rural communities. The advantages of such associations should need no argument at this date. They have been proved by example in the best clinics of the country. This system has been adopted by all the leading teaching institutions of America, and its value is attested by the generally high esteem in which these institutions are held. The best existing hospitals, public and private, as well as the medical schools, could be utilized for these experiments, if and so far as they can be adapted to a social program and will meet standards for qualification. Because duplication and partial use of equipment and technical assistance are obviated by such centralization, material facilities may be kept up to higher standards with prompt replacement for obsolescence. Services of consultants and specialists can be made more conveniently available. Constant close contacts between the members of the staff in their coöperative activities have an educational value.

In addition, in such groups work can be allocated according to the competence and the special skill of the members. Younger, inexperienced men are not excluded from opportunity or forced to sit idle until they acquire patients, as they are under the present system; nor are they permitted on their own responsibility to undertake tasks beyond their capacity. They are offered opportunities for continual development and education under supervision. By proper distribution of duties time may be found to utilize these opportunities.

To make no provision for productive investigation in such an organization is a shortsighted policy. Nothing so stimulates interest and emulation as constant contact with research endeavors. Original activities tend to attract the most vital and intelligent men; they enhance the quality of work and improve the morale of workers. If the consumers need more tangible rewards they may comfort themselves that they will reap the first returns of any discoveries made in their institution.

The activities of these organizations should not be confined within the walls of the hospital. This is only the center from which they should radiate. A well-equipped modern hospital is not merely a hotel for the sick; beds and nursing care are not its sole functions, but only one of the types of service it offers. It is an institution in which are centralized the personnel and facilities required for the practice of medicine. These should be made available to all strata of the population, to ambulatory as well as to bed patients, just as they have been made available to the needy through outpatient clinics. This will be possible, however, only when medical care and hospital service are linked together. In so far as it has accelerated the movement of medical practice from home and office to hospitals, hospital insurance has worked for the improvement of medical care. But, as long as it does not provide for physicians' services it is economically unsound. Because of its convenience persons are hospitalized for diagnostic and therapeutic measures that could equally well be conducted while the patient was ambulatory. When medical care and hospital service are linked together, as they should be, that part of the cost of insurance which covers the expenses of hospitalization can be reduced.

If personnel of high quality is to be procured and an efficient organization is to be established, payment in these groups should be

by salary. Under no other system can coöperation be obtained. By no other means can rewards be apportioned with consideration of the competence of the members of the staff and the utility of each one to the organization as a whole. A still more cogent argument for payment by salary has received too little emphasis, the fact that this method of payment promotes the mobility of physicians and enlarges the field of selection. For these experiments the most capable men should be sought, regardless of geographical considerations. Such men cannot be persuaded to move, however, if they can be offered no economic security. The fee-for-service system of payment restricts the choice of personnel to local talent. Efforts should be made, of course, to permit local physicians to participate in the projects, as far as this is compatible with the successful conduct of the experiments. But a well-balanced, highly qualified staff cannot always be collected from the physicians of a restricted area.

Fee-for-service payment creates competition within the group on a cash, rather than a service, basis. It tends to pit the specialists against one another and against the internist, whereas they should be coöperating in behalf of the patient as a whole. In any case, fee-for-service payment is unsuited for a system of medicine financed by insurance or subsidy. When the patient pays the bills for the doctor's services a proper bargaining relation exists. But when a third party pays a fee for each service, it is to the advantage of the patient to demand, and of the physician to give, the maximum amount of service, whether it is required or not.

Completely free choice of physician must also be abandoned. Choice must be limited to members of the group and must be regulated within the group. Since free choice is not always wise choice, its elimination is not an unmixed evil. An individual has the right to waste his own substance on poor medicine; but when he risks the common funds of a group, the other members of the group have the right to insist that they be spent wisely. If the group properly discharges its responsibility the consumers will all alike be assured service of high quality.

Organized medicine, of course, refuses to sanction any projects that do not recognize the principles of fee-for-service payment and free choice of physicians. The retention of these principles is the chief weakness of all the health insurance projects instituted by state and county medical societies. It was in its insistence upon these prin-

ciples that the American Medical Association brought upon itself the judgment of the Supreme Court.

This is only one of the barriers that must be broken down if experiments like those I have outlined are to be instituted in a free spirit. Our state licensure laws constitute another. Neither of these can be allowed to obstruct progress toward better medicine. There should be no valid objection to the modification of state licensing laws in this crisis if standards of qualification are in no instance lowered. Whatever the leaders of organized medicine may say, there is a large enough body of idealists among physicians to assure the success of courageous experiments if emphasis is placed on improving the quality, as well as increasing the distribution of medical care.

This experimental approach is suggested, not because there is a lack of adequate patterns or good precedents to justify the institution of groups about hospitals, but because there are not equally good patterns or precedents for the control of such organizations. The existing custom of entrusting control of hospitals to prominent financiers with philanthropic inclinations is unsuitable. Executive or administrative boards thus constituted are inherently arbitrary and irresponsible. At best, they rule by beneficent paternalism. Systems of medical care supported by prepayment or public subsidy are not philanthropic ventures, but realistic attempts to escape the uncertainties of philanthropy. I should surmise that policy-making boards for a community or group project established about a hospital should contain, besides representatives of the consumers at large, members selected from public welfare and social service organizations, civil and governmental, which are concerned with matters relating to the health of the community.

At the present moment, if such experiments are to be instituted, the whole control of the medical resources of the country will have to be radically revised. The selection and allocation of medical personnel and facilities must be vested in some person or body with broad vision and expert knowledge of the whole field of medicine and public health, one that is not interested only in the distribution of practitioners, but which recognizes the significance of education and investigation, and is aware of the full social implications of medicine. This person or body must be as free as possible from prejudicial affiliations. The military authorities do not meet these specifications. Their prime responsibility is to the military forces;

this problem involves the civilian population as well. The Medical Corps of the Army and Navy have been trained to consider only one highly specialized administrative objective. The leaders of organized medicine cannot be entrusted with the disposition of medical manpower so long as they insist that the present method of practice cannot be changed.

If such a radical revision can be effected and if realistic experiments are established and conducted intelligently and without reactionary inhibitions, patterns should soon be found which will not only increase the efficiency of medicine in this war, but which will serve as models for more extensive permanent health programs. Not only will the welfare of the public profit, but better opportunities will be offered to the members of the medical profession who are and will be serving in the armed forces. Especially will the young men have places to which they may return with some hope that they may realize their original aspirations, that they may resume the education of which they have been deprived. The practice of medicine will be turned from salesmanship to productive public service.

ORGANIZING THE COMMUNITY FOR HEALTH PROTECTION IN WARTIME

By *DEAN A. CLARK, M.D.*

THE TITLE of this discussion opens up almost limitless possibilities, yet we have to reduce them to something concrete, practical, and understandable. Perhaps we can begin by scrutinizing the principles which must underlie any local scheme for health protection at present. The first of these is the realization that what we are able to do right now will, to a large extent, determine what we can do after the war is over. The second principle is that any health plan is futile which is not reckoned as a part of the whole community picture. This means, of course, that adequate health protection cannot be organized merely by those technically trained in the health field. All groups must participate. A third basic principle is that health planning must include all the health needs of all the community's people, without regard to rights, privileges, or economic circumstances. Fourth, finally, we must recognize and face the obvious fact that our accomplishments will depend almost wholly upon the more effective organization and use of the limited trained personnel and specialized facilities now at hand, or indeed, upon even less than these. We are not going to get many new additions to our medical resources while the war lasts.

It will be worth while to look in some detail at ways in which these principles can be applied. Many illustrations can, in fact, be found among programs now in operation. The provision of medical services to recipients of public assistance and to the medically needy may be used to illustrate the first principle. Namely, that our future health programs will be determined by what we do now. There is in some places a tendency to think that since our assistance loads are

relatively small we can afford to coast along with all the inadequacies of our present system. Yet we will not be able suddenly to erect a coördinated plan for providing medical services for these groups, should a temporary postwar dislocation cause them to grow rapidly in size. On the other hand, if a good plan has been worked out for the present small assistance load it can easily be expanded to care for more persons later on. I should like to emphasize particularly the care of the medically needy. In spite of relatively full employment, higher living costs and scarcity of health personnel and facilities continue to make it likely that this group will become no smaller than before the war. It may, in fact, be larger. At any rate, we must keep up and improve our standards of tax-supported medical care, or we may subsequently find ourselves hopelessly behind the times.

The control of tuberculosis is another example of a program whose future is now being determined. It would be quite easy to outline an ideal scheme for postwar control. But where will all our postwar plans be if we neglect tuberculosis now and after the war find ourselves overwhelmed by a terrific increase in the disease? No, it is perfectly obvious that however fancy our postwar plans may be on paper, they are going to turn out, in fact, to be but direct extensions of our wartime health programs. Let us have no illusions about being able suddenly to pick up in 1945 where we left off in 1941. We must not be taken in by the palpable nonsense that we can win the war first and then worry about the peace.

The second principle, that health is the concern of the whole community, not just by the medical professions, would seem to be axiomatic; yet the implications do not always seem to be clear. It means, for example, that all groups in the community must play a part in drawing up and carrying out the health program. Too often, we are inclined to leave health planning to doctors, nurses, medical social workers, and other technically trained personnel. To be sure, these persons must be responsible for the professional features of the program, but they alone cannot know what people's needs are, nor can they alone know how to meet them. There are many different ways of securing community representation, but all satisfactory ones take account of the fact that, ultimately, those who have most at stake are not the doctors and nurses and social workers, but the people themselves, and therefore the people must determine what they need and want. The views at least of labor, agriculture, man-

agement, and the general public must be obtained before health requirements can possibly be appraised or solutions reached.

Sometimes a council of social agencies can serve as a representative body, but often such councils do not include adequate representation from labor, from agriculture, and from industry. A local public health council can serve the purpose, provided that its membership really presents the point of view of the lay public. In some communities, the defense council has assumed the role through special subcommittees on health and welfare. It does not much matter, of course, what name is given to the planning body, but it matters a great deal whether the group simply acts as a clearinghouse for the expression of rival views of those with special interests in the health and welfare fields, or whether it truly gives an opportunity for the public to evaluate its own problems and to organize for their solution.

The best paper plan on earth will fail if people feel that it is being handed out by "experts." People do not want others to tell them what is good for them; they want to participate from the beginning. The attitude of labor is a good illustration of this. Often employers wonder why their workers look with suspicion on an apparently fine scheme for industrial hygiene, for preplacement examinations, etc., which has been presented after careful thought and consideration, but with no voice from the union in its planning stages. What could be more natural than such suspicion? The same scheme, worked out with union participation from the start would be accepted gladly by the workers and would be executed with their enthusiastic help.

The hospital service plan in Michigan was among the first of this kind of health organization to recognize this fact, and since putting union members on its board, it has trebled in size and in effectiveness. The rural health associations formed under the leadership of the Farm Security Administration illustrate the same principle, as does also the health division of the council of social agencies in Buffalo. We cannot get far unless this principle is followed wholeheartedly and seriously.

Third is that health protection must include all preventive and curative services for the entire population. There is no need to stress the fact that we need all our manpower if we are to win this war. Yet in all the talk about the farm labor shortage and the problem

of absenteeism, little has been said about the drain that preventable or untreated illness makes on our workers.

Clearly, it is not enough to insure that some one phase of the problem—let us say venereal disease control—is well handled, if we neglect the rest. The best industrial hygiene and accident prevention measures might help a good deal to reduce the work days lost because of occupational health hazards, but of what use will this be if we neglect the nonoccupational illnesses which cause fifteen times as much time loss? Of what real value is a fine plan for hospitalization and medical care in a community where families have to live in shacks and trailers and drink contaminated water? Health simply cannot be treated as an isolated phenomenon. An excellent program of education in nutrition, for example, is futile if people cannot afford to buy, or cannot buy at any price, the food they need.

Perhaps the best example of a community that considers all health factors is the Army. I dare say that no community is doing as much to safeguard the health of every individual as are our armed forces. We can ill afford to criticize an organization which not only provides for disease prevention and complete medical care, but also remembers the health factor in all its plans for feeding, clothing, and housing its members. The Army and Navy may be enrolling a huge fraction of our manpower, but at least they are trying to keep all their men and women at peak efficiency.

We cannot blame our failure to maintain the best possible civilian health on the loss of medical personnel to the armed forces until we can show that we are using our remaining health personnel and facilities to the best advantage. And this is the fourth basic principle of organizing for health protection. On the whole, we have not taken all possible steps to make our health services more effective and more economical. There are notable examples of what we *could* do if we would.

One state tuberculosis sanatorium has been able to keep up its professional standards by employing most successfully a number of refugee physicians. A great pool of these men still exists, but few indeed are the states and communities that have drawn upon it. The same sanatorium uses prison labor for much of its nonprofessional work. Prisoners are paid full wages for their work (the money being held in trust until the prison term expires), and have shown considerable interest and enthusiasm in contributing, in this way, to

the war effort. A valuable by-product, of course, is the rehabilitation process this useful employment is effecting among the prisoners. Somewhat similar is the use by a certain general hospital of paroled prisoners as orderlies, a scheme which has also been most successful. Another tuberculosis sanatorium is employing well-adjusted patients from a near-by mental institution. This plan, too, has proven not only of help to the tuberculosis hospital, but also of great therapeutic value to the mentally ill employees.

A different type of economy is illustrated by the pooling of doctors' and nurses' time. By bringing professional people together in a clinic, many more patients can be treated than could be managed by the same doctors and nurses if they were scattered in individual offices. The California Physicians' Service, a health insurance plan sponsored by the California Medical Association, has found, for instance, that the tenants in large housing projects in San Diego and near San Francisco can be served more economically by the establishment of clinics with salaried doctors and nurses at the housing projects than they could by individual visits to the doctors' offices. It is highly significant that these schemes are backed by the official organization of private practitioners.

Somewhat similar are the plans, now in effect in some New York State counties and in the District of Columbia, for dividing the community into districts, each of which is covered by a particular doctor, and for rotating night calls so that a single physician answers all calls one night while his colleagues have a chance to rest. These plans, too, were sponsored by medical societies. Then there are the migratory labor camps of the FSA, in which doctors and nurses, paid by the hour or by salaries, hold daily clinics. All these plans illustrate the point that doctors can make more effective use of their skill if their time can be organized so that they do not have to wait for patients and so that they do not all make home calls in the same outlying community at the same time.

We have been told that to save doctors' time, patients should go to the doctor instead of asking the doctor to come to them. This is really but part of the answer, because when long distances are involved, sending patients to the doctor wastes patients' time (and many of them are war workers), and gasoline and tires. We need to go one step farther: we must organize within the community so that a designated doctor will go periodically to a private office or a

clinic relatively near his patients, where they can see him at an appointed time. To care for emergencies, doctors should be assigned in rotation to cover a specified territory. Thus the time of both doctors and patients may be economized.

Economy is also needed through better division of labor among the various personnel in health services. Our hospitals are learning that graduate nurses can be freed for professional tasks by the judicious use of volunteer nurses' aides. Industries and the Army have shown that laymen trained in first aid can adequately staff many posts where doctors and nurses were formerly employed. Nurses and even orderlies are now being satisfactorily entrusted with duties which only a doctor used to perform. It is being discovered, too, that the general practitioner can effectively carry out work formerly left to the specialist. This "diluting" of medical services through increasing the responsibility of less highly skilled workers need not lower the quality of care given. It all depends on the way services are organized and supervised. Every teaching hospital has known for years that a third-year medical student, properly supervised, can serve excellently as a substitute intern, and that a nursing student in her first or second year can fill in for a ward charge nurse.

We have much to learn, too, about speeding up our training process to give us additional technical personnel in the shortest possible time. Both medical and nursing schools have begun to do this, but it seems likely that still further compressing of our professional courses will be required if the war lasts beyond another year. No one thinks any more that nine calendar years are needed to make a high school boy into a doctor. We now say it can be done in six, and I venture to predict that we shall be satisfied with five if the demand is great enough. In fact, the Government is now seriously considering a suggestion for using nurses in certain types of practice after but two years of training. Again, our standards of care need not suffer from the speedier training process, provided only that we organize effectively to assure that persons are assigned to tasks commensurate with their training and to supervise the work they undertake.

Finally, we can economize by bringing the standards of employment in the health field up to others in the community. It is useless to talk about freezing hospital, clinic, or health department employees to their jobs unless we can make those jobs worth while.

Good work will never be done under sheer compulsion. It may sound contradictory to say that our best economy will be to spend more money on the wages of nurses, orderlies, and maids, yet by doing this we can get so much more for our money that the community will profit in the long run. I know that this implies some changes in our customs: hospital budgets are not made of rubber, and if hospitals are to pay out more, they will either have to raise their prices to patients, which will result in less service to the whole community, or receive more from other sources. This means, in the final analysis, more tax support for our health institutions. We must, indeed, face the facts: if we want to organize for health protection we shall have to pay decently for it; moreover, we shall have to pay for it as a community, rather than haphazardly as individuals, if we want to assure a unified health program for the benefit of our whole population.

The challenge to use our health resources most effectively is, then, perhaps the greatest one we are facing. No community can be said to be doing its part unless it is utilizing all sources of labor, taking steps to reduce waste in the time of its technically trained personnel, making use of less highly trained paid workers and volunteers to free more highly trained people, speeding up the training process for needed additional workers, and paying reasonably well for the services it expects its health workers to perform.

You may well say that half the problem has been left untouched. What if a community has no doctors or nurses or hospital beds? Suppose you live in Vallejo, California, or Valparaiso, Florida? With the best will and the best organization, you could not accomplish much, because you would have so little with which to work. But as a nation we have the resources to serve Vallejo and Valparaiso and hundreds of other places. Community organization for health depends upon national organization for health. Even relatively large units, such as states, are impossibly handicapped if they depend solely on their own resources. For example, the ten states classified as most rural by the census are almost the same as the ten states with the lowest per-capita incomes; they coincide closely with the ten states which have lost the most doctors in the last twenty years; and, still more important, they are the ten states which exceeded their quotas of doctors for the armed forces by the largest

percentages. Health planning should and must begin in the community, but it can only end with the nation as a whole.

If we look at the four principles in relation to the national scene, we can see what remains:

1. Does our national wartime health planning show that we realize that our future health programs will be determined by what we do now? If so, I very much fear that the 50,000 doctors who will be discharged from the armed forces will not be distributed to serve our nation in any more systematic way than they were before we entered the war.

2. Do we yet understand that health is the concern of the whole nation not just by the medical professions? Has the public an adequate voice in health planning in the national scene? Precious little has been done to draw in lay representation to consider the health situation. I should also add that precious little has been heard from communities, or from labor, agricultural, and industrial groups, to show that they realize their stake and their proper responsibilities in health protection.

3. Are we organizing nationally all preventive and curative services for the entire population? Admirable progress has been made along some lines, but so far we have seen no comprehensive plan to provide preventive services, industrial hygiene, medical care, and emergency medical services for all our vital war workers, industrial and agricultural, to say nothing of the dependents of these workers or of the population as a whole.

4. Finally, are we, as a nation, using our remaining health personnel and facilities to the best advantage? Here, perhaps, we have been the least successful. Our doctors, dentists, and nurses are even less equitably distributed now than before the war began but we have been unable to remedy this so far. No real solution has been found for problems of licensure or for providing financial security for doctors who move to needy areas. Nurses are still being employed by private patients to perform services not needed medically, while ward patients go without needed service. In many a community, doctors are still unable to utilize their skill completely because they are not allowed to work in the one available hospital, if it happens to have a closed staff. Salaried industrial physicians cannot, during off-hours, furnish general care to the people of their neighborhoods because of local pressures. Hundreds of industrial and

farming communities which need physicians could obtain them if prepayment plans were organized in order to guarantee financial stability. Mr. Henry Kaiser has attracted excellent physicians through just such a scheme, but the mechanism is still widely neglected.

I do not mean to say that we have accomplished nothing. Enormous progress has been made in many places; but if we are to achieve real health protection for the nation, we shall need more thoughtful, more disinterested, and better organized planning than we have had so far.

We must not let the deficiencies on the national scene distract us from the need for pursuing health organization at home. Unless we carry it on there we will not uncover the problems that require national attention. As we tackle these problems at home, we will be able to demonstrate what kind of action needs to be taken by the nation as a whole. Only if the communities can show the need, and only if the voices of the communities are heard in support of the necessary national action, will we eventually be able adequately to organize this nation for health protection in wartime.

NEBRASKA ORGANIZES FOR HEALTH PROTECTION

By *ELIN L. ANDERSON*

NEARLY FOUR years ago the College of Agriculture of the University of Nebraska undertook a project on the medical care and health of rural people as a coöperative arrangement with the Farm Foundation of Chicago. The purpose of the project was not to make another survey nor to propose any special health program. Its aim was to help rural people analyze their health and medical needs and to determine how to meet these needs in coöperation with their physicians, dentists, and health agencies. The project was predicated on the belief that rural people could do much to solve their own health and medical problems by community planning and group organization. The sole contribution of the Farm Foundation was a field worker.

The problems of health and medical services that are common to most rural areas are enhanced in Nebraska by the problems of recurrent drought and of vast distances thinly populated. The 1,300,000 people of the state are spread over an area equal to seven of the Eastern states; medical facilities are unevenly distributed. Annual state expenditures for public health have been little more than the cost of building one mile of the concrete highway across this vast state.

The first year of the project was experimental. The project was initiated in Dawson County, because the people there were particularly anxious to work out, as they said, some program by which independent farm families could have at least as good medical care as the families on relief. The County Home Demonstration Council first took leadership. After numerous discussions with physicians and rural residents, they became convinced that the greatest need

and interest was in working out a method of regular payment for medical care which would assure some positive health services as well as security against the hazards of costly illness. A committee of physicians and rural people was set up to study prepayment plans for medical care. Rapid strides were made at first. Said one of the physicians on this committee, "Perhaps it doesn't matter how we physicians are paid. Think what we could do in this town if we added a wing to our community hospital and all six physicians moved their offices there. Under the assured income of a prepayment plan each of us could pursue his special interests and soon be a partial specialist. That would mean more service to the people." Such progress was too good to last.

The storm broke when, in one upland corner of the county, the people and their physician set up a medical coöperative by which families would receive medical and hospital care and drugs from their physician for \$36 a year. To some of the conservative members of the county medical society this was socialized medicine at the front door. To offset such a trend they offered to carry out a county-wide program of examination of preschool children, but they discouraged any further study of medical-care plans.

It now became evident that a broader educational program was necessary to develop an understanding among the rural people and their physicians of the nature of the problem and its possible solutions. With this in view the circular "Do We Want Health?" was written in 1940 and studied first in the 1,700 home demonstration clubs of the state and later by other organizations. It was the first statement in popular form of state health and medical problems and of suggested lines of action for a more thorough group program. It met with immediate response. All over the state the people in the rural areas asked for round-table conferences to analyze their health and medical needs and the ways of meeting them. These discussions ranged over a wide variety of needs and possible solutions, but they always gravitated to a recognition that the central core of any rural health program was some organized prepayment plan by which preventive measures could be made a part of the regular curative services offered by local physicians.

Impatient to do something, a number of communities undertook projects which brought out the importance of group action to obtain certain health services. In Dundy County, the home demonstration

agent organized the first county health council in the state. This council immediately planned and conducted programs of immunization, dental examinations, and tuberculosis testing. Other counties followed this plan. In South Sheridan County, where the nearest doctor is forty-five miles away, the Home Demonstration Club women organized themselves to secure a public health nurse. Undaunted by the lack of legislation permitting counties to contribute tax funds to a public health program, they appealed to school districts and raised the money needed to match state and Federal funds for a nursing service. The county now leads the way in demonstrating what a public health nurse can do in a sparsely settled area where there is no other medical service.

In spite of several such encouraging developments in various parts of the state, progress toward better medical-care plans seemed to be halted by the resistance of organized medicine. For a time the College of Agriculture considered diverting the health study into one on general health education on such accepted subjects as diseases of children and tuberculosis. But the rural people felt that this was no time to yield. They asked the College to call a state-wide conference at which they could present their problems to official representatives of the State Medical Association.

The round table conference held in August, 1941, marked a turning point in the health study. All those invited either attended or sent representatives, some going as far as 400 miles at their own expense. The people spoke convincingly of their needs. One woman told what it meant to live forty-five miles from a doctor at time of childbirth; the untrained midwife service that was available; the part that she herself had to play as an inexperienced midwife in order to help a neighbor. The people showed familiarity with such coöperative programs as the Ross Loos Clinic in California and the Farmers Union Coöperative Hospital Association in Elk City, Oklahoma. They asked the physicians to assist them in developing similar programs suitable to conditions in Nebraska. The medical men were impressed. The spokesman for the State Medical Association stated that the Medical Association would work out payment plans for medical care with representatives of the people and the University. Thus the State Health Planning Committee was formed.

The State Health Planning Committee has clarified many of the problems of medical care and has worked toward some solutions.

As physicians and laymen have worked together, they have come to a deeper appreciation and understanding of their respective responsibilities in any health program. The varied economic conditions of the state were first studied with land-use planning maps. From this analysis the conviction grew that several methods of payment, ranging from the present fee-for-service, through voluntary pooled funds, to outright taxation, must be integrated into one health program if all the people were to have equal opportunity for health and medical services.

Next, the guiding principles of any medical program were considered. It was evident that in many rural areas free choice of physician scarcely exists; that modern medical services require community health and diagnostic centers and coöperative effort among physicians rather than competition; that the present method of paying for each illness or call often acts as a deterrent to developing a family program focused on maintaining good health. Only after much discussion were the following principles evolved:

1. Any program should provide general medical care aiming toward preventive medicine rather than toward emergency care alone.

2. Medical services should be organized in such a way as to encourage coöperation and collaboration among general practitioners and specialists; this is to be effected wherever possible through the development of properly standardized community-owned hospitals or health centers.

3. Methods of payment, for those who so desire, should be on the basis of a pooled fund composed of periodic payments by families or individuals for which they receive medical services on a yearly basis per family or individual.

4. Families should have free choice of physicians. Continuous effort should be made to provide qualified general practitioners and to discover methods by which people may be guided to such qualified physicians.

5. There should be a clear definition of the responsibility of the physicians and laymen to the plan—the physicians to have complete responsibility for all the medical aspects of the plan; the lay group, for the general and financial organization.

Now came the task of putting these principles into practice. Instead of a state-wide health insurance program, it was decided to

work out plans suitable to two different types of areas in the state, one sparsely settled, the other more thickly populated. Because of the urgent request for help from the people of the sparsely settled areas where medical facilities are few, attention was first given to this region.

The Sandhill region, comprising more than a third of all the territory of the state, has a population of from two to five persons per square mile. Medical facilities are few. For 200 miles along the main highway there is no hospital. Yet the people of one section of this territory, in coöperation with the State Health Planning Committee, have developed a program of preventive and curative medical services that may well set an example for sparsely settled areas anywhere.

Over 200 families in Thomas County and the surrounding territory of more than a thousand square miles have joined a coöperative health association. For \$30 a year each family receives common drugs, the preventive and curative services that their physician can render, and the services of a public health nurse. The program is not limited to the more prosperous. The county commissioners have made it possible for families on relief to join in the plan on the same basis as other families; the State Assistance Office has made similar arrangements possible for old age pensioners and other families. Farm Security Administration families have joined.

Maintenance of high standards of service is assured through the supervision and generous financial grant made by the State Department of Health, with the approval of the United States Public Health Service and the United States Children's Bureau, for the preventive services that the physician and nurse render. The local people have made the ground floor of their hotel into a most attractive office for the physician and nurse, who are on outright salary, fees from nonmembers going to the association. In order to serve the people most effectively in this vast area, the physician and nurse spend one morning a week in each of the five towns whose population ranges from forty to 270 people, providing medical care, immunizing children, visiting schools, and conducting other public health services. The support of the public health nurse has meant that the services that the physician can render have been nearly doubled. Recently, the nurse reported that she never had so much to do in her public health work in Omaha as she had in each of the little

communities of her 1,000 square miles of territory. On the other hand, because of the regular visits to these small communities, the doctor and nurse have never had to make extra home calls to these communities. Such organization, therefore, has meant a great saving of the doctor's time and energy. It is hoped, in time, to add to this program dental and other services, for to many rural people this seems a solid foundation on which to build a health program anywhere in the state.

Members of the College of Agriculture, active in the health study, have assisted in getting under way a different type of medical program in Hamilton County, a well-populated area of the state. It is one of six counties in different parts of the United States wherein the United States Department of Agriculture is aiding experimental medical-care plans for self-supporting rural families, coöperating with local medical societies. The plan is open to all farm families of the county. They pool 6 percent of their net cash income for the services of general practitioners and specialists, some dental care, drugs, and hospitalization. In Hamilton County no family pays less than \$10 nor more than \$57 annually for these services. The Federal Government is making a contribution to the pool so that the amount of money paid by low-income families will equal the \$57 put in by upper-income families. The principle involved is that there should be equal opportunity of medical care for all people, regardless of their ability to pay.

The doctors are showing how even in wartime this plan makes it possible for them to organize their time and services more effectively. On the basis of regular physical examinations for all participating families, the physicians know where medical treatment is most needed and plan accordingly. In addition to emergency operations, the physicians arrange for patients to come in to the local hospital for long-postponed tonsillectomies and appendectomies as facilities are available in the hospital. From this project it is hoped that much may be learned about the basis of a sound postwar medical program for rural people in thickly populated areas.

When the State Planning Committee made its first progress report in February, 1942, to a representative group of all concerned, the question was raised whether planning for medical care should be discontinued in the face of other pressing wartime responsibilities. The people's answer came in no uncertain terms: health and medical

services are more important now than ever before; with fewer medical men available, their services must be put to the most constructive use; if plans are not developed now in the midst of war, there is no assurance that a sound health and medical program will be established in the coming complex peacetime.

And so the State Health Planning Committee carries on. It advances in any sector of the health front in which there can be some forward movement. Since 1943 is a legislative year, it has turned its attention to much needed public health legislation. A bill has been introduced to enable counties, or a group of counties, to form a county or district public health department. Popular flyers and bulletins have been distributed as part of an intensive educational program in regard to this bill. The hearing before the Public Health Committee of the Legislature was well organized. The bill has come out of committee, but its future is still uncertain. A third state-wide health conference is now being planned to which representatives of all state organizations interested in any type of health program will be invited. The hope is to integrate the efforts of all organizations toward the one goal of more adequate health and medical services for the state.

Only as the State Health Planning Committee has proceeded in its work of planning education and demonstration has the content of the rural health program become more clearly defined:

1. The central figure is the general practitioner, given opportunity through organized methods of payment to utilize preventive as well as curative measures in medical care.
2. To improve the quality of medical care, community-owned medical centers are needed where, with the necessary equipment, general physicians and specialists may coöperate in serving the people.
3. These local diagnostic or medical centers, some of which might have three or four emergency beds, must be organized in working relations with a few large hospitals and health centers districted within the state.
4. Public health districting by the State Department of Health must be closely coördinated with hospital districting, for only when public health is interwoven in the pattern of medical care will the tremendous possibilities of its services be realized and financially supported by rural people.

Ways of achieving such a program have also become apparent. Given an opportunity to understand the means of meeting their health and medical needs, rural people quickly seek to build for themselves better services by organized action. They can realize their goals however, only as their physicians are willing to plan with them with mutual trust and appreciation of the respective responsibilities of medical men and laymen in these matters. With this guiding philosophy the health study proceeds toward its still distant goal.

COUNSELING AS SOCIAL CASE WORK

By GORDON HAMILTON

IN THE convulsion of total war, with its losses, anxieties, and deprivations, with mobility of peoples, dislocated homes, lowered standards of living, changed roles and responsibilities of the breadwinner, homemaker, adolescent, and even of the child in the house, a great many practical needs must be met, a great many unusual personal problems solved. The community responds generously with programs such as those for temporary housing, day care for children, immense sums for Army and Navy relief, recreation, and campaigns of all kinds—and not the least with an avalanche of information and advice popularly known today as “counseling.” The human race has always consulted oracles; friends and neighbors counsel; the columns of the daily papers, the human-interest magazines, the radio, all do a large business in more or less “amateur problem-solving.”¹ Advisers in the medical, legal, and other professions usually confine their interpretation to general expositions of the subject, and avoid individual advice, but the counselors in practical management, and especially in problems of social relationship, seem to recognize few, if any, limitations. To the public “counseling” seems natural. It represents authority (which most of us in our weaker moments like) without obligating the client to do anything at all about following the authority’s advice. This suits the American temperament splendidly. Because it has not been fully developed, counseling is not usually professional and has no strings tied to it—it is not very threatening. You can take it or leave it, and for the most part people leave it with no hard feelings. Yet it would be a mistake not to realize that this widespread demand for “Information [and advice] please”—this very popular

¹ Bertha Reynolds, *Learning and Teaching in the Practice of Social Work* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1943), p. 13.

program with its innumerable commercial and noncommercial sponsors—represents a significant need and a significant response which are a definite challenge to social workers everywhere.

There is a valid place in human experience for an information service, from the floorman in the department store to the travel bureau in the railway station, from directories of all kinds to the chamber of commerce. The complexities of modern living require that certain people know resources and be able to steer other people toward them. The chief qualification for information service is that the worker shall be well informed, accurate, and courteous. The person seeking information may, but more frequently may not, want advice thrown in. For some reason, the average person seems to enjoy giving information and advice, no matter how incorrect. Anyone who asks for road directions has noticed this. The motorist may not even receive a factual response to his inquiry, but the reply, "Follow me and I'll show you." Thus he asks for information and gets unsolicited "guidance." I think we would all agree that asking for information should not mean that the person must get with it a packet of counseling. People seem particularly to like to give advice about human problems—how to feed the baby, how to conduct housekeeping or business, what to do about love affairs. Even though the informant knows that the advice will not be taken, he still loves to give it; but the moment a useful information service shows signs of turning into counseling, particularly in social relationships, danger signals should be flown.

As we have said, people have a right not to ask for advice, just as they have a right not to take it if it is offered. People like to manage their own affairs, even when their capacity to do so is limited. "Muddling through" on our own is one of the great traditions that is the taproot for what we have come to call "democracy." While one would be loath to challenge any of the precious values in self-determination, there is a question as to whether a modern community has the right to offer anything but the best in the way of counseling service. Advice without understanding the particular situation is mostly futile and often destructive. Amateur counselors are hurt, or they tend to deny services, if their advice is not taken. "I told my chauffeur that I would pay for his wife's operation only if he went to the surgeon I selected," or "She is very ungrateful. I have done everything for her and she just goes on suiting herself,"

are heard over the bridge table or among untrained volunteers. It has been too often assumed that a position of power, wealth, or prestige gives one the privilege or duty of offering gratuitous advice. People (particularly poor people) who do not take advice are supposed to be headstrong and ungrateful. The adviser, by some accident of experience, money, or birth, is supposed to have all the answers, while the advisee is voluntarily or involuntarily a recipient.

There are developing stages in all social programs. Just as the earliest stage of relief-giving was a handout to a recipient, now we have programs of assistance, insurance, and allied services which involve mutual responsibilities as well as rights, so we can see that a great deal of guidance, whether or not it is called counseling, is today still in the primitive stage of a handout, that is, on the one side an amateur adviser, on the other a passive recipient! The plain truth is that competence in advising is a hard-won, slowly achieved, professional skill.

The welfare agency which sets up an information bureau tells us that from half to two thirds of all requests are for factual information about a social resource—employment agencies, fresh-air camps, settlements, institutions of all kinds, specialized schools, etc. Perhaps one third to one half of the requests, however, are for advice as well, or else the request for information is a thinly veiled request for help with some problem of social relationships. The rapid extension of day-care facilities is a good example of the way this operates. If women go to work in great numbers, communities must set up shelters as convenient as possible to factory and home. For many of these applicants, information rather than counseling is wanted. But for every uncomplicated request for day care there will be two involving consciously or unconsciously formulated complications: the mother with a sick husband who feels she must place her children and go to work because her mother-in-law is too interfering; the wife who is planning to place the two-year-old and leave the other children of eight and ten to shift for themselves; the inexperienced young wife whose husband has gone to war, leaving her with a baby for whom she does not want to take full responsibility. Many others who do not really want to place their children at all are unaware of community resources to help them manage the household problems. It is no accident that counseling services have grown

up around such intensely vital areas as marriage, care of children, vocational guidance, and employment.

The trained ear learns to detect those instances in which the request for information is simple and when it covers bewilderment, indecision, distress. The greatest pressure for specific information and a concrete answer may come from the least self-directing person in the most unanswerable situations, and often as a disguise for the expression of unbearable anxiety. Just as it has been hard to learn that people have the ability as well as the right to participate actively in the management of government or industry, so it is hard to believe that there are better ways of helping people to improve their situation than by the "take my advice" method. It is a long road, as Bertha Reynolds says,² before we accept the fact that science has something to offer about the old human tendency to give merely well-intentioned advice. In the sphere of behavior and personality problems it has been particularly observed that advice, as such, is the least useful. It is here that the patterns of counseling and social case work intersect. For "counseling" has enjoyed community acceptance, but has developed little professional skill, while case work has been weaker in community acceptance, yet has developed a professional structure and considerable professional skill.

Within the profession of social work it has long been recognized that counseling is an essential part of the case work process. Case work has largely passed through its first phase of "handout," whether of resources, information, or advice, and is slowly becoming a controlled discipline in democratic relationships. The oldest concept of case work, fortunately, has been that people can be helped to solve their own problems. Case work has been moving steadily from a directing to a nondirecting technique, in the sense that capacities for growth and self-determination are the concern of the social case work process. It is what people can be helped to do for themselves which is more and more the distinguishing element in case work, group work, social work, as a whole. That solutions are the most real when people actively participate in them is emphasized in social work as in progressive education. It is true that most people, whether they go to psychologist, social worker, banker, or doctor, are able to deal with reality and to function normally, in society. The area in which they need help may be a relatively uncomplicated one, and.

² *Ibid.*

when this is attended to, the person can handle the rest adequately; but it is also true that deep-rooted human urges and dissatisfactions are often expressed through practical requests for sex information, where to place a child, or even in such homely terms as how to make a loan.

If it is true that the psychological event is many-sided, that it is a complex of factors dynamically related, how much truer that the social event is many-sided. We have said that people like to give advice on practical management and social relationships. The arresting fact is how often practical affairs and social relationships are interwoven. Social work, historically, first became known for offering concrete social services to people—money, shelter, recreational facilities, etc. But it has long been an observation in social work that an emotional or behavior problem may be involved in the request; or, conversely, that an environmental conflict has been internalized—"I am a part of all that I have met." The great tragedies from the Greeks to Hamlet have always recognized this. But it is equally true in the comedies. It is in the very nature of human experience. It is actually this weaving together of events and feelings that makes the human experience dynamic.

In social case work the client's concrete request frequently comes first; the request for advice or help on social relationships may follow. Confidence in the worker often is based on satisfying experiences of practical help. Although as case work has become more accepted the overt request may be for help with a behavior or personality problem, the focused emotional problem more typically goes to a psychiatrist; the nonfocused emotional problem, especially when displaced on a concrete need, is typical for the case worker. The skill comes in understanding disguised as well as surface needs—how to release feeling and tension; how to assist in reformulating the problem and to consider alternatives in a nonjudgmental atmosphere. We know that problems are created when the demands of the personality are in conflict with the pressures or demands of the situation—as in unemployment—or else when the demands of the personality are in conflict with each other—as when a man wants to be with his family and wants to go to war, or a woman wants a career and wants children too; and these conflicts are particularly distressing if part is unconscious. In a strong personality these conflicts become more or less unified, or at least harmonized (psychologically

speaking, the ego is the unifying device); but in a less well-integrated person if the reality situation through illness or other pressures becomes overwhelming so that the ego cannot function, the person is caught in an unresolved dilemma.

When we speak of a primary behavior disorder in a child we mean that there is an external conflict with his environment, usually his parental environment. In the same way there can be a primary conflict between the adult and his economic environment. There is validity in the assumption that by relieving economic pressures through wages, insurances, and related measures, the ordinary person may get himself into a new context or balance with society so that he can function. We have seen this demonstrated thousands of times, not only in security programs but in the individual case, and need no further conviction that to diminish the pressure of the environment even in one area may enable the person to go on from there. We also know that a small shift in the drives of the personality, achieved through insight, often enables a person to function adequately. But we know, too, and this is the important point for counseling, that problems do not always come neatly packaged—so many pure environmental pressures, so many inner personality demands—but that problems are psychosocial. Irrational feeling elements are interwoven with all sorts of practical issues. This is why workers have to be trained to understand that it does not matter at which end, practical or emotional, a client begins, and why the two objectives of relieving environmental pressures and increasing insight must be integrated in modern case work counseling. It is not our wisest heads who have tended to place a premium on psychotherapy as against practical services, and it is certainly not the client.

No one, of course, has a monopoly on counseling or guidance. Psychologists have for a long time been called upon in schools and other settings to give information and advice with reference to vocational guidance. Vocational guidance in the educational system gives the applicant information about job requirements and opportunities; may collect data about the person seeking advice; may supplement with data from tests, often coaches the person on how to apply for a position, etc. The accent has been on the normal in the sense of norms, standards, averages; individualization has been more by measurement than by interview. At one extreme it is close to labora-

tory procedures; but at the other extreme, as psychology has learned from psychiatry, the focus of counseling has been more what is sometimes called "psychotherapy."³ Here the emphasis is on relationship through the medium of the interview; such counseling rests on a "nondirective" technique which is designed for release of feeling, in a nonjudgmental atmosphere, hopefully leading to insight. Social resources are not typically used. "A therapist," says Allen, "has nothing to offer but himself."⁴ The objective is "a unique growth experience" in which "the patient differentiates himself from the therapist" in the single dimension of action and reaction in the relationship. Many educators would agree, however, that between these extremes, namely, counseling, which is largely a selection of tests and a permissive relationship which approaches psychotherapy, a great deal of advice of the old handout pattern is still being given.⁵

Marriage counseling has been practiced in so many settings and with so many philosophies that only an allusion is possible. Sometimes it has been associated with sex hygiene information; sometimes under educational auspices for life adjustment in general, or preparation for parenthood; sometimes under religious auspices and with moral and spiritual purpose. It has often been closely related to medical technique and sometimes has swung in the psychotherapeutic direction. The historic function of the church in counseling is an even larger subject.

A recent setting for counseling has proved to be that of industry. The turnover in war industries, with inevitable effect on production, has brought to the fore certain experiments which up to now have received little attention. In such a standard book as Tead's,⁶ neither guidance nor counseling is mentioned as a part of personnel work, which was then largely focused on shop relationships and hiring and firing. But the movement in industry, especially during the war, is taking more account of human or "morale" factors. The report of the Western Electric⁷ development makes fascinating reading. The counselors moved through the stages of information and "handout"

³ Carl R. Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942).

⁴ F. H. Allen, *Psychotherapy with Children* (New York: Norton, 1942).

⁵ C. B. Zachry, *Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940).

⁶ Ordway Tead, *Creative Management* (New York: Association Press, 1935).

⁷ Fritz J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939).

advice, from stereotyped interviews to appreciation of the differences between manifest and latent content in the case situation. Like the case worker, they came to have a respect for observations and personal history to guide the interview. Like the case worker, also, they found that the individual is conditioned by his life experience, and that difficulties arise because of the drives or demands of the personality and the pressures of the situation upon it. Probably in many plants, however, counseling is still focused on the work bench and problems of absenteeism narrowly conceived; or "welfare" may even not have got beyond the kindly matron and the rest room stage. In very few places are trained persons yet employed for counseling. Even in unions where counselors are employed, the fear of the expert and traditional prejudice against "welfare" still persist, so that professionally trained persons are not often employed nor community agencies used.

We can also observe "morale" counseling in the armed forces, although the old top sergeant's hard-boiled philosophy is still prevalent. Men were there to "take it"—i.e., army discipline—just as people are supposed to take help or advice. The nearer one could come to making a machine out of a man the better. None of this soft stuff of thinking soldiers were people. But the long, long road of wisdom continues to teach that servants are human, and aliens are human, and workers are human, and soldiers are human, and the more human and the less like beasts and machines the better for all of us. In one Army unit the term "psychotherapy" was first used when a lot of time was spent through interviewing in helping a soldier to become a positive asset to the Army. Less intensive interviewing was called "counseling." Problems referred to such a unit included violation of an article of war, any problem arising in the soldier's schooling, emotional problems, "any queer-acting" soldier, or limited service. Gradually, the unit workers decided that there was no need for a "fancy" name, like psychotherapy, and that counseling was involved in any problem. The simple too often became the complex, and the complex had to be dealt with simply or left alone. Moreover, all the tangible resources of the military establishment were used with the goal of helping the soldier, like the civilian, to make responsible choices and utilize his capacities more fully. They found it was not short contact versus intensive, not emotional versus practical needs, but simply a new setting for social case work. Inci-

dentally, and not without humor, we may note that if social case work is still supposed to be directed toward the less well to do, counseling in the Army is reserved for the men, not for the officers.

There are many misconceptions about counseling. One is that advice and information giving are simple procedures calling, perhaps, for experience, but for little or no special skill or knowledge. Another is that counseling is addressed to "normal" people and to the self-directing middle class, while only poor and queer people go to social workers. Another is that it is an attractive form of easily learned psychotherapy, but if objective data and reality settings are minimized or ignored, we have a situation as dangerous as "take my advice" is ineffective. There is no form of therapy without cures to its credit; but we must recognize that if admonition does not always save, neither does catharsis always heal.

If there are many misconceptions about counseling, there are also many misconceptions about case work. It is still popularly supposed to be a handout—a rather unsavory mixture of bossing and charity. It still suggests to the public having to take help and advice willy-nilly, or poking into other people's business, or something to do with a sob story, or something esoteric vaguely connected with psychiatry. Social case workers themselves are in part responsible for this. Our struggle for democratic professional relationships has been slow, painful, and full of mistakes. The fact that social work is still not even a licensed profession, so that anyone with a taste for offering advice, alms, or some form of personal domination can call himself a social worker, has not made the road any easier. While the community spends millions of dollars for higher education, some merit systems still assume that a high school diploma can equip anyone to deal with the most intricate problems of human relationships.

The most striking thing about nonprofessionally based counseling is that, although the tool of interviewing may come to be quite skillfully used, there is often little sense of family relationships, and still less of community forces and resources. The untrained worker rarely looks beyond the routine, the procedure, the immediate dislocation. The untrained worker is apt to be bound to his own institution; he does not always see his advisee as a social personality nor himself as a part of the larger community. To recognize that the individual functions as a total organism and that a work or school adjustment may involve a life adjustment does not mean that one

invades every area of a person's life, but it does mean that one must know the client as a social person, not just as workman or soldier or patient in a hospital bed.

I am not, of course, saying that only case workers can do counseling. I am saying that counseling involves a basic social case work process. I am not saying that many partially trained interviewers, particularly during the war and postwar emergency, will not be needed for information, steering, and advising, and many will function well. I am saying that there is no substitute for knowledge of personality and behavior, of community; and no substitute for mastery of the basic disciplines. Only professional knowledge can help workers move from the handout level to real skill in helping people. There are life situations which must be recognized in order to be left alone; there are mechanisms called "defenses" which must be understood; there are economic and cultural and biological forces which must be taken into account. Social case work is a discipline which starts from the assumption that all problems are psychosocial, that one must understand the relation between the human personality and the economic event in order to help effectively. I also want to emphasize that case workers must be broadly trained as social workers to meet the responsibilities of today.

Because case work historically began with offering concrete services in connection with poverty, there has been a natural tendency to assume that its techniques are directed only to the poor. The concepts that the public has best understood about social work have been about these concrete services. What has not yet been assimilated is the fact that social workers have had a greater experience in counseling in a wider range of human affairs than almost any other group. With the expansion of the insurance programs, not only will financial need be less characteristic as a component of applications to social agencies, but the social security objectives themselves must begin to emphasize the necessity for skill in working with individuals as essential to the sound administration of these services.

At present, people seem to take to case work readily enough when it is offered under the phrase "your Red Cross," or the seamen's union and other unions like it served under the description of "personal service." It is everywhere popularly received as counseling. But the term social case work connotes "welfare," and "welfare,"

which should be a fine word, connotes charity, and charity, when not used in its New Testament sense, is unacceptable to the modern ear. Perhaps we should find better words than "social case work" and "social group work" to express the science and art of our approach to people. Recreation agencies have long charged small fees and used this to demonstrate that their service was not confined to the poor. Family and children's agencies are also beginning to charge small fees for case work services, and this wholesome practice will soon be as much taken for granted by the public as other professional fees, even though most publicly supported and some voluntary social work will continue to offer largely free service.

The idea of freedom from want is new. The democratic idea that people of every race have a right to participate in their own destiny is not yet realized. The idea that the good life is for everyone is still challenged, and the idea that people can be helped through insight to make more intelligent choices for themselves is perhaps the newest of all. When the public comes to understand that social case work is available for all people and that its main concern is to help people to better integration of their own strengths, better utilization of social resources, deeper insights for self-guidance, the older prejudices will give way and social case work will be able to make its real contribution in the sort of world we are all trying to build.

COUNSELING IN INDUSTRY

By CAROLYN L. MCGOWAN

OUR CONCEPT of counseling responsibility in the public service is no different from that which obtains in private industry. Whatever the employment setting, be it private industry or the public service, the counselor's task is the same, her clientele the same, and her ultimate responsibility the same.

This brings me to the first of three basic facts which will help us to define counseling. Whether in private industry or in public service the major obligation of the counselor is to the employer. This may sound harsh. It is not. Why? Because unless management can show its vested interests—the stockholder or the taxpayer—that services instituted for the benefit of employees, to whom it is already paying a wage, reduce production costs and increase output of goods or services, there is no justification for the expenditure of capital funds. Counseling in industry is an arm of management; through serving employees the interests for which the organization exists are served; the primary justification for such services lies in the ultimate benefit to the employer. That is reasonable, just, and sound.

The second important fact, based on acceptance of the first, is that there are definite limits within which counselors in industry operate. These limits may be defined in this way: only those maladjustments of employees that are reflected in the employment situation are of justifiable concern to counselors. That too may sound coldly unsympathetic, but when we point out that we know—and employers also are coming to recognize the fact—that matters of personal concern to employees are more likely than not reflected in their attitudes or habits of work, we are not far from reaching out into all aspects and relationships of life to assist individuals in finding answers to their problems.

England has recognized the value to its war-production program

of caring for the needs of its workers. At a Washington conference called by the Secretary of Labor, the labor *attaché* of the British Embassy described the welfare offices set up by the British Government to serve war workers. Britain recognized that its industrial workers, overtaxed by long hours of work, by many inconveniences and personal sacrifices, had to have their personal problems attended to, in the interest of increasing production and reducing absenteeism and labor turnover. Those are the production problems that counselors in industry are called upon to solve here in America today. We must be realistic about it. It is production we are interested in; the problems faced by workers are reflected in production. We must help employees solve these problems. That is particularly true today. It is true in peacetime as well, but the impact of war makes it more apparent. The costs of such services are not analyzed as carefully in wartime as they are in peacetime, and whether these expanded services will remain when the costs will have to be reckoned more closely in terms of capital gains versus social gains is something we all ponder.

A third fact we must face, and it is closely related to the second. Counselors serve primarily only those employees who need assistance, when such need is reflected in productivity or morale. The other extreme is the counseling service in education. Having been in counseling in education for eight years I can say without fear of criticism that we attempt to make the sun shine brighter for every student. Our programs in education are designed to assist every student to develop his own potentialities to the maximum. We feel it to be our obligation to society. We are concerned not only with "problem cases," but with every student, and we plan our curricula and service programs accordingly. We cannot do this in industry for one simple reason: the individual is not the end product in industry as he is in education. In industry we can justify our interest in the individual only in so far as the benefits accruing from our interest increase the production of goods or services.

These three facts are basic ones, and they are especially important in understanding the operation of counseling programs in industry.

However, all counseling programs in industry are not just remedial. There are constructive and preventive aspects as well. I believe we would lose our professional status immediately if we were unable to say this. We are constantly studying ways in which

personnel policies and procedures may be improved, ways in which employment conditions may be improved, and ways in which certain circumstances and conditions of living may be improved, particularly under wartime stress.

Let me explain briefly just how these programs operate. The counseling staff must have the coöperation and wholehearted support of plant officials. Counselors have no authority in the strict sense of the word and therefore must depend upon making their value and influence felt by establishing the best possible relationship with those who do possess authority. For example, if an aggrieved employee comes to the counselor to complain because he, or she, has not been placed properly or has not been given an opportunity for promotion, the counselor hears the employee's story. If it is felt that the grievance is warranted the counselor's opportunity for assisting the employee comes only as a result of whatever good relationship has been built up by the counselor with the officials who do have the authority to make a reassignment or a promotion. It is vital that the counselor shall have earned for herself the trust and confidence of management. This is paramount; for without it the counselor is ineffective in aiding employees when their grievances or problems relate to the employment situation itself. When such confidence has been established the counselor can, and does, not only assist the employee in securing satisfaction, but can also assist management in effecting a better placement of an employee, who will then do a better job. In such cases as these, counselors serve not only employees, but also management. The effective, experienced counselor in such instances will use whatever resources are at her command to investigate company policies, if cases like this accumulate, and will make recommendations to management for revision in policies or procedures. In this way, counselors are actually consultants to management on matters affecting individual adjustment, and their programs take on constructive, preventive aspects.

The types of problems counselors are called upon to deal with include housing, recreation, child care, maternity cases, financial difficulties, personal and family health, and emotional disturbances. Human nature and its problems are the same from Maine to California, and in spite of certain rigidities, counselors in industry come face to face at sometime or another with every one of these. What

employee with, for example, pressing financial problems, or with illness at home, or with children improperly cared for during the working hours, can possibly give her best efforts to her job? Somewhere on the production lines her worries take the concrete form of an imperfect piece of work, and that imperfect job gets to the counselor in the form of a complaint from some source. Then the counselor comes face to face with the real issue.

In conclusion, we may emphasize a few major points:

1. Counseling services in industry are designed to improve production and worker morale by reducing the extent of maladjustments among workers, whether these maladjustments are the results of conditions and circumstances of living or of working.
2. Counseling in industry must show substantial benefits to management, since our present economic system is concerned primarily with material gains rather than with sociological gains.
3. Counseling in industry operates as a staff function; "authority of ideas" is the only authority with which it is vested.
4. While technically, counselors operate within certain definite limits, there are actually no limits to the scope of problems with which counselors may be called upon to deal.
5. The methods and techniques used by counselors in industry do not differ from those used by counselors in other situations. We adhere to the philosophy that methods and techniques used should result in the highest degree of self-reliance and self-sufficiency possible for any individual counseled.
6. Finally, the two-way influence of the effective counselor makes her both a friend to employees and a consultant on human relations to management.

COUNSELING FOR THE ABLE-BODIED SERVICEMAN

By *HOWARD A. WILSON*

IN MILITARY annals the overthrow of the Maginot Line presents the outstanding lesson of modern warfare. Curiously enough, its implications are directly felt in the field of social welfare. The collapse of the fortifications occurred first in the men who manned them, the men who lacked the strength of spirit and firmness of purpose to hold fast, the men who lacked morale.

In large measure this loss in morale can be traced directly to the home front, which failed in its support. France staked her future on the steel and concrete of the Maginot Line, and neglected to bolster and strengthen the spirit of her soldiers.

The soldier who drives a sixty-ton tank, the sailor who mans the gun turret of a battleship, the pilot who bombs the enemy territory from a Flying Fortress is before all things a man, a human being, an individual. Neglect him and his problems and the tank is poorly maneuvered, the gun inaccurately aimed, the bombs badly scattered.

Let us look closely at this soldier, sailor, aviator. Voluntarily or by selection he has left his home, friends, family, and community to enter a strange world. It is a one-sex world, autocratic, subject to physical and mental strain far beyond the normal stress of civilian life. His individuality is submerged, his freedom of choice removed, his thinking directed to an unusual degree, and his activities bounded morning, noon, and night by military regulations. On the other hand, the problems needing his personal attention have multiplied. His sudden removal from his family and friends has intensified them. His income is limited, his channels of communication cut off. He wants help. He needs, first of all, a consultant.

If we are to be his counselors, let us glance at the limitations with

which we are faced. First, there are the Army and Navy regulations. They must be met and, furthermore, sustained, not contravened. This materially handicaps us. There is little room within their narrow confines for the freedom of action so frequently desirable in assisting a client.

Second, there is the limited availability of the serviceman. He is subject to duty at all times. He is not free to visit us when he needs to do so, he is not free to leave the military post whenever it seems advantageous. He is also subject to sudden movement. Our first interview with him may be our last. It must accomplish intake, consultation, investigation, and planning.

Finally, let us recognize that our client is under the forceful pressure of a strange and complex organization. The "setting" in an Army camp is far different from the surroundings of the civilian client in his home community.

In spite of these differences the science and art of counseling are essentially the same as those which we have been taught. It is the limitations, the reality, which we must face and for which we must make adjustments. These same realities present grave problems to the administrator. It is not an easy matter to meet the demands for counseling in all parts of the world where our armed forces serve. If the American Red Cross could get every member of the American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers to join its ranks it would still be understaffed. If every professionally trained male social worker not subject to selective service were employed there would still be an alarming dearth of men for posts at home and abroad. Yet the demands must be met. It necessarily follows, then, that we have had to recruit and train workers whose experience has indicated an aptitude for this field of work. Ministers, lawyers, medical students, teachers, college professors, and others have found their way into our ranks. Within the limits that Army and Navy regulations raise, within the limits that emergency problems present, they have served with intelligence, understanding, and an ever increasing efficiency.

In training field directors and assistant field directors our problem has been to reduce to their simplest forms the techniques of counseling. We have sought to inculcate the basic philosophies that underly all counseling. Interpreted to the needs of the serviceman, this means that the serviceman may turn with complete freedom

from military reprimand to his field director and, without concealing his worries or fears, talk about his problems. He can tell them to an understanding, friendly person, a person with resources and resourcefulness, having confidence that these resources will be used to their fullest extent in his behalf.

There must be a realization by the field director that enthusiasm is not enough, that his own maturity, his knowledge of human emotions, and his ability to avoid emotional involvement will determine his success as a counselor. Men who come for help bring attitudes. These may include suspicion, hostility, sullenness, resentment, defensiveness, a demanding attitude, threats of suicide, or gratitude and friendliness. All must be dealt with skillfully, competently.

Nor can the worker in his desire for self-satisfaction become a superparent who would assume all the responsibility for the enlisted man's problem. Karl De Schweinitz has said, "The first and hardest lesson to learn about people who are in trouble is that they can be helped only if they want to be helped. There is no such thing as making an adjustment for somebody else. Only the husband and wife can make the adjustment to marriage; only the mother and father can make the adjustment to parenthood; only the widow to widowhood."¹

Situations sometimes arise which call for help which the field director cannot provide. This is the time for whatever specialized resources are available. It follows that an adequate knowledge of these resources is essential. There is, in the field of counseling, no place for amateur psychiatry or amateur medicine. In the same way, we have no room for false generalization. To generalize on the "high type," the "low type," or the "deserving type" is dangerous in the extreme. I quote Gordon Hamilton, of the New York School of Social Work: "People are not worthy or unworthy, self-respecting or not self-respecting. There are . . . only two kinds after all . . . those we understand well and can help a little, and those we understand little and can, therefore, help not at all. To train the eye to see and the mind to interpret is the work of humility, patience and devotion."

The converse of this is to recognize each man as different from

¹ Karl De Schweinitz, *The Art of Helping People Out of Trouble* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924).

every other man. It applies, not only to their personalities, but also their problems. No two problems are exactly alike. Private Jones and Private Smith each received a telegram stating that an uncle was dangerously ill. Interviewing disclosed, however, that Private Jones was ill-adjusted to Army life and sought in any way to be free from it, if only temporarily. He hardly knew his uncle, actually cared little about his well-being, and in seeking an emergency furlough was unintentionally practicing deception. Private Smith, on the other hand, became splendidly adjusted to military life. He had been brought up by his aunt and uncle. They were, we might say, *in loco parentis*. His need for an emergency furlough was obvious. The furlough itself provided the solution to his immediate problem. The problem of Private Jones required a conference with his commanding officer which resulted in a transfer to a different type of service. This provided the needed chance for readjustment.

In his approach to the serviceman, and in considering the problem he presents, the field director should neither moralize nor judge; should neither condemn nor condone. This is not to be mistaken for indifference to antisocial behavior and attitudes, nor should it imply a lack of moral values. The problem to be dealt with concerns the thoughts and feelings of the serviceman. Censure will not only block the progress of the interview, but will convince the serviceman that the field director is not an understanding person.

This brings us directly to the fallacy of "uncoöperativeness." In the broader sense, this war is being fought that man may have the right to live his own life. How ridiculous, then, that we should accuse the very man who is fighting of "uncoöperativeness" because he refuses to adopt the plan we feel is most constructive. He may have an entirely different set of standards, needs, or wants by which he judges the worth of such a plan.

A case in point is that of a corporal who, in spite of a field director's counseling to the contrary, brought his wife to live in an adjacent community. Because of illness she soon needed medical attention and funds for temporary maintenance. Instead of labeling this family as "uncoöperative" the field director recognized that the need of husband and wife to be together transcended, in their minds at least, the difficulties to be faced. The soldier and his wife had a right to make that decision for themselves. The field director rec-

ognized the problem to be, not one of how to deal with "uncoöperativeness," but how best to provide medical service and maintenance.

One of the most difficult techniques of counseling, apparently, is involved in being able to direct the interview with ease and grace. Letting each man, in his own way, tell his story is fundamental to any helping situation. Besides understanding the problem itself, it is important that the field director understand how the man feels about it. This can only be explained by the man himself, and to do it he must be given the time he requires. This is all the more important since we have so little opportunity to interview the serviceman.

Moreover, many a problem is solved by the mental catharsis afforded by a good listener. This seems particularly true in battle areas. One field director, who had returned from Guadalcanal, said that he had spent untold hours just listening to the men who had been in the battle area and who had the greatest need to "talk it out on someone" to relieve their pent-up feelings and calm their overstrained nerves.

Interviewing is a two-way process made easier if questioning is done with a fine art. As a rule, there are only two purposes which questions should have: to elicit factual information related directly to the problem, or to direct the client's conversation from barren to fruitful channels. Trickery has no part in counseling. The so-called clever tactics used to outwit a man can only result in loss of respect and understanding. Frankness and honesty on the part of the field director are as essential as warmth and graciousness. To offer less to those who seek our counsel would be insulting and unworthy. It also follows that the field director must never abuse the trust and confidence with which a man often reveals himself. Particularly does this apply to the using of case stories as anecdotes. Of themselves they may seem harmless, since identities are withheld, but it cannot fail to impress others that confidences are lightly held.

These are some of the basic principles we have endeavored to place in the minds of the staff working with able-bodied servicemen. They do not by any means end here, nor can so brief a discussion permit of the necessary elaboration on each point, but they do provide a springboard for further study and reading.

The problem of counseling to the sick and wounded is another matter. Our hospital staffs are made up of professionally trained

medical and psychiatric social workers, and their work is done under the direction of the medical officers in the hospitals. However, to the newly trained worker among the able-bodied as well as to the professional in the hospital there is this to say: Counseling essentially requires that we give something of ourselves. The cool objectivity with which we weigh problems must not be too cold, too objective. The psychological reaction of the serviceman must not become the point of greatest interest and his problem too readily translated into terms of behaviorism. Let us remember that the psychological approach, the objective point of view, the techniques of counseling, are tools for our use, to be used not clumsily, without regard to their fitness, but delicately, with discrimination.

Man is more than an anatomical grouping of tissues, more than a labyrinth of thought processes, more than the result of heredity, environment, and intelligence. Man has a spiritual life, a soul if you wish. His soul responds to warmth and kindness and sincerity. We shall fail to reach it if the kindness in ourselves is withheld, if the warmth of simple understanding has grown cold, if the sincerity of our hearts has given place to cold objectiveness.

I know that underneath the pride which we share in our professional standards there burns the flame of idealism, a warm fire of devotion to our fellow man. Let the flame be seen, the warmth felt. It is badly needed.

CASE WORK OR COUNSELING IN THE DAY NURSERY?

By CALLMAN RAWLEY

WHAT difference does it make whether the service offered in connection with the day nursery is called "case work" or "counseling"? The difference is that behind these terms there is also a difference of opinion about practice, a difference that is expressed in the belief that people who use nurseries are different from people who use social agencies. In other words, those who use nurseries are normal and self-reliant. They need only a bit of information or steering to accomplish their purpose, and case work, therefore, must not be imposed on them (as if case work were something lying outside the natural problems incurred by every parent using a nursery and could be given or not, according to the parents' self-sufficiency!). If a nursery social service were to efface itself to such a degree, it would very quickly find itself in trouble, for the problems of mother-child separation at the nursery age do not stop at class lines nor at lines of ego strength.

A recent book on nursery school education written for teachers has this to say as to what kind of child profits from nursery school experience: ". . . this depends on the child, the nursery, and the alternatives to nursery school attendance. The child's readiness for nursery school experience can be gauged only through acquaintance with his level of development."¹ Now this is a yardstick which one can see grow out of the practical requirements of the teacher's job, but it measures only one factor, and, to a social worker, not the most important factor, in a child's readiness. It completely fails to take into account the fact that parents are involved in his readiness

¹ Catherine Landreth, *Education of the Young Child*, (New York: John Wiley, 1942), p. 48.

and that the readiness is in relation to them as well as to the coming experience in the nursery. In a general way, the teacher understands that the relationship between the child and his family affects his behavior in the nursery, but she has neither the training nor the skill to apply this in an intake process; nor does she have the time, for a good intake process is a full-time professional job, and so is the teacher's job in the nursery. For the development of her own skill she needs the high concentration and singleness of focus which she has at present in her teaching function and from which she ought not to be diverted by the addition of case work responsibilities.

The absence of case work in the intake process may be partly responsible, however, for the high turnover in children, in recent years, in nurseries throughout the country. The right child, apparently, was not always accepted, by this method; nor was the child whom the teacher thought ready, on the basis of his development, always ready. This is as we should expect and corresponds with observations by the former National Association of Day Nurseries to the effect that mothers were dumping children into nurseries for reasons quite other than the welfare of the child and that nurseries were being used to perpetuate all kinds of undesirable mother-child relationships.

Let us assume that a child in a day nursery begins to present a behavior problem. What does the nursery which has no social worker to do about it? Through a parent discussion group it may try to give the parent information about "developmental processes, essentials of child care and effective methods of educational guidance."²

The teacher will give the parents additional information: "By her questions, by the readings or observations which she suggests, she aids parents to appraise all the factors that contribute to their problems."³ In the nursery the teacher tries to create a serene, cheerful atmosphere; she offers friendly support and interest to each child; she gives physical assistance or suggestion in any undertaking that might be too frustrating to a child; she uses suggestion in order to turn a highly charged infantile response into a constructive one; and she helps the child to become more independent and adequate.⁴ This is the method of good pedagogy, and we would not expect the

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

teacher to be able to employ a different one. However, we know from our experience that this method does not work in situations in which the root of the child's behavior lies in his relationship to his parents or in his unwillingness to be separated from them. In such situations child-care information has very little effect, because the problem is not one of ignorance, but of feeling and of relationship.

It is true that the exciting opportunities in a nursery for learning and self-expression contain a certain amount of therapeutic value for the child and allow him while he is there to escape from the difficulties which disturb him outside the nursery, but they leave the base of his difficulties unchanged. Very often, then, the difficulties reappear at the end of the day, when the mother calls for the child, or in the morning, when she takes him to the nursery. If the child cannot detach himself during the nursery period from his basic difficulties, he will have to express them in disturbing nursery activity, and then nursery school methods will not change him. It is too much to expect of the nursery, just as it is too much to expect of a child guidance clinic, to cure a child without also working with the parents.

I suppose that the average teacher dimly recognizes this. Occasionally, when she is hard pressed by the behavior of a child, she may step outside the field of pedagogy and try a homemade remedy. A little girl in one nursery always becomes frantic around five o'clock when it is time for her mother to call for her. She is afraid that her mother will not come. All the teacher's skill in helping her to relate to other children and to enjoy herself with them has not reduced the anxiety one bit. The teacher has tried to handle the problem by reassuring the child, then by distracting her with a new activity, but nothing works. And that is as far as the teacher can go or should be expected to go.

In a nursery that has case work service this problem would, of course, be the responsibility of the case worker. It indicates one way in which the case worker can help the teacher, in addition to her help in selecting the right children for admission. Another way is by helping the teacher to diagnose trouble signs. No day nursery or nursery school is without these trouble signs, such as the hysterical crying, the vomiting, the sitting alone with a far-away look, and a teacher needs all the help she can get to prevent her program of group activity from becoming too disturbed. What these trouble

signs express and what should be done about them is the business of case work, and the teacher will find some of its content indispensable in guiding her in her future relationship to the child. In fact, if case work did nothing more than discover the source of a particular problem behavior, it would be performing a great service; for it would tell the teacher whether the difficulty lay in the nursery, or in something outside over which she had no control. If the difficulty was in the nursery the teacher would know that she should change her methods or question the child's remaining in the nursery; if the difficulty lay outside, she could feel comfortable and tolerant toward the child's problem because she would know that she was not causing it and need not feel guilty about it.

Sometimes, also, a teacher needs help in recognizing trouble signs, for she is apt to think of trouble in terms of her work. Trouble is anything that disrupts group activity. Seclusiveness in a child, for instance, might be noted, but when he begins to whine, wants to go home, that is real trouble, because it calls for special attention and the other children might begin to react in the same way.

Experience in one nursery has shown that the mere sharing of responsibilities gives a teacher a great sense of relief, since she does not have to bear alone the total burden of handling the nursery and at the same time try to do something about behavior problems which have their origin in the extramural relationships of the child or in the experience of his separation from his mother. She feels relieved that she can confine herself to the nursery job and that some of the behavior problems will be taken off her hands by the social worker. It defines her function better and limits her to the educational field in which she feels competent.

I have tried to suggest that the very educational objectives of the nursery, even at a time when it was a luxury for nonworking mothers, called for the skills of case work to help it free certain children from relationship problems with parents so that they could benefit from the nursery's educational opportunities and that case work would eventually have come to the nursery, even without the stimulus of working mothers. How much more general is the need for case work in the nursery now when mothers who have never before been to a social agency are working away from home for the first time and their children are for the first time struggling with the problem of separation from them!

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR UPON COMMUNITY WELFARE ORGANIZATION

By JOANNA C. COLCORD

THE IMPACT of World War II upon community organization began many months before we were a belligerent nation. As soon as our role as the "arsenal of democracy" was formulated, we became a potential target for hostilities, so that the need for our communities to do advance planning for safety has been recognized since early 1940, when the Council of National Defense was revived from the dormant state it had rested in since the last war. The passage of the Selective Service Act in September of that year marked another stage in the program of defense.

As production of war material and the training of a citizen army began to spiral upward together, the impact landed unevenly upon our communities. War industries and camps were located without much reference to the facilities for maintaining increased populations in their vicinities. Many small communities were overwhelmed with needs they had never envisaged and had no means to meet. Others were well-nigh depopulated of enterprising workers, on the move to find defense jobs which their own areas did not provide. And every community, large or small, busy or with idle wheels, was faced with the manifold adjustments in community and family life entailed when its young men were sifted out for the armed services.

The Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense was the first body entrusted with over-all responsibility for directing national policy and the communities' responses. Its several divisions were set up to deal with industrial production, supply of raw materials, employment and labor policy, food production, transportation, price stabilization, and consumer protection. To the latter

division was entrusted also the protection of the health and welfare of the population. A Division of State and Local Coöperation, later established, began the work of promoting the formation of state and local defense councils to deal with all these problems at the appropriate levels.

Before the winter of 1940-41 fairly opened, it became evident that no one body could carry out a program of such magnitude. The functions of the Advisory Commission were redistributed to specialized agencies, some of which were created within the President's Office for Emergency Management, which had hitherto been a coördinating body, but which by successive proliferations became the principal operating body for civilian affairs within the emergency structure of government.

Some of these functions were new, or at least only remotely related, to the regular departments of the Federal Government; others represented merely the emergency aspects of programs which had been developed over long periods of years. This was the case with health and welfare, already largely concentrated, so far as the regular program was concerned, within the reorganized Federal Security Agency. The Gordian knot was cut in this area by the establishment in November, 1940, within the Office for Emergency Management of what is now the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, with the Federal Security Administrator as its head. Although technically and for budget purposes within the Office for Emergency Management, this agency is, in effect, the emergency arm of the Federal Security Agency. The latter agency includes the ODHWS in its annual reports as though it were a subdepartment, and the Office for Emergency Management connection is "played down" in a way that suggests that this is a deliberate policy.¹

In May, 1941, the last vestiges of the Advisory Commission had been abolished, and a new body, the Office of Civilian Defense, was established, also within the Office for Emergency Management, to take over the work of promoting state and local organization. Both the ODHWS and the OCD proceeded to decentralize their work, the former operating through the already-established regions of the Social Security Board and of the United States Public Health Serv-

¹ Since the foregoing was written, the ODHWS was abolished by order of the President on April 30, 1943, and its functions, duties, and powers transferred to an Office of Community War Services, established within the Federal Security Agency.

ice (which were coterminous, although with separate offices); the latter establishing regions of its own corresponding to the Army corps areas. The ODHWS and the OCD (in one of its two main divisions, now called Civilian War Services), were attempting to impinge upon the same state and local areas, without, at least in the early stages, having reached any working agreement as to delimitation of field; and the fact that the regional offices of the two agencies did not cover the same states, and were rarely in the same city, meant that conference and clearing at the regional level went on, if at all, only with extraordinary difficulty.

The regional-state relationships of the two were also on a different basis. Although, under our national system, state agencies are supposed to be independent of the control of the corresponding Federal agencies, the ODHWS was heir to the relationships created between the Social Security Board and the state welfare administrations in administering grants-in-aid programs. Although the regional staffs were primarily concerned with such matters as recreation, nutrition, and social protection, they could count on active coöperation and interpretation of their programs to state and local authorities by the public assistance regional representatives, working out from the same office. Regional advisory committees, and their subcommittees on family security, which represented in their membership social work leaders in the region, worked with both staffs informally and without distinction. Moreover, approval by the ODHWS regional office was necessary before Lanham Act grants could be made to communities for the construction and maintenance of needed community facilities, such as schools, hospitals, and recreation centers.

The OCD, on the other hand, came to its regional setup "cold," so to speak. Its program was experimental, and subject to frequent change; it had no rewards to offer in return for compliance with regulations, except a few goods in kind, such as helmets, gas masks, and fire-fighting apparatus, the demands for which it was never able to meet. Its staff was new to the job, and was dealing with governor-and-mayor-appointed bodies, the membership of which had often even less experience for the job in hand.

Why was it necessary, in the first place, to set up two separate emergency agencies? That question has never been satisfactorily answered to my knowledge. If instead, a single coördinating body

had been appointed, with two main divisions, one concerned with civilian protection against external attack, the other with meeting the internal threats to civilian health and welfare which the prosecution of war brings; if the heads of the two divisions had been persons of recognized technical competence in their several fields; if over them had been a coördinator who had no other job, and who had the skill and the power to secure the participation of all appropriate governmental agencies in joint planning at the Federal level, we should, I think, have been spared a good deal of the working at cross-purposes at Washington which, it is no secret to say, has hampered the program; which has permitted one agency to be played off against the other in the interest of still other programs; and which, in part at least, has occasioned the lethargy and near despair shown by state and local groups in some areas.

The first difficulty was inherent in the national situation itself, and in the crabwise fashion in which we went to war. Going straight out of the deepest depression and unemployment in our history, almost overnight, into a period when every product that we could grow or make was in enormous demand, it is small wonder that we became slightly drunk at the sudden change. Production for defense at second hand was the early emphasis; and state and local defense councils were largely councils on how to secure contracts and turn out the goods. Problems that could have been clearly foreseen were not foreseen, or were disregarded. The warnings of social-planning agencies were as unpopular as they had been at the outset of the depression, when it was feared that they would "hurt business" if spoken too loudly or publicly. Preparation for attack received only mechanical or half-hearted attention.

Pearl Harbor put an end to all that, but swung the emphasis equally far away from health and welfare, in the direction of civilian protection. Especially in the coastal areas, state and local defense councils felt, and properly, that their first business was to prepare for attack. But along came a flock of difficulties. Protection of citizens against a problematical danger was an expensive proposition, and state and municipal budgets carried no provision for it. A few states appropriated funds, and the most-threatened cities diverted surpluses and managed to get some equipment. By the spring of 1942 some was coming through from the OCD in Washington. But at that time I found only one city where gas masks had been sup-

plied to more than the police, firemen, and wardens; and in that city, Tacoma, the precaution had been taken because of the presence in the heart of the industrial area of a chlorine factory which would have smoked the whole place out if it had been hit when the wind was right. In no city had the threat of bombing been taken seriously enough to lead to the construction or adaptation of deep shelters. I doubt if there is any place in this country today which has any such provision, except where deep tunnels and culverts already exist for other purposes.

Another difficulty which bulked very large in the local picture was the absence of any clear-cut understanding of the potential role of the Red Cross *vis-à-vis* the public welfare authorities and the Citizens Defense Corps, in case of hostile attack. Especially in cities where the local Red Cross chapter had previously taken the lead in some natural disaster, it was preparing to take the lead again, and the general expectation and desire were that it would do so. In April, 1942, the director of a state welfare department said to me, "I've got no staff to take over civilian relief in case of attack. That's the Red Cross's job. They brought us through the floods, and they can do it now—I say more power to 'em!" That was the very month, however, that an agreement signed at Washington between the ODHWS and the Red Cross made civilian relief definitely that state director's responsibility and that of every local welfare department under him. In a large Western city which I visited in May, 1942, the Red Cross chapter had spent over \$100,000 in equipping a series of casualty stations. Word had come through that week of another agreement, this time between the OCD and the Red Cross, which meant that all that equipment had to be turned over, and the direction of the program relinquished, to the emergency medical division of the local defense council.

I am not implying that these agreements, though so tardily arrived at, were not clear-cut and logical—they were. The Red Cross has always stood for relinquishing to government anything that government is willing to do—and government had unmistakably indicated its intention of administering both assistance and medical care to sufferers from enemy action. However, to the local communities, which first learned of these agreements only from the newspapers, they seemed arbitrary reversals of policies with which the localities were satisfied.

A third difficulty in this area of civilian protection centered around plans for evacuation. Here the localities looked to the states, and the states to Washington, for guidance, and none, by the spring of 1942, was forthcoming. State committees were at work, but no one in the local communities knew what was in the wind. One local defense council in a city that lay between the mountains and a big naval base had already notified its people that there could be no way out for them across the mountains and desert—whatever came, they would have to stay and take it. Another defense council in the same state said, "That's the Army's job; if they order us to evacuate they'll have to take us out and tell us where to go"; while still another had mobilized 700 volunteers with no other duties than to evacuate people if such a step should be ordered. And all the while, in this same state, the defense council had an evacuation committee at work, without having contact with the three chief cities. Even the term "evacuation" carried different meanings. Some cities thought you were asking about plans for dispersal within a city following an "incident"; others thought you meant moving out hospital and institution populations. One city was planning, in reverse, to be a reception center for a smaller city nearer the coast; but in general, the question of where they were going to evacuate people *to* had received no consideration.

By the summer and early fall of 1942 much of this had changed. The spring agreements had been implemented and clarified by instructions from the state offices; emergency welfare plans for the administration of Federal civilian war aid had been worked through, were understood, and generally accepted. Most local welfare departments had, indeed, already had some little experience in administering such aid to citizen refugees from war areas, to families of interned enemy aliens, or to crews of torpedoed fishing vessels or merchantmen. The OCD and the ODHWS had set up a joint committee on evacuation, established field service, and sent out information and suggestions; and state and local councils were following suit.

The era of clarification included the consummation of agreements between the ODHWS and the OCD, as well as between these agencies and the Red Cross. The OCD has placed more emphasis than in the past on promoting the organization of civilian war services at state and local levels, and this, in turn, has created channels

through which the ODHWS can reach down more effectively into local situations. The issuance late in 1942 of the OCD's "Organization Outline for Local Defense Councils" and the ODHWS's pamphlet "Health, Welfare and Related Aspects of Community War Services" marks the appearance of joint and coöperative aims.

The OCD defines civilian war services by exclusion, as,

all those civilian activities, other than protection, with which communities and individuals must be concerned as part of their contribution to the prosecution of the war. They include salvage, transportation, war savings, services to service men, recreation, consumer interests, nutrition, health and medical care, welfare and child care, housing, education, agriculture, labor supply and training, and plant utilization.

Persons concerned with this branch of the defense council's work form the Citizens Service Corps, as distinguished from those carrying out civilian protective duties, who form the Citizens Defense Corps. Social workers serve in both corps, but an important distinction between them is that in the Citizens Service Corps social workers act as members of planning and coördinating bodies for activities which are to be carried out by the existing health, welfare, and related services within the community (or, in rare instances, by special operating units created to carry out functions for which no established agency exists). Social workers serving in the Citizens Defense Corps (chiefly in emergency welfare, including information and registration services) are, however, members of bodies which are expected to go into action whenever the emergency for which they were recruited and trained may arise. In both corps, social workers serve as volunteers, along with a great mass of other volunteers who are performing an enormous variety of duties. But the social workers have this distinction: wherever they are found in either corps, they, like the doctors and nurses, are usually operating as professionals, within the sphere of their own professional competence.

A great step ahead in community organization, from our point of view, was taken when in September, 1942, the OCD issued an operations letter urging that local defense councils establish within the Citizens' Defense Corps an Emergency Welfare Service coördinate with, but separate from, the Emergency Medical Service, whose chief should be "a recognized leader in the welfare field with broad experience and administrative ability." Previously, there had been no clear directive establishing the emergency welfare services as an

entity; the fact that both emergency relief and emergency medical care had been in the area of participation of the Red Cross had tended to blur the essential differences between them. In one city, the emergency medical director had made a vigorous attempt to regiment the administration of emergency assistance as one of his department's subfunctions. One of the early charts issued by the OCD showed "emergency food and housing" as a dependency (of all things!) of the wardens' service.

A second important recommendation made in the September operations letter was that the chief of the Emergency Welfare Service should "use the Welfare and Child Care Committee of the Civilian War Services branch of the defense council as an advisory and planning group." The policy had earlier been established of using the Health Committee on the Community War Services side as the advisory and plan-making committee for the Emergency Medical Service; but up to this time the social workers serving in the two corps had been quite independent, no channel of communication existing between them except altogether outside the defense council, through the council of social agencies, if one existed. It was quite literally a case of right hand and left hand.

One area of haziness, as to the status of the public welfare agencies with respect to the local civilian defense authority, still remains. In case of hostile attack, the agreement is clear that the latter's emergency welfare division would be in complete control of emergency housing and feeding. However, this would be paid for with funds, not coming down through the civilian defense setup, but direct from the Federal Security Agency. In administering these funds, state and local public welfare officials would be deputized to serve as Federal agents. Unless the Emergency Welfare Division were completely controlled by public welfare authorities, it is easy to see how complications might arise. As has frequently been demonstrated, within as well as outside the public welfare field, there can be no effective control exercised over an agency that holds the purse strings by an agency that does not.

During an emergency period following a hostile attack, and particularly if mass feeding and shelter were required, what needed to be done might be carried out as under the defense council, or at least in accordance with the plans it had laid down and approved. But during what we used to call the "rehabilitation period," when

individual grants would have to be set up for reimbursement and replacements, and when the funds would be by-passing the defense set-up, it is scarcely conceivable that the fiction of defense council sponsorship of the process would be preserved.

Up to now, we have been emphasizing community welfare planning to meet hypothetical attacks from without, with only a few ground-laying references to that required to meet the day-to-day internal pressures and changes which war brings. The function of the defense council in this area is twofold. It is, first, to mobilize volunteers, lay and professional, to carry out the tasks involved; and, second, to furnish the framework for coördinating the programs. Many of the tasks needing to be undertaken in communities are new, and involve no especial need of professional direction. I refer to such activities as salvage and waste prevention, sale of War Stamps, and the organization of home hospitality and gifts for men in service. Others, such as furnishing consumer information, and house-and-room-finding, may be largely carried on by lay people with a minimum of professional oversight. It is probably only through that "definition by exclusion" that they have become grouped with the health and welfare services which form the backbone of Civilian War Services. Indeed, in some defense councils, some of these miscellaneous and volunteer-managed activities have been separated organizationally and placed in a third division of civilian mobilization, along with the civilian defense volunteer office, though this is not the nationally recommended pattern.

What progress may have been made over the country during the last few months in standardizing the terminology of the committees on the war services side of the chart, I do not know; but in the summer of 1942 there was little or no uniformity. State defense councils had attempted, in advance of any word from Washington, to suggest organization patterns. Intrastate likenesses between cities were common, but they were only likenesses, even within a state. In one state, the entire division was commonly named "Division of Human Skills and Aptitudes"; yet one city within that state substituted a "Morale Committee," with committees on the family, child welfare, recreation, and so on, dependent from it. However, in spite of strange terms, the structure was usually recognizably that of a catch-all division for everything that was not defense.

It was a strange tangle for social work to pick its way through.

Several courses were pursued, with varying results. Some councils of social agencies hung back to await developments; others were foremost in demanding that channels for coördinating health and welfare be provided. In some particularly fruitful experiments, a regular functional committee of the council of social agencies organized an emergency subcommittee—for example, upon day care for children of working mothers—which became the defense council's committee while at the same time retaining its relation to the parent committee. The official statement of Community Chests and Councils concerning such relationships is that "leadership may be applied to a specific problem through (1) a group functioning as a department of the defense council; (2) a group functioning under the council of social agencies with defense council approval; or (3) a group operating as an official arm of both bodies."

In some communities, the council of social agencies itself set up a whole battery of emergency committees, even in advance of the formation of a defense council; and when this took place, handed them over to the defense council, lock, stock, and barrel, as a going concern. While this may be the most thoroughgoing and effective way to proceed, it has certain dangers. If accompanied with complete diversion of the time, energy, interest, and funds of the Council of Social Agencies, as has well-nigh happened in some places, it means that the member agencies get little service on other than war-caused problems, and that these continuing needs are poorly interpreted to the community. It must be realized that no part of the defense council's budget is commonly set aside for committees on health, welfare, and recreation. Office space may be supplied, but the directional costs must be met from private funds if at all. Many a council of social agencies executive is being run ragged trying to keep up two jobs—one in his own office, one in the defense council's. However, we must keep in mind that there are many well-integrated, though small, communities in this land of ours that not only have no councils of social agencies, but no social agencies at all except those which are public and state—or county-wide. Here, such social planning as is done at the local level to meet war conditions must be done "from the ground up," by the defense councils. Having worked together for war, will their volunteers and committee members be content to disband when the peace bells ring?

We cannot think of the impact of the war on community planning

without being inevitably led to think of the impact of the peace. After we win this war, there will be community problems that equal in gravity those we now face. Will peacetime central financing cease to be a community-by-community affair, and be geared to the state level, in the direction now being pointed by the War Chests, following the pattern set last year by the United Service Organizations? If so, will community planning, although remaining a function largely of the private agencies, follow fund raising up to the state level?

Or will the structure of the defense councils of today, public or quasi-public bodies as they are, prove durable, and remain in existence to coördinate the emergency problems of peacetime? Some people in the defense councils are thinking ahead in these terms. They argue that, just as the relief of distress passed from private to public hands, so will planning the remedial efforts of the community, and at no remote day; and that the defense council's emphasis on local autonomy, citizen participation, and national stimulation and guidance of program make it the logical body out of which to develop such a peacetime coördinating movement.

Those of us who have seen enthusiasms wax and wane may recall that at the close of the last war, some of the leaders within the American Red Cross were convinced that it should be that agency's peacetime role to conduct a general service of case work, relief, and health education in every county of every state. The day of the private agency was believed to be over. The governmental agencies that did take over were not part of the Red Cross, but private agencies, with vastly altered roles, are still here.

The future will be certain to bring great changes. It may be that a revitalizing of community planning will come about through preserving and modifying the defense council structure; but not, I think, because it is governmental—rather in spite of that. Personally, I find it hard to look forward to a time in this country when social planning will be done for the citizens instead of by the citizens.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER IN A WAR-INDUSTRY COMMUNITY

By W. EARL PROSSER

BRIDGEPORT. Roll the sound of the word over your tongue and through your mind. There is nothing lovely about it. Indeed, it is simple, plain, commonplace, substantial.

Bridgeport itself is like that. There are some sordid ugly spots within the city and a few beautiful ones, but mostly it is just plain and practical and strong. Despite the important part it plays in our industrial effort today, Bridgeport is no romantic city.

Bridgeport is a man in work clothes and a woman in slacks with a large handkerchief over her head. Bridgeport is three shifts a day and somebody always working, somebody always sleeping. Bridgeport is jammed busses, crowded movies, people standing patiently in line to get a table in a good restaurant.

Bridgeport is thousands and thousands living in furnished rooms. Bridgeport is migrants from Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. Bridgeport is an industrial pay roll made up of three times as many employees as in 1929. Bridgeport is, surprisingly enough, well-attended churches. But above all, Bridgeport is production.

Bridgeport is industrial America rolling up its sleeves and going to work. That is the important thing about Bridgeport—the fact that it is doing a job of work and doing it well with a large measure of skill and without strikes. That is what is important—not the social welfare and health problems that have developed—because, as a matter of fact, these problems are not nearly so grave nor so omnipresent as one might believe, nor are they nearly so serious as those which Bridgeport will face after the war.

In normal times Bridgeport is a town of about 147,000 people. The boom started in Bridgeport almost three years ago, and people started pouring in and have never stopped, until now the town has a population of about 200,000, with thousands more who commute daily from New York and surrounding Connecticut to work in the Bridgeport factories.

The best way to describe Bridgeport's reactions when the defense boom hit is to say that the town had a "split personality." On the one hand, it was almost impossible to resist the tide of prosperity that stole over the city, soothing away all minor ailments. On the other hand, Bridgeporters remembered well what happened during and after the last war. They remembered how 50,000 people poured into town during World War I and how on Christmas Eve in 1918, after the armistice, Remington Arms laid off 7,000 workers at one stroke. They remembered, too, that in 1918 there were 585 people on the relief rolls, and in 1922 the figure was 37,000. And they remembered how during World War I the city administration had borrowed at the drop of a hat to make questionable civic improvements and how, later, special taxes had to be levied to meet those obligations.

Bridgeporters remembered all these things, but in spite of the doubts occasioned by these memories Bridgeport went steadily ahead producing the weapons for war. With the advent of Pearl Harbor doubts and indecision dropped away. Bridgeport knew well its role in wartime. Bridgeporters redoubled their efforts, and production became at once a watchword, a symbol, and a way of life.

Although Bridgeport has embarked once more on a production spree people behave differently from the way in which they had behaved during World War I. There is little riotous living. With their sharp and bitter memories of two severe depressions in little more than twenty years, Bridgeporters are using their new-found prosperity to pay off old debts, and to buy such solid luxuries as refrigerators, washing machines, and new furniture as long as they are available. The migrants have acted in much the same manner. Fully half of these migrants are married, and many have families with them, but all send a part of their wages back home. Many are saving to get a stake, and then they will return to their homes.

Because the community now has no illusions about the permanence of boom-time prosperity, citizens of this old Yankee town

have made serious efforts to mitigate, alleviate, and, if possible, to avoid the social and economic evils that boom days often leave in their wake. The Welfare Division of the Bridgeport Defense Council was organized about two years ago. It was developed by the Council of Social Agencies and patterned on the council's structure. As a matter of fact, we make little real distinction between the Council of Social Agencies and the Welfare Division of the Defense Council. Actually, they operate as one unit, since the personnel of the two organizations are interchangeable, and they overlap in membership. The leadership in both organizations is identical.

Why do we have two organizations? Simply because the term "defense council" carries with it a sense of urgency, a sense of immediate need. Because of its patriotic name we have been able to accomplish social welfare and health gains that would never have been possible if we were organized simply as a council of social agencies. We have been able also to recruit many new and valuable members who were interested in the Defense Council but who would not have been interested in the Council of Social Agencies. In addition, because it has been made a practice to clear all new projects of a welfare and health nature through the Defense Council we have been able to squelch many harebrained schemes right at the start. Furthermore, we have had the coöperation of the whole community in using the Defense Council as a clearing device for welfare activities and enterprises, thus enabling us to keep system and order in the welfare structure of our community. Our policy has been, for the most part, to strengthen existing agencies rather than to add new ones. At the end of the war the Welfare Division of the Defense Council will lose its identity, but the Council of Social Agencies will continue and will absorb whatever gains have been made in personnel and accomplishment.

Much of what has been done by way of improvement in community welfare, health and recreation has been accomplished through the Welfare Division, which has functioned as a large, over-all committee, a core about which community action has revolved. Nevertheless, Bridgeport, despite every precaution, has serious health and welfare problems, some of which have been brought about directly through the war and most of which are an accentuation of normal peacetime community maladjustments.

Our greatest problem, and the one from which many others stem,

is that of housing. The population of Bridgeport has increased by about 50,000. Ninety thousand men and women are working in plants which two years ago employed 35,000. Some 16,000 persons live in Government housing projects, most of which are good, substantial dwellings. Around 16,000 people live in furnished rooms. There has been a considerable amount of construction of private dwellings, and there are no trailer camps in Bridgeport. With rare exceptions single men experience no difficulty in securing rooms. Rooms for women have been difficult to find, but landlords are now looking with more favor on girls and women as roomers. Light-housekeeping rooms for couples are extremely difficult to obtain, as are houses to rent. The colored population of Bridgeport has jumped from 3,000 to 10,000. For them the housing shortage has been, and is now, extremely grave.

In spite of the serious situation no makeshift dwellings have been erected to become slums after the war. Housing project units that will care for some 4,000 people are either under construction or are planned for the near future, and rooms are still available.

Though there can be no doubt that the stresses and strains of wartime living and working are having ill effects on health, I feel that, in general, health has not yet suffered severely and may even, in some instances, be improved; for, due to their improved economic status people are eating and living better and seeing the doctor and dentist more often.

Nevertheless, tuberculosis is on the increase in Bridgeport as it is all over the country. Venereal disease is also on the increase, but not out of proportion to the increase in population. There is no organized prostitution. When caught, prostitutes are sent to the state farm until they are cured. As one of the results of a city-wide health survey our municipal venereal disease clinic will be enlarged and improved in the near future. Patients may receive treatment there for little or no fee.

Our two main hospitals have recently received a grant of \$1,250,000 from the Federal Government and have also carried out a successful \$900,000 building fund campaign.

No discussion of health in Bridgeport would be complete without some mention of nutrition. Under the general name of the Bridgeport Plan and with the slogan "Pack a lunch a man can work on" nutrition education has penetrated practically every corner of com-

munity life, including the schools, the restaurants, the bakeries, the factory cafeterias, and the individual home kitchens all over the city.

In 1942 a survey through the schools which covered every child whose parents, or the only parent, were employed indicated that in the majority of cases, parents were working out fairly satisfactory plans for the supervision of their children. A consultation service for working mothers was set up at the United States Employment Service and manned by case workers experienced in child care. It died a slow death because of lack of clients. Yet every personnel director in the city had been informed of what the consultation service was equipped to do.

One completely new day nursery has been added. Another has been doubled in size through Lanham Act funds. Two others have increased their capacity so that each one can care for fifteen more children. None is full or even nearly so.

Perhaps the most successful child-care experiment has been the program which one of our settlements has developed, permitting children to come there before school, to get lunch at the settlement, to return after school for a light snack and for supervised play until six in the evening. The children like it.

As far back as April, 1942, 52 percent of the industrial workers in Fairfield County were women. (Bridgeport is located in Fairfield County.) No matter how hard we try we cannot possibly provide adequate organized group care for all children of working mothers. The most helpful aspect of the situation is that most mothers are, of their own initiative, devising reasonably adequate plans for the care of their children. At present, we are attempting to find a partial solution to the problem by putting those mothers who want to work in contact with women who are willing to care for children at a reasonable fee. We plan to provide supervision for this type of foster day-care home.

One of the most frequent complaints made by the newcomer to Bridgeport is "Wadda ya do for excitement in this town?" This complaint is, in a sense, unfair because, while Bridgeport is not exceptional, it does provide as much in the way of recreation as most towns its size, and it usually provides a good deal more than the town from which the migrant came. What he misses most of all, whether or not he is aware of it, are the close associations and long-standing friendships he knew in the town from which he came—

friendships and associations that make any type of recreational pursuit more enjoyable.

A brief survey of recreation in Bridgeport would indicate that the movies, vaudeville show, and bowling alleys are usually crowded except on weekday afternoons, and one must wait for a seat or an alley. The taverns are busy, but there is, for the most part, a minimum of rowdyism.

A large unit of the United Service Organizations mainly serves defense workers, both men and women. The over-all monthly attendance is about 15,000. Three dances are held each week. Until transportation became too difficult one dance was held each week from twelve to three for those who worked odd shifts. Industrial leagues for all types of sports have been organized by the U.S.O. and the Young Men's Christian Association.

Both these organizations have developed special groups within the industrial plants for those interested in glee clubs, photography, boxing, social dancing, etc. Much of this work has been done through a key man in each plant, but a few plants have professional recreation leaders who are employed full time to organize group activities.

One of the most popular programs of a recreational nature has been the "Let Freedom Sing" Sunday afternoon broadcasts. These were originally sent from a local radio station in coöperation with one of the local newspapers. Then the U.S.O. took up the program, which consists of a broadcast by a different industrial plant each week. Workers within the plant create, produce, and participate in these programs. Prizes are offered for the best broadcast. There is a huge listening audience, and the competition and friendly rivalry between plants have done much to provide diversion from the monotony of constant work.

Bridgeport has excellent beaches and parks which are widely used during the summer months. Indeed, I may repeat that probably the community offers as much recreation as most towns, and more than many. To the lonesome out-of-towner it is doubtful, however, if anything the city can offer compares with the good times he had back home.

In any description of Bridgeport's welfare structure, the block plan, which covers almost the entire city, must be mentioned. It has served well as a medium for the study of social problems and as a

means of communication. The Volunteer Bureau, equally important, supported by the Community Chest and the city, has supplied thousands of volunteers for civilian welfare and civilian protection since it opened its doors early in 1942.

Bridgeport's problems are serious and should be dealt with, but they are neither so grave nor so ponderous as those Bridgeport will face after the war when money no longer flows freely and depression brings its woes. So, while the boom is still with us, may I remark that it has brought its benefits as well as its cares.

In general, workers are making more money than ever before. Usually they are happy and contented on their jobs. They can buy good clothes, good food, entertainment, medical and dental attention.

Under the pressures of war many improvements have been made in our welfare and health organizations that will carry over into peacetime living. It is worthy of note, too, that juvenile delinquency has not increased, and crime has not increased in a greater proportion than the increase in population.

Bridgeport, in many ways, is a remarkable town. It can be proud of its good schools, churches, beaches, and parks and of an industrial empire comprising some four hundred plants, among them giants like General Electric, Remington, and Bridgeport Brass. But, in a broader sense, these are not the really important values. What really does count is the heart of the city—what goes on in the minds and souls of the people who live there. And here is where Bridgeport shines.

Over a period of many years this old Yankee town has taken to its bosom a population that sounds like the roll call of the nations—a population composed of Poles, Italians, Slavs, Swedes, Irish, old New Englanders, and many others. And the town has molded this agglomeration into a compact whole.

During the fusing process these people from all the lands of the earth have learned about tolerance, and a love of freedom, and something of what being an American means. These are the qualities that make Bridgeport more than a melting pot. These are qualities that bind this plain, old, substantial Yankee town to all the other cities and towns scattered over the land.

DEFENSE COUNCILS AND PERMANENT WELFARE AGENCIES

By T. J. S. WAXTER

DURING periods of crisis many experiments are made to meet changed conditions. One such experiment is the defense council, organized to meet new situations growing out of the war and to mobilize the civilian front for the maximum war effort.

The defense council and the welfare program of the permanent agencies are closely related to each other, and welfare programs are bound to be affected by the mass community response to the defense council. It is necessary, also, to remember that a war economy does not so much bring into the social system entirely new developments as accelerate developments and trends already under way.

The year 1943 finds a public welfare agency in practically every American community. These agencies administer material aid, but they deal only with symptoms and not with causes. During the past decade these welfare agencies have grown enormously, both in the volume of work handled and in the emphasis given them by public attention. Since the war began, however, interest has moved away from welfare services, and they have become, in the public mind, subordinate to many other functions. It is a bitter fact that in this time of crisis social work appears to many to be a peacetime luxury.

Many Americans have long distrusted welfare agencies and look upon the misery of those in need as due entirely to the improvidence of the individual. The work handled by the Army Relief and the Navy Relief and most of the activity of the Home Service Division of the Red Cross could well have been absorbed by already existing welfare agencies. The existing welfare agencies were not used because of the stigma which still attaches to those who benefit from their services. Against this background defense councils have been

organized in every American community. The councils, depending mainly upon the help of volunteers, have accurately reflected local thinking and have been one of the mediums through which the civilian population has been organized to give the maximum support to the war effort.

The changes that have occurred in the city of Baltimore may be taken as typical of what has been happening the country over in the field of community organization, defense councils, and local welfare agencies since the war began. There are slightly over one million persons living within the geographical limits of Baltimore, and the city is surrounded by a populous metropolitan area. It is a large defense center engaged in the manufacture of steel, aircraft, ships, and other war materials.

The most vexing, if not the most important, problem facing Baltimore welfare agencies is that of personnel. It has become exceedingly difficult to retain the older, experienced staff members and almost impossible to find new, trained people. This turnover is due to numerous factors, but undoubtedly the two most important are the salary scales and the desire of every American to be of maximum assistance in the war effort.

In most sections of the nation, employees of social welfare departments have been underpaid. Every effort must be made to raise salaries to a more equitable level.

There is much that can be done about the individual and his relationship to the war. Many social workers have been caught in the evolutionary change in values which has taken place in the past year. The color and drama of war are infinitely more appealing than the routine of the social services. Many of the Baltimore workers have expressed the desire to be of more immediate value in the war. They are impatient with their present jobs and do not actually sense the relationship between public welfare and the total war effort. This attitude presents a real challenge to the administrative offices of welfare departments. The vital link between the human needs of individual Americans and the war must be dramatized and used to build morale and retain staff.

The present emergency has emphasized the use of volunteers by local welfare agencies. Traditionally, welfare agencies have thought of the use of volunteers as being beneficial in terms of public relations, but they have been highly dubious about its intrinsic value

to the agency. However, this traditional attitude has, of necessity, changed. First, the crisis has given to tens of thousands of citizens a desire to volunteer their services to some useful end; and, second, personnel problems have made the use of volunteers more acceptable.

The Office of Civilian Defense has used thousands of volunteers. It is estimated that in Baltimore there are over seventy-five thousand citizens who have volunteered to give some time to the defense activities of the OCD. The local welfare department utilizes the services of several thousand volunteers in maintaining the Emergency Welfare Service under the local defense council.

The OCD is developing new techniques in the use of volunteers, which may be exceedingly helpful to permanent welfare programs. The institutions and medical care services have expanded their volunteer program. This has not, as yet, been true in the public assistance division, though the possibility is being explored. An obstacle to the use of volunteers is the additional burden, occasioned by the rapid turnover in staff which has been placed on all persons occupying supervisory positions.

The OCD in Baltimore has been invaluable to the Department of Welfare in its public relations. The department is charged with the administration of the Emergency Welfare Service, which is only one of the numerous protective services under the defense council. It has been necessary that the activities of the Emergency Welfare Service should be known to all OCD volunteers, particularly to the 16,000 air-raid wardens. Innumerable meetings with wardens in each of the air-raid districts have been held. Usually, these meetings are held in one of the official emergency housing stations. The canteen serves a simple dinner, and each person pays for his own meal, usually less than twenty-five cents. After the dinner, the Emergency Welfare Service is explained by members of the staff who cover that particular district. A one-act skit is given. This has met with considerable success and has been given before thousands of volunteers. The opportunity is also taken to discuss numerous welfare problems in their relationship to the OCD.

Baltimore has a separate committee for all the OCD activities which are nonprotective in their nature. This committee, known as the Baltimore Committee on Civilian Mobilization, is in the process of setting up a block system. Under this system there will be one woman in charge of each of the city's 8,000 residential blocks

The welfare division of the committee has the same opportunity as that of any subdivision to write up material for the block organization and to gain the help of the organization on any project. The closer any welfare department is to a successful block organization, the better its public relations.

Standards of service must be not only maintained, but expanded by the permanent welfare agencies. There are thousands of unfilled jobs in Baltimore. This, naturally, has brought pressure to bear upon welfare departments to justify their case loads. Welfare departments not only must justify their present expenditures, but also must increase the amount of unit grant to take care of the rise in the cost of living. It must be made clear that the blind do not suddenly see at a declaration of war nor do the crippled suddenly walk. Slums do not suddenly become spots of beauty.

The gains made during the past decade must be held. It is clearly realized that the armed forces must take all they need without reference to the civilian population even though only basic necessities may be left for the home front. The social worker has no quarrel with this; it is as inevitable as it is right. He does feel, however, that of those things left to the consuming public there should be a more equal distribution than has ever obtained in the history of the nation.

Let us consider the plight of the assistance family. In the midst of almost universal prosperity, the family's real income has decreased. Their neighbors have more income than ever before. Their neighbors' standards of diet, clothing, and recreation have shot up with increased employment opportunities and increased wages. Even if the assistance grant has been increased fairly to meet rising prices, the members of the assistance family have been placed under additional handicaps. Standards of living have risen for everyone except the assistance family and its children are now more clearly differentiated from the other children in the neighborhood. This, of course, leaves scars and necessitates new understandings on the part of social workers.

Local defense councils can be of tremendous help in meeting this challenge. Let me illustrate this by the housing situation in Baltimore. Baltimore, like all defense centers, is badly overcrowded. There simply are not sufficient housing units to meet the need. Migrants still crowd into the city by the thousands. Conditions

under which numerous families are living are unbelievably bad. This is particularly true of the Negro group and of unemployable families who are still receiving public assistance.

The Department of Public Welfare has taken an active part in the whole housing program. Some months ago, the department organized and trained a Volunteer Housing Corps of several hundred persons. Members of the corps made surveys of housing conditions, and assisted in compiling the results of the disaster housing survey made by the air-raid wardens. The Volunteer Housing Corps has been influential in pointing up many of the housing needs of the city and has performed a real educational function. This is equally true of thousands of air-raid wardens who have gone into innumerable homes in their line of duty. There is now more public interest in housing in Baltimore than at any time in her history. This is due, primarily, to the activities of the local defense councils, and the use that has been made of volunteers recruited by the councils.

The statement has often been made that the ill-housed workman is a poor workman and that decent housing is part and parcel of the war effort since, to a large extent, it controls the morale of the individual worker. This statement is more acceptable today because of the large number of citizens who have, for the first time, actually seen bad housing conditions.

The problem of housing has all too often been thought of as a matter of regulation. This is only partially true. The problem of housing for families who have sufficient income to purchase minimum adequate shelter is primarily one of regulation. Property available to them can be forced by proper regulation to conform to a decent standard. The problem of housing for families which do not have sufficient income is primarily one of subsidy. This group cannot purchase or rent houses which comply with the accepted standards. If they are to have homes complying with minimum standards their income must be directly or indirectly supplemented. In other words, inadequate or slum housing is going to continue unless there is subsidy, direct or indirect. Even in the best of times this involves a large percentage of the population.

The defense council is, certainly, partially responsible for the fact that the problem of housing is discussed more realistically now than ever before, and squarely faced as never before because of its relationship to civilian defense.

The most important problem facing Baltimore is that of obtaining sufficient men and women to man its factories. Five years ago, the inability to find employment occasioned problems and hardships to many thousands of American families. In 1943 quite the reverse is true. There is work for everyone, but it may not be the kind of job that the individual has had before. Numerous individuals and families need help in readjusting their lives to changing conditions. Perhaps the war job of the tire salesman means a lower wage and the family must adjust its scale of living. Perhaps the man who takes a war job must go to a community where there are no housing facilities for his family. Perhaps the family must be helped over a period while the man is taking a course of training. The employment of the mothers of young children has given new emphasis to the problem of day care.

The welfare sections of defense councils have been interested in the families which need advice and assistance. This has resulted in numerous individual welfare agencies discussing the problem with the defense councils and with the local councils of social agencies. In most instances, the part played by the OCD has been to accept responsibility for planning jointly with the other agencies in the community. The administration of the new services has been left to the permanent agencies. The OCD has, however, joined with the permanent agencies in bringing pressure to bear for new funds and new facilities. This is clearly seen in the day nursery situation. When the request for Lanham Act funds for day nurseries is made, it is virtually a Federal requirement that the local OCD join in such a request. The reason for this is that the Federal authorities evidently feel that the OCD more properly reflects public attitudes and public needs than do the permanent local agencies.

In other words, a group of volunteers (the OCD) joins hands with the permanent agencies (the local welfare departments, departments of education, and councils of social agencies) for planning and for social action. It cannot be stressed too strongly that the war does not so much bring new needs into being as sharpen up old needs which have existed for indefinite periods. The war is enabling welfare agencies to deal more adequately with various problems that have been part of the American scene for generations. These new services, where necessary, should extend far beyond the end of the war.

One of the numerous problems which illustrate the coöperation of permanent departments with the OCD is the control of venereal disease. Baltimore, as a large defense center, has had thousands of unattached men and women coming into its already overcrowded living space. Approximately eighty-five thousand men are in Army camps and Naval stations located within easy reach of Baltimore.

The problem of venereal disease is as old as man. Any program should obviously be planned for a long-time pull, not merely for the duration of the war. Any approach to the problem must immediately involve an educational program. Police and health departments have an obvious place in any plan and so too have welfare services. Rehabilitation services for young girls who are either active prostitutes or on the road to becoming such are the primary concern of welfare agencies. In Baltimore a broad, comprehensive attack on the problem is under way. A city-wide council with a long-time program has been set up. This council is sponsored and its members are selected by the Baltimore Committee on Civilian Mobilization.

The work of the council has fallen naturally into four parts: (1) vice control and the whole problem of the relationship of law-enforcement agencies to prostitution and vice; (2) preventive health measures which include adequate clinics, supplying of drugs and proper information to the medical profession, and the follow-up of all contacts having active infections; (3) rehabilitation services; and (4) a study of the causative factors and of a preventive program.

In Baltimore the local Department of Welfare is requesting Lanham Act funds to open two small homes as an experiment in rehabilitation. An effort is also being made by the department to join with the private case work agencies in offering services to the courts so that young prostitutes may be cared for under some program of probation. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that the welfare services have been given a permanent place in the general plan.

The council recognizes that a study of the roots of the problem of venereal disease control belongs to the sociologist and not to the technician in law enforcement and preventive medicine. The causative factors are to be found in the total environment that surrounds each growing child. This includes housing, neighborhood, diet, education, recreation, etc. It means that the basic cause of prostitution is the way in which the community permits its children to be reared. Adequacy of living is the only answer to the problem.

It is also recognized that the cause of prostitution is no more to be found in the girl who becomes a streetwalker than in the man who has the sexual urge. A real preventive program would deal as severely with the man as with the girl. The average magistrate's court throughout America, which will blithely send a girl to jail for prostitution, would not even consider prosecuting the man who was serviced for a fee.

Another example of the changes which are being felt both by the OCD and by the permanent agencies may be taken from the field of medical care. The provision of good medical care to the entire population regardless of ability to pay is the common goal of public officials concerned with health and welfare, of the medical profession, of the hospitals, and of other medical and social agencies. How this can be accomplished most effectively has become a matter of both local and national controversy. Vast changes may be impending. The present emergency situation will certainly accelerate trends that have been under way for the past several decades. It is quite possible that before the end of the war necessity may require even greater changes in structure than are now foreseen. Many of the luxuries, such as private nursing, will, in all probability, be abandoned. It is not inconceivable that each defense area will have a district coördinator whose duty it will be to integrate total medical care services to meet the needs of the entire population. It is also quite possible that the beginnings of a real program of health insurance will be enacted by the Congress.

Curious things have happened in Baltimore in the field of medical care. The demand for free ward services in hospitals has greatly diminished, while the number of private and semiprivate patients has increased beyond the available bed capacity. This has been largely due to an abundant employment market with relatively high wages and to group hospital insurance. The decrease has taken place even in spite of the fact that thousands of new workers have come to the city.

Broadly speaking, the hospitals have met the demands made upon them. However, they have not been able to meet the increasing need for obstetrical care. The birth rate has jumped beyond anything the city has experienced. Three years ago, the city authorities were urging that all children should be born in hospitals; today there are not sufficient hospital beds to meet the demand. Emergency

plans must be adopted to meet the increasing need. This increase in the birth rate will continue for at least another year until, should the war continue, it will undoubtedly begin to drop until the lowest point in the nation's history is reached.

The personnel situation is distressing. The most urgent need is for general duty nurses. The inability to secure sufficient nurses has caused the Municipal Hospital, run by the Baltimore Department of Public Welfare, to curtail its services. In a period of unparalleled need, the obstetrical unit of the Baltimore City Hospitals has reduced the number of beds available by 40 percent. This situation presents a curious paradox. There are some thirteen hundred graduate nurses on the various registries in the city. In other words, nurses are available in Baltimore, but they cannot be induced to take jobs as general duty nurses in hospitals.

The number of visits to the public dispensaries has decreased materially as a result of better employment and high wages. This, of course, is reflected in greater demands upon the private practitioners, which come at a time when many physicians are leaving to accept commissions in the armed services.

The number of emergency visits made by physicians in the employ of the Department of Public Welfare has also decreased materially. The whole situation is complicated by the tremendous growth of the highly industrialized area in Baltimore County, east of the city. This area has grown more rapidly with the war than has any other part of the state of Maryland. It needs medical care facilities of all kinds. It is, however, a curious fact that most of the inhabitants of this area are not conscious of their unmet needs for medical care. They have come to Maryland, in most instances, from the rural areas in the South where medical needs have never been adequately met.

This need in Baltimore County is bringing the health and welfare departments of Baltimore and Baltimore County together in joint planning. This working together of county and city may lead to coöperation in other directions. The present tendency is, also, to break down residence requirements; for it is recognized that the defense worker who is sick is valueless to the war effort. The OCD in Baltimore has a Health and Medical Care Section which has been extremely helpful in pointing out the situation to the people of the city. It has had a special committee at work on the obstetrical prob-

lem and has brought pressure to bear on the local department of welfare to expand its services to the medically indigent obstetrical cases and to open the closed beds in the Municipal Hospital. It has offered its services to help in securing additional funds. It is, also, through the block system, attempting to secure and train badly needed hospital aides.

These are but some of the changes which have occurred and which are being reflected both in the programs of the OCD and in the permanent welfare services. Others equally important could be noted. It is necessary to remember, however, that while changes have been stressed, it is, nevertheless, true that welfare services are basically the same as they have always been. Their job is still to assist individuals who are faced with problems which cannot be solved without help. There is no change in the objective, though the means to its accomplishment may change from time to time.

In social welfare, the development in the last decade has been to move the emphasis from the individual to society itself. In other words, the modern concept of a social welfare program is to create a society which guarantees security to each of its members. Assistance families are no longer a group apart. They mirror defects in the system as a whole.

The Social Security Act of 1935 and the administration of public assistance with funds from general taxation are evidences of the recognition that government has a real responsibility for the economic security of each American. Postwar planning will certainly endeavor to grant additional security to the individual citizen. This tendency is portrayed in the report recently submitted by Sir William Beveridge to the British Parliament. The forces which brought this to the surface in Britain are alive in America.

It must, however, be realized that adequate social security is not to be found in such techniques as compulsory insurance. This must, of necessity, while important, be secondary. Prevention, not cure, must be stressed. This involves the whole functioning of the national economy. There is grave danger, also, in waiting for postwar planning to correct all the inadequacies in the American social and economic structure. It is in this field that the OCD can find its greatest effectiveness.

Supposedly, the OCD is the watchdog of the civilian front and accepts responsibility for organizing the home front so as to be of

maximum use in the war effort. Literally millions of OCD volunteers must have asked themselves questions as to social conditions, for the first time. It is the basic job of the OCD to organize the civilian front so that these defects may be corrected.

The young men in the armed forces should know that we at home are trying to build a better America. Many of them came to manhood at a time when America was vexed with the grim paradox of having widespread poverty in the midst of plenty. When the war came, those young men who had been denied the opportunity to work were called upon to go into the armed forces. Democracy has not been presented to many of these young people in its most favorable light. The nation has a direct and inescapable obligation. This obligation necessitates the building on the home front of a better America, the building of a civilization which will give to each person a job and an opportunity to prove his worth.

The very fact that we at home shall have less in the months ahead means that more attention and consideration should be given to those who are less able to fend for themselves. With what we have, let us do an infinitely better job.

PLANNING THE CIVILIAN WAR SERVICES

By THOMAS DEVINE

THE OFFICE of Civilian Defense is concerned solely with the war and with community organization as an important factor on the home front. The fact that defense council developments involve community organization on a mass-production basis has, of course, its future implications, some of which are obvious and none of which anybody has yet taken the time to consider and to analyze clearly. Our concern is for the contribution of this movement to the winning of the war, so that the only statement regarding future developments that I can make with any assurance is that the OCD will exist for the duration.

There are three main functions contained in the Executive Order under which we operate. One is to "review and approve all civilian defense programs by Federal agencies involving the use of volunteer services so as to assure unity and balance in the application of such programs."

Although this sounds like a formal and authoritative responsibility, this function is not carried out in a formal manner or spirit. Attached to the office of the Chief of Civilian War Services branch, we have a staff of liaison representatives who spend their entire time working with the various Federal agencies in the development of programs which need to be carried out in local communities. Instead of "reviewing and approving," these representatives work coöperatively with the other agencies at the time when the need is first recognized and when various proposals are being made to meet the need. We do not assume responsibility for the content of a particular program. For instance, the decision that silk or iron or rubber must be salvaged is a decision of the War Production Board. We advise how a salvage job can be best carried out in thousands of communities. Similarly, the decision for the nation to conserve

rubber through car sharing is a responsibility of the Office of Price Administration. We help determine how communities can organize car clubs for the large number of car users who are not employees of the larger plants.

The second charge in our Executive Order is:

Keep informed of problems which arise in states and local communities from the impact of industrial and military efforts required by war, and take steps to secure the cooperation of appropriate Federal agencies in dealing with such problems and in meeting the emergency needs of such states and communities in such a manner as to promote the war effort.

This is probably our most difficult responsibility and the one in which we can report the least achievement. Many Federal agencies have had long-established contacts with communities. Other Federal activities, although strictly war emergency programs, were developed before defense councils were organized. Still other agencies, assigned a specific responsibility for a particular activity, are inclined to concentrate in local communities on their particular job without relationship to, or consideration of, the total community program. The most encouraging thing that I can say is that there is evidence of very real progress, that more and more the various Federal agencies are recognizing that through coöperation with the central planning body in each community their own specific interests will be best promoted. One added complication in this coördination responsibility is that the OCD deals with state defense councils, and only at the request of a state does it ever get into a local community, while many of the other Federal services deal directly with local authorities or local committees.

The essence of the Executive Order is contained in the phrase, "assist in the mobilization of community resources for the purpose of dealing with community problems arising from the war." The organization of defense councils is the plan through which this prime responsibility is carried out. A defense council is, therefore, the war agency of local government. It has two separate and distinct responsibilities. One of these is provision for the protection of the community in case of enemy attack. This function is carried out through an extension of local governmental activities. It is and must be an authoritative, line-operated program with suitable public officials in charge of the various protection groups. The chief of

police is head of the auxiliary police; the welfare commissioner is in charge of the Emergency Welfare Service; the health commissioner is responsible for the Emergency Medical Service. The fact that the air-raid warden program is not a normal peacetime function of government is not inconsistent with this organization. The basis of its operation is, again, the authoritative governmental type of action.

Separate and distinct from this protective function is the Civilian War Services program. In this field the defense council sponsors complete community organization for the purpose of dealing with community problems related to the war—and we are learning that there is practically no community problem which is not related to the war. As we talk of defense councils and community organization, we have been accustomed to thinking of the council as a whole as being the community organization body. In most communities it rarely works this way. Community organization enters into the functioning of the Civilian War Services and the over-all council, which is either a county or municipal body, sponsors both an extension of governmental functions and the community organization.

The most important responsibility of Civilian War Services is over-all community planning. This follows the usual council of social agencies pattern of organization, in which committees are responsible for the various segments of the community program. So we have a committee on family and child care, on health, transportation, housing, salvage, recreation, etc. Most important of all is the coördination of these programs in the Executive Committee of the Civilian War Services Branch. It is essential that this body have representation from each of the various committees. Its membership should also include representative citizens, business and labor leaders, and public officials. The block plan and the war information program should operate under the direction of the Executive Committee. This committee must have authority over every activity of the defense council's community program. A weakness found in some councils is the failure to have such a strong over-all committee which, for instance, decides what programs should be carried out through a block plan and what programs should be promoted through Victory speakers. The simple but fundamental question of who decides what block leaders should do has not yet been settled in many communities.

The Civilian War Services Branch has two responsibilities. The first is to carry out those national programs essential to winning the war—such as Victory gardens, salvage, War Bonds, and others. The second is to meet the problems which war brings to communities. It is recognized that in meeting some of these problems Federal assistance in greater or lesser amounts may be needed—funds, for instance, for the day care of children. This recognition does not alter the fact that the determination of the need for the development of a program starts with the local community organization, that is, the Civilian War Services Branch of the local defense council.

We are becoming increasingly aware that the relative urgency of the two types of programs, that is, national war jobs vs. local war-impact problems, varies greatly according to the type of community and the degree of the war impact. There is no place in which the community life has not been affected by the war and does not have such problems as recreation and housing, but for 90 percent of our communities there is a certain balance between meeting community needs and carrying out national programs. However, there are approximately sixteen hundred and fifty communities where the impact of war has so disrupted normal life that community efforts must be concentrated on housing, child care, health, and similar services. Many of these communities need a substantial amount of Federal assistance for the construction of houses and hospitals, or the operation of child care and medical services. It is, however, becoming increasingly evident that Federal assistance alone is not adequate if there is not sound community organization and sound community planning, with full utilization both of local resources and of Federal aid.

I referred to defense council developments being community organization on a mass-production basis. What is the field in which this organization is taking place?

Thirty-four percent of our population, or more than forty-five million people, live in our 199 cities of 50,000 population or over. It is in this group of cities that the community chest and council of social agencies movement has developed. There are, unfortunately, a number of these cities which have never been organized, but in a large percentage of them, chests and councils have done a major job in bringing community social forces together for coöperative action.

I had assumed that our urban organization was the one outstand-

ing development of that sort in the country. My months with the OCD have opened my eyes to the community organization of rural communities that has developed under the leadership of the Department of Agriculture and the Farm Security Administration.

Forty-three percent of our population, or over fifty-seven million, live in rural districts, or in towns of less than 2,500 population. Much that the OCD is still trying to bring about in the organization of larger communities, so that programs such as salvage and nutrition may be adequately carried out, is already in existence in rural areas. Many programs function smoothly with no added organization.

Twenty-two percent of our population, over twenty-nine million people, live in some thirty-two hundred communities with populations of between 2,500 and 50,000. This is the area to which community organization is, by and large, a new and thrilling experience. Not only in these communities, but in others which have already been organized to a greater or lesser extent, there is both an urge for service and an urge to organize so that service may be effective. The problem of the OCD is not to initiate the idea of organization, but to try to keep up with what is happening around the country and, through publications and field service, to pass from state to state and community to community the best ideas and experiences which develop.

The block plan is a good example. Scores of communities established block plans before the OCD did anything about them, so that our first publication was simply a summary of the ideas which had come in to us. We now know that there are all kinds of block plans—not a block plan. There are block plans which are simply messenger service organizations, means of disseminating information throughout communities. Experience has proved the effectiveness of this type of dissemination compared with radio, press, or movies. This information service type of block plan is usually organized on a purely appointive basis, similar to a community chest setup, with the chairman appointing division chairmen, the division chairmen appointing the zone chairmen, and zone chairmen appointing the block captains.

The other extreme of the block plan is the Chicago plan, which is really community organization on a block basis. The unit is the square block, with sometimes as many as 2,000 families in a block. Block leaders are elected by secret ballot or in any other way that

the people of the block choose. The leader keeps a complete card file of every family on the block, and a list of the chairmen of each program, such as the Victory gardens, nutrition, and recreation, as well as the protection services such as those carried on by the air-raid wardens and messengers. Some programs are handed down from the councils, but in large measure, programs are developed within the block and are copied from one block to another.

Chicago thus has a social experiment strongly reminiscent of the Cincinnati social unit, but in Chicago it extends over a whole metropolitan area. Numbers of blocks have organized the unorganized youth and secured competent leadership for these groups. Child-care programs have been organized by several blocks joining together in a zone. The block plan has become a tremendously important development in the life of Chicago. Each block has its headquarters. People come together and discuss their local and national war problems, whereas formerly the only gatherings on a neighborhood basis had been those called by the ward leader.

At present the members of the block organization section of the OCD are busily gathering information about different types of block plans so that they may inform and assist the many communities which are just starting to organize. The latest figures which we have are for January 1, 1943. During the three preceding months, the number of defense councils reporting block organizations increased from 671 to 1,121. However, we received reports from only 3,000 out of the 14,000 defense councils. During this same period, the number of block leaders doubled for the country as a whole. Our Cleveland office, representing four states, reported that the number of block leaders increased from 24,000 to 200,000.

The first emphasis in the development of defense councils was on protection, communities naturally organizing first to prepare for the contingency of enemy attack. Recently there has been a greatly increasing emphasis on civilian war services. I would like to close by quoting from a recent talk by Director Landis on this change in emphasis:

What we had known as security began to fade away. Security had been family, and bank deposits and life insurance, and of a sudden it seemed to hinge on the spitting fire of bullets in the Solomons, on the speed and fire-power of pursuit planes, or on the salvo of big guns at the Midway. We were through with talking about total war, for the totality

of war was upon us. It is amid these facts that civilian defense began to gather meaning. We became conscious that for America to be at war, its tens of thousands of communities had to be at war, and to put them at war it was necessary to organize every warlike resource that they possessed. If scrap was wanted, that was their job. If tires had to be saved, that was their job. It was their task to make rationing not only work, but work cheerfully. It was their duty to make no unnecessary drain upon materials or manpower or food or medical services. They had to fight this war by throwing overboard what was unessential and stripping boldly for action.

But this change could not be affected by merely wishing it. It could not even be accomplished by groups of well-meaning and patriotic people. It was a responsibility that rested upon all the people and that required over-all organization if it was to be decently and effectively discharged.

The only agency that could bring about this over-all organization that would embrace all the people was government in some form. The task was too huge, too embracing for a private organization or for groups banded together by any tie less than that of being Americans.

And then the war grew bigger; different and seemingly less soldierly tasks were thrown at communities, tasks that lacked glamour, demanded no uniforms, no equipment—only perseverance and patience. Here and there, at the start, a defense council saw both its responsibilities and its opportunities. This defense council quickly became the focal point for the new civilian war services that were emerging. If volunteers were required, it took steps to furnish them. If organizational jealousies threatened, it developed a comprehensive plan that would solve them by putting allegiance to country first and by making the community task big and broad enough to give everyone more rather than less work.

For that is what these tasks are—not reform, not niceness but the grim, tough task of getting oneself and keeping oneself fighting this war. This is the rapidly expanding meaning of civilian defense. It is understanding what the demands are upon the community, what its war deficiencies are, what can be done to make it a better fighting unit in this war, and then marshaling its resources to meet these demands. It is a wise, over-all recruitment of volunteers and sane deployment of them to specific tasks in specific problems. It is the defense council recognizing the responsibility of its assignment to translate into action appropriate to its own community the hundred demands which war places on this nation as a whole. It is the defense council doing the tremendously difficult job of coördinating in the name of the community all the civilian war service programs of that community. The local defense council is, in short, the war cabinet of the community.

PROGRESS IN INTERRACIAL RELATIONSHIPS

By *EDWARD S. LEWIS*

THE PRESENT and future status of interracial relations in this country depends so much upon the war and its outcome that one cannot be discussed without mention of the other. That we have made some significant gains in improving race relations during the past twenty-five years, few would deny. But when we put this general pattern of gradual betterment against the sharpening of issues in our present world struggle, the contrast is striking.

Social work leadership has showed much more awareness in recent years of the Negro question in all its ramifications. It was in the thirties that we saw heads of relief agencies giving Negro case workers, supervisors, and intake secretaries new opportunities for employment. The success of Negro social workers in all our metropolitan cities is now an accomplished fact. It should be pointed out in passing, however, that only in Chicago, St. Louis, and New York City have these workers been upgraded or promoted in accordance with their demonstrated ability.

Councils of social agencies in Cincinnati and Hartford have added Negro workers to their staffs on an integrated basis, and while it is a little too early to judge the success of these ventures, at least they point to an interesting trend in the administrative social work field.

National social work agencies have made some beginnings in the employment of Negro personnel. The National Tuberculosis and Health Association employs an able representative of color who carries on an effective promotion program in Negro communities. The Planned Parenthood Federation formerly relied on a white staff to work with Negro families. More recently, Negro personnel has been added to the staff, with good results.

The American Red Cross has employed for the first time in its history competent, well-trained Negro social workers to work in the foreign fields, in connection with service canteens for Negro troops in England, Africa, and Australia. Only one Negro field representative has been appointed for national field work in this country.

The Atlanta School of Social Work, the Department of Social Sciences at Fisk University, and the National Urban League have been asked in recent years to furnish personnel, expert guidance, and counsel on the social welfare problems of Negroes on a scale that is without precedent in the history of these organizations.

The heads of Government agencies have also become more concerned about the problems of Negroes, and have appointed to their staffs racial relations advisers and specialists who try to see that the pressing needs of Negroes in housing, health, employment, and social security are not overlooked. Especially notable have been the advances made in the public housing programs under the United States Housing Authority. An alert staff saw to it that employment quotas for skilled Negro workers were complied with, and it also played an important role in site planning and in good management. As a direct result of this enlightened administrative policy, Negro housing projects located in all sections of the country have chalked up an enviable record of proficiency on all counts.

Let no one assume that the employment of a few race relations advisers has solved the problem of adequate representation and full participation of Negroes in the welfare phases of the Government. The "advisers" are without power and must rely on their skills in negotiating tight bargains. In spite of Executive Order 8802, there are many departments in the Government which employ no professional Negro workers. The Board of Economic Warfare, for example, working on postwar reconstruction problems in Africa, has no Negro employees in key positions. The National Resources Planning Board is another case in point.

A complete integration of Negro welfare specialists in all departments of the Government, based on their special skills, knowledge, and previous experience, is the only sound approach to an adequate treatment of the Negro's social and economic ills. We have seen only the mere beginnings of this basic operational procedure.

Rapid strides have been made during the past year in the employment of Negroes in war industries. Several hundred thousand new

workers of color have been employed in aircraft industries, ship-building, and ordnance plants. According to John J. Corson, Director of the Bureau of Employment Security, the employment of Negro workers in war industries during the past year increased 15 percent in contrast to a 10 percent increase for white workers. Of course, when one considers the wide disparity of employment at the outset, the increase is not remarkable. By and large, it represents the demands of a tight labor market.

I was privileged to see about a thousand Negro workers in action at an Eastern aviation plant. It was thrilling to observe white and colored workers carrying on the highly skilled operations involved in the assembling of bombers with efficiency, dispatch, and, above all, harmonious relations.

In August, 1941, I had participated in a Congressional hearing and listened to officials of this same plant testify that to employ Negro workers would completely disorganize production. "White skilled workers would not work with them," they said. But so far no serious incidents have occurred to mar the progress being made in the utilization of Negro labor in vital war industries.

The role of trade unions in the integration of Negro workers in war industries has been noteworthy. Unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations have led the way in promoting democratic practices and have, in some instances, helped in the upgrading of their dark-skinned brothers. The International Machinists Union, of the American Federation of Labor, which has a clause in its constitution forbidding Negro membership, has yielded to the pressure of war and given work permits to Negro mechanics. In the building trades fields, craft unions of the A.F. of L. have let down the bars for the organization of Negro craftsmen, and most war-construction projects have employed a fairly representative number of Negro skilled workers.

The enunciation of sound principles of labor organization and the practical application of these principles, however, are two different things. Both branches of organized labor have lagged in working out remedial programs for the elimination of racial prejudice among the rank-and-file workers. The C.I.O., in its last convention, took a step in the right direction when it appointed a committee to investigate and to help remedy discriminatory practices in its unions.

It is not enough to appoint investigating committees and to draw

up a report on facts about discrimination that are already well known to labor leadership. The A.F. of L. has appointed similar committees, and no improvement in policies or attitudes has ensued. A vigorous, practical, workers' education program should be carried on in all locals, with one major emphasis, namely, that the basic interests of colored and white workers are identical, and that the labor movement will never come into its own in this country until white and Negro workers in all trades and industries learn this elemental truth.

In spite of the measured progress which has been made, token employment remains the order of the day. A special newspaper correspondent in New York City had planned to do a feature article on some large war plant in the United States with a "perfect record of performance in the hiring of Negroes, Jews, and other racial minorities." He has not been able to find one such plant. If all war employers could be convinced that in hiring workers regardless of race, creed, or color they are lessening the time which will be necessary to crush fascism, the available Negro labor supply would be exhausted in quick order.

The worst setback which we have encountered recently was the calling off of the Fair Employment Practice Committee hearings by Paul V. McNutt, Director of the Manpower Commission. On June 25, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802:

1. All departments and agencies of the Government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production shall take special measures appropriate to assure that such programs are administered without discrimination because of race, color or national origin.

2. All contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a proviso obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color or national origin.

3. There is established in the Office of Production Management a Committee on Fair Employment Practices . . . to investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the provisions of this Order and take appropriate steps to redress grievances which it finds to be valid.

Although the FEPC had no legislative power to enforce compliance with its findings, it did serve as an effective instrument for bringing before the bar of American opinion discriminatory employment practices that were crippling the war effort. The Birmingham hear-

ings of the Committee aroused the opposition of Southern Congressmen, and there has been a determined effort since that time to curb this worthy administration venture.

Some twenty-two organizations have presented to Mr. McNutt a unified program to strengthen the work of the Committee. The acceptance by the Manpower Commission of these proposals would restore the confidence of racial minorities in the United States that the Government really means to carry out the mandates of Executive Order 8802.

We have acquired some valuable lessons from the work of the FEPC. Jews, Mexicans, American-born Japanese, foreign born, and other minorities have learned that the patterns of racial discrimination are essentially the same. The Metropolitan Council on Fair Employment Practice in New York City, composed of twenty-three organizations concerned with combating discrimination, and the New York State Committee on Discrimination in Employment are having experiences each day that confirm the accuracy of that statement.

Employers and trade unions are fully aware of the many loopholes by which compliance may be avoided. Then, too, the employer knows that the Government's house is not in order on the matter of democratic employment practices. We should by all means strengthen, not weaken, the Government's measures for counteracting discriminatory employment practices. Now is the time to make activities such as those carried on by the FEPC a permanent function of the Government. This action should be taken, not for the benefit of any one minority group, but in order to insure the genuinely all-out production which we must have to win this war.

Gross educational inequalities in states which have separate systems for white and colored people have made a mockery of our so-called democratic education:

Of the total Negro population in the United States, 78.6 percent live in those states in which separate schools are maintained. Thus four-fifths of America's Negro citizens must send their children to schools like those of ten Southern states which spend annually an average of \$38.87 on each white pupil, and \$13.09 on each Negro pupil.¹

¹ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People *Bulletin*, February, 1942. p. 9

More than \$25,000,000 in salaries is lost by Negro teachers each year solely because they are Negroes. This \$25,000,000 represents the annual discrepancy between the salaries paid to Negro teachers and those paid to white teachers in fifteen of the eighteen southern states which maintain segregated schools.²

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People has pledged itself to add these millions of dollars to the annual income of Negro teachers, and telling gains have been made through important court decisions.

The burning question in the last five years has been how to secure more adequate training facilities for our young people. In the famous *Gaines vs. University of Missouri* case, the United States Supreme Court denied the constitutionality of the practice of the state of Missouri in establishing a law school exclusively for the benefit of white persons. It is significant, further, that in the same decision, the Supreme Court held that the obligation of the state to provide equal facilities is not at all conditioned by the number of Negroes who might desire the course offered.

Finally, in the *Alston vs. School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia*, Judge John J. Parker, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, said in part:

. . . The allegation is that the State in paying for public services of the same kind and character to men and women equally qualified according to standards which the State itself prescribes, arbitrarily pays less to Negroes than to white persons. This is as clear discrimination on ground of race as could well be imagined and falls squarely within the inhibition of both due process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.³

This decision, as reported by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, has set the precedent for other teachers' salaries throughout the South.

The highest tribunals in the land have finally declared that unequal educational facilities and double standards in teachers' salaries are unconstitutional. Of course, these decisions will not immediately remove inequities, but they have set the stage for future test cases, on sound legal precedents. It was Lord Bryce who pointed out that democracy depends on the collective intelligence of the people, and

² *Ibid.*

³ Cited in *Journal of Negro Education*, VIII (January, 1939), 115.

there is no way for us to achieve this ideal unless all the people have equal access to educational opportunities.

The stupidity which frequently characterizes the administration of our separate educational setups was never more glaring than in the defense and war-training courses. Incredible as it may seem, it has been necessary to threaten local school boards with suits in order to get defense training courses started for Negroes. In Atlanta, after a long series of negotiations by the Urban League and Government agencies, a training course has been started for Negroes who expect to receive employment in a Bell aircraft plant. In Baltimore the Citizens Committee on Current Educational Problems finally mobilized enough pressure to organize a defense training school for Negroes in spite of the opposition of local school officials.

Difficulties associated with war-training programs for Negro workers are not confined to any one section of the country. I talked to a New York official who said: "We have mixed schools and will train all persons regardless of race. But vocational educational administrators all over the country have not wanted to train persons when there were no available opportunities for work." On the surface, this looks like a sound procedure because of the obvious frustrations which come to those who have been given skilled training and cannot find employment commensurate with their abilities. Prevailing occupational patterns throughout the United States, however, have restricted Negro employment in all fields, and if we had to wait until opportunities opened up in order to get training, the majority of our workers would be relegated to domestic and personal service occupations.

Production schedules demand millions of additional workers, and the schools have an important role to play in seeing to it that the bottlenecks which have systematically eliminated Negro men and women with potential skills are themselves eliminated. No sounder advice could be given to Negroes than that they should train for tomorrow's jobs. We have experienced a definite lag in securing applicants for war-training programs, even where there are no restrictions. If Negro workers can be assured that they will get employment opportunities comparable to previous training, and if the same kinds of promotional programs carried on with white groups are extended to Negro groups, discrepancies will soon disappear.

In passing, reference should be made to the Julius Rosenwald

Fund, which has not only sponsored education for the Southern Negro, but has also encouraged Negro housing and health projects in the North. Its president, Edwin R. Embree, has pressed for the integration of Negro students and teachers in Northern colleges and universities, and he was among the first to recognize the implications for this country of international problems of color.

Philanthropic gifts for Negro education have not removed crystallized segregation practices, to be sure, but they have served as excellent demonstrations of what could be accomplished in extending the frontiers of knowledge in backward sections of America. It can be said categorically that present inequities in education between white and colored citizens will not be erased without Federal aid. Fortunately, there has been some evidence of progress within recent years.

The poll-tax problem emerged from being a sectional, racial issue to become a leading national problem. Important work has been done by the National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax which has pointed out graphically that Rhode Island, with a population of 687,000, cast 314,023 votes and elected two representatives. Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, with a population of 9,300,000, cast only 264,419 votes and elected thirty-two representatives.⁴

The results of this disproportionate representation are clearly evident in Congress, where Southern members get a corner on committee assignments because of seniority, and block legislation designed to improve the lot both of colored and of white citizens. It has been possible for this group successfully to filibuster proposed antilynching and poll-tax bills, emasculate the FEPC and the National Resources Planning Board, and retard progress in the manpower program.

Time was when such measures could be killed in Congress simply by dubbing them "Negro" issues, and resorting to well-known political tricks. Trade-union leaders, however, soon learned that these same gentlemen were also responsible for the introduction of vicious anti-union legislation, and one of the most promising trends has been labor's growing support for progressive legislation. Some of its leaders have spoken out strongly against lynching, the poll tax, and the "lily-white" Democratic primaries.

⁴ *Survey Graphic*, November, 1942, p. 502.

The last two national elections have given convincing proof that Negroes themselves are beginning to recognize the relationship between votes and economic security. In states where they are allowed to vote, they have thrown their support to candidates who have shown some appreciation for the plight of underprivileged people.

For the first time in the history of Maryland, labor representatives of the C.I.O., the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, and the A.F. of L., endorsed a Negro trade unionist, on the Democratic ticket, for election to the state legislature. Unfortunately, the Negro candidate lost in the primaries, but the precedent has been set for future collaboration.

There are other heartening signs of the times. The First Lady of the Land, Mrs. Roosevelt, has frequently spoken out against racial discrimination. Wendell Willkie has added his powerful voice to the struggle for human rights, and has identified himself with the movement for the extension of democracy at home as well as abroad.

The Mayor of the City of New York has appointed five distinguished Negroes to the Bench and has thereby given colored people in that city an opportunity to participate in important law-enforcement processes. There is also an elected representative in the New York City Council who has interpreted the problems of the Negro people with extraordinary facility and effectiveness.

Dr. Frank Graham, President of the Southern Conference on Human Welfare, now holding an important post in the Government, has taken positions on segregation and discrimination in the South that a few years ago might have cost him his life.

Last, but by no means least, there is a member of the Negro group in the House of Representatives. His presence there symbolizes the participation of the Negro citizen in the democratic processes of the nation.

In response to a resolution by the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., the Council of the City of New York set aside March 5, 1943, as Crispus Attucks Day. It marks the first time that the City of New York has named a day after a Negro. Crispus Attucks, a former slave, was the leader of a small group of American patriots who gave their lives on the Boston Commons and provided the spark for the War of Independence.

The military history of this country is replete with the valor and heroic services of Negro soldiers and sailors. Yet the history text-

books used by millions of Americans have few if any references to their activities. Fortunately, their records have been preserved and are being disseminated by the Association for the Study of Negro History.

In order to appreciate some significant advances which have been made in the drive for equal participation in the military forces, we must turn back to World War I. Approximately 95 percent of the Negro troops were detailed to labor battalions.⁵ There were scarcely any Negro officers and only a few hundred were trained, after much agitation, at Fort Des Moines. Naval service for Negro sailors was limited to that of messman. There were a few soldiers of color in the artillery, but none at all in the air corps. As late as 1940, our representation in the armed forces was limited to 13,275 enlisted men and three line officers in the Army, with about four thousand enlisted men in the Navy.

The staggering blow delivered by the Japanese Navy on December 7, 1941, and the heroic conduct under fire of one Dorie Miller, Negro messman, set in motion certain forces for the democratization of our armed forces that are of far-reaching significance.

Negro and white soldiers are now being instructed together in officer-training camps located in Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Maryland, Alabama, and Pennsylvania. No serious incidents of friction have been reported. By the end of 1942 there were about four hundred Negro officers in active duty.

In the early part of 1941 the Army Air Corps admitted Negroes for the first time and formed the 99th Pursuit Squadron, a segregated unit, at Tuskegee, Alabama. Several groups of cadets have piled up impressive records, have won their wings, and are now ready for foreign service. Many Negroes felt that in opening this new branch of the service there was no need to follow the pattern of segregation. Determined efforts were made to express this feeling through their one representative in the War Department, Judge William Hastie, civilian aide to the Secretary of War. Mr. Hastie resigned his post in protest against the lack of any opportunity to present the Negro point of view on questions of this nature.

The Navy finally yielded, after the terrific pressure of public opinion, and admitted Negroes to the Coast Guard in limited capaci-

⁵ Earl Brown, "Colored Soldiers, U. S. A.," *Survey Graphic*, November, 1942.

ties on shore establishments. More than a thousand Negroes have entered the Great Lakes Naval Training School to take their basic training. Important gains have been made in all branches of the armed services, with the exception of the Marine Corps, and we may yet cross the bar of opposition in that outfit.

Although we have moved forward in the military services in securing the rights of American citizens to defend our country, there remain serious drawbacks to the kind of unity which the present struggle for freedom demands. In spite of strict military censorship, we have learned through the Negro press of rough handling of Negro troops by white military police, and, in a few cases, of near race riots between white and colored soldiers.

Not more than 5 percent of the British people had seen Negroes until they were quartered in British villages. When the townspeople began to entertain Negro troops on the same basis as white troops, trouble ensued. "American military authorities," according to Miss Patricia Strauss, a writer active in the British labor movement, "have asked the villagers not to be too courteous to Negro troopers." They may be polite, but not too friendly.

Miss Strauss made it clear at the annual meeting of the National Urban League, in February, 1943, that she held no brief for present British colonial policy and the treatment of the Indian people, but she felt that the whole cause of the United Nations was being weakened by the spread of American racial prejudice among a people who were eager to extend simple courtesies to fighting men regardless of their color. It is ironical to have the American race problem bobbing up in the British Parliament when our own Congress should have taken steps that would have prevented such occurrences.

Unfortunately, top leaders in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces have not been converted to the importance of democratizing the military services. When a group of Negro newspaper editors conferred with Army officials in Washington, it is reported that the officials said, in part, that the Army did not make the race problem, and it would not serve as a sociological laboratory for doing anything about it. When patterns of racial discrimination and prejudice are rigidly enforced, and are even extended to foreign fields, can there be any doubt about the demoralizing effect on those who are supposedly fighting to preserve the Four Freedoms?

What is the outlook for improving race relationships in this country? Should we not win the war first and then take up the solution of the race question? Is this the proper time to press for the achievement of democratic rights?

Sir Stafford Cripps, in the *New York Times*, on February 21, 1943, made two pertinent statements:

To wait until hostilities have ceased, and the binding force of the common danger is no longer present, is to miss the chance of common agreement.

During the time of war, when the feeling of coöperation is still strong, is the moment to secure common action for the period after the war.

The fact that there are tensions, conflict situations, and sharp protests associated with the war effort is no sign of deterioration in our interracial relationships. It is quite obvious that the only way we make genuine progress is by keeping the problems in the cleansing arena of public opinion. Social workers can aid and abet this through existing resources in their respective communities. There are group work and community organizations concerned with these problems, and they welcome all persons who are anxious to extend the frontiers of democracy. Certainly, there are countless opportunities to break down stereotyped thinking in staffs and on the boards of all social work organizations.

Above all, we need to press for a fuller utilization of Negroes in war industries. If we can thus raise the economic status of the group lowest down, many of the problems which plague us in the fields of health, housing, delinquency and relief will automatically solve themselves.

We can also exercise our citizenship rights and our interest in good government by writing to our Congressmen and requesting that they support measures for the repeal of the poll-tax laws; for the strengthening of the FEPC, and for the elimination of Jim Crow practices in the armed forces. Members of trade-unions can unite with other labor forces which are giving support to some of the measures listed.

The time for recrimination has passed. Bitterness, hatred, and hostility are ammunition for the enemy. We have a job to do together, and that is to destroy for all time the false concepts of racial superiority, brute force, and power politics as the means for solving

human problems. We must achieve victory through unity, and build a postwar world that will be characterized by justice, decency, and security for all men, regardless of race, creed, or color. America, in order to survive, must unshackle herself from the luxury of racial prejudice.

ALIEN ENEMIES AS A WARTIME MINORITY

By *EDWARD J. ENNIS*

IN THE months that have passed since the attack on Pearl Harbor there has been unprecedented activity on the home front as well as on the military front. One sphere of activity on the home front has been the control of the alien enemy population by the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice in coöperation with the War and State Departments, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

War has always raised the problem of proper treatment of aliens caught in an enemy country upon the outbreak of hostilities. In earlier times, when war was a less total struggle, the problem was simple. In other countries, where no large permanent resident population of alien enemies existed but only a relatively small number of businessmen, students, or expatriates, no great problem was presented. Generally, the desirable objective was to clear the belligerent nations of enemy aliens as quickly as possible by giving them reciprocal opportunities to depart immediately. Indeed, our own Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which is substantially unchanged and is still the basis of our authority for dealing with alien enemies, expressly recognized the international custom which prevailed in a less complex world by mentioning that usually a reasonable opportunity might be given to alien enemies to depart.

Three special factors, however, make alien enemy control in this country in the present war a more complex problem. In the first place, there is not the simple problem of dealing with a relatively few alien enemies whose allegiance is plainly with the country of their birth as, for instance, that of an American businessman caught in Tokyo or an Englishman in Berlin at the outbreak of the war.

The members of our relatively large alien enemy population have, for the most part, left the land of their birth to reside permanently in this country. Even though, for lack of education or a variety of other reasons, they have not severed their nominal legal allegiance and have even retained sentimental attachments to the old country, for the most part their factual allegiance is to the government of the nation where their future and that of their children lies.

The second special basic factor is the fact that since the war is on an ideological, and not merely a national, basis, it is obvious that loyalties cannot be determined by the accident of birth but that great consideration must be given to the democratic convictions which aliens of enemy nationality have acquired in this country and which line them up in this struggle on the side of humanity, against the present governments of the countries of their birth.

The third basic factor which distinguishes this first total war from former wars has been the high development by the Axis of fifth-column propaganda techniques. Even before our entry into the war the Government was not blind to the hostile propaganda activities carried on through the German and Italian consulates and such organizations as the German American Bund. Upon our entry into the war we could not know to what extent various types of fifth-column activity, such as propaganda, espionage, and sabotage, which contributed so materially to the fall of Holland and France, might be unleashed against us. Precautions had to be taken even though, in the absence of an actual invasion of our shores, such activities by civilians among us might not occur. It was against this background that alien enemy control was planned before Pearl Harbor and placed in operation immediately thereafter. Its two main divisions were the internment program for potentially dangerous alien enemies and the general regulation of the entire alien enemy population.

Prior to the establishment of alien enemy control, the Department of Justice, through the Special Defense Unit and the FBI, investigated large numbers of Axis nationals who had used the traditional hospitality and free speech and press of this country to propagandize on behalf of their governments abroad, and lists of those who might be dangerous upon the outbreak of war were compiled. Within twenty-four hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor 1,000 Japanese aliens had been apprehended, and within a week a total of 3,000

alien enemies of German, Italian, and Japanese nationality were in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We were determined, however, not to repeat the mistakes of France and England in interning large groups of friendly refugees of enemy nationality against whom there was no specific evidence of hostility to our Government. In France thousands of German refugees, who had been the first victims of the Hitler government, were interned by the French and held in convenient custody until they were turned back to the victorious Nazis. In England the bombing of Britain was accompanied by a spy and invasion scare which resulted in the internment of a great number of the 70,000 alien enemy population. They were released after many months of detention and the loss of their services in the defense of the country where they had sought refuge. Many eminent physicians from Austria and Germany were idle in detention while the people of Britain injured in the bombings awaited medical attention. In Britain, however, the danger of invasion was imminent enough to give some excuse for this public panic. In this country there would have been no excuse for it.

Immediately upon the apprehension of those alien enemies concerning whom there was sufficient evidence to warrant a careful examination of their cases, a procedure had to be devised to provide for that examination. It might have been done, as in the last war, simply by an examination of the investigative reports by officials of the Department of Justice with final decision by the Attorney General and with no assistance from anyone outside the Department of Justice. The Attorney General, however, believed that although he should not delegate his responsibility for the decision in each case, the investigation could best be conducted by not limiting it to an examination of reports by his assistants. He determined that the community in which the apprehended alien enemy lived should, in some degree, be brought into the matter and that the alien enemy should be given every feasible opportunity to meet and explain the charge against him. To accomplish this purpose and to avoid any public uneasiness that Government officials might be exercising arbitrary power by interning thousands of persons needlessly, alien enemy hearing boards were appointed by the Attorney General in each of more than one hundred Federal judicial districts to give the alien and his witnesses a hearing and to recommend to the Attorney General whether he should be interned for the duration of the war,

paroled to a responsible American citizen, or completely released. The members of these three-man boards were drawn from every business and profession. In the large cities where the alien enemy population was concentrated care was taken to include members of German and Italian background who could understand the pull of divided loyalties and who could by their knowledge give the aliens some assurance of a fair disposition of their cases. As a result of this procedure about 50 percent of those apprehended were, after full examination and investigation of their cases, interned; 35 percent were paroled and required to report at regular intervals to an American citizen sponsor who pledged to report any adverse conduct of the alien enemy. The parolees were required to report less frequently to the district parole officer of the Immigration Service. The remainder were released.

By May of 1943 approximately 2,200 Japanese, 1,765 Germans, and 263 Italians had been ordered interned—a total of 4,228. Fourteen hundred and sixty-five Japanese, 1,140 Germans, and 460 Italians had been ordered paroled—a total of 3,335. About 430 Japanese, 494 Germans, and 230 Italians have been released—a total of 1,154. In addition, a handful of Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Rumanians have been considered for internment.

In all, about ten thousand cases have been heard or reheard by the boards and reviewed in the Department of Justice. We do not pretend that errors may not have been made in some individual cases. Often the decision between parole and internment may be a close one. We were very conscious that in the nature of human affairs the evidence of hostile conduct before our entry into the war might be subject to numerous explanations. The cardinal rule in this review procedure, however, has had to be that no chances may be taken with the national security; doubtful cases must be resolved against the individual and in favor of the safety of all the people of the United States. On the other hand, we have been impressed with the great responsibility which, in a democratic country, must accompany the arbitrary power to intern individuals not convicted of crime. For that reason a large proportion of those arrested on suspicion have, after thorough investigation, been released. Moreover, these cases are never considered closed; whenever any new evidence is brought forward on behalf of an interned alien which

might possibly result in a different decision, he is accorded a rehearing and a full review of his case.

Internment of alien enemies has raised numerous collateral problems, such as the care of dependents, who are often American-born children, or the propriety of permitting a wife and children to accompany an alien enemy into internment. On the one hand, relief might have been refused, based on the analogy to cases of persons imprisoned for crime. On the other hand, alien enemies are interned on suspicion and for the benefit of the State, and therefore it is thought proper that their dependents should not suffer. Arrangements were made for the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Federal Security Agency to coördinate the activities of local and state relief agencies for the assistance of these dependents. In addition, family camps have been established by the Immigration Service to permit dependents to join husbands and fathers in internment as a last alternative where no other arrangements can be made. Of course, this alternative is chosen cautiously because of the care which must be taken in raising children in detention camps which are dominated by Axis thought without, however, disregarding parental authority and responsibility for small children.

The second main phase of the alien enemy control program is the application of whatever special governmental controls are deemed essential for the entire alien enemy population of 1,250,000 persons. Shortly after our entry into the war all German, Italian, and Japanese aliens were required to obtain certificates of identification as alien enemies and were required to carry these with them at all times. By regulations of the Attorney General, pursuant to proclamations of the President, they were required to surrender to the Government firearms, radio transmitters, short-wave radio receivers, and other contraband. They were also required to obtain special permission from the United States Attorney in order to travel outside their community. In providing controls for the entire alien enemy population we did not lose sight of the fact that the great majority of them are loyal to this Government. Nevertheless, at the beginning, without knowledge of what type of assault the Axis might launch against us in this country, it was essential that every precaution be taken. After the first danger had passed and as soon as the military situation clarified, the opportunity was taken to restrict the application of these general regulations. Even at the out-

set, Austrians generally, who individually might be treated as Germans because of the occupation of Austria by Germany, were exempted from registering as, and being treated as, alien enemies if, in the alien registration of 1940, they had not registered as Germans. Even if they had been so registered, they were given an opportunity to show that it had been done in error, and after investigation they were permitted to change their registration so as to avoid being classed as alien enemies.

During the first few months of the war the premises of thousands of alien enemies were searched by the FBI and a great deal of contraband was taken into custody. However, no substantial evidence was produced that any of these articles were possessed with the intention of using them contrary to the interests of our Government. Consequently, on the basis of this experience, when war was declared against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, our favorable experience with the German, Italian, and Japanese population was brought to bear on the situation, and the entire Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian population in the United States was not required to register as alien enemies or to observe the general alien enemy regulations. The President's proclamation of July 17, 1942, did not provide that all aliens of these nationalities in the United States should be treated as alien enemies, but merely provided that any individual of one of these nationalities might be apprehended and so treated if the facts warranted.

A few months later, after our further military successes, it was determined that without sacrificing the paramount factor of safety, the countervailing factor of the loyalty of the large number of the alien enemy population could be recognized by releasing the entire Italian alien population of more than six hundred thousand from the general stigma of being subjected to the general alien enemy regulations. This was done by the Attorney General on October 12, 1942.

In view of the damage to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, the military authorities believed that invasion of the West coast was a possibility in the first few months of the war. It was thought that the 40,000 Japanese aliens and the 70,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry living on the West coast might contain a few hundred or a few thousand persons who would be prepared and willing to aid an invasion, by sabotage or by direct assistance to landing armed Jap-

anese forces. The military authorities believed that the potential danger was not from the Japanese aliens alone, whom the Attorney General had power to control, but from an undiscoverable number within the whole Japanese population. Thereupon, in February, 1942, the military authorities decided to evacuate the entire Japanese population from the military area which consisted of a strip along the entire West coast in the states of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona. No agency of the Government other than the armed forces was equipped in either personnel or material to do the job, and it was undertaken by the military authorities under an Executive Order of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Japanese were first evacuated into assembly centers operated by the Army and then transported out of the military area into ten war relocation centers operated by the War Relocation Authority, an agency created for that purpose.

As in the case of other control measures, the favorable change in the military situation now permits some change in the treatment of the Japanese, and every effort is being made to arrange for the release of thousands of them from the relocation centers to take jobs and resume normal life outside the coastal military area or, in some cases, even within that area.

We are now in a position to make some appraisal of the effect of the alien enemy program which has been executed in terms of its dual objective of promotion of internal security without loss of the allegiance of, or undue hardship upon, the alien enemy population. It would be a matter of sheer speculation to attempt to guess whether or not apprehending 10,000 alien enemies and interning half of them, on the basis of their conduct before Pearl Harbor, had prevented any specific fifth-column activity since our entry into the war. However, the entire investigative experience of the past months has not revealed any plots, or planned sabotage or espionage by resident aliens of enemy nationality. Indeed, the one spectacular case of sabotage which has been discovered and prosecuted, that of the eight saboteurs who landed in the United States from a submarine, suggests that there was no one here prepared to carry on the work or it would not have been necessary to adopt the risky expedient of thus transporting saboteurs and their supplies from abroad. Moreover, it did not appear that in addition to the members of the saboteurs' families who were accomplices in their concealment that

there was any developed ring of accomplices in any sabotage they may have planned.

Furthermore, other convictions for enemy activity since Pearl Harbor have indicated that the problem is not a problem to be met by severe regulations of alien enemies, but that our enemies may equally be found among our citizens. Max Stephan, sentenced to death in Detroit for treason, for harboring an escaped German aviator, was a naturalized citizen. Karl Friedrich Bahr, who returned to this country from Germany on a repatriation vessel and was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for attempted espionage, was an American citizen, born in Rochester, New York. Even in Hawaii, although there was extensive espionage carried on through the Japanese consulate in connection with the attack on December 7, 1941, the report of the investigating committee headed by Mr. Justice Roberts, of the Supreme Court of the United States, indicated that there had been no sabotage committed by the resident Japanese population. Indeed, many of the Japanese had performed voluntary and heroic acts in defense of Hawaii during the attack.

Of course, we could not know when the alien enemy program was launched that the development would be of this character. We feared the possibility of, and therefore had to take precautions against, attempts at extensive sabotage by individual members of the alien enemy population even though we had faith in that population as a whole. We are glad to be able to say that so far as acts of hostility in the United States are concerned, there has been no evidence of a serious fifth-column problem among alien enemies as such. In fact, they have not presented obstacles to our war effort comparable to the conduct of some of our citizens. In view of the spectacular success of the fifth-column technique in France and Holland, it has, of course, been an easy means of sensational but unsound publicity to describe luridly the fifth-column danger in this country and even to refer to acts of sabotage by Japanese in Hawaii which never occurred. The facts do not support any such picture of an active fifth column. Consequently, some of the rigorous steps taken in the exercise of proper precautions need not be maintained where events for a considerable period of time do not bear out the need for that degree of control.

What effect have these measures had upon the alien enemy population? Have we lost their allegiance by regulating them as alien

enemies? Practically all the evidence indicates that we have not. At the beginning they, as well as the Government, did not know whether traitors existed among them and they were in agreement that strict precautionary measures were needed. When they had proved themselves by their loyal conduct, they properly expected that this would be recognized by release from alien enemy regulations so far as that could be done with security. When the Government responded by releasing the majority of all alien enemies from the regulations at the time that it released Italians, that undoubtedly did a great deal to resolve many conflicts of loyalties in favor of this Government. Italian mothers and fathers, bewildered by being stigmatized as alien enemies while their sons were serving in the armed services of the United States, had an additional reason to be thankful to the land of their adoption.

The American public generally is to be congratulated that it has not been led into the hysteria against aliens merely because of their enemy nationality which swept the country in the last war and resulted in numerous acts of needless discrimination, leaving wounds which took a long time to heal. A sane approach to the alien enemy problem has helped us to escape that hysteria. State legislatures, in general, have not been inclined to adopt legislation against alien enemies, and in the few cases where such an inclination appeared, they were encouraged to leave the problem to the Federal Government.

No doubt, in some cases, the internment or parole of alien enemies may confirm their adherence to Axis doctrines. It is impossible altogether to prevent the most rabid Nazis and fascists who have been interned from infecting their fellow internees with their propaganda, so it will be even more difficult to rehabilitate them politically. On the whole, however, this disaffection will not influence any considerable number of the alien enemy population.

It is not yet clear, however, that the same can be said of the military evacuation of the Japanese. They went willingly enough, and no doubt they did realize the terrible possibilities of race riots if there had been an air or naval attack on the West coast assisted by even a few resident Japanese. Many thousands left their homes voluntarily and went inland until resistance from inland communities made it necessary to substitute Government relocation for voluntary evacuation. Despite their initial coöperation there have been some

disturbing signs that a year of enforced habitation in crowded camps under some conditions of discomfort is beginning to take its toll of the loyalty of the Japanese. Lack of satisfactory working opportunities, difficulty of maintaining parental control over children, and the failure to restore them to normal life outside the military areas have created great dissatisfaction. In answer to efforts to enlist their services as volunteers in the armed forces, some of the young men take the position that since their full rights of citizenship have been denied them, they should not be asked to bear the heaviest obligation of citizenship. Naturally, the inability of the Japanese to be assimilated in the population, the social and economic prejudices to which they have been subjected, and the cultural ties which some of them have with the Empire of Japan render the Japanese a most complex and confused community so far as loyalty to the Government is concerned. Obviously, among the aliens who have been denied the opportunity to become citizens, and even among some of the citizens who have been educated in Japan, there are some who are loyal to Japan and capitalize upon the present difficult situation. They lose no opportunity to point out to those who have clung to their loyalty to the United States that this loyalty has not been rewarded by complete confidence. Consequently, we cannot yet appraise the final effect of the Japanese evacuation. Much, no doubt, will depend upon whether they are allowed eventually to go back to their homes in California and resume the lives from which they were so abruptly severed by the war.

Probably the most important way in which the war has affected the alien enemy minority is by the restriction of job opportunities—a matter not within the scope of the security program of the Department of Justice. Some general limitation on job opportunities is bound to result because it is impossible to require private employers to adopt a strong feeling against the enemy and, at the same time, to employ alien enemies if other persons are available. The manpower shortage and, to some degree, the Government's educational program have alleviated this difficulty, although the Government, which refuses to employ aliens at all, is not in the most favorable position to urge their employment by private employers. More specific curtailments of job opportunities are effected by the statutory provisions forbidding any aliens to work on restricted war contracts unless they are cleared by the War and Navy

Departments. Procedures have been improved a great deal since the beginning of the war to assist employers in getting a quick clearance on aliens against whom there is no adverse record. The increasing manpower shortage here too is mitigating the reluctance of employers to trouble to get governmental clearance.

On the basis of past experience we may look forward to what next should be done. So far as interning alien enemies is concerned, the bulk of the job has been done, but it may be expected that continuous investigation will result in some additional internments. However, this will be to some degree balanced by reconsideration and parole in cases in which additional evidence may become available. The problems to be met, in addition to a review of individual cases, include the treatment of interned alien enemies by the development of some voluntary system of political education for those who may be permitted to remain in the United States at the end of the war. At this time we can recognize the problem of policy to be adopted on the deportation of interned alien enemies, but the factors which will determine its solution have not yet been developed.

An important question we are now facing is whether the exemption of all Italians from the general alien enemy regulations, as well as the Austrians, Hungarians, Rumanians, and Bulgarians who were never subjected to them, should not be extended to at least part of the German alien enemy population of 300,000.

It is the job of all of us—Government agencies, private agencies, and the American people—to exercise constant vigilance so that the sensible attitude which we have so far been able to maintain will not be replaced, even for a short time, or in any field, or in any section of the country, by blind national prejudice which would not only divert energies which should be used productively in the war effort, but would cause wrong to individuals and to groups for which as a nation we would have reason to be ashamed when reason was restored with peace.

So far we have profited well by our lesson in the last war and have avoided the jingoistic excesses which were later regretted. With vigilant application of the principles of the Four Freedoms we shall preserve and improve our record in the present war and eventually make loyal citizens of most of our aliens of enemy nationalities.

AMERICA'S REFUGEES: EXODUS AND DIASPORA

By JOHN W. POWELL

CALIFORNIA is about to pay a debt. Some forty thousand workers and farmers from the West coast will migrate in 1943 and 1944 into Midwestern lands whence other thousands, a few years ago, fled dust, drought, and despair to seek new fortunes in the Golden West. The forces of nature, made dangerous through man's mis-handling of the soil, drove the Okies into unplanned and unprotected flight. In California it was social and economic forces—among them some of the most dangerous in American life—that forced military and civilian agencies to undertake the greatest planned and controlled migration in our history: the movement of the American Japanese.

These people were not, and are not, dangerous. In spite of rumors, repeatedly denied by all official sources, there is no record of a single act of violence or sabotage either in California or in Hawaii, where tens of thousands of American Japanese were employed on secret military preparations, and where other thousands have volunteered for combat duty. In California their major crime was to have created hundreds of millions of dollars in agricultural wealth, which some of their neighbors sought to control by forcing the racial issue.

What we as a nation are doing to these people, however, is dangerous. It is dangerous to our faith in ourselves as democratic people, who are opposed to the arbitrary exclusion of any group from membership in our nation on grounds of race or color. It is dangerous to all minorities, and to their faith in the democratic solution of their differences. And it is dangerous to our interests in the Pacific, where the good faith and credit of America's democracy are being measured by her treatment of Oriental minorities.

Since we have embarked on this venture, we have to carry it through. It is possible to turn it into a channel of permanent advantage to the Japanese Americans themselves, and into a triumphant example of successful assimilation of what has been a "problem" group. Whether or not the outcome is to our credit depends on three factors: the attitudes and preparation of the *évacués*; the organization and backing of the War Relocation Authority; and the understanding and active coöperation of Americans in all the cities across this continent.

The American Japanese *évacué* going East faces, not prejudice, to which he had made some adjustment on the coast, but a dense wall of ignorance. East of the Rockies, people are surprised to learn that these people are citizens, and speak English, and have high technical and professional competence. The West coast *évacué* is equally ignorant of Eastern areas and cultures. The task on both sides is one of education. In the long run, the only education is that which results from face-to-face acquaintance, side-by-side living and working.

I need not describe a typical relocation project, with the swirling dust, the barren earth, the flimsy barracks whistling in the wind. No words could communicate the poignancy of the "intake," where those of us who helped to receive the American Japanese *évacués* learned the real meaning of our job. All that concerns us now is the attitudes that were called into play, and which became part of these people's equipment for survival: a sort of permanent apprehension and the quiet dignity of patient acquiescence.

These communities were suitable for young male soldiers in active field service. I can imagine no plan less adapted to the living of a complex community of families, with all their necessities of work, of worship, of social life, of government and administrative services, of privacy and decency, morality and manners. When the residents moved in, there was no stick of furniture in any house; no scrap of recreational equipment; no schools; no churches; but little water, and that undependable.

Soldiers need little privacy. They can be efficiently fed in company mess halls, accommodated in common latrines and unpartitioned showers. But throw into such a naked camp whole families of people who regard privacy as precious. Take away the family dining table, and throw the families into a common mess, where age-

groups tend to sit together, dissolving families, weakening the father's headship, destroying conversation and manners. The results are obvious.

Go even further. Place the administration and provision of food, shelter, medical care, clothing, public assistance, in agencies over and above the people. There are no "dependents" on a project; if Tommy does not like the family, he can go live with someone else. His food, his housing, his health, like his education and his placement in a job, are provided individually by the administration, without the mediation of his parents. Was his family rich? Were the neighbors poor? There is no way to tell, here where all alike live in the shabby and crowded informality of a vacation camp. There are no cars. If some houses have more furniture, it is salvage from the meager piles of scrap lumber and forgotten nails; if some yards show flowers or vegetables, if some rooms have crude partitions between the beds of the parents, the children, and the strangers who live with them, this shows only the ingenuity and aggressiveness of the residents. A comfortable, livable household is the reward of what a man is and does, not of what he was or of what he used to have.

There are limits to what a man can do for himself on the projects. True, the older ones can work, while Grandma cares for the small children and Grandpa polishes his inevitable ironwood. However, the project wage is, generally, \$16 a month: only pocket money, since the major subsistence is furnished to worker and nonworker alike. Remember that this managerial scheme of living is superimposed on people made apprehensive through a succession of uprootings and losses of property; people who were taken from their jobs and homes, stabled where the horses had been kept at race tracks, then moved again; people whose defense against apprehension was patient acquiescence.

Remember, further, that the previous culture of these people had been built around the family, with authority in the father. One obeyed the Government as one had obeyed the father, because that was Authority. And, precisely as a child whose father is rather arbitrary and unpredictable learns to complain, to beg, to wheedle, to manipulate his parents to gain advantage for himself, so on the projects the *évacués*, have begun to show that same pattern of response toward the Government that is the source of their hard-

ships and their benefits. What should we have expected? All the familiar ambivalence of children toward a father with complete authority is reappearing in these children of evacuation. They respect government; they are overwhelmingly loyal; they want to be told with authority what they shall do. At the same time, they resent; they learn to play off the administrators, one against each other; they appropriate for their own use whatever the project has on hand. Mr. Nakamura would never lower himself to steal from Mr. Tanaka; but both men have tables, cupboards, fences, that appeared mysteriously at night, while the *évacué* police guarding the lumber pile politely studied the stars.

The Japanese clusters on the West coast were self-governing and independent. Seldom did a Japanese name appear on a relief roll or a police blotter. Under the entrenched rule of strong councils of older men, the young men were being readied to take over leadership when the time came. But the time was not yet. The evacuation came too soon. It swept the older leaders into internment, leaving second-raters in charge of the group. It caught the young still in training, still in college and technical school, and in full centrifugal flight from the Japaneseness of their parents, out toward acceptance and status in the reluctant Hakuji communities.

In the projects, political and economic power was stripped from the old men and given to the young. A few years later, it would have been all right. The old men's average age was fifty-nine; the young men's, barely over twenty. The change was made at a time when the old were almost willing, but not quite; and when the young were almost ready, but not quite. The fathers found administration and planning taken from their hands and monopolized by their English-speaking sons who worked with and for the Hakuji. So the old men took to their avocations, cultivated their plants, and criticized the young.

The young men had been preoccupied with their own training for individual function and status. The control of a Japanese community was the last thing they wanted. Deprived of the accustomed leaders, they felt insecure, inadequate; in consequence, they both relied on and resisted the administration. They found themselves under fire, both from their elders and from their supervisors; and few among them wanted or would accept conspicuous responsibility. The young men fell back on the old Japanese habit of sharing

responsibility among all the members of a group, without officers or ranks. They are uneasy in the American patterns of committees, chairmen, delegates. With the exception of a few whose American experience had habituated them to these forms, the Nisei preferred to remain on the sidelines or in the crowd, while he kept an eye out for his own individual opportunity of advancement, status, or escape.

Nothing dismayed the young people so much as being thrown back into the enormous colonies of Japanese. Almost every young person I know on the project has said to me, in despair, "I never saw so many Japanese people before in all my life"; and some have added, "You know, I don't like these Japs." But America had said to them, "You're all Japanese in here." Their parents had used that leverage to re-establish the old controls; the babies and the school children found themselves talking Japanese instead of English; and the Nisei youth felt himself trapped in a racial pool whose banks were too high. Rejected by the Army, in which thousands of their kinsmen were serving, and listed as IV-C, "neutral aliens," their bitterness was real and deep.

Yet the prevailing tone on the projects was astonishingly American. Every block had its baseball and basketball teams. On Sunday and Wednesday there were dozens of church services, prayer meetings, Bible classes, and "singspirations" in rooms set aside for the strong fundamentalist-revivalist religion of the residents. The Buddhist young people carried on ardent forums and socials. As one walked down the long streets in the dusk, when the fierce heat had abated and life was expanding into front yards, it was a peaceful village scene. Neighbors called across from door to door; young people in threes and fours exchanged the evening gossip and repartee of young people America over; from behind the barracks came the shrill yells of "1-2-3 for Janet" and (a version I never heard outside Minneapolis before) "Ole-ole-olson free!" The tone was familiarly American, its overtones the quick foreign syllables of the old people as one has heard such overtones in Milwaukee, in San Francisco, and in St. Louis.

Even the older mothers were launched into an unheard-of emancipation. Freed of the drudgery of field and house, they flocked into English classes, needlework and flower-making and art classes; into mothers' clubs, where they made a valiant beginning at the job of

pulling themselves up by each others' bootstraps from the 1870 Japan of their former lives into the American 1940s where their children lived.

The old culture, the old music and poetry and drama, still flourish on the projects. But if one had doubts about the project being in America, they were forever stilled as he stood on the barren dust to hear 200 young voices coming from improvised bleachers where, in Government-issue mackinaws and homemade dresses, the massed choir sent "Hark, the Herald Angels Sing" and "Adeste, Fideles" rolling out against the silence of the desert, the yelping of the coyotes, and the blazing stars. They were stilled when he stood in the hushed attentive ring of thousands around those bleachers again as the symphony orchestra of school children and old men and teachers played the music of Russia, of France, of England, of Vienna, and of Dixie.

In the newly settled blocks of the project, one saw at first the small children being carried everywhere by their parents. Around the barracks, along the roads, in the canteen, at the shows, it seemed as though half the shoulders had those lively round black eyes peering over them. At first I thought it was to keep the children out of the dust; but that was impossible. Then I thought the children were frightened, clinging to their parents; but I saw that they were not afraid, and wanted to be set down. At last I understood that it was the parents who were frightened, who were lost, and clinging to their children.

Gradually, the horizon of security widened, and the children were set down to run at liberty. But the dismal diapason of anxiety remains the deepest and most universal index to the behavior of the *évacués*. To an unprecedented extent, their lives have become a quest for security. This is what makes these people, after their shocks and losses and abrupt moves, cling to whatever spot they happen to have fallen into in the project. Like shipwrecked sailors on a raft, each family clings to its own room, its little pool or garden. Even overcrowded families, quarreling with each other, refuse to move to empty rooms a block or two away.

This same anxiety, with all its origins and all its still-valid justifications, is making it difficult for us to persuade people to leave the projects although it is suicide for them to remain. This is what I must make you understand.

The insecurity of the young employables dates from their struggle to escape from the well-integrated Japanese cluster, out into age-group and job association with the Hakujin: to escape their restricted and disadvantaged position, into equal acceptance in status and function. But California screened them out, forced them back into Japanese employment far below the level of their training. A few were getting through the screen, out into technical positions. Others had come to see that their only avenue of escape was through technical channels. Throughout the extraordinary school record of the Nisei runs this emphasis on technical vocational training. In the Army, most of the Nisei were technical men, and most of those, sergeants.

Along with their training, the Nisei sought a foothold through Hakujin friends, usually schoolteachers or church and "Y" workers, or classmates. The evacuation, sweeping all along regardless of citizenship, Army service, or criminal record, denied at once their training and their friendships, and called them Japanese. Today, the nation is inviting them back into membership. That is the most important step this country has yet taken in the prosecution of its claim to democratic war aims. But the success of this step will not be automatic. The nation has some earlier sins to expiate.

The young person in the projects now is doubtful whether he will be accepted as an American. He is over-self-conscious about his color and features; seeing few but Japanese for a year, he has forgotten what a variety of masks the American wears. He will apply for a job; if you accept him, as often as not he will change his mind. It is our job to create the opportunities, the securities, which will build a center of gravity in the Midwest to outpull the center of gravity that the project offers.

Economically, the project itself offers the most security; but it is precisely from that kind of security that these Americans must be rescued, and as soon as possible. The only security an American has the right to ask for now is the sense of belonging to this nation, and the right to share in its vicissitudes on an equal basis.

At first, we thought of the projects as settled communities, to last for the duration. We know now that that was wrong; that they can be only the waiting rooms for Americans en route to new stations. You do not try to maintain institutions for education and government in a waiting room. We have given people jobs to do to pass

the time; most project jobs are leisure-time activities carried on in working hours. Fine minds, trained skills, are wasting on the projects. Untrained young people, robbed of their chance at training, have there no chance to make it up. The project is, in effect, a concentrated racial WPA camp, with the old characteristics of made work and relief wages breeding the old attitudes toward work, toward Government as a source of obligatory benefits, toward organized begging as a responsible mode of life. As one whose life interest is education, I hate and fear the education that the project experience is giving my fellow Americans.

The most courageous of these American Japanese young people, and some of the older ones, have held their faith in their American identification. These are, in general, the ones who held responsible positions on the projects; and they are also the ones who are going out first. A small number has lost faith entirely, and became convinced that their future lies with Japan. Most of these will not leave the projects for some time. In between is the greater number: unhappy where they are, but fearful of their acceptance and their future outside. "Who will take care of me if I lose my job?" they ask, the first of Japanese descent in this country to ask such a question. Most of all, these people are watching the careers of those who go out first.

These pioneer *émigrés* are conscious of their responsibility as ambassadors. In your fair and friendly acceptance of them lies our greatest hope of reclaiming thousands of first-class Americans, Americans who must be saved from subcitizen status, from permanent dependency, from defeat by the fears we ourselves have instilled into them.

These young people who are coming to our cities are not Japanese. They are Americans who like pie and Jack Benny and want to fly against the Japs and the Axis. They are without leadership of their own, still seeking their security and their models among the Hakuji. When we are friendly, and give them a genuine share in the work to be done, no workers could be more conscientious or devoted, but they are unsure of their welcome, and easily estranged. They need to be taken into our churches, not left to form their own; into our clubs, our unions, our committees.

They still tend to seek their fortunes individually, as opportunity offers. Characteristically, they are not sympathetic with other minori-

ties, and have never identified themselves with labor. In the stress of their escape in search of status, they usually ignore the larger collective issues. Yet, in every crisis, they have responded to the wider loyalties. In the face of demobilization and evacuation, more than a thousand of the eligible young men have volunteered for Army combat service. Thousands more are waiting only to be drafted; and hundreds of the girls are clamoring for admission to the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. Other hundreds, in the face of a certain contractor's betrayal of his contract with them, voted to continue breaking all production records in turning out camouflage nets for the fighting troops.

When they come out into St. Louis, into Rockford, into Mankato, to whom shall they turn? The churches are, once again, out in front, helping with a job that is too big for one single agency. But will the defense agencies, the volunteer services, the social agencies, the League of Women Voters, the farm bureaus, accept them into membership? Will landlords combine to force them into Little Tokyos again? What will the social workers and their agencies be doing if that happens?

Here come more Americans. In their reinstatement lies our hope of faith in ourselves, and faith in us among other nations. No people on earth need America more than these, at this time; and there are none whom America needs more, or who will serve her better.

RESETTLEMENT OF AMERICANS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY

By CLARENCE E. PICKETT

IT IS about a year ago now since the United States Government, on the grounds of military necessity, took one of the most unprecedented actions in its history. It ordered the evacuation from the West coast of all persons of Japanese ancestry, two thirds of whom were citizens of this country by right of birth. Since that time, these people have been confined at ten isolated communities built for them in the interior. They are still there. But it is my fervent hope that most of them will not be there a year from now. It is my hope that an aroused public opinion will insist that these evacuated people be taken back into the stream of American life.

It should be noted that voluntary evacuation was tried first; that is, persons of Japanese ancestry were encouraged to leave strategic areas and take up residence elsewhere. This voluntary movement proved of short duration, and it is estimated that not more than eight thousand persons took advantage of it. Inland states immediately raised strenuous objection to this sudden influx of what to them was a strange people. They felt that California was trying to unload her problems on them under the guise of wartime necessity.

As a result of this opposition the program of voluntary evacuation was abandoned, the order was given for evacuation *en masse*, and the biggest organized migration in the history of the United States was begun. It was handled by military officials attached to the Western Defense Command and the area evacuated included all the state of California, the western half of Washington and Oregon, and the southern third of Arizona. Once undertaken, the evacuation proceeded swiftly, area by area, with the people moved first into some

fifteen temporary assembly centers established by the Army at fairgrounds and race tracks.

Then on March 18, 1942, the President by Executive Order created the War Relocation Authority, a civilian agency, to take charge of the program of resettlement. By mid-November, 106,000 persons of Japanese ancestry had been moved from these temporary assembly centers into ten relocation centers rushed to completion by the United States Corps of Army Engineers.

These relocation centers—two each in Arizona, Arkansas, and California, and one each in Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah—have populations of from eight to eighteen thousand people. It is safe to say that never in history have ten cities come into being more quickly, under such strange circumstances, or in the face of such tremendous difficulties. They are pioneer communities in every sense of the word, located for the most part in desolate, out-of-the-way places.

You can readily imagine how difficult it must have been for the *évacués* to adjust themselves to this totally different environment.

It was, as one of them said, like being "moved from the salad bowl to the dust bowl." The relocation cities resemble army camps. The people live in long, low, tar-paper-covered barracks, divided into four one-room compartments with a family crowded into each room. Everyone eats at the community mess halls, of which there is one for each twelve barracks, and in which an average of 250 people are fed at each meal. In each block there is also a combination bath-laundry-latrine building, and a recreation hall. There is a hospital. Elementary schools and high schools are conducted in the barracks.

The War Relocation Authority makes every effort to provide useful work for everyone, and most of the work necessary for the existence of the community is done by the *évacués*. They develop land for crops; raise vegetables; build roads and irrigation systems; cook the food and wait on tables; work in offices; haul coal; work as mechanics, policemen, firemen, carpenters. About half of the members of the teaching staff are *évacués*. Working in the hospital are *évacué* doctors, dentists, nurses, and pharmacists. They operate their own stores and shops, run their own newspaper. They have their own internal government. All these activities are carried on under the supervision of the WRA staff, which in most cases numbers less than two hundred people.

Residents of these centers are required to stay within the confines of the relocation area unless they have been given special permits to leave. On the outer boundaries of the relocation area, which usually covers several thousand acres, the Army has erected a barbed-wire fence. Guard towers with searchlights have also been installed, and a company of military police is stationed outside the area.

Two thirds of the Japanese American residents are American citizens. They have been charged with no crime; they are guilty of no offense against the peace and security of the United States. They have been brought to the centers irrespective of citizenship, age, loyalty, or station in life; forced to vacate their homes, give up their jobs, turn their backs on everything they had known in the past. How would other Americans feel if they were pushed around like that? What would happen, for example, if instead of Japanese Americans we had corralled 106,000 Irish Americans and herded them into these relocation centers?

And yet, the charge is frequently heard that the *évacués* at these camps are being "pampered." The very best that can be said for the living conditions at the centers is that they meet the minimum standards of decency so far as ministering to bodily needs and comforts is concerned. By that I do not mean any criticism of those charged with their administration. I am convinced that the WRA is doing the job it was told to do, in as humanitarian a way as is possible under the circumstances. What I do mean to say is that American citizens forced to live under such conditions are not likely to have a very high opinion of the practical workings of democracy. Some of them may even see some parallels between these centers and Hitler's concentration camps. Others may wonder if the Four Freedoms are intended to apply only to remote places.

Certainly, the long-range solution is not the relocation of these people by segregation in such centers as wards of the Government. Rather, it is in relocating them as individuals in places where they can make the greatest contribution to the national welfare, at jobs in industry, agriculture, and professional life, and in providing for students to continue their academic pursuits.

The college and university students are among the first and most obviously desirable groups for resettlement. When the evacuation began, several responsible educators and public-minded citizens on

the West coast, assisted by people of similar interests in the rest of the country, created the National Student Relocation Council. From its early beginning this council had the approval and enthusiastic coöperation of the WRA, and the official sanction of the War Department in the form of a letter from the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy.

The committee operated with an office in San Francisco where all Japanese American students who wished to continue their studies in inland institutions might register, and where their dossiers of personal and academic data were collected. There were approximately twenty-five hundred young men and women in college when the evacuation took place. The securing of adequate data for each of these persons has been a matter of enormous detail. Until the end of February, 1943, this work was carried out by a group of able and devoted educators and young people on the West coast.

The Eastern office, at Philadelphia, communicated with colleges and universities concerning their willingness to receive the students, and carried on negotiations with the WRA, which undertook to clear institutions willing to receive students through the Army and Navy. The Eastern office also presented the need for scholarship funds to church boards, foundations, and colleges.

By March, 1943, approximately seven hundred students had actually arrived at their new locations and were carrying on their work in 122 institutions in twenty-five states. Another 400 have been accepted for winter terms. For about two thirds of these the necessary documents have been submitted to the WRA, and travel and leave permits are coming through gradually. This means that the figures change constantly, for practically every day brings word of more students who have successfully arrived at their new campuses.

Reports from the colleges which have received students are highly commendatory. One administrator writes:

These young men and women have, so far as I have been able to observe, found themselves almost immediately acclimated to their new environment. Our own student body has received them most cordially and from all the evidence at hand have not had a single experience of an untoward nature. If these young people are as happy in their new surroundings as we are in having them come here, then we will have been more than justified in opening our doors to them.

The comments of the students are equally significant. One writes:

To me it means more than just a college course; it means that I have been granted an opportunity for a new kind of life in which I can help give to my fellow schoolmates a better understanding of the Japanese American Nisei, and also become a better American.

It is estimated that about \$107,000 has been appropriated by colleges, of which \$58,000 is in scholarships, \$18,000 in remission of fees, and \$31,000 in work opportunities. About 20 percent of the students came to college able to finance their own expenses. Since, however, the ability of their families to earn has been greatly restricted, if not eliminated, many of those who have been able to finance themselves up to this point will be dependent in subsequent years, and therefore it is probable that the scholarship funds will need to be larger in the future. In addition to the contributions by the colleges, gifts from church boards, foundations, student service organizations, and individuals have made available approximately \$85,000 for travel and scholarship aid.

The industrial relocation program of the WRA is in motion with the full approval of the War Department, the War Manpower Commission, the Justice Department, and other Federal agencies. *Évacués* are already moving out of the centers in considerable numbers to re-establish themselves in new homes and new jobs throughout the interior of the country.

Here, in brief, is how the plan operates. Any *évacué* wishing to leave a relocation center to take up his residence elsewhere makes application for a leave permit. This application is then checked against his record at the center and against records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the latter being a check to see that there is no evidence of disloyalty. If, after this investigation, his application is approved by the WRA, he is free to leave the center, provided he has a job or other means of support and provided there is reasonable assurance that he will be accepted by the community to which he is going.

At first glance, these latter two provisions may seem to constitute a bottleneck through which only a thin trickle of *évacués* would ever get out into private employment. Indeed, if a resident of one of these centers had to depend solely on his own efforts to find a job and win community acceptance, these two provisions would be a bottleneck. Realizing that fact, the WRA has set up a staff to help

the *évacués* in getting relocated and to serve as an intermediary between the centers and prospective employers.

This job-finding and contact organization consists of five regional offices located at Chicago, Cleveland, Kansas City, Denver, and Salt Lake City, with field men working in other localities. Also working with WRA on this aspect of the program is the United States Employment Services and its many offices scattered throughout the country. The War Manpower Commission and the Department of Agriculture are giving their assistance, and of great value are committees of local citizens, representing church and public welfare groups, civic organizations, and others, which have been organized in many towns and cities. The American Friends Service Committee, for instance, is taking an active part in the relocation program, as is the Federal Council of Churches and other national organizations of church and social service groups.

These coöperating agencies work with and through the relocation offices of the WRA in finding opportunities for employment, establishing contact between the prospective employer and the relocation office, carrying on educational work to acquaint their communities with the program, and winning local acceptance for it. They also assist *évacués* to find a place to live and help them to adjust themselves to new surroundings and to the life of the community.

An organization to facilitate this program has also been set up at each relocation center. A census has been taken of all residents at the centers so that information on occupational skills and qualifications can be made immediately available to the prospective employer. This not only helps the employer to find workers with necessary qualifications, but also aids the workers in finding the jobs that they are best fitted to do.

Still another step has been taken to expedite this movement of workers out of the centers. In order to avoid the delay that would inevitably result if workers waited until they had a definite offer of employment before putting in their applications for leave, the device of establishing hostels is being tried in Chicago, and it is proposed to extend it to other employment centers. *Évacués* who wish outside employment are released to the agencies operating the hostels so that employers and prospective employees may have an opportunity to meet before actually making a contract.

There is a labor force estimated at forty thousand workers at

these centers, and it would be tragic indeed if this force, through no fault of its own, were to be kept immobilized at a time when the maximum utilization of all our manpower resources is so vitally important. Represented in this group of workers are a variety of skills and occupations. Many of the group have had additional training since coming to the centers. They are ready and willing to make their contribution if we let them, and to afford them that opportunity is the goal of the relocation program in its present phase. When *évacués* leave the center to take a job they are entitled to receive the same consideration as any other American worker. The WRA insists that there be no discrimination against them. In fact, they are not permitted to go into any community where they are not welcome. The emphasis will be on placing them where they will be most needed, but not to permit them to enter any particular area in such large numbers that they will displace other workers. It is expected that they will receive prevailing wages. If their work is unsatisfactory they may be discharged the same as any other unsatisfactory worker, and, like any other worker, they are free to change jobs. They are not allowed to go back into the evacuated area, but they may go anywhere in the interior of the country.

As of March 1, 1942, a total of 2,400 *évacués* had been granted indefinite leaves and had left the centers (this figure includes about seven hundred *évacué* students attending outside colleges), and more than eleven thousand *évacués* had made application for leave permits. Back at the centers, 2,300 workers had been granted advance leave clearance and were ready to go out as soon as jobs were found for them.

This program for relocating Japanese Americans in outside employment is not a new idea with the WRA. As a matter of fact, it was tried out even before the evacuation was completed and before most of the relocation centers were built. More than sixteen hundred *évacués* went out in the spring of 1942 to relieve an acute shortage of labor in certain Western sugar-beet areas, and in the fall of 1942, a workers' army of nearly ten thousand went out of these centers to help in the sugar-beet harvest in Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, and other states. It is estimated that the beets harvested by these volunteer workers added approximately two hundred and ninety-seven million pounds to the nation's sugar supply, a year's

ration for 11,000,000 people. As workers, they made an enviable record, and the farmers want them to come back.

For most of the rural communities, this was the first experience they had had with Japanese Americans, and it proved to be very revealing. As was to be expected, there was a certain amount of suspicion and antagonism at first, but as the season progressed and the farmers and townspeople came to know them and discovered, somewhat to their amazement, that most of the workers were as American in thought and action as they themselves, the feeling of mistrust pretty largely disappeared.

A large majority of the American people have never had anything to do with persons of Japanese ancestry; they do not stop to realize that two thirds of them are citizens who have never lived anywhere else but in the United States and who owe allegiance to no other country. That accounts for the fact that many people not only fail to make a distinction between the alien and the citizen group, but go even further and assume that the Japanese in the United States are no different from those in Japan. Another popular misconception is that these relocation centers are internment camps filled with dangerous aliens, saboteurs, and fifth columnists. Then too there is the racial question involved which also tends to complicate the issue.

Public confidence in the Japanese American people and public understanding of their problem have certainly not been increased by the action of various organizations and individuals who have advanced proposals for legislation to deprive them of citizenship and who have sought to harass them in other ways. Such tactics have not only contributed to public misunderstanding of the basic issues involved in this problem, but they have contributed to the doubts and fears of the people at the centers and made them hesitate to venture out into what seems to them to be an unfriendly world. I mention this because it is important to any realistic consideration of the problem, and to point out the simple fact that the greatest and most difficult barriers to the success of this relocation program are not the barb-wire fences that surround the centers.

An important development is expected to have a far-reaching effect on the movement out of relocation centers. Some time ago Secretary of War Stimson announced that Americans of Japanese ancestry were again eligible for service in the United States Army. Since Pearl

Harbor they had not been eligible for military service under the Selective Service Act, although some five thousand of them in the Army prior to that time continued to serve. Secretary Stimson's announcement said that a combat unit of several thousand Japanese Americans would be organized for active duty, and volunteers for this unit would be recruited at the centers and from areas in which there was no evacuation.

In-announcing plans for the formation of this combat unit Secretary Stimson said:

It is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the nation's battle. When obstacles to the free expression of that right are imposed by emergency considerations, those barriers should be removed as soon as humanly possible. Loyalty to country is a voice that must be heard, and I am glad that I am now able to give active proof that this basic American belief is not a casualty of war.

President Roosevelt too hailed this action of the War Department and said that it met with his "full approval."

What the ultimate success will be of the program to relocate a whole segment of our population, only time can tell. Progress thus far has been encouraging, and augurs well for the future. A great deal still remains to be done. I believe that the WRA and the agencies coöperating with it are laying the foundation for a sound and permanent solution of this problem, and I am confident that the American people, with their sense of justice and fair play, will do their part in restoring to a group of fellow Americans their rightful heritage.

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IN THE LIGHT OF WARTIME SHORTAGES

By *ELIZABETH WISNER*

THE PERSONNEL shortages in social work cannot be divorced from the total manpower problem, for whatever decision is reached as to the relative size of the armed forces, and the number of civilian workers needed in agriculture and industry, will directly affect every agency and every school of social work. In the fall of 1942 the enrollment in all member schools of the American Association of Schools of Social Work showed a decline of 13 percent; men students were fewer by 43 percent, and the loss generally was from the recent college graduates. Probably every agency has also felt the impact of the competing opportunities and salaries afforded by the wartime expansion as well as by the procurement activities of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, the Women Appointed for Voluntary Emergency Service, etc. It is now estimated that sixty-two and a half million persons, including the armed forces, will be needed by the end of 1943. How much personnel will be left to man the essential health and welfare services? Furthermore, within the services themselves, which should have priority in their personnel needs?

There has been much talk of "pirating" of workers, but who is to decide what is the best use of the available personnel? An executive of a family agency which had lost several workers said that she would be willing to urge all her staff to go with special war emergency agencies if that was to the best interest of the war effort. On the other hand, she felt that the services of the agency were contributing to the total war effort in that particular community. In that same city a committee of the local chapter of the American Association of Social Workers which had been studying the problem

of recruiting social work personnel asked, "Can't the national agencies get together and decide something about their respective needs?"—a question which perhaps must be answered sooner rather than later if the present chaos in personnel demands is to be lessened.

Is social welfare an essential activity at this time? In a preliminary report on "Professional Education for Social Welfare Services in Wartime," prepared for the American Association of Schools of Social Work, this question was examined and some of the discussion in this article is based on that report.¹ According to the experience of Great Britain, health and welfare are closely related to national productivity:

Welfare activities there have been based on two assumptions: (1) to be most productive a worker must have satisfactory working and living conditions; (2) workers cannot be forced to go where needed unless the government guarantees proper living and working conditions on the job and in the localities. Regarded a part of the manpower problem are provisions for coördination of community activities for reception, housing, feeding, transportation, recreation, health and welfare. Factories employing more than 250 workers must provide medical services and munition factories must have canteen facilities. Trained personnel for welfare services in the factories has been considered so important that the Minister of Labor and National Service has helped to establish three months' training courses in four universities. The students selected receive scholarships to cover fees and maintenance.

In this country the answer to the essential nature of the welfare services seems to be "yes and no." On the negative side, the Essential Activities Committee of the War Manpower Commission has not been sympathetic toward the essential nature of these services because the field of social work is not clearly defined or delimited, and because many persons in social welfare positions have not had the minimum of six months of training required before they can be classified under an essential occupation or profession. Therefore, some of the confusion as to our war status arises out of the dilemma which has for years plagued our profession, namely, "Who is a qualified social worker?" "What period of training is required before a person should bear that label?" The 1940 census reported 72,528 social and welfare workers, or an 80 percent increase over the figure for 1930. In contrast, membership in the American Association of Social Workers, which requires a minimum of professional education, now

¹ By Arlien Johnson, December 31, 1942.

totals 10,602. No wonder that the Essential Activities Committee has been confused as to whether social work is an accepted occupation or profession.

In contrast to the rather discouraging picture in Washington as to the status of welfare activities, the services of social workers are in great demand, and the shortage of qualified persons is critical. That is why I say the answer to the essential nature of these services seems to be "yes" as well as "no," for in the governmental and semi-governmental agencies many persons with professional qualifications are sought. The War Relocation Authority, established by Executive Order on March 18, 1942, employs a limited number of social workers in its ten relocation centers; the War Shipping Administration, in coöperation with the United Seamen's Services, is seeking medical social workers in connection with medical care of torpedoed merchant seamen. The office known as the Community War Service with some two hundred new positions and the Office of Civilian Defense with approximately twenty-five have sought workers who are skilled "in coördination and integration of community services and the development and utilization of community resources in such programs as recreation, training and placement of volunteers, family security and social protection," and for some of these positions a minimum of a year of professional education has been required.

In December, 1942, the American Red Cross employed 3,280 workers in their services to the armed forces: 37 percent in hospital services (medical, psychiatric or other social work, and recreation); 41 percent in the Army and Navy posts in the United States; and 22 percent in overseas club programs. In seven out of the nine classifications for positions involving services to individuals, professional education and experience are part of the personnel standards. The National Travelers Aid Association unit of the United Service Organizations requires similar standards. Inability to find such persons has undoubtedly led to a lowering of requirements. In addition, social workers have been employed outside social agencies as counselors in industrial plants, in governmental bureaus, and in public housing projects, although no figures as to the number are readily available.

In turning to the social services under the Social Security Act, which many of us would regard as essential to the maintenance of morale, as well as within the objective for which this war is presum-

ably being fought, the picture is even more serious. Case loads in public assistance are lower but, in general, the loss in personnel has been at a higher rate than the decline in case loads would warrant. In some county departments of public welfare there has been a 100 percent turnover in personnel. Moreover, these state and local departments which, in the main, have never been adequately staffed, are called upon for additional services for which qualified personnel is especially needed, such as selective service investigations, civilian war assistance, service and assistance to families of aliens, and service to women referred from the social protection units. Consider, also, the Aid to Dependent Children program where serious problems can arise in the transition from a depression economy to a war economy demanding the employment of women; one in which poor administration may lead to much public criticism and place the future of the whole program in jeopardy.

It is now estimated that approximately seventeen hundred social work positions in the public assistance agencies, or about 7 percent of all such positions, are unfilled. During the year ending August 15, 1942, one permanent employee out of every three resigned. Military service was, of course, a factor, but in the main, resignations were due to the larger salaries paid by other Government agencies, by private employers, and other social agencies. The turnover has been particularly serious in respect to administrative and supervisory positions and, generally speaking, replacements have been made from personnel with lower qualifications and less experience. The United States Children's Bureau likewise reported that as of December 31, 1942, 320 of the 1,008 existing positions were vacant. In view of the nation-wide concern over day care for children of working mothers, the retention of these child welfare services which have been developed in areas where such services were almost wholly lacking is another "must."

So far, no reference has been made to personnel shortage in the private agencies where, traditionally, professional preparation has been required. The national representatives in the family and children's fields reported that as of the fall of 1942 more than four hundred workers were needed to replace those who had resigned and that usually persons with less professional education were being employed. Current figures are not always available for all fields, but in May, 1942, 251 positions in medical and psychiatric social work

were not filled, and I assume that there are even more vacancies today. In considering the total shortage for all fields, another factor, the unequal distribution of welfare workers in proportion to the population throughout the United States, is of interest. The 1940 census showed that there was one welfare worker for every 921 persons in New York State, and for every 1,147 in California, as contrasted with one to 7,012 persons in Arkansas and one to 7,772 in Mississippi. The important question is what is being done and whether it is likely that anything sufficiently comprehensive in scope can be undertaken during the war to meet the personnel situation.

In 1917, when the United States entered World War I, thirteen of the present thirty-nine American schools of social work were in existence, located mainly in the centers of population in the East and Middle West. The far South and the West were without any such educational facilities. The American Red Cross rapidly expanded its organization, and through the fourteen divisions or regional offices many brief institutes were held all over the country. In addition, small subsidies were granted by the national organization to some colleges and universities for the establishment of short courses to prepare workers for the Home Service program. In a few instances these training programs provided an impetus to the development of permanent schools of social work. By 1919, when the organization now known as the American Association of Schools of Social Work, was formed, nineteen schools, some independent, others under the aegis of colleges and universities, joined to form this national association.

While everything connected with the present war is on a vaster scale than similar efforts in 1917-18, undoubtedly the expansion of the American Red Cross taxed the personnel resources of the recognized agencies of that period to a considerable degree. The recognized social services were, on the whole, privately financed by city agencies, and in vast areas of the country there was little demand for professionally equipped staffs. The Red Cross, through its network of institutes, tapped new sources of personnel in areas where opportunities for employment in social work had been previously slight or nonexistent. This was relatively easy to do, for there were at that time few competing demands from industry or from strongly organized social agencies. In contrast to the present personnel standards of the national Red Cross, institute products not only filled the

rank-and-file positions, but in the less organized areas such workers were of necessity rapidly promoted to positions of responsibility in Home Service and in the hospital social service program developed in the Army and Navy. What effect the personnel needs created by the Red Cross had upon the schools I cannot say, but it is evident that the war and postwar changes increased the interest in professional preparation.

The second great emergency which created a phenomenal demand for social workers, namely, the depression of the 1930s, followed by the passage of the Social Security Act, is still fresh in our minds, and the role played by the schools of social work is a matter of record. Statistics compiled annually by the American Association of Schools of Social Work show that the total enrollment of students majoring in social work in the accredited schools rose from 2,863 in 1932 to 5,296 in 1935. This number of students has never been equaled since. The influence of the administration of unemployment relief and the Social Security Act upon the growth of professional education is clear, for since 1930 ten of the present member schools of the Association have been admitted. It is, however, well to remind ourselves that the great acceleration in enrollments during 1934-35 resulted largely from the remarkable training program undertaken by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, for almost a thousand workers were granted financial aid to attend schools of social work. The need for personnel was vast, and the FERA showed imagination and courage in its attempt to meet the situation on a comprehensive scale. Moreover, a permanent contribution to the public social services was made as many of the FERA students gave leadership to the development of the public assistance and child welfare services inaugurated after the passage of the Social Security Act. Institute training, of course, was also widely used but, in the main, status and salary increases went to those workers who had some professional preparation. Again, as in 1917-18, new sources of personnel for social work were tapped, and many competent persons were recruited.

Turning now to the position of the schools of social work in the present emergency we find that the 1942 fall enrollment in all member schools of the Association decreased 13 percent over that of last November. The loss of potential men students through the operation of the Selective Service Act undoubtedly accounts for some of

this loss, for the number of men enrolled had increased from 284 in 1932 to 1,245 in 1940. A decline was already noticeable in November, 1941, and became precipitous in 1943. This loss in men students was inevitable, but that of the recent women college graduates was less expected. When the loss in potential personnel became apparent the Association appointed a special committee to study the problem. This committee has published material which has been widely circulated to undergraduate colleges and universities, and the individual schools have redoubled their efforts to interest undergraduate students. The American Association of Medical Social Workers has issued a leaflet on the opportunities and requirements in that field, and other national agencies have stimulated their member agencies to action along many lines. The American Association of Social Workers has also been concerned, and some local and state chapters have taken considerable responsibility in informing the public of the need for social work personnel.

In view of the over-all manpower problem the question of new sources of recruitment is serious. Efforts to attract the best women undergraduates should not be relaxed, but the opportunities open to them after little or no specialized training, at relatively high salaries, provide a competition that it is difficult to meet. The press, the radio, in fact every vehicle of public opinion, lends prestige to the wartime efforts of women in practically every occupation except teaching and social work, and, naturally, young women long to be doing something which is regarded as a part of the war effort. Some of the new sources for recruitment which have been suggested to the schools include married women whose husbands are in the services, college graduates who have been employed in offices, and former social workers who might be persuaded to brush up on their skills and work part time in local agencies. Whether these combined efforts will prove successful in increasing the potential social work personnel it is difficult to say.

Of greater immediate significance, both to the agencies and to the schools, have been the efforts of the Association together with other groups to present the facts regarding personnel shortages to the war emergency agencies in Washington with the hope that Federal aid might be made available to selected workers to enable them to secure some additional preparation for the fields where need is especially acute. It is evident that any plans drafted for the preparation

of social workers will depend upon the decision made by the War Manpower Commission as to the essential nature of welfare services and their place in the whole manpower picture.

Other current scholarship and educational leave programs should be mentioned. For a number of years the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board and the United States Children's Bureau have encouraged the state agencies to provide educational leave with some financial assistance so that workers could attend schools of social work. Although the number of such students has never been sufficient adequately to staff the local agencies, these educational-leave programs have been valuable in stimulating and renewing an interest in better personnel. The number of such workers registered in the schools for the 1942 fall term was 127. In 1943 the American Red Cross also inaugurated a scholarship plan as one means of increasing the number of qualified Home Service personnel, and the plan has been extended so that medical and psychiatric social workers can be prepared for the Army and Navy hospitals. The National Travelers Aid Association has conducted some institutes, but as yet it has no announced plans for the use of schools of social work. The Family Welfare Association reports that member agencies are developing work-study fellowships, educational leave, part-time study while on the job, and loans for scholarships. Some war chests have been approached with recommendation that member agencies be allowed to spend money on scholarships.

Meantime, the American Association of Schools of Social Work has considered how the present resources of the member schools can best be used. Decline in student enrollment has meant a loss in revenue which is serious for some schools. In fact, many of the schools have long operated on wholly inadequate budgets. There has been considerable turnover and some loss in the supervisory personnel, and the chaotic personnel situation within the agencies has had a direct impact upon student training. A school of social work which is an integral part of a private university is likewise affected by the financial fortunes of that institution, and the drafting of the eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds and the absence of practically all men graduate students means loss in revenue to the university. Moreover, until the Army and Navy plans for the use of these institutions were announced, planning ahead was almost impossible. In some institutions it is still not clear what effect the use of the univer-

sity facilities by the Army and Navy will have upon the schools of social work.

In the face of these uncertainties, however, faculty discussion and planning have been directed toward wartime needs and possible wartime adaptations. Since it is apparent that the schools of social work have, in the past, prepared only a fraction of the total number of those workers who designated themselves as social or welfare workers to the census enumerators in 1940, it is also evident that our limited educational resources should be mobilized toward some constructive objective. I believe that "spreading thin" will yield no better results in professional preparation than it does in the administration of relief. Stated as an objective, this does not mean, of course, that the schools of social work are "doing business as usual" or that they wish to do other than use their resources and the energies toward meeting, so far as they can, the wartime needs.

As the result of separate faculty discussions and planning and shared experience, the member schools of the Association have generally agreed on certain broad educational principles which seem sound, at least for the present: First, resources as the schools can command should be utilized to strengthen the graduate professional curriculum, and nothing should be done to lower standards which have proved to be valid. Second, in curriculum planning, new courses which may be added should be viewed as a part of the regular curriculum, and "special courses" should be avoided. To some this may sound too much like "business as usual," and therefore a further explanation of what the schools are actually doing within the framework of these principles is pertinent.

Acceleration for the purpose of shortening the educational process is currently emphasized in university circles, and the majority of the schools of social work have considered whether short cuts can or should be made in the two-year professional course. Some of them, at least, agree that this cannot be done with any advantage to the student or to the social service program for which he is preparing. However, there are ways of shortening the period of full preparation through making a continuous program available for those students who wish to study throughout the summer and winter months. The addition of summer sessions by schools which previously offered no summer work and the admission of new students twice or three times a year by those schools which formerly registered new students only

in the fall term are, in effect, methods of accelerating the educational process. There are other schools which have been "accelerated" for years in the sense that continuous winter and summer programs have been offered with a course sequence which permitted the student to complete the work for the Master's degree in a minimum period. The question of some kind of undergraduate preparation has recently been reopened by a committee of the Association, and while there are wide divergencies of opinion as to the validity of introducing any of the professional courses, such as case work and field work, into the undergraduate curriculum, there is at present some experimentation along this line.

Another change which might facilitate the entrance of new students and thereby increase the number of social work personnel is the relaxation of some of the undergraduate prerequisites and of the usual age requirements. Beyond these attempts both to increase the number of students and to accelerate the period of preparation there is not much that can be done at the graduate level. To encourage students to add courses to an already heavy schedule or to shorten the time spent in supervised practice would yield nothing in the way of meeting the present shortages and would be disadvantageous to the student. Moreover, since a large proportion of the students in schools of social work, even under prewar conditions, did not remain at any one time long enough to complete the full course, the present situation is not very different. The lack of certification, the low salaries often paid, and the many positions open to students with less than full professional preparation are factors which have long been operative in reducing the time spent in schools of social work. Therefore, it is to be expected that the more mature students, at least, will accelerate their own entrance into the field as they have formerly done.

As to curriculum changes, it is the general opinion that the present requirements should not be scrapped in favor of special courses to prepare "war workers." Few courses in a social work curriculum can be taught today without some reference to the current problems, and inevitably there is a focus of interest both in the presentation of material and in class discussion upon the present catastrophe. Some schools have introduced a course or two on the function and structure of wartime agencies, but again this is in the nature of an addition to the program rather than a substitution of basic content.

The increased interest among students in preparation for medical and psychiatric social work and group work and the continuing interest in child welfare have led some schools to strengthen the required content in those areas and have meant a heavier load upon the available field work facilities in those fields. With every crisis such as the present the question of the newer trends in our welfare services and their significance to professional education is immediately raised. As a result of the depression and the social security legislation, the Association made a study on "Education for the Public Social Services" which indicated certain needed changes in emphasis and content in many school curricula. Again, as the war and postwar problems emerge, consideration must be given, not only to the whole question of the rehabilitation of the war injured, taking this problem as one illustration, but to the more basic question of the kind of professional preparation which will best equip the social worker to serve our postwar economy.

Additional pressures felt by the schools are the numerous requests from agencies who wish assistance in staff education. In-service training, extension courses, work-study, part-time study are all involved. The role of the schools and their faculties in the preparation of volunteers and social work aides has also been the subject of much study and discussion:

In general, it is felt that the orientation of volunteers is distinct from the program of the professional schools and is properly the province of community groups such as local councils of social agencies. Such orientation is non-academic, and its function is clarified by avoiding terminology such as "course" and "class" and "training" by using the term "orientation."²

Although the schools believe that the orientation of paid staff and volunteers is outside the area of their major responsibility, they stand ready to act in an advisory capacity, and individual faculty members have participated widely in orientation and institute programs.

All this adds up to an attempt upon the part of the individual schools and the Association to evaluate their present resources and to put them to the best possible use during this critical period. It is apparent that the educational facilities available to meet the person-

² Report of the Committee on Schools of Social Work and Defense to the Executive Committee, American Association of Schools of Social Work, January, 1943.

nel shortages are not being fully used and that there is the possibility of a further decline in enrollments. Vigorous efforts to recruit new personnel to the field of social work have been undertaken, and some results may be expected, but they may prove meager in the face of the widespread need. In view of the competing opportunities, scholarship aid on some comprehensive scale is indicated, and with this in mind the Association and other interested groups are continuing their efforts toward the recognition of the welfare services as essential activities with the hope that some Federal aid may be made available to prepare enough workers to fill openings in the most critical areas.

TRAINING THE PAID, UNTRAINED WORKER

By AGNES VAN DRIEL

WHEN one realizes that the staff turnover in the social service positions in public assistance agencies has been so high that in the year ending August 15, 1942, one permanent employee out of every three left the agencies and that new staff members were added at the rate of one for every four employees, any problem of agency administration takes on added color. In twenty-five of the forty-seven reporting agencies, 30 percent or more of the staff members in social service positions had left the agencies. In four states, more than one half of the staff members left the public assistance agencies. In twenty of the state agencies, 30 percent or more of the staff members in social service positions were newly added during the year. In six of these, more than one half of those in social service positions were new workers. Add to this the fact that on August 15, 1942, vacancies in social work positions in the public assistance agencies numbered about seventeen hundred, or slightly more than 7 percent of such positions.

Another aspect of this problem concerns the quality of replacements. One state agency which made a careful study of the volume and nature of its employee separations found that employees who had gone from the agency in 1941 were above average. They were younger than the average, better educated, rated in performance above average, and a large majority of them had been on the job from one to three years. While specific data are not available for the country as a whole, state reports stress the fact that the quality of personnel recently inducted is, in general, lower than of that previously employed. This condition is a serious threat to the effectiveness of the public assistance agency. It is particularly serious because

there are increasingly fewer competent persons available to fill administrative and supervisory positions and to give direction and leadership to the agency.

Therefore, we find the public assistance agencies in the midst of a continuing turnover, with many positions remaining vacant because of shortages, with many of the newcomers possessing less general and special education and less experience than the workers who formerly staffed the agencies. Add to this the inevitable effect of high turnover on staff morale: for some, a restlessness which is a part of the war psychology; for others, an uncertainty because of their eagerness to identify as closely as possible with the war effort. Color the picture further by the fact that agencies, deprived of adequate leadership, lacking direction of their efforts, and confused in their objectives, cannot easily attract employees eager to give constructive service.

One mitigating factor in the situation is that some of the ablest people have chosen to remain in the agency. These we count on for leadership, few though they are. Also, among those who are joining agency staffs, are persons who have good potentialities. Agency training programs, then, must build on what the workers bring, that is, fundamentally, an interest in people. Training programs must focus upon helping untrained people to use their interest in people in a disciplined way.

Perhaps it may be advisable to consider what the basic structure of staff-development programs in public assistance agencies has been. In general, the state agencies, while properly showing considerable variation, have in the past included in their staff-development programs these basic elements:

1. An orientation period for all newly inducted workers, planned as a help toward making a "good start on their jobs," and toward giving them a "sense of direction" in the agency organization.¹
2. Continuing supervision, supervision which "emphasizes the essential element of administrative leadership—leadership which aims to develop individual strengths and to direct activities of staff in such a way as to bring about improvement in the entire service."

¹ Division of Technical Training, *The Orientation Period for Public Assistance Staffs as Part of a Total Staff Development Program* (Bureau of Public Assistance Circular No. 11 [August, 1941]), p. 1.

Its purpose, of course, "is to get the job done on an efficient basis and in an effective manner."²

3. Educational leave, through which the agency continues salary to a few carefully selected workers who are sent on a planned basis into schools of social work for full-time study.

4. Resources supplemental to orientation, supervision, and educational leave in a staff development program, including institutes, lectures, attendance at conferences of social work, committees, study groups, reading.³

If such a program for staff development has had validity in the past, then it would seem reasonable that such a framework with appropriate adaptations should continue to serve as the basis for present-day training programs in public assistance agencies. Perhaps now is the testing time, with the war situation as the crucible, in which the agencies can test the soundness of their past thinking and their earlier practice in the area of staff development.

Now is the time when problems are the most serious in respect to newness of staff, including the degree of competence of the staff, which the public assistance agencies have ever experienced. These agencies, in the period of late 1935 and the years 1936 and 1937, when the state agencies were being established—some of them completely new and others as outgrowths of earlier public agencies—did not face as serious a personnel problem as do the agencies today. Then, it will be remembered, our country was only beginning to emerge from the destructive depression. Employment was still at relatively low ebb. There were many people with good basic general education—many of them with college degrees, some of them with advanced degrees—who were available. The group of workers who had secured at least some professional education prior to or during the depression period, many of whom had been employed in the relief agencies, went into the public assistance agencies when the relief agencies were dissolved. To be sure, some of the states, having a greater desire for patronage than for service to persons in need, ignored such competent workers and took on the staffs of the public

² Division of Technical Training, *Supervision as an Administrative Process Contributing to Staff Development* (Bureau of Public Assistance Circular No. 6 [November, 1940]), p. 1.

³ For discussion of such resources, see Division of Technical Training, *Effective Use of Supplementary Resources in a Staff Development Program* (Bureau of Public Assistance Circular No. 15 [May, 1942]).

assistance agencies persons of lesser competence, because the merit system for the selection of workers was not then obligatory. Today the public assistance agencies are competing for staff members, not only with social agencies directly concerned with the armed forces, but also with war industries which pay salaries many times larger than those paid by even the more forward-looking public assistance agencies. The resultant is an admittedly serious personnel situation.

What have the public assistance agencies experienced as a first requirement in changing emphasis in training? The single outstanding element in training needs today is for emphasis on content. By that we mean an understanding of the purpose and objectives of the agency and of the elements necessary to their attainment; its legal base; its policies and procedures, their effect upon individual and family situations, and the philosophy and principles underlying them.

Specifically, a home visitor must have had her agency training focused upon such matters as how eligibility is determined in such a way that it is a first step toward providing additional services which are possible under the statutes and under the agency's policies and resources. A consultant on the staff of the Division of Technical Training observed, through participation in a field staff discussion in a Midwestern state, how, in actually meeting a training need, the workers were able to analyze a case situation and see its effect. The conclusion was reached, after discussion, that the whole focus of the agency's service to a certain family with an incapacitated father would have been changed had a good investigation been made in the beginning and accurately recorded. Specifically, the emphasis in the initial, as well as in the continuing, contacts with the family would have been shifted from the mother to the father, and there would have been a more clearly evident purpose in the many visits made to the family. For supervisors, too, there is more than ever a need to be secure in their knowledge of the content of the program. How can they concentrate on devising methods of supervision and ways of improving such methods until they have a substantial base upon which to operate?

Here I should like to emphasize two points. It goes without saying that it has always been necessary for any worker in an agency to understand the content of her job. However, a few years ago, the workers came to the agency, or were promoted into supervisory posi-

tions, with more basic knowledge than is now the case. Today the lack of understanding of content throughout the public assistance agencies is serious.

The second point is that the content which I am suggesting should be taught to new workers relates specifically to agency function and procedure and the application of social work principles to agency function. I am definitely not recommending that agencies undertake to teach the whole of social work nor attempt to duplicate what the schools of social work are doing.

With this basic need for teaching content, what are the agencies undertaking by way of training programs? An awareness of the cost of training, in terms of time and money, is causing agency administrators to think through the value, in the face of high staff turnover, of providing for workers' training. Quite properly, the costs should not outweigh the total gains to the program. It is in this effort to keep a sound balance between principles and exigency that adaptations of previous plans for training have been made. Greater emphasis is being put upon a more careful, thorough, orientation period. This implies a competent planner and leader. Sound planning and carrying out of orientation periods have always been important. Today they are more important than ever. Some agencies are undertaking to strengthen their orientation by extending the period given in the state office, thereby relying less upon the field supervisors and the local supervisors for leadership in the orientation period. Some agencies are developing orientation centers in order that the leadership may be concentrated in the hands of a more competent person than might otherwise be the case, in order that its content and method may be more fully developed, since orientation is thus the specific and major responsibility of one person (with appropriate assistance); rather than of a person with many responsibilities.

In one small state agency, where the orientation period had formerly lasted a week, a three-day conference was substituted. Representatives from the Department of Public Welfare and from the Old Age and Survivors Insurance field office discussed the functions of their departments. The agency program was discussed with reference to the public assistance programs, and departmental organization was explained. Special reading was assigned to the new staff

members. At later staff meetings questions raised in the orientation period were explored in greater detail.

Agencies are finding that, while they need now, as always, to give help to their supervisory group on how to supervise, the supervisors specifically need help on the content of the program. This is due again to the shifting picture of personnel in the public assistance agencies wherein persons are upgraded or inducted directly into supervisory positions before their competence has been developed to include knowledge and skills adequate to meet the requirements of the position.

Several agencies have effectively used the institute method to provide short periods of planned study, with content related to agency problems. In some instances, the content was largely in the area of general philosophy and principles underlying the public assistance agency's work; in others, it dealt more specifically with the agency's purpose and objectives, its statutory base, its major policies and procedures. In every instance one of the factors found necessary was competent leadership: someone who not only had a knowledge of content, but was able also "to apply this knowledge realistically to the agency situation and to adapt it to the stage of the development of the staff."⁴

In one state where there was concern over helping county directors to intensify their understanding of the program so that they could more effectively use its content in supervising local workers, a consultant was asked to lead an institute on supervision with the county directors. In various ways the state agency had taken definite steps toward placing more responsibility for program operation upon the county directors. The turnover in the visiting staff had required considerable attention from the county director in the training of new staff. The county directors as a group were almost entirely without professional education. Many of them had been promoted from the older group of visitors who had not had an opportunity for orientation under the agency's more recently developed plan which emphasized agency objectives and basic principles.

There was careful planning for the two-and-a-half-day institute. In summarizing the discussion, the consultant said, in part:

We discussed in several different connections the skill required during the whole investigation process, beginning with the application when

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

interpretation of agency policies in an understandable way is essential to future planning and constructive service. There are certain facts which are necessary in order to help the client, and it is in discussion of these facts and in reaching an agreement which the client understands and has participated in, that the skill lies. We need to give visitors help in understanding the significance of these facts in terms of planning with the client. We do not wish to confuse the visitor by the implication in our individual discussions that these facts are only of significance in certain types of situations . . .

Some of these problems we discussed in connection with an emphasis on consistent use of case materials in supervision. Use of such case records should focus on help to staff in understanding more fully the total needs of the family or individual and on planning on a continuing basis for meeting needs whether with regard to continuing eligibility for financial aid or with regard to other services. The review of the record from the standpoint of approving the assistance plan is a part of the daily work of the county director or the case supervisor. Such approval is only one part of the whole process but is important from the standpoint of the client. He has come to the agency because he believes he needs assistance. If we do not have an appropriate plan for assuring to him this assistance or if we fail to act promptly, we are in effect denying his request. How may we use the process of approving the assistance plan so that it may be developmental to workers? It was agreed that there should be more planning on the basis of the recorded material. A tendency to discuss cases before recording or without benefit of the written statement was observed, and the result noted in fragmentary discussion of isolated elements in the case situation. It was agreed that the use of case records in supervision depended upon developing more adequate records . . .

At the conclusion of the institute, there was a day's discussion with the district supervisors in which some of the questions suggested in the meetings were explored, and there was an opportunity to emphasize ways in which district supervisors might help staff members to plan so that the content of staff meetings and individual conferences might grow more naturally out of their daily experience. Emphasis was given to the need to place special stress upon the use of case material in discussions with county directors and in group meetings as the basis for planning regarding the total client situation. The group was interested in means of developing workers' abilities to participate in staff meetings and other discussion groups. They recognized some of the difficulties which had arisen through attempts to obtain workers' participation by means of academic presentation rather than through the application of their own ex-

perience to a given situation. There was some analysis of the use of staff materials as a starting point for the discussion of future plans rather than as a checking device for determining the effectiveness of the meeting or conference alone.

Recent emphasis which state public assistance agencies have given to the development of standards of performance has led the staff to direct its supervision more concretely to what is actually in the job and how the job should be done. It has also given to the supervisory staff a tool for appraising performance. The first step in developing standards of performance has been taken by a good many state agencies with the results just indicated. Now the agencies are realizing that not until these standards are used in a day-by-day analysis of the job process are they really understood.

Educational leave as an important part of the public assistance training programs is seriously needed today. Agencies are finding it more difficult than ever to use educational leave because of lack of funds and also because, with staff turnover and staff shortages so acute, it is difficult for an agency to release its most promising workers for a period of study. Yet, those states that have somehow found a way to release staff members for such study have found that it paid valuable dividends.

Training programs, to be worth their salt, must meet agency needs effectively. To plan training programs for public assistance agencies today, and then effectively to carry them out, is, without doubt, a more difficult and challenging problem than ever before. But social workers have always been faced with serious difficulties. They have been obliged from the early days, when their work first began to take shape as a profession, literally to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. This has been particularly true of public welfare. It has been shunned by some; it has been exploited by others. It has been a difficult job at best, but never without its stimulating associations and its satisfying rewards.

There are certain helps in the midst of the need and of the confusion. The schools of social work are more than ever concerned with assuming their proper responsibilities in the current situation. Quite properly, this responsibility includes concern for content and method of both professional and preprofessional education, for research, and for development of the literature of the field. However much difference of opinion, however much confusion, however

much error may exist in curriculum planning, it is heartening, because there is irrefutable evidence that the schools are aware of the need to relate teaching to practice and are undertaking to do something about it.

Again, we are helped by the resource of an ever growing, ever improving literature. One has but to turn his mind back over the years to realize the tremendous improvement as well as the growth, particularly in the last ten years, in publications. Writers are now discussing a wide range of subjects within the field of social work, whereas some years ago the literature was overwhelmingly in the area of case work. There are more agency reports which serve as a basis for evaluating agency practice. There are studies and monographs which indicate that social work research is making itself felt in social work administration. Agency workers are beginning to express themselves in writing through agency manuals, agency reports, articles in the house organ. All of this marks a healthy development within the practicing group, and, by and large, the literature helps to stimulate the thinking of other workers.

A newspaper columnist addressed himself to the general public long accustomed to automobile riding: "Yes, you too can walk! First you put one foot down, then you lift the other foot and set it down a little ahead of the first foot. Repeat this process and you find your long unused feet in the process of that forgotten activity called walking." Perhaps we too—all of us—can learn to think for ourselves! Our leadership in public welfare has been none too great for the work to be done. The demands of the field call for still greater leadership, in quality and in numbers. Today, in the midst of the war, the public assistance agencies find themselves with much of their leadership drained off. Perhaps the experience, black as it is, may help those of us who remain to use our brains and our hearts and our hands in ways and to a degree which we have never before experienced. We too are finding ourselves unable to rely on the skills in leadership to which we had become accustomed. We must learn to think again about first steps that will carry us on our road. Perhaps by this stimulation we may uncover unexpected potentialities in ourselves so that the public welfare programs will not only be spared, but will be strengthened in this emergency.

SOCIAL SECURITY: SAFETY NET OR FEATHER BED?

By ARTHUR J. ALTMAYER

HARDLY a decade ago the term "social security" had not come into existence. In those days, that now seem so remote, the discussions ranged around the question of whether we should embark on a social security program for this country. Now social security is an accepted goal of the democracies—I might say the chief goal of the democracies—and discussion now centers upon precise ways and means of improving our social security program.

Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour of Great Britain, has termed social security "the main motive of national life, both in wartime and in the peace to follow." So has Jan Smuts in far-off Africa. The Atlantic Charter proclaims that "they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security."

Possibly there are some who still believe that there is a basic conflict between the idea of individual liberty and social security. You will recall that some people used to say that we must choose between liberty and security but that we cannot have both. They used to point out that a convict has security but not liberty, and they felt that such an illustration proved their point. Such a concept of what is meant by social security is, of course, the exact opposite of its true significance. It is true that we can furnish an individual security in the sense of providing for his animal wants and deprive him of his personal liberty, but social security, if it means anything, means that we make it possible for the individual to provide for his own wants in his own way. Thus the concept of social security not only is not in conflict with the concept of liberty, but it is synony-

mous with the concept of liberty because it makes liberty a positive and not a negative thing. Liberty means far more than freedom to starve. It means a real opportunity to make the fullest use of one's capacities. Far from destroying individual initiative and thrift, providing a minimum degree of protection to families against the major vicissitudes that beset them in this modern complicated and hazardous world releases energies because it substitutes hope for fear as the mainspring of human endeavor.

There is some danger now that the term "social security" has come to have such an inclusive meaning that its usefulness as a term to describe a specific program of action may be impaired. In its larger sense social security must mean, above all, full employment and full production. It must also include decent housing, education, and health, as well as the elimination of destitution.

I shall not discuss social security in this larger sense, but only as a specific program designed to eliminate want by preventing the loss of current income. Regardless of how completely and quickly we achieve the goal of social security in the larger sense, it is not only feasible but vitally necessary that we establish a specific program for the elimination of want. I say that it is feasible to eliminate want in this country because the actual production of goods and services before we entered the war, if properly distributed, was sufficient to eliminate want. I say that it is necessary to provide a system designed to eliminate want even though we achieve the goal of full employment and full production because the working people of this country will still be confronted with the great economic hazards of sickness, physical disability, old age, and death, as well as intermittent unemployment. All these great hazards mean interruption of earnings, and loss of earnings will still spell want even in a land of plenty. I mention intermittent unemployment as a continuing major cause of loss of earnings because under a system of free enterprise, which we cherish and are fighting to preserve, we must encourage invention, improvement, elimination of waste, variety, and continual adaptation to changing ideas and circumstances. This must mean that, as the processes of production and distribution change, individuals will be forced out of one employment and be obliged to seek another. This is the price, if it can be called a price, that we pay for maximum production, free enterprise, and free labor. Of course, to the extent that we fail to achieve full employment and

full production, a system of social security designed to eliminate want is all the more necessary. Nor should we overlook the fact that a system designed to eliminate want also does actually make a great contribution to the maintenance of full production and full employment by assuring the maintenance of mass purchasing power, upon which mass production must depend.

Not so long ago, there were 28,000,000 people who were dependent upon their Government for the necessities of life. Not so very long ago, there were 12,000,000 workers unemployed through no fault of their own. Even today there are over 5,000,000 people who are still dependent upon their Government to supply them with the necessities of life, and there are still approximately 1,500,000 workers unemployed through no fault of their own. Even now there are 7,000,000 people who are unable to work because of sickness or physical disability, and 3,500,000 of these are permanently totally disabled. Almost 50 percent of the persons examined under the Selective Service Act have physical defects which caused their rejection for general military service and which must affect their earning capacity in private life. Whether or not we establish a social security system, as a civilized and progressive nation we shall still have these problems and their economic consequences to solve and we will undertake to solve them. A social security system merely undertakes to solve these problems in a systematic, effective, and economical manner.

When we undertake to establish a social security system designed to eliminate want we are not striving for strange and new ideals, nor is it even necessary for us to depend upon strange and new methods. We have a world history and world experience upon which to base our planning and our action. Indeed, we already have in our own Social Security Act the fundamental elements of a program designed to eliminate want. It is only necessary for us to extend, expand, and improve upon our present Social Security Act in the light of the experience and thinking that have developed since that act was passed in 1935.

Since the security of the large majority of people is dependent upon their earnings, the focal point of our efforts should be to provide reasonable protection against interruption of income due to sickness, accidents, old age, death, and unemployment. This can be accomplished to a large extent by a system of social insurance under

which benefits are paid to compensate for a reasonable proportion of the wage loss sustained, the cost of such benefits being financed out of contributions made by the workers and by their employers, and ultimately with some contribution by the Government, representing the entire community. However, even a comprehensive contributory social insurance system cannot provide complete protection under all conceivable circumstances. Certainly an insurance system cannot insure against hazards that have occurred prior to the establishment of the system. Therefore, there is also need for a basic, flexible, and comprehensive system of public assistance to meet the needs of individuals and their families which cannot be met out of their own resources.

I believe that the respective responsibilities of the Federal and state governments are markedly different in the case of social insurance and in the case of public assistance. The cost of social insurance is borne by contributions based on pay rolls, and the benefits are paid on the basis of wage loss without a needs or means test. The cost of public assistance is borne out of general revenues, and assistance is granted only on the basis of an investigation as to the individual's need. Since the cost of social insurance is related to pay rolls, it is important that employers not be subjected to unfair interstate competition because of varying rates of contributions in the various states. In the case of public assistance there cannot be this unfair interstate competition because the cost is borne out of general revenues.

Since the benefits under social insurance are related to wage loss, there is an automatic adjustment to the presumptive need of the beneficiaries and an automatic adjustment to varying wage levels throughout the nation. Therefore, there is no necessity for investigation and determination of individual need in the light of local circumstances as is true in the case of public assistance. However, while social insurance should be set up as a Federal program, the actual administration of social insurance should be, and can be, highly decentralized through delegation of authority and the establishment of representative advisory councils and appeals boards in the several states.

At present we have a Federal old age and survivors insurance system administered wholly by the Federal Government and an unemployment compensation system administered by the states but

largely induced and sustained because of Federal legislation. I believe that there should be added to these benefits insurance covering a reasonable proportion of the wage loss and other costs of permanent total disability, sickness, and nonindustrial accidents sustained by the insured workers and their families. I further believe that the present Federal-state program of unemployment compensation should be combined into a single comprehensive Federal system of contributory social insurance. We would then be covering all the major economic hazards to which the workers of this country are subjected.

Under such a unified comprehensive system of social insurance there would be no gaps, no overlaps, and no discrepancies in the protection afforded. Such a system could operate with a maximum degree of simplicity and efficiency, since there would be only one contribution, one report, one record, and one local office to which employers and employees could go to ascertain their rights and duties. It is sound public policy, as well as in the interest of the insured workers, that workers share with employers the combined cost of all the benefits proposed instead of the employer bearing the entire cost of certain benefits and the workers bearing the entire cost of other benefits.

During the next ten years it is probable that the current costs of all the benefits suggested would be more than covered by a total combined rate of contribution on pay rolls of 10 or 12 percent, depending on the exact benefits provided. This would include both employers' and employees' contributions. The total combined rate at the present time is 5 percent. However, even under the present Social Security Act, the combined rate automatically becomes 7 percent on January 1, 1944, and 9 percent by January 1, 1949.

Since general taxes are insufficient to meet the costs of the war and other necessary Government expenses, they should not be relied upon at this time to pay any part of the cost of a contributory social insurance system. On the contrary, a sound contributory social insurance system should levy pay roll contributions sufficient to yield a large surplus in a period of full employment, such as we are experiencing now, in order that the system may be prepared for a period of declining employment when income from pay roll contributions will decline and benefit payments will increase.

In 1939 Congress amended the Federal old age insurance system

so as to provide for dependents' allowances. I believe that all the various types of social insurance recommended should also provide for dependents' allowances. By providing for dependents' allowances a social insurance system can be made more adequate in meeting the actual needs of beneficiaries without increasing the total cost of the benefits. While insured workers with dependents would receive more than persons without dependents, every insured person would receive his money's worth in insurance protection. This is possible because a larger proportion of employers' contributions would be used to pay benefits to those with dependents than to those without dependents.

I fully appreciate that my suggestion that the present Federal-state unemployment insurance system should be made a part of a single unified comprehensive social insurance system would represent a very important change that should, of course, be given most careful consideration. However, I believe that it is of vital importance, not only to the success of a social insurance program, but also to success in coping with postwar problems that the Federal Government assume direct operating and financial responsibility for the payment of unemployment benefits.

The causes and cure for mass unemployment are beyond the control of individual states. The Federal Government in the past has been obliged to assume the prime responsibility for coping with the problem of mass unemployment and undoubtedly will have to do so in the future. It is vital that there be no division of that responsibility, in order that the related approaches toward a solution may be completely integrated. Government stimulation of private enterprise, public works, and unemployment compensation are all necessary to cope with the problem of unemployment. What is done or not done in one respect has a profound effect on what can or must be done in the others. During the postwar period, the policies followed in the demobilization of the armed forces and in the termination of war contracts will vitally affect the volume of unemployment compensation payments. On the other hand, the adequacy or inadequacy of unemployment compensation benefits must be taken into account in determining the policies to be followed in the demobilization of the armed forces and in the termination of war activities. Under such circumstances, division of responsibility may well lead to failure to act consistently and effectively.

There is no question in my mind that combining the present state-by-state unemployment insurance system into a unified, comprehensive, contributory social insurance system would result in far simpler, more effective, and more economical administration. At present there are fifty-one jurisdictions collecting contributions and requiring reports from employers and fifty-one systems of records. An employer operating in all the jurisdictions must submit 209 separate reports in the course of a single year. If unemployment compensation were made a part of a comprehensive Federal social insurance system, such an employer would be required to submit, at most, four reports in the course of a year and perhaps only one. The same record could be used, not only for unemployment compensation, but also for all other types of insurance as well.

Of still greater importance than these administrative advantages is the fact that a truly national system of unemployment insurance would be much safer and sounder because of the wider spreading of the unemployment risk and the more effective utilization of reserves. Therefore, such a system would be far better able to cope with any severe depression resulting from the termination of our war-production program. A Federal unemployment compensation system could also provide much more adequate benefits for workers generally because of the wider spreading of the risks and the more effective utilization of reserves. It is most important that unemployment compensation benefits be made more adequate than they are at the present time. The weekly benefit rates in many states are insufficient to cover a reasonable proportion of the weekly wage loss that an unemployed worker suffers. Most serious of all is the fact that in most states the duration for which benefits are payable is so limited that a very high proportion of workers in receipt of unemployment compensation benefits exhaust their benefit rights before finding another job. For the country as a whole, even in a period of good employment, such as 1940 and 1941, 50 percent of the workers exhausted their benefit rights before they found another job. In some states the proportion ran as high as 65 and 75 percent. In a period of considerable unemployment these percentages would, of course, be still higher.

A national system of unemployment insurance as a part of a comprehensive social insurance system would not only be safer and sounder and more adequate, it would at the same time possess the

necessary flexibility to meet varied situations in different parts of the country. Since benefits would be based on the individual's past earnings, they would automatically reflect differences in wage rates in the various parts of the country. The administration would be decentralized, and representative advisory councils and appeals boards would be established in the several states to make certain that administration is kept close to the persons affected.

If a single social insurance system is adopted covering all hazards it of course becomes increasingly desirable and necessary that the coverage of such a system be extended as widely as possible, since all the population is subject in varying degrees to these hazards. The main groups of employees now excluded from protection are agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and employees in nonprofit organizations. In addition, self-employed persons, such as small businessmen, professional men, and farmers, are also excluded. From an administrative standpoint there is no longer any reason why any of these groups should be excluded, and from the standpoint of providing protection there is every reason why they should be included. In the case of workers for small employers it is administratively feasible to extend coverage through the use of a stamp-book system. Under such a system the employee would be furnished with a book in which stamps would be placed by his employer as evidence of contributions made by the employer and by the employee. In rural areas the employer could purchase these stamps from the mail carrier, and in urban areas they could be purchased at post offices.

It would, of course, not be feasible to insure self-employed persons against unemployment or temporary disability because there would be no employer-employee relationship or specific wage loss to serve as a test of entitlement to benefits. However, it would be perfectly feasible to insure self-employed persons against other economic hazards.

It is most essential that the social insurance rights of workers entering military service be fully protected. Under the present law workers entering military service suffer the same reduction and eventual extinction of any social insurance rights they may have developed as do other employees who leave insured employment to enter uninsured employment. In the case of unemployment insurance must of the states have frozen any rights which persons entering military service may have possessed prior to entering such service.

However, a great proportion of persons entering military service had developed either no rights whatsoever or very meager rights. Therefore, the best solution would be to count the period of military service as a period of insured employment so that when these men return to civil life they will not only have suffered no loss of benefit rights, but will also have built up greater benefit rights to assist them in making the difficult transition. This would be an act of simple justice.

Even with this comprehensive social insurance system it would be too much to expect that all destitution would be eliminated. No system of insurance can insure against hazards that have already occurred or can provide adequate protection under all conceivable circumstances. Therefore, I believe that we should not only maintain, but greatly strengthen, our present system of public assistance.

When we discuss social security as a specific program of action we usually make a distinction between social insurance and public assistance. It is true that social insurance is usually financed through contributions made by or on behalf of the beneficiary covered by the system of social insurance. In contrast, public assistance is usually financed out of general public revenues. Likewise, under a contributory social insurance system benefits are paid on some predetermined basis not related to the individual need of the individual, whereas under public assistance benefits are paid with regard both to the actual resources and to the requirements of the individual. However, the usual statement that social insurance provides payments as a matter of right irrespective of need, whereas public assistance provides payments only on the basis of need and not as a matter of right, is quite wrong and betrays a lack of understanding of the basic philosophy underlying social security. It is true that the payments under the social insurance system are made on a predetermined basis. However, that predetermined basis usually involves a benefit formula which is related to the presumptive need of the recipient; that is to say, the formula is usually worked out in such a way that low-paid workers usually receive a larger proportion of their wage loss than high-paid workers, and workers with families receive larger benefits than single workers. In the case of public assistance, while it is true that benefit payments are made on the basis of individual need, nevertheless those payments are made as a matter of right which the recipient possesses as a citizen or resident

of the community, and he has a legal remedy if that right is ignored. The inextricable relationship of social insurance and public assistance is inevitable because the objective of both is to provide people with a minimum income necessary for decent living.

The Social Security Act as it now stands provides Federal grants-in-aid to the states to cover 50 percent of the cost of cash assistance to three groups of the needy: the aged, the blind, and dependent children. At the present time there are 2,250,000 needy old persons, 860,000 children, and 55,000 needy blind persons receiving monthly cash assistance. While I believe that public assistance should continue to be administered by the states and not by the Federal Government, I believe that the Federal Government should make grants to the states for assistance rendered to any needy persons, not only to the needy aged, the needy blind, and dependent children. There is great need for a system of Federal grants-in-aid to relieve distress among persons who are not eligible for assistance under the existing Federal-state categories. This arises out of the fact that many states and localities have inadequate resources with which to meet the total relief problem and from the further fact that the resources they do have are used disproportionately to help needy persons who are eligible under the three categories for which the Federal Government now grants aid, as against other needy persons who are not eligible under these limited categories. The termination of the food stamp plan and of the distribution of surplus commodities by the Federal Government has further reduced the adequacy of the assistance being rendered these needy persons. Most of the families now dependent upon public assistance do not include any person who could be employed, even under very favorable employment conditions. Moreover, there are many needy families receiving no assistance whatsoever. Therefore, even with the general increase in employment, the states and localities will continue to have a large burden to meet.

A plan of Federal grants-in-aid to the states for aid to all needy persons should not be looked upon as a substitute for Federal work programs in periods of widespread unemployment. On the contrary, the adoption of such a plan would make work programs more effective, since they would be relieved of pressure to meet the needs of persons who may be cared for better in another way. Moreover, such a plan, adequately financed and properly administered, could

assist in restoring to the labor market a substantial number of needy persons, thus rendering them self-supporting. It is also essential to supplement the present system of uniform 50 percent Federal grants-in-aid with additional Federal aid that would not have to be matched by states whose per-capita income is low in relation to that of other states. It would be possible to establish such a system of additional Federal aid on an objective basis which would utilize existing governmental data measuring the per-capita income of the various states. In addition to the two major changes that I have suggested, there are several other ways in which the present Federal grants should be liberalized. For example, the definition of "dependent child" should be broadened. Under the present definition a child, in order to be eligible, must have been deprived of parental support or care by reason of "the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent." Moreover, a child must be living with prescribed relatives. I believe that the definition should be broadened to include all children who are needy for any reason whatsoever and who are living in a private home with any relative or legal guardian. I also believe that the maximum amount of aid to dependent children for which the Federal Government will provide matching should at least be raised if not eliminated.

It is also highly desirable that the Social Security Act be amended so that payments for medical care of recipients could be matched by the Federal Government even though the payments are made directly by the public assistance agency instead of being included in the individual recipient's budget.

The expanded social security system which I have outlined can play a vitally important role in the economic readjustment and reconstruction that will be necessary when the war ends. On the one hand, it can provide protection to individuals and their families against the loss of income which they may suffer after the war, when a decline from the high levels of wartime production will increase the burden of the various hazards. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the economic system as a whole, social security can aid in maintaining consumer purchasing power when the national income exhibits a tendency to shrink and thus can assist in maintaining employment at a higher level.

The obvious question which will occur to many who may agree with the inherent desirability of having a comprehensive social

security system available at the end of the war is whether the present is a practical and appropriate time for action. The enormous outlays and the vast administrative undertakings now necessary for the prosecution of the war may appear to suggest that action be deferred until after the war is won. The answer is that unless action is taken now there is grave danger that the postwar period will arrive before a well-rounded social security system can be put into successful operation. A successful social security system cannot be improvised overnight. As a matter of fact, the extension of social security now would greatly aid in the successful prosecution of the war. The greater sense of security which would result would make the people of this great nation more effective defenders of democracy. This has been amply demonstrated in Great Britain, where social security was extended even while the bombers roared overhead and where it is now proposed that there be a far greater extension.

Entirely apart from the increased human happiness and well-being that would result, the fact is that immediate expansion of the social security system is highly desirable from the standpoint of the nation's economic and fiscal circumstances. Two of the major economic problems of the war effort are the control of inflation and the securing of revenues through taxation or borrowing or both. The enlarged excess of contributions over disbursements which would occur during the war period would curtail current purchasing power and serve as a potent force in the fight against inflation. Investment of the excess in Government obligations would make corresponding sums available to the Treasury. These investments would aid in financing the war just as do the War Savings Bonds purchased by individuals. Moreover, the establishment of an expanded social security system now would make the people better able to pay war taxes and buy War Bonds because they would have some protection against loss of current income due to the hazards insured under the contributory social insurance system.

As President Roosevelt said, "This is one case in which social and fiscal objectives, war and postwar aims are in full accord. Expanded social security, together with other fiscal measures, would set up a bulwark of economic security for the people now and after the war and at the same time would provide anti-inflationary sources for financing the war."

I should like to emphasize that the program suggested would pro-

vide only a minimum basic security for the people of this country. It would provide a safety net protecting the people of this country against major economic hazards, not a feather bed releasing them from the necessity of helping themselves. It would be an effective system because the benefits would be related to proven wage loss or proven need. It would be a system which would provide a maximum amount of security at a minimum cost. In a very real sense the costs of insecurity are now being borne by the individual citizens of this country. A sound social security program makes these costs more bearable by distributing them more systematically and equitably. This is true of both the public assistance and the social insurance phases of the social security program, although it is more apparent in the case of social insurance.

There are some who fear that social security will destroy individual initiative and thrift and enterprise. There are some who believe that providing a minimum basic security will merely encourage people to rely upon the Government instead of upon themselves. Such fears arise out of a basic lack of confidence in democracy and the common man. I believe that assuring people a minimum of subsistence will encourage them to strive for something still better for themselves and their families. I do not believe that we can expect the helpless and the hopeless to practice the prized virtues of independence.

Let us also not forget that under a contributory social insurance system the workers of this country and their employers would pay for the benefits that are received. It is not a plan for giving everybody something for nothing. In the case of public assistance, I am merely proposing that we accomplish better what this nation from its inception has always accepted as a public responsibility, namely, the care of the poor who would otherwise lack the necessities of life.

I do not pretend that the program I have outlined will usher in a utopia; I do not even contend that it will eliminate poverty in this country. I do believe and contend that it will abolish want. Is this too ambitious a goal for a great and powerful nation?

This nation should emerge from the war a richer nation, not only materially but spiritually. We have learned how to provide full employment. We have learned how to increase our production tremendously. We have learned lessons of coöperation the hard way. Our future problem is not a problem of resources, but of unity of

purpose. I am confident that with unity of purpose we have demonstrated that we have the ability to accomplish our purpose. Certainly there can be no higher purpose than to promote the welfare of human beings, and that is the paramount responsibility of social workers.

THE BEVERIDGE REPORT AND THE SOCIAL WORKER

By HERMAN FINER

IT IS more appropriate to consider the broad significance the Beveridge Report has for social workers than to discuss its detail. It would, indeed, be hardly fair to take away the pleasure and responsibility of studying the Report in its entirety, and deriving from it not merely the particulars of the masterly plan, but a direct appreciation of the powerful, reasonable, and tensile mind which composed, and the sense of social humanity and economic magnanimity which pervades it. These things constitute part of the liberal education of all true social workers. I shall be concerned rather, to put the recommendations in their social background and perspective, and to make salient the advances envisaged by Sir William Beveridge with their social and administrative consequences. Nor will it be amiss to notice the position of the plan's opponents.

First of all, then, how is it that the plan emerges at this particular moment in world history? The Beveridge Report is the direct offspring of Britain at war. Something like it might have come in the long-term natural evolution of British social forces in peacetime. Nothing as comprehensive or momentous in its effect on public opinion could, however, have been considered for many years, perhaps decades, in time of peace. The truth is that the war, as experienced in England, has forced natural development forward, and cast out purely factious obstruction. In time of tribulation a people, like an individual, learns to respect a new priority of values: what seemed important and part of the foundations of society before are seen to be unworthy habits and oppositional attitudes never fully thought through. The heavy sacrifices in life and bloodshed, the loss of possessions laboriously gathered in the homes of the humble as

well as of the rich, the anguish of families dispersed by reason of war service or industrial transference—all contributed to a questioning of traditional assumptions regarding the duty of man to man when they dwell in the same society, and a profounder feeling of collective social responsibility. It is most important to notice that the social conscience of the nation, always in evidence, has been made more sensitive and more ready to react to the perception of need.

I was asked by a director of the Tennessee Valley Authority how the message which the bombings in England had taught to all classes of the nation could be transmitted and learned in other societies. The answer is, lacking the same experience, that while it cannot be done in all its depth and vividness, at least it will be transmitted and perpetuated by its fruits of mind and character, that is, by such testimonies as we have in the Beveridge Report. For one of the direct results of the great intellectual and social ferments set up in Great Britain by the trials I have mentioned was the establishment of a Government Committee of Ministers on Reconstruction under the labor leader Mr. Arthur Greenwood (appointed by Mr. Churchill); and one of the first steps taken by Mr. Greenwood to fulfill his responsibility was to charge Sir William Beveridge personally (though working with a consultative committee) to undertake "with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes, a survey of the national schemes of social insurance and allied services, including workmen's compensation, and to make recommendations." It will be inferred that there were schemes in operation already: emphasis upon their inter-relation is one of the major pioneer paths of the Report.

It is necessary to stress that there were already social security schemes in operation before Sir William began. The Beveridge Report stands in the long historic succession of public measures to deal with social distress commencing, on its secular side, at least, with the middle of the sixteenth century, its first stage culminating in the famous Elizabethan Poor Law; its second, with the Poor Law Report of 1834; its third, with the Poor Law Report of 1909; and its fourth, with the Report we are now discussing. Each of those stages represents a new phase of English economic and social organization; each, therefore, a different stage of civilization; and each, again, an advance in the nation's social conscience. The change from one stage to the other represents a point we must seriously take

to heart: the evolution from simple charity in a primitive agricultural society to the large-scale social care and measures required by our modern highly complex and involved economic systems. So far as it had evolved, the British social conscience had, by the outbreak of war, produced a large number of social security measures, including provision for workmen's compensation, health and unemployment insurance, public assistance, technical education, special schemes for maternity, the blind, old age and widows' and orphans' pensions, etc. In their comprehensiveness, amount of provision, and their administration (combining efficiency with kindness), they were, then, the best in the world, with the possible exception of those in operation in New Zealand. This is recognized at the outset of the Beveridge Report. What they lacked, however, was coherence—coherence of administration and a governing principle of equity. For the British social services were the product, as I have suggested, of a long history, and inevitably there was patchwork; the various laws were passed at different times, and by different governments. Thus, for example, and it is the important matter to notice, the benefits for unemployment, etc., were neither related to subsistence, nor to each other, nor to the rational question of maintaining workers until they could be retrained for, or themselves find, another occupation when their regular one, for some reason or another beyond their own control, was no longer open to them.

In the first stage of social conscience to which I made bare reference, there was a supersession of the social provision made by the Church on the principle of Christian charity by the secular administration of poor law benefits; and a rigid distinction was made between the unable and those able but unwilling to work, with a difference of treatment for each class, and stress was laid on the responsibility of the family for its own destitute. This corresponded to the severely localized character of the economy of the era, where every man could still be his brother's keeper. There was severity of treatment for the idle able-bodied. It is perhaps not out of place to mention that in the later stages of its administration one of the penalties for idleness was transportation to Virginia, offering a glimpse of some of the ancestral origins, perhaps, of some members of the Daughters of the American Revolution. In the second stage, that is, the Poor Law Report of 1834, there was, to a surprising degree, a continued attachment to the Elizabethan principle, per-

haps because there was as yet insufficient appreciation of the economic effects of the Industrial Revolution. Certain qualities of that Report need mention if we are to understand the advances made by the Beveridge Report. There was a heavy emphasis on the idea that social distress of the individual was somehow due to a moral defect on his own part. This was shown by the strict differentiation between employed able-bodied persons and the destitute, who were to be given relief, but so deterrent a relief that they would try to escape its benevolence at the earliest possible moment and become independent workers again. However, there was one great advance: the principle that the same rules, as enunciated by Parliament, should operate uniformly all over the nation. Before that, some fifteen thousand practically independent parishes conducted the administration, incompetently, of course, and with inequitable differences of relief and conditions between one place and another.

This severity rested upon a false analysis of the causes of destitution; it placed a Malthusian emphasis on individual weaknesses of character. Under the changing conditions of British economic life, now dependent on the fluctuations of world commerce, and manufactures, and the division of labor, the diagnosis proved far too simple. Its inadequacy was soon recognized, and the means and consequences of this recognition are most important to students of contemporary social welfare. It was discovered by statistical inquiry that by far the larger proportion of those who needed relief owed their plight to disease, usually due to defects of environment and inadequate preventive provisions in childhood, to ignorance, or to old age. Disease also caused unemployment. As the century wore on, it came to be seen ever more clearly that the able-bodied breadwinner lost his job, not as the result of his own evil laziness, but owing to some breakdown in the nation-wide or world-wide production and distribution of goods and services. Therefore, the means of treatment changed from mere deterrence to an attempt (*a*) to anticipate physical destitution; and (*b*) to make social provisions by the expenditure of capital funds, or by commitments, that would produce preventive social measures. Hence, the annual charge for merely remedial and palliative measures would be decreased. Such measures included education, efforts to improve public health, medical relief, public works, assisted emigration, etc.

By the turn of the century the next stage was reached, that of the

Poor Law Report of 1909, prepared by the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. This Commission made a profound, rational analysis of the causes of destitution. The report of its progressive minority prevailed in the public mind, in legislative and administrative reforms, and introduced Sir William Beveridge to public life in activities which culminated in the present Report. The Report of 1909 recommended the break-up of the Poor Law. It recommended, that is to say, that each cause of destitution and each class of the destitute should be dealt with, not by a poor law system, but in the ordinary administrative setup, by the appropriate preventive and curative means; it provided, in the way now familiar to us, for old age and for the young, and so far as the unemployed were concerned, with the "organization of the labor market." It was now seen with clarity that the roots of destitution lay deep in the normal organization of capitalistic enterprise, in which equality of opportunity was absent, and in which there were staggering differences of wealth, and in which, again, the ups and downs of industry, the rise and fall in the soundness of world markets, the impossibility of complete prediction of supply and demand, and the control thereof even where prediction was possible must, whatever the moral character of the worker, result in seasonal, cyclical, and catastrophic unemployment. One of the results of the Report was the establishment of labor exchanges, later known as unemployment exchanges—known in the United States as unemployment service offices—through which it was hoped that the supply and demand for labor would be better adjusted than through the haphazard methods then prevailing. The man who was called in by Mr. Churchill, then in charge of the Home Office, the Labor Division of which was the forerunner of the Ministry of Labor (set up in 1917), was Mr. Beveridge.

So we come to the final stage, that is, the Beveridge Report and contemporary society. Sir William draws together the threads of the principles and changes made manifest since the Report of 1909, for that gave rise to many piecemeal changes. The cardinal merit of the Beveridge recommendations is that they are made coherent by two dominating considerations: comprehensiveness and guaranteed subsistence. These two were the principal factors missing from previous British practice; indeed, from all social security practice. They are simple and right, but it is in the Beveridge recommendations that they were first made clear with the clarity of Columbus's dem-

onstration of how to make an egg stand up on end. In that Report, too, the economic, social, and administrative consequences are drawn to their full conclusion and firm consequences. We must now consider the new principles more closely:

1. *Physical destitution.*—The Beveridge Report answers, by implication, the controversy which for decades had explicitly or implicitly raged over whether the community should intervene before physical destitution set in, or afterward. All rational good sense is on the side of the former method, and the Report of 1909 accepted it. The Beveridge Report takes this inside a much broader conception, President Roosevelt's "freedom from want." The Report says, under the rubric "Abolition of Want as a Practicable Post-war Aim": "The aim of the Plan for Social Security is to abolish want by ensuring that every citizen willing to serve according to his powers has at all times an income sufficient to meet his responsibilities."

2. *Subsistence.*—By far the most important advance made by the Report is the basing of all social security measures on the state assurance of a guaranteed subsistence to all, of an income based on a minimum, which is subsistence. No previous scheme does this or expressed the intention to do so. "Social insurance should aim at guaranteeing the minimum income needed for subsistence." What this is in terms of money must at any time depend on the purchasing power of money, but the principle is perfectly clear. Beveridge arrives at the figure applicable by basing himself on several of the great social surveys made in various cities—by Booth, Rowntree, etc.; surveys that themselves were great acts of social pioneering since, by setting an arithmetical standard to replace former guesses, they captured the mind as never before—and then calculates the price of these things as of 1938, with an addition of 25 percent for rises in cost since that time. He thus arrives at his basic figure: forty shillings a week for man and wife in unemployment and disability and, after the transition period, as a retirement pension, in addition to allowances for children at an average rate of eight shillings per week. Forty shillings are roughly equal to ten dollars. In American terms at any time, and especially in wartime, this seems a very meager subsistence. However, two things must be remembered: the Report gives an extremely careful calculation of the basis, and what ten dollars means under English conditions is considerably more than it means in the United States.

Thus the guaranteed subsistence is set at the very foundation of the whole Beveridge system. It has its immediate consequences in the rates of insurance contribution from the workers and employers individually, and the contribution which the State must make in money and organization. It not merely requires the conditions of the insurance scheme strictly considered, but depends on certain assumptions which must now be mentioned.

3. *Comprehensiveness*.—The plan is comprehensive in two senses. In the strict sense, the participants, as contributors to its funds and as beneficiaries, include everybody of every age in Great Britain. That is vastly different from the social services that already exist, the chief limitation of which is an upper-income limit, by force of which, for unemployment purposes, only, about fifteen million out of a total gainfully occupied population of twenty million are included. The scheme is comprehensive also in that it is fitted into a systematic attack on all forms of social distress. This point is at least as important as the first, for these social insurance provisions are workable only if certain assumptions may dependably be made regarding other social arrangements. "The second principle," says the Report, "is that the organization of social insurance should be treated as one part only of a comprehensive policy of social progress. Social insurance fully developed may provide income security; it is an attack upon Want. But Want is one only of five giants on the road of reconstruction and in some ways the easiest to attack. The others are Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness."

The first assumption, then, is that the State will be able to take such measures as will avoid mass unemployment. Sir William's arithmetical relationship between the contributions which have to be made into the insurance fund from which the benefits are to be paid out is made on the assumption that there is no greater percentage of unemployment than 8.5 percent. Mass unemployment would disrupt the contributions from all sides. Clearly, this is a tremendous problem to solve; but every nation, friend or foe, has sworn to accomplish it, and men at the front and in industry are making such determined demands for this after the war that it will have to be accomplished, even though it should require massive changes in the conduct and regulation of enterprise.

It is perfectly clear, also, that measures for the treatment of the other evils, for themselves and for their contributory effect upon

employment and earnings, are essential: a comprehensive State medical scheme; wider opportunities of education; the wholesale clearance of slums and healthy and cheerful housing and environmental amenities. In Great Britain, at least, these plans are in active preparation.

4. *An insurance plan.*—The plan proposed by Sir William is an insurance plan; that is to say, with the exception of children's allowances which are to be contributed out of public funds by the Government, it is a scheme by which the benefits are paid for by the recipients in a determined relationship between what is paid for and what is received. The relationship is based upon the principle of the calculated risks of unemployment, sickness, occupational disease, old age, etc. In other words, the worker is not to get something for nothing, any more than all the rest of the population, which, as I mentioned earlier, is included. The Report is emphatic as to the insurance character of the program, and rightly, as can be seen in view of the kind of opposition that has developed in some quarters. Sir William makes it clear that it is necessary that the benefits shall be covenanted for and paid for. He believes that British people do not wish for free allowances from the State, as announced both by the established popularity of compulsory insurance and the remarkable growth of voluntary insurance. Moreover, there is strong popular objection to a means test, not because people want everything for nothing, but because it appears to penalize what people have come to regard as the duty and pleasure of thrift, or putting pennies away for a rainy day. "Management of one's income is an essential element of a citizen's freedom." Furthermore, it is, for many reasons, important that insured persons shall not feel that income for idleness, however caused, can come from a bottomless purse; and that a Government should not feel that by the payment of doles it has fully completed its duty of seeing that unemployment and disease are reduced to a minimum.

5. *Obligatory contributions.*—The Beveridge system, then, is not an arrangement to provide something for nothing, but a system in which benefits are exchanged for contributions. What does this imply? It implies that the benefits are not all shouldered by the Government. It implies that there is an arranged redistribution of income by means of the insurance arrangement; and, in fact, that redistribution takes place in two ways: (a) Everybody is obliged to

contribute from present income to take care of the future when he or his fellow may be out of an income; it is a transfer of present wealth in the measure of the calculated risk for the future. (b) Through the medium of the State's contribution toward the benefits which come out of taxation, there is another redistribution, from the richer to the poorer—I emphasize that it is not from the rich to the poor; there is no two-class system at the basis of the arrangement—right down the scale by reason of the graduation of the tax system of the nation. The contributions are shared by workers, management, and the Government.

6. *Diagnosis of want and benefits.*—The diagnosis of want as it appears in the Beveridge Report is at once the most comprehensive and the most searching that has yet been made, and it largely accounts for the merit of the entire plan. When you have clearly discovered an evil, you are in a position to recommend a remedy with the same qualities of definition. It is well that we consider both the diagnosis of want—that is, the causes of income loss—and the appropriate treatment as proposed by Sir William. There are eight such primary causes:

a) Unemployment is the inability to obtain or to hold employment on the part of a person whose livelihood is dependent on it and who is physically capable. This is to be met by unemployment benefits for an unlimited time, subject to the condition of retraining for other work, by grants for removal from one part of the country to another, and by grants for lodging. Grants for the latter two are part of the provision for the transference of workers from one occupation and region to another, and constitute an element of elasticity proved essential by experience in relating supply and demand for labor.

b) Disability is the inability of a person of working age of whatever previous occupation, or none, to carry on a gainful occupation, by reason of illness or accident. The plan meets this by a disability benefit.

c) Loss of livelihood has to be provided for, for people who have not been dependent on employment, but may have had their own business or home occupations, support from which has ceased. To meet this, provision is made for the maintenance of income for a period during which the applicant is trained for a gainful occupation.

d) Old age, that is, the attainment of the age of sixty-five by men and of sixty by women, is met by a pension, subject to the person's retirement from gainful occupation. However, since the age composition of Britain is such as to require the continuance of all the labor force available, retirement at sixty-five may be deferred, an additional sum per week then being added to the basic pension according to the age of retirement.

e) The needs of married women are among the primary causes and are included in the various factors in what has come to be known as the "housewives' policy." Here, let us reflect upon this additional conspicuous portion of the Beveridge plan, that is, Sir William's recognition of the fundamental importance of the family and of the crucial value of the married woman's part therein. Many have championed the cause of married women; some vehemently, but none so persistently and effectively as the author of the Beveridge Report, in his recognition of the social contributions made by the married woman who fulfills her diverse domestic duties. It may seem strange, at first sight, that a bachelor, fond of descanting on the virtues of celibacy for men engaged in intellectual pursuits, should have so powerfully emphasized the social value of the married woman. That recognition goes back many years and, indeed, in so far as it was related to the family as a social unit, gave rise, in 1932, to *Changes in Family Life*, a widespread inquiry undertaken with the assistance of the British Broadcasting Corporation into the various economic, educational, and social attributes of the family.

The "housewives' policy" includes the following provisions: (1) There is a marriage grant. (2) A grant is provided in every case of maternity. In addition, there is a benefit provision for a period preceding and following confinement in the case of a gainfully employed woman. (3) When the husband's earnings are interrupted by unemployment, disability, or retirement, the wife receives a dependent's allowance. (4) Widowhood is met by a series of provisions according to the situation, including a temporary benefit during readjustment; a guardian's benefit while the widow is caring for her children; and a training benefit if and when there are no children in need of care. (5) Separation by legal arrangement or an established desertion in which maintenance by the husband terminates are recognized with a variation of the widowhood benefits.

(6) Incapacity for household duties is met by treatment and paid help.

f) In case of death, funeral expenses are met by a grant for the insured persons or for the dependent.

g) The needs of childhood, that is, of those below working age, are met by weekly allowances to the family which may be entirely in money or partly in kind.

h) Disease of the insured person or of a dependent is provided for by medical treatment through the national health service and by rehabilitation.

7. *The social security budget.*—It may be surmised that the provision of these benefits to all who are in need must require substantial financing. The cost is, indeed, most carefully calculated by the author of the plan. He offers a comparison, in millions of persons, between what is spent on the social security schemes now in operation, what these would cost in 1945, and what his own recommendations would cost in 1945 and in 1965:

	1938-39	1945		1965
	Actual Expense	Present Schemes	Proposed	Proposed
Government (including local revenues for hospitals and public assistance)	212	265	351	519
Insured persons	55	69	194	192
Employers	66	83	137	132
Other (mainly interest)	9	15	15	15
Total	342	432	697	858

Therefore, as seen in the foregoing table, when the scheme is fully in operation, double the amount spent in 1945 will be disbursed. In comparison with the other contributors, the taxpayers, through the Government contribution, suffer relatively the least increase of burden; then the employers, while the greatest increase comes from the insured persons. However, as explained, since at the time the whole population will be included, the individual rise is less than it seems.

The amount required of the Government in 1938-39 was about one twenty fifth of the national income from all sources. For 1945 it might be something like one sixteenth, assuming full employment and prosperity, while in 1965 the total for insurance from all contributions would amount to about one tenth of the national income. It is a substantial sum, and the question whether the nation can

afford it is not an idle one. On the contrary, it is a very interesting one, for the answer to the question reveals the conditions of success of the whole scheme. First, the nation must maintain its production at a level which will enable all parties to pay their contributions. All the more necessary is it to see that there are full employment, good health, capable and educated citizens. Second, it throws a duty on employers to improve their methods of production, especially where they are producing, as so many in Britain do, for markets abroad where competition must be faced. Third, much of the real burden, in slack work, illness, absenteeism, must in any case be faced in lost efficiency, if the benefits are not provided. Fourth, some of the benefits, like funeral grants, endowments for children's education, and contributions to group health schemes, are already being paid over and beyond the compulsory payments to present-day national insurance schemes. These are to be included in the over-all payment. A larger sum is required from the worker every week; but it is also true that much more is to be given him in return for his payment.

8. *Contributions and poverty.*—The contributions which will have to be made by the insured persons vary somewhat as between the different classes insurable, as to benefits receivable, and as to the age of the contributor. The important points are: First, all contribute a single security contribution on a single insurance document each week or combination of weeks, which is different from the present situation, in which State and voluntary insurance are separate, and in which the latter may be transacted with different companies for different benefits. This is the way of great administrative savings. Second, the mainstay contribution is that paid by an insured male adult—four shillings and sixpence per week. The question has been asked by many, especially those who are opposed to the plan, whether it is justifiable to bind a man to this quite substantial regular weekly payment for weeks, as a condition of getting his benefits. There are many workers who, in normal times, do not earn more than forty shillings a week; one tenth, then, is to go regularly into insurance. Indeed, the Report recognizes that some may have to be assisted by means of machinery auxiliary to the insurance scheme, that is, by public assistance, and, we may add, by voluntary charities.

Indeed, the poverty line taken by Rowntree, upon whose social surveys the scheme is partly founded, and applied to the city of York

in 1936 circumstances, would show that the Beveridge plan would strongly reduce, but would not altogether abolish, poverty. It would still leave quite a large number of people with inadequate wages and earnings.¹ Let it be remembered that the plan is concerned with subsistence, that is, bare necessities, and nothing above. It is important that this should be stressed since there are critics who speak as though men and women were about to be pampered from the cradle to the grave; and as though this rescue of millions from destitution below the lines of subsistence were sure to "sap their character," whatever that may mean.

9. *A Ministry of Social Security.*—The administrative apparatus for the management of the system prescribed is to be a single Ministry of Social Security, to which the various departments, now in command of their respective parts of the social services, would transfer their functions. One of the glories and safeguards of British democratic social advance has been respect for local government. In this connection two things are conspicuous in the Beveridge plan. Sir William envisages central policy-making and authority in control, but the actual execution of the operations would be consigned with more or less elasticity to local government authorities. Such, for example, would occur in regard to public assistance for those in some way or another falling outside or between the meshes of the scheme; for the nation-wide educational opportunity that must be provided; for the public medical service. In regard to the insurance arrangement itself, there would have to be local security offices, and these would include conveniently located advisory bureaux. It is here that the social worker would find a place for the exercise of the social conscience and responsibility of our own day, specially if, as the scheme envisages, many of the functions of private insur-

¹ From the *Times*, December 14, 1942.

<i>Causes of Poverty</i>	<i>Number of Persons in Poverty</i>	<i>Percentage of Those Removed from Poverty</i>
Inadequate wages	5,643	54.5
Inadequate earnings	1,636	26.6
Unemployment	4,909	72.4
Old age	2,521	61.3
Death of husband	1,346	72.1
Illness	701	79.3
Miscellaneous	429	84.8
Total	17,185	61.1

ance should be taken over by the State, so that the number of workers would be greatly increased under governmental conditions of work.

There are opponents of the scheme. There are those who argue that Britain cannot afford it. To this, the Report itself gives a rejoinder, namely, that judged by the rapidity of recovery after the last war, we may look forward to enough wealth to shoulder the burden; and that to omit to implement the scheme would be to weaken our own labor forces. Again, Britain depends on her exports for her high standard of living. Would she not hamstring herself by high social security costs to increase the cost of production and prices in the world market? I have already partly answered this. Colleagues of mine have given an even more satisfactory answer in statistics.² Insurance companies do not like the idea of their profitable business being taken away from them, and even some insurance company employees (some of whom live by pushing unwanted and unafforded insurance on those who must afterward surrender their policies), find the idea repugnant. One Church has spokesmen who seem to prefer that men and women in distress shall come to it for charity, even if it is inadequate, rather than buy their own security with their own funds. There are some socialists who would prefer to reject the benefits to come to the workingman because he may cease to be revolutionary; and some friends of laissez faire fear that an insurance scheme like this would sap the thrift, the character, and the initiative of that same workingman. To the last-mentioned, an answer is given in the plan. There are conditions for benefits: readiness to be retrained; readiness to transfer to another occupation; acceptance of rehabilitation. There is an answer beyond this. It is ridiculous to talk of responsibility and initiative in the face of risks which, in the modern, industrial, large-scale community, are entirely beyond the knowledge and control of any individual, even the most wealthy industrialist. The adaptation of industry to new demands, inventions, and markets necessitates provision for those

² Cf. Kaldor, *Economic Journal*, April, 1943: "The Beveridge scheme itself would add only 5 per cent. to the total Government expenditure . . . it would be more exact to say . . . that the cost of Beveridge to the taxpayer will be 1 penny on beer and sixpence on the income tax—a very moderate sacrifice indeed for the abolition of want. It is less than 1.2 per cent. of the average incomes of all classes of the community . . ." Note that income tax here does not mean the high income tax of war time, but a much modified level.

Cf. Singer, "Can We Afford Beveridge?" *Fabian Publication* No. 72.

affected by transition. It is even tenable that so important is this latter factor in the prosperity of modern industry, that unemployment is a function of industry in transition, seeking new prosperity, that the State should bear all the cost, without any contributions.

The British Parliament has accepted many of the recommendations.³ A Gallup poll⁴ and numerous other manifestations of national opinion add to the conviction that within a few years the plan, practically in its entirety, will be carried out. A great new section will be added to the beneficent services of the Government.

This will require a supplement to the hitherto operative sense of responsibility in social affairs of the nation at large, of the insured, and of the public administrators of the services. The latter, in particular, will be exercising authority in a delicate sphere of human relations; think of those concerned with retraining and rehabilitation, the manifold health services, the workers in the advisory bureaux. They will need deep devotion to their tasks and to the people who depend upon them. Devotion is not a simple thing; there are kinds as well as degrees of it appropriate to each social purpose. In this field of social welfare such devotion must be inspired by the spirit pervading the Beveridge Report—its outlook, its organization, its grasp of the subject, its sovereign good sense—and also by that feeling of helpfulness toward those in want which will obviate the blemish of a supercilious authoritarian attitude that the administrator is by nature always right and the citizen never otherwise than born to be wrong.

That devotion must be in tune with the inspiration of the grand succession of men and women whose lifelong touch gave wisdom and humanity to British social administration. We may briefly recall that succession: Elizabeth Fry; Florence Nightingale; Octavia Hill; Eleanor Rathbone; Mrs. Sidney Webb, who was one of those who introduced Sir William Beveridge into social administration, thus helping to make him but the latest in that splendid line of adminis-

³ It has rejected the subsistence basis of benefits; rising rates of benefit for old age pensions; unlimited duration of unemployment payment; abolition of industrial insurance companies and the housewives' grant was not mentioned. The children's allowances are to be less than proposed by Beveridge, and some are to be paid in kind instead of entirely in money. Medical services, full employment, universal coverage, contributions, substantial benefits, widows' benefits, etc., were accepted.

⁴ Seventy per cent approved; 16 per cent disapproved; 14 per cent were undecided. Of those who disapproved one half said the State should bear all the cost, and one half were too poor to pay the prescribed contribution.

trators in which Sir Edwin Chadwick (Poor Law and health administration), Kay Shuttleworth (education), Sir George Newman (preventive medicine), and Sidney Webb were forerunners.

A famous teacher called men and women of this kind "administrative saints"; and such are the characteristic saints of the twentieth-century community; the kind without which twentieth-century society must fall away into frustration and bitterness. The historian Lecky once said, "The age of great heretics is over." This is true. There are no great heretics, because there are no great ecclesiastical leaders to evoke heresy. But there are great economic and social heretics because there is a strong, widely diffused faith in a new and better social order that challenges the one which now has ruling force. A new faith challenges an old habit. It is in this coming order that the administrative saints have their work to do, and one of its media is full social security in our time.

THE SECURITY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD

By EVELINE M. BURNS

ON MARCH 10, 1943, the President transmitted to the Congress two reports from the National Resources Planning Board. The first of these, entitled *National Resources Development Report for 1943*, was what the publishers would call a slim volume. It attempted to outline the major problems to be faced by this country in effecting an orderly transition from war to peace, in such a way as to maintain full employment. The report also suggested some of the steps which might even now be taken, and some of the policies which seemed to the Board to merit careful consideration and further exploration. It was not a blueprint, but rather an agenda.

The second report was, as the press has reproachfully pointed out, a much more bulky document, entitled *Security, Work, and Relief Policies* (known as the security report). It represented the fruits of a three-year study of public-aid policies which the Board had begun in 1939. It was a document which attempted to set upon the record just how much progress the nation has made in assuring freedom from want, and what remains to be done before that goal is attained. On the basis of this careful factual analysis, recommendations for future policy, both general and specific, were made.

In a very real sense these two reports supplement each other. The security report necessarily deals with only one aspect of the postwar problem, although a very important aspect. Clearly, for the vast majority of our people, freedom from want must and should be attained through participating in production. According to the security report, "the great security that the vast majority of people look for is the opportunity to work at decent wages." The major

domestic problem confronting postwar America is thus to discover ways and means of doing in peace what we have discovered we can do in war, namely, to assure effective employment of all our resources, including labor, and by so doing to raise the national income to heights undreamed of in the prewar era. It is this challenging task which forms the subject matter of the *National Resources Development Report*.

But the Board realized that even if the nation should successfully solve the problem of full employment it would not thereby have reached automatically the goal of freedom from want. The old, the young, the sick, and the seasonally or temporarily unemployed would not necessarily be assured of incomes even if we had full employment as that term is generally understood. Even today, with employment at its all-time peak, indeed with a labor shortage, there are over four million households who derive all or part of their incomes from some form of public aid. Every departure from full employment must swell the totals of those in need of socially provided income.

Thus the two reports are complementary: the one (the development report) deals with the broad problems of postwar planning on the domestic front with special reference to full employment; the other (the security report) takes one single field, namely, the problem of insuring freedom from want, and deals with it in an exhaustive manner.

The security report was begun in 1939. At that time the National Resources Planning Board appointed a special committee on long-range work and relief policies, under the chairmanship of Professor William Haber. The membership of the committee consisted of representatives of the major Federal agencies concerned with public-aid programs, state and local welfare administrators and private agencies, as well as two independent experts.¹ The report was prepared by a

¹ The membership of the committee and their affiliations at the time of appointment are as follows: William Haber, chairman, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan; Will W. Alexander, former administrator, Farm Security Administration; C. M. Bookman, Executive Vice Chairman, Community Chest of Cincinnati; Corrington Gill, Assistant Commissioner, Work Projects Administration; the Right Rev. Francis J. Haas, Dean, School of Social Science, the Catholic University of America; Fred K. Hoehler, Executive Director, American Public Welfare Association; Katherine F. Lenroot, Chief, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor; Mary E. Switzer, Assistant to the Administrator, Federal Security Agency; and T. J. Woofter, Jr., Director of Research, Federal Security Agency; Director of Research, Eveline M. Burns.

special research staff under my direction, with the assistance and coöperation of the research staffs in the Federal agencies concerned and of many state and local welfare agencies.

It is especially noteworthy that the entire report, including the recommendations, was unanimously approved by all members of the committee. Those who are familiar with the difficulties of coördinating policy and reconciling diverse viewpoints will appreciate the significance of this fact and will probably share my regret that it is not more widely realized that the report is in a very real sense a product of joint thinking. In this, our report differs notably from that of Sir William Beveridge, which was the report of one man and not the unanimous opinion of a committee.

Our first task was to set upon the record just how much we had or had not done in assuring security and job opportunity to our people. Unlike Sir William Beveridge again, we did not have the advantage of a long series of special inquiries or royal commissions on which we could draw. Many of the questions we asked had not been asked before, or had not been asked in relation to the entire country. Yet, at the risk of producing a volume of unwieldy size, we believed that it was vital to establish the facts before we could proceed to make recommendations. Too much had happened too fast in the decade of the thirties for it to be anything but presumptuous to lay long-range plans without making an inventory of where we stood in 1940. We believed, too, that if we put the facts on the record those who disagreed with our specific recommendations would at least be in a position to begin where we left off. Their alternative proposals, like ours, would have to be tested against realities.

The results of our survey were, to say the least, disturbing. We found, in the first place, that despite the measures developed in the thirties, we still had no guarantee by 1940 that people in need could be assured freedom from want. One of the characteristics of our American attack upon the problem of insecurity has been the development of a series of diversified programs. Each of these programs was presumably developed because we believed that certain types of people had unique and special needs which called for special provision. It followed that in each of these programs there were eligibility conditions, the object of which was to restrict the program to the people for whom it was uniquely appropriate. The causes of need are so various that, as might have been expected, there was

always a substantial number of persons who could not fit into these categories. This fact could not have impeded our attainment of freedom from want if there had been everywhere in existence a basic system which would have provided adequately and without loss of self-respect for those people who could not properly be cared for on any of the special programs.

Unfortunately, in many parts of the country, this condition was not satisfied. Either there was no general public assistance program at all or, where it existed, it was so inadequately financed or so restrictive in its conditions that literally thousands of people were denied any kind of public aid. They may have received surplus commodities, but there are few who would argue that the occasional receipt of celery, grapefruit, and beans was, in any real sense of the words, freedom from want.

A study of our existing programs reveals, in the second place, that the standard of living of the vast majority of people at any time dependent on public aid was extremely low. Obviously, no one would argue that a country could assure to all its unemployed, its sick, and its aged, a standard of living equal to that secured by those who actively participate in production. Nevertheless, there is a minimum below which a wealthy country cannot afford to allow its people to fall. The standard of living which was, to use an ironic word, "enjoyed" by many of the beneficiaries of our special programs before the war was little less than a disgrace. Nor were we very farsighted in the way in which we differentiated between different groups of needy people. By and large, we treated our children much worse than we treated our aged.

The growth of social insurance in this country and the enthusiastic reception of the Beveridge Report, which proposes to make social insurance universal in Great Britain, indicate that this way of assuring freedom from want is one that is clearly favored by our people. In fact, our social insurance programs today still cover only a fraction of our population. The remainder, if they are secured against want at all, must receive public aid through other programs which involve the passage of a means test and which often impose conditions which are destructive of the self-respect of the applicant. Here again is one of the questions we have yet to answer before we can feel that we have satisfactorily solved the problem of freedom from want. If the British are able to offer social insurance as the

instrument for providing security to all their people, are there reasons why we cannot do the same? If we find that there are real economic and social differences between the two countries which might prevent our using social insurance as fully as the British, can we do anything else to make the position of persons excluded from social insurance less insecure?

Unlike Great Britain, this country has prided itself on adopting a broad view of the problems of economic insecurity. When a man loses his job, by and large, the British answer is that he should be given social insurance benefits indefinitely. We recognize that unemployment means much more than the mere loss of money income. We have insisted in the past that, after a period of unemployment, society must take action to prevent the demoralization, the loss of skills, and the sense of nonparticipation in creative work that idleness brings.

Yet, a survey of our experience with work programs in recent years shows that we have not in fact offered a job to all people who have been out of work for any substantial period of time. Indeed, in the thirties we did not even succeed in providing work for all the needy unemployed. Moreover, because we confused the work and the relief objectives in a single work-relief program, the achievements of the work program itself were less than they would otherwise have been. We put a certain number of unemployable or inefficient workers on the work program because that was the only way in which we could afford them some measure of security. Inevitably, the quality of the work and the reputation of the work program suffered. We told ourselves that we were giving people work because that was the only self-respecting way to treat an unemployed person. Yet, before a man could be given work relief, we forced him to undergo a test of need which he was unlikely to pass unless he had exhausted all his resources. After he had been employed on a work program for eighteen months, and might have begun to feel some sense of security and respect for himself, we threw him off the work program, telling him we would take him on again if he could show that he had once again exhausted all his resources and could pass a fairly restrictive test of need.

Unlike the British, we have shown in past years that we recognize the special problems of unemployed young people. We did, indeed, develop two major programs for unemployed youth, but here again

we did not fully master the problem. We were never sufficiently clear as to what we were trying to do for young people. We never provided work or training through the Civilian Conservation Corps or the National Youth Administration for all the young people who were at any time unemployed. We were not even sufficiently careful to see that the kind of thing done for young people was, in fact, calculated to instill into them disciplines, steady work habits, and needed skills.

Up to this point I have looked at our freedom-from-want programs from the point of view of the people concerned. Other shortcomings are, however, apparent when one considers the methods by which we financed these programs and the ways in which they were administered. We have not yet succeeded in so distributing Federal aid in the states as to enable all states to meet need arising within their borders without throwing a disproportionately heavy burden upon state and local taxpayers. Nor have we succeeded in distributing Federal funds among programs in a way that will lead to a balanced and socially desirable development of the individual programs. General relief, in which the Federal Government and some state governments do not participate, is still the stepchild among all our security measures. The financing of public-aid programs has not yet been recognized as an important component of our entire fiscal policy and has not been properly integrated with the other fiscal policies of government. We still rely upon types of taxes, such as sales and wage taxes, which throw a relatively heavy burden upon the lowest income groups and thus make still more insecure the position of those whose economic insecurity we aim to reduce.

In the administrative field the country has, and very properly, developed a series of diversified programs. Nevertheless, we have not yet avoided various types of overlapping between programs, nor have we as yet solved the difficult problems of intergovernmental relationships that arise when several levels of government are involved in the administration of any one program. In particular, the position of the state welfare administrator is especially difficult because he must maintain relationships with a great variety of Federal agencies which have not always adopted common policies in regard to matters of common concern, and frequently he must also supervise the activities of an unwieldy number of local units.

Finally, the complicated administrative organization which re-

sults from our diversified programs and our Federal system causes very real difficulties for the applicant for public aid and for the employer and other members of the public who must supply information and pay taxes. Applicants have no central point to which they can go to find out what services they are entitled to, and they may well be confused by the numerous points of access to the various public-aid programs. Further, they may be investigated by representatives of more than one agency. Employers are irritated by the numerous and uncoordinated requests for information from the many agencies administering public-aid programs, and by the many tax returns to be completed.

Our recommendations for dealing with the situation revealed by the factual study took the form of both general and specific proposals. Because the committee found much confusion of objectives and inconsistency of policy in the thirties, we proposed the adoption of certain clearly defined objectives of policy and the application of certain financial and administrative principles to all programs. We then proceeded to apply these policies and principles to existing programs in order to arrive at specific recommendations for each. Only in this way, we believed, would the country have any assurance that it was working toward the evolution of an adequate, well-rounded, and consistent system of social security.

In brief, it can be said that our proposals involved a fivefold approach to this goal. In the first place, we urged that government must be prepared to provide real jobs for those whom private industry cannot employ, because we believe that, after a certain period of unemployment, both the individual and the society of which he is a part suffer if his labor is not productively utilized. To do this during the inevitable readjustments of the postwar years, we must begin now to plan for useful projects. We must decide the broad policy questions which such an undertaking will raise, such as the appropriate hours of work and the rates of wages and standards of efficiency which are to prevail. We must frankly answer the question as to whether we are prepared to spend the necessary money which alone will make possible a real work program that will benefit both the worker and the nation as a whole.

In the second place, the committee proposed special measures which will avoid the wastage of the strategic years of our young people. If they should not find jobs on completing their education,

we must see that they are provided with the necessary work and training which will enable them on reaching adulthood to compete effectively with other adults. We must see to it, also, that they have the opportunity to acquire the necessary education that will enable them to function as intelligent citizens. Here, too, there are many problems of policy and procedure which we must settle if we are to be ready by the end of the war with measures all set to go.

Our people have clearly demonstrated their preference for the social insurance method of assuring income when they are prevented from earning through old age, illness, or temporary unemployment, and of providing also for their survivors in case of death. The committee therefore recommended in the third place that steps should now be taken to extend the benefits of existing social insurance programs to as large a proportion of the population as possible. We also urged immediate enactment of permanent and temporary disability insurance. We pointed out that many difficult technical questions must be solved and some major problems of principle must be decided if we are to make social insurance available to a much larger proportion of the population than now enjoys its benefits. Because of the important role which social insurance, especially unemployment compensation, can play in maintaining a flow of income during the postwar readjustment period, we cannot begin too soon to strengthen our existing programs.

Because of the fact, which is recognized in all countries, that social insurance can never provide for all types of need and all family circumstances, the committee recommended the development of a comprehensive general public assistance system to care for needy people regardless of their age, sex, or place of residence. We made specific proposals for the financing and administration of such a service, and outlined its general character.

Finally, and in some ways most importantly, the committee argued that the most intelligent attack upon insecurity is to prevent it in so far as we can. Much insecurity is due to ill health. Much is due to the low level of wages that prevails in certain parts of the country. Some of it arises from the ineffectiveness of our arrangements for putting men in touch with jobs and for seeing that they have acquired the skills and training required by modern industry. If our social security programs are to meet the challenge of the postwar world, we must begin now to examine the social services which

have a preventive and constructive character and plan for their expansion where this is needed. Only in this way can we reduce the problem of want to manageable proportions.

In addition to these proposals for specific programs, the committee made many suggestions for changes in the manner in which our programs are financed and administered, which I cannot discuss in detail. I can only urge you to read the last part (Part V) of our report, which I believe will convince you that we have tried to take account of the many considerations which must be weighed if we are to achieve success in our goal of abolishing want. I repeat that the problem is not a simple one, and we believed that we would be only misleading people if we pretended that it was.

I have given you the broad outlines of the committee's report, indicating what it does and does not do. Objections will be raised on both counts. Some people will complain that the committee gives no estimates of the probable costs of putting its recommendations into effect, or they will say that such a plan for social security will be prohibitively costly. I suspect we shall have, on one hand, to meet the objection that our proposals lack the administrative simplicity of those now being discussed by our British allies and, on the other hand, the charge that we have given too large a role to the Federal Government in view of the heterogeneity of our country. Finally, we shall undoubtedly be told that now is not the time to undertake social reforms.

The first group will point to the neat and precise figures of Sir William Beveridge and ask why we offer no similar estimates. The answer lies in the fact that economic and social conditions in Great Britain are very different from those in this country. The British have already accepted, in large measure, the doctrine that the central government has a responsibility to insure maintenance to all its people. Moreover, geographical differences in standards of living are far less marked in Britain than here. Hence, Beveridge can recommend immediate adoption of a system of universal coverage and uniform benefits and, with the background of thirty years' experience with social insurance, can estimate pretty closely just how many people will be eligible for benefits over a given period and, therefore, how much money will be needed.

The second criticism on the ground of costs is that we cannot afford social security as envisioned in the report of the committee.

On purely economic grounds, I believe this to be a mistaken view. In the first place, the report does not call for any large new outlay of money, with the exception of sums needed to finance public provision of work. Social insurance is largely a redistribution of income. Expenditures for the work program will be very heavy only at times of depression, when all economists agree that there is a need for an expansionist policy on the part of government. The provision of income to the unemployed through this program would be a means of vitalizing the economy. If we accept public provision of work as a regular policy, and plan for it, we can give to business new evidence of demand on which investment will be based. At the same time, we shall be adding to the wealth of the country through the product of our work programs.

People who believe that administrative problems can be solved through simple organization charts will object that the committee's plan for the administration of public aid is too complicated. Why can we not have something simple like Beveridge's, they will ask. The answer is twofold. In the first place, we have traditionally recognized that the problem of insecurity cannot be met merely by the provision of maintenance. We believe in the right to work as well as the right to maintenance. Hence the report calls for work programs and youth programs in addition to the programs which provide cash income, as the Beveridge Report does not. Such programs are not logically administered by an agency dealing with social insurance and public assistance. In the second place, Great Britain is a far more homogeneous country than the United States, and administrative problems are not raised there by a Federal form of government. So Beveridge is able to centralize his income-maintenance programs in one national agency, with operating units in the local communities.

The committee's proposals to solve the many-sided problem of insecurity are necessarily many-dimensional, reflecting the diversity of the American scene. Their operation will involve more programs and call for the participation of more than one level of government. Indeed, I suspect that some of the criticism we shall meet will stem from a point of view diametrically opposed to that which I have just discussed. Those who recall our proposals for a Federal grant-in-aid for general relief, accompanied by Federal standards, and for federalization of the employment service and unemployment compensa-

tion may fear that we are unduly centralizing the administration of public-aid programs.

I want to make it particularly clear that the committee was not merely seeking the extension of Federal authority into another field or into all fields of public aid. It was not a group of Federal officials trying to enlarge their domain. Two members were representatives of state and local public and private agencies; two other members, including the chairman, were not agency representatives at all, although they were well informed in the welfare field. Furthermore, the report is based not merely on data from the Federal agencies, but also on a mass of material from state and local agencies, both public and private, in published form or supplied directly to the committee by the agencies. This is one reason for the length of the report. Almost every page is documented with data from state and local sources. The committee was particularly proud of the results of its study of general relief; we believe that never before has so much material on this important program been gathered together in one report. In a very real sense, the state and local welfare officials were collaborators, and their points of view and suggestions, for action in the Federal field as well as in their own agencies, were carefully considered by the committee.

The committee has definitely stated that "our preference is in general for joint operation" of public-aid programs. But the problem of insecurity is so complex that highly diversified measures have to be developed to meet it, and no simple formula can be used to allot responsibility to any government. The issue is no longer the simple antithesis of Federal vs. local control. We have, therefore, to attempt to preserve the obvious values of local participation in a service so vital to a community and to the nation as public welfare, while making sure that, in the national interest, no community performs this service badly because it is either unable or unwilling to provide minimum security.

I can assure you that where the committee has recommended increased Federal control (as in unemployment compensation), or increased Federal participation (as in general public assistance), it has done so in an effort to allow our public-aid systems to fulfill their highest potentialities and to preserve the national interest in the assurance of security to all our citizens, rather than out of any intent to increase the domain of the Federal Government.

Finally, there will be many people who will say that we must postpone plans for such a utopia until the war is won. The committee's answer to that would be that it is likely to be too late to lay plans, once the inevitable strains and adjustments of the postwar years are upon us. Take a look at what is happening now—the enormous increase in industrial facilities with their unpredictable effects on levels of production, the breathtaking discoveries being made every day in new uses of basic commodities. Any thoughtful man can see that this tremendous increase, both of things to make and things to make with, is bound to create a period of trial and error and readjustment after the war before the broad patterns of peacetime economy become established. The least we can do now—and it is a great deal—is to make sure in our own self-interest that there is a minimum volume of continuous income flow in the country, a minimum amount of purchasing power as a floor for our new economy. This is the positive reason for planning postwar security now. The negative reason is that unless we do, we shall have to meet problems of unemployment and distress head on, extemporizing as best we can. Then we shall have the story of the thirties repeated, with here a little aid and there a little aid, expanding or curtailing or abolishing programs with no clear sense of where we are going or what we are trying to do—and with no real freedom from want. Many of the gains of the past decade will be wiped out, and we shall reproach ourselves for lacking the plain common sense and intellectual courage to think these things through. We must have planning now to win the peace.

SOCIAL WORK AND THE FIRST FEDERAL RELIEF PROGRAMS

By JOANNA C. COLCORD

IN REVIEWING Josephine Brown's book on public relief,¹ I stated: "Participation by social workers in the demand for federal relief is a chapter in the history of social work that still remains to be written." Now I have been asked to write that chapter.

We may find it hard to recall, if our professional lives go back of 1929, and difficult to credit, if they began later, how entirely absent from American thinking prior to the depression was the idea that the Federal Government should participate in the relief of its needy citizens. It was, indeed, taking an extreme position to declare that states should share the burden with localities. Pressure upon states was confined to the forerunners of social insurance which were being fought for in the first two decades of the present century—workmen's compensation, mothers' aid, old age pensions—and in all these areas progress was sought after, state by state, with little or nothing said about the possibility of Federal action.

The earliest demand for Federal participation in a relief program occurred in Chicago in 1914, when the Chicago Municipal Markets Commission—by no means a social work group—in a report to the mayor and aldermen on a practical plan for relieving destitution and unemployment saw no solution of the problem of homeless migrants unless the Federal Government would assume financial responsibility for their care. Only in 1933, and for a brief period of years thereafter, was that demand met.

In one area and only one, namely, proposals for planned public works to relieve unemployment, was Federal responsibility envisaged from the first and made a center of agitation by the small group

¹ Josephine Brown, *Public Relief 1929-1939* (New York: Holt, 1940).

who stood for and promoted the idea of thus not only mitigating, but also to some degree preventing, the ravages of cyclical unemployment. The earliest Federal unemployment legislation proposed in the depression was a bill to set up a planned program of public works, introduced by Senator Wagner of New York and left pending when Congress adjourned in the summer of 1930.

At the annual meeting of the National Conference of Social Work at San Francisco in 1929, Daisy Worcester, of San Diego, rocked the Conference with her paper on "The Standard of Living." I turned back to it to see if it contained any hint of Federal relief responsibility; I could not find that it did. Mrs. Worcester certainly made a monkey of the newly released report on recent economic changes made by the National Bureau of Economic Research, and called on social workers to take leadership in presenting the true facts to the American people, but in relation to securing a living wage in an era of economic prosperity, rather than in relation to relief on a national scale—a need not then envisaged.

In the fall of that same year, there came an economic change indeed, and the whole skyscraper to which the Bureau of Economic Research had devoted two volumes of laudation crumbled into dust. The depth of the economic debacle and the prolongation of its consequences were not immediately apparent to social workers. Only with the spring of 1930, when relief applications continued to mount instead of seasonally declining, did the agencies realize what lay ahead. In attempting to make their communities aware of the situation, many of them encountered the opposition of industrialists and merchants, who felt that the demands for community action were "bad for business." Only in the late summer and early fall of 1930 was emergency organization to prepare for the coming winter resorted to in most cities; and more than another year was to elapse before the first state—New York—took action to come to the aid of localities.

Josephine Brown claims that as early as the fall of 1930, "city officials, private citizens, and congressmen alike began to urge the appropriation of federal funds for unemployment relief"²—the implication being that the rest of the country preceded social work in these demands. In this statement she is completely ahead of her story. It is true that social work was not at that time urging Federal

² *Ibid.*

relief, but no more was anyone else whose voice aroused discussion. The President's Committee on Employment, organized in November, 1930, served only as a clearinghouse and adviser for local efforts to promote employment and relieve the unemployed. The country went into the second winter of the depression in the hope and belief that it would be the last. Washington's official position at that time was that the primary responsibility lay with local voluntary agencies (both regular and emergency), with local governments lending what aid they could.

But as the bitter winter deepened, voices did begin to be raised in demand for Federal action. Ten bills were introduced during the winter, most of them designating the American Red Cross to administer Federal unemployment relief. None of them came to actual vote. President Hoover's reply to this demand, made in February, 1931, was the assertion of his willingness to throw Federal resources into relief, but only "if the time should ever come that the voluntary agencies of the country together with the local and state governments are unable to prevent hunger and suffering."

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a year and a half later, when he was campaigning to succeed Mr. Hoover (who had meanwhile reluctantly signed the Emergency Relief and Construction Act), stated a position not so very different from this, though in positive rather than in negative terms. He was quoted in the *New York Times* of October 14, 1932, as stating his conviction that,

the primary duty rests on the community through local government and private agencies to take care of the relief of unemployment. . . . I am very certain that the obligation extends beyond the States and to the Federal Government itself if and when it becomes apparent that States and communities are unable to take care of the necessary relief work.

This, in short, was what America believed, as expressed by its two leading candidates for the presidency. But by the fall of 1932, many social workers were convinced that the time envisaged by both speakers had come, and passed.

In the early summer of 1931, the National Conference of Social Work met at Minneapolis. The delegates' minds were full of the tragic winter behind them, and many discussions centered around unemployment, and public versus private relief. In one of the ses-

sions, Linton Swift, speaking on "The Future of Public Social Work," alluded to,

the statement reiterated several times by President Hoover in the past winter, to the effect that the American method of assisting the unemployed is through private charity. Many of us sharply disagree with this statement, not merely because it is not true, but because of its implications. . . . We all know that between 70 and 80 percent of all the relief spent in this country comes from public tax funds. . . . Many of us are convinced that responsibility [for unemployment relief] should be centered as much as possible in local and state governments, where the people may be more continuously aware of its implications. Because of that conviction most of us would agree that Federal appropriations for relief of unemployment should be only a last resort.³

In another session, Harry Lurie, speaking on "The Drift to Public Relief," took a different view:

It is obvious that the principle of equalization of tax resources is essential if a satisfactory nation-wide system of relief is to be established. . . . The Federal Government should not indefinitely evade responsibility for these problems. . . . Through an appropriate governmental department . . . the resources of the Federal Government might have been made available by some form of proportionate grants to the states in the drought area and to industrial regions now suffering from unparalleled conditions of distress.

Only a few weeks were to elapse, however, before these two speakers were associated with other social work leaders in a spontaneous movement to contribute the knowledge and experience of social work to the rising discussion of Federal relief. In the early summer of 1931 the National Social Work Council, an association made up of delegates from many of the national functional agencies, began to discuss organization "with a view toward formulating such contributions as social work can offer during the approaching session of Congress," and on October 13 an informal Social Work Conference on Federal Action on Unemployment was constituted. (Among the replies received from persons asked to serve was one from Aubrey Williams, then secretary of the Wisconsin State Conference on Social Work, who urged a Federal program of public works!)

³ Mr. Swift called attention to the fact, however, that many communities had already exhausted their public and private relief resources, and ended by warning against "acceptance of any relief program as a substitute for more fundamental social action"—a significant point, in view of our present discussion of an expanded social security program.

October 13 was marked by another important contribution of social work to Federal action. It was the date on which William Hodson, then Executive Director of the Welfare Council of New York City, wrote his open letter to President Hoover, calling first for a rapid but objective study of the financial status of local units of government; and second, if they should prove unable to carry unemployment relief, for Federal subventions by means of grants-in-aid.

When the organization of the Social Work Conference on Federal Action was complete, there were 157 members, representing twenty-eight different states and fifty different cities. A Steering Committee was appointed, consisting of: Frank Bane (American Public Welfare Association); Howard S. Braucher (National Social Work Council); Allen T. Burns (Association of Community Chests and Councils); C. C. Carstens (Child Welfare League of America); Joanna C. Colcord (Russell Sage Foundation); Helen Crosby⁴; John A. Fitch (New York School of Social Work); David H. Holbrook (National Social Work Council); Paul U. Kellogg (*Survey*); H. L. Lurie (Bureau of Jewish Social Research); John O'Grady (National Conference of Catholic Charities); Walter M. West (American Association of Social Workers); Linton B. Swift, Chairman (Family Welfare Association of America); and Benson Y. Landis, Secretary (American Country Life Association). Subcommittees were set up on methods of administration of Federal aid for unemployment relief (Joanna C. Colcord, chairman), and on Federal aid for public works (John Fitch, later John O'Grady, chairman). The task of assembling data on the adequacy of existing resources, state and local, for unemployment relief, was assigned to Frank Bane, serving without committee.

The Steering Committee's first report emphasized that membership in the Conference and on its Steering Committee was purely personal:

Neither group assumes to speak for the field of social work, for social agencies, or to bind the Conference as a whole. In consulting with persons interested in Federal legislation, Committee members . . . acted as individuals and not as official representatives of the Committee, even though they may have made use of material developed by the group.

⁴Miss Crosby was loaned to the Family Welfare Association of America by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and did yeoman service by acting as assistant secretary to the Steering Committee.

The Social Work Conference on Federal Action had no budget. Its constituent national agencies met all expenditures of their staff members for clerical work, wires, and postage, and for travel expenses to and from Washington, except when they were summoned to give testimony at congressional hearings. The director of one of these agencies told me that he estimates the cost to his agency alone, and exclusive of his own time, to have been over \$1,500. This at once answers the question of why it was the national agencies, and not the professional association of social workers, which originally took the lead. However, the difference was more apparent than real; for more than 80 percent of the members of the Conference were members of the American Association of Social Work, and of the nine members on its Unemployment Commission, established in June, 1931, all but two became members of the Conference as well, and two of these served on its Steering Committee. The Association believed that it would be more useful to put its weight behind the Conference, and its own Unemployment Commission, after a few months of existence, became more or less inactive.

The President's Emergency Committee for Employment was reorganized in the fall of 1931 under the chairmanship of Walter Gifford, and its new name, the President's Organization for Unemployment Relief, indicated a changed focus. As state funds began to be available during the fall and winter, the policy of this agency changed to the extent of recognizing the responsibility of states to come to the aid of localities, but it continued to set its face against Federal intervention, as the testimony of its chairman at congressional hearings clearly shows.

When it first came together, the Steering Committee of the Social Work Conference on Federal Action was far from unanimous in its opinions, which ranged between,

a frank advocacy of Federal grants as a means of equalizing resources, a recognition of Federal aid only as a last resort after local and state resources are exhausted, and opposition to federal aid as a matter of principle. There seems to be general agreement, however [the report states] that any action which may be taken in Congress this winter will be of great importance to social work, and that if any Federal appropriation is to be made for alleviation of unemployment through public works and federal grants in aid of relief, social work should exert such influence as lies within its competence, to assure sound methods in the allocation and administration of such funds.

The stated purposes of the Conference included:

1. Securing, analyzing, and making available information on current proposals for alleviating unemployment through Federal appropriations for public works and grants-in-aid of relief, particularly as to those aspects which, although outside the special competence of social work, may influence our suggestions on other aspects
2. Developing (with as wide participation as possible in so short a period) such suggestions as social work is competent to make in the formulation and administration of such a program
3. Securing from those who are framing or proposing legislation, a hearing for the social work point of view, and developing support in the various social work groups for the suggestions developed through the Conference

Just how the third of these purposes should be carried out had not been planned when, on October 26, Prentice Murphy forwarded to David Holbrook a letter from Senator Costigan's secretary (with whom Mr. Murphy had been associated in the White House Conference of the previous year), asking for information as to "how completely the extent of [the need for unemployment relief] has been measured, and what the existing agencies are prepared to do in the way of relief." Senator Costigan's own account of what followed is from the *Congressional Record* of February 5, 1932:

Before this session of Congress opened I was convinced that there is overwhelming need in America for relief, long disregarded. . . . So persuaded, when I arrived in Washington a month or so before Congress assembled, I immediately proceeded, by consultation with expert men and women, to obtain answers to certain questions. I dispatched letters and telegrams to different parts of the country, designed to secure the best available advice from those best advised on the relief needs and resources of the country . . .

To my agreeable surprise, instead of receiving an occasional answer making random suggestions, I was promptly advised that there were large groups of leading social workers in America who desired to confer with members of the Congress on this highly important subject. Some of those who responded, let me say in frankness, were opposed at that time to Federal legislation. They were invited to Washington, none the less, for the conferences that seemed necessary for a sound solution of this problem. They came; a substantial number of them came; and on different days—mind you, this was before Congress assembled—full-day private sessions were held with men and women of America who know most about the overwhelming relief needs of the country, and are best qualified to advise on the most constructive way in which to deal with those needs.

On November 7, the first of these meetings was arranged in Washington, at which members of the Steering Committee and some co-opted members of the Conference itself discussed informally with Senators Costigan and La Follette and Representative Lewis provisions of the Federal relief bill which these legislators were then in the process of drafting.

That so close a contact was established with Washington was, of course, due first to the fact that Senator Costigan had long fought for measures near to social workers' hearts, and his attitude toward them was already favorable. We did not have to peddle our goods, so far as he was concerned. The second important factor was that we had goods to offer. Although the differences of opinion within the group about the desirability of Federal relief had by no means been resolved, as Senator Costigan indicated, all agreed that the measure which was to be introduced should have every administrative safeguard which the experience of social workers could suggest, and there was wholehearted coöperation in drawing up these standards. By the time of the first conference with Senator Costigan a preliminary report on suggested methods of administration was before the Steering Committee and, later in the month, one upon public works had been prepared. These reports were made available to the senators, and subsequently printed and circulated with minor verbal changes in the Steering Committee's report, which appeared in January, 1932.

This report stated definitely as the majority opinion of the committee that Federal aid was required, and that it should include both home relief and work relief, the latter preferably in the form of road construction. The arguments against Federal aid were examined, and refuted by arguments and facts in its favor. The Steering Committee's chief recommendations were: (1) that Federal funds should be given as grants-in-aid, for which the states should apply, furnishing supporting data and agreeing to abide by Federal regulations; and (2) that allocation be entrusted to a board, whose executive should be the Director of the Children's Bureau. This Bureau was, it will be recalled, the only Federal agency in existence at the time whose program fell within the area of social work. These provisions, as well as many others suggested by the Steering Committee, were incorporated in the Costigan-La Follette bill introduced on January 15, 1932.

Prior to this, however, two earlier bills had been introduced, and hearings held upon them before the Senate Committee on Manufactures. These hearings gave opportunity for the data on need for Federal aid gathered by the Steering Committee to be presented in support of the bills; and some twenty social workers appeared and spoke. The work of organizing the testimony fell to Walter West. A great deal of this testimony was used by Senators Costigan and La Follette in the debate upon their bill, which, as we will recall, was defeated on February 16, 1932. Senator Costigan once said that after it was all over, one of the senators who had opposed the bill came to him and congratulated him on the informative and disinterested nature of the testimony produced in its support. "It is a rare thing," this man said in effect, "for a group of people to come before us armed with facts and argument, and seeking not their own benefit, but that of other people."

Contact with Washington on behalf of social work fell chiefly to four men, who came to be familiarly called the "Four Horsemen." These were Allen Burns, William Hodson,⁵ Linton Swift, and Walter West. Friends who called their offices became accustomed to the report, "He's in Washington for the rest of the week"; and every porter on the Pennsylvania Railroad became familiar with their faces.

Defeat of the Costigan-La Follette bill was a victory for the Hoover administration. But the specter of want would not down; and almost immediately new bills for Federal relief were introduced, Senator Wagner picking up the ball from Costigan and La Follette. As originally introduced, his bill was very like its predecessor in respect to Federal relief, but it doubled the appropriation, one-half to go to road building. The Steering Committee's relations with Senator Wagner at this point were not as close as with the other two senators; and since most of the work on the bill was done behind closed doors, the committee cannot be said to have had an effective hand in drafting the provisions of what emerged after amendments as the Emergency Relief and Construction Act, passed in July, 1932, just as the Congress was disbanding. Leo Wolman, writing in the *Yale Review* a few months later, called it "unfortunate that, in this first experiment with Federal unemployment aid, the recommenda-

⁵ Mr. Hodson did not represent a national agency, and though a member of the Conference, was not on the Steering Committee.

tion made by organizations of social workers . . . was not incorporated in the law finally enacted by Congress."

The Steering Committee's program during the summer, while the newly established Reconstruction Finance Corporation got under way with the program of relief loans to states and municipalities, was one of watchful waiting. In November, 1932, the Social Work Conference on Federal Action on Unemployment was dissolved, and the personnel of the Steering Committee became the Committee on Federal Action on Unemployment of the American Association of Social Work.⁶ The Executive Committee a few months later discharged its Commission on Unemployment, and merged the two programs.

There was little change in personnel thereafter, and no interruption in program. One prime advantage in the change lay in the use which could now be made of chapters of the Association, and in the rapid exchange of information between the committee and related groups in important centers of population. From the first, the Steering Committee had recognized that it was "lame" when it came to getting information from rural and unorganized territory, which in those days was not covered by a network of county public welfare offices. To meet this situation so far as possible, the Association secured correspondents from among its members in non-chapter territory, and obtained regular reports from them as well as from the chapters, keeping all members informed about progress in Federal legislation through the columns of its journal, the *Compass*. Subcommittees were set up on (1) methods of administration of Federal relief (Joanna C. Colcord, chairman); (2) Federal legislation for transients and homeless (C. C. Carstens, chairman);⁷ and (3) relief needs, resources, and standards of adequacy (Ralph Hurlin, chairman).

Efforts to substitute a more adequate Federal relief program than that being conducted under the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-

⁶ The committee functioned under this name till the fall of 1933, when its name was changed to the Committee on Federal Action in Social Welfare. In April, 1934, when the Association adopted a divisional structure, the members of the Committee became the Division of Government and Social Work.

⁷ The work of this subcommittee soon was absorbed in that of a national Committee on the Care of Transient and Homeless, appointed by the National Social Work Council, which secured an independent budget and engaged in a program of activities until December, 1938, when it was succeeded by the short-lived Council on Interstate Migration.

tion were resumed in the fall of 1932. Senator Cutting introduced a bill, which failed to pass, amending the Emergency Relief and Construction Act to provide Federal aid to states in caring for homeless and transients, and Senators Costigan and La Follette reintroduced essentially the same bill which had been defeated at the previous session of Congress. Hearings on this bill were held January 3-17. The testimony of about twenty-five social workers representing the American Association of Social Workers was again arranged and organized by Mr. West, and an independent group, the Conference on the Maintenance of Welfare Standards, organized the previous November by the American Public Welfare Association and cooperating agencies in Chicago, presented a detailed and comprehensive report. On January 27 the Executive Committee of the American Association of Social Workers reaffirmed the Association's support of a broader program of coöperation between the Federal Government and the states, in a series of resolutions transmitted to chapters together with an analysis showing that in six specified respects the Emergency Relief and Construction Act then in effect failed to contain provisions held necessary by the Association, while in these same respects the Costigan-La Follette bill did provide these safeguards. The points regarded as essential were:

(1) Grants to the states instead of loans; (2) a small appointive board of qualified persons to administer federal relief funds; (3) specific authority in the Federal board to assist in the development of state administrative programs; (4) limiting of the federal government's relations to state governments in the allocation of relief so that the federal government does not deal directly with sub-divisions of states; and (5) provision for the homeless and transient.

The Senate again rejected the Costigan-La Follette bill, and substituted an amendment to the Emergency Relief and Construction Act by Senator Wagner, the only improvement, from the Association's point of view, being that relief to homeless and transients was included; but the House failed to pass the measure before Congress adjourned.

The Hoover administration was now on its way out, and President Roosevelt was about to be inaugurated for his first term. The banking and financial situation of the country was tottering on the brink of the collapse which necessitated that the incoming President's first official act be the declaration of the well-remembered

"bank holiday." The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was reaching the bottom of the millions appropriated to it in the previous summer for relief loans, and no repayments into the fund had been made or could be expected. Unemployment was mounting, and the relief crisis becoming more menacing day by day.

In the dark hours following the inauguration, one of President Roosevelt's first concerns was the relief situation. The measure he wished to see enacted differed from the Costigan-La Follette measure only in the method of administration provided; the President wished to have the measure entrusted to an independent Federal authority. Calling Senator La Follette in, the President asked him to set about drafting the new measure. La Follette promptly called upon his old allies, the "Four Horsemen." Walter West was absent in the field at the time; and at the President's suggestion, Harry Hopkins, the Chairman of the New York State Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, was called into consultation. Hodson, Hopkins, and Swift put everything else aside and stayed in Washington till the bill was drafted and introduced in the Senate, while Allen Burns then took up the ball for the House, assisting Representative Lewis in its introduction, organizing testimony at the hearings, and being himself on call for testimony during four straight days of committee discussion. The first Federal Emergency Relief Act was signed by the President on May 12, 1933, and later in that same month Harry Hopkins was appointed as its Administrator.

In the June *Compass*, Walter West, letting his mind rove back over the two-year battle, wrote:

The interpretation of social work testimony on the floor of Congress, and the several volumes of printed records, helped powerfully to confuse the complacency of a whole national administration and to bring about the desired coöperation of the federal government with the states. I believe that this was due to the fact that our material came from our experience, and was more real than that of other groups.

Long before the final passage of the relief bill, the committee members had become united behind the necessity for Federal relief. The chapters, with surprising unanimity, backed up the Association's stand. At the hearings, no countertestimony was introduced from social work sources—the profession presented a united front. More than that, it came armed with facts and reasonable arguments.

Fact-gathering, criticism, and suggestions for improvement in the relief program were to become a major part of the Association's program, under the Division of Government and Social Work, in the years that followed, but the story of the first Federal relief program must end here.

PROBLEMS OF A POSTWAR WORLD

By MAX LERNER

A YEAR or two ago, it was the postwar plans of Hitler and Goering and Goebbels and Rosenberg that were relevant, and not yours or mine. At that time it looked as if it would be not we, but the Nazis who might win the future and inherit the earth.

Now we are within sight of victory even if it is still somewhat distant sight. Ever since the defeat of the Nazis by the Russians and the victories of the American and British troops in North Africa, the war has taken a new turn. In Winston Churchill's phrase, this is not the "beginning of the end," but it is the "end of the beginning." It is the end of the period in which it was always we who seemed to be on the defensive. It is the end of the period in which it could be said of the democracies that their motto was "Always too little and always too late." It is the end of the period in which we allowed Hitler to eat nation after nation, one at a time, until he came to the heart of it—America and Britain and Russia. Now the Nazis and the Italians are on the defensive, and not we.

For that we must be grateful. But we must not think that victory is just around the corner. It is not. The business of killing Japs and Germans and Italians is a long and arduous one. The difficulties of the campaign in Tunisia should have convinced us that the enemy is still strong. Even we have found that the Nazis have power left for real counteroffensives. But if these difficulties have no other effect, they should at least serve to remind some of our publicists, our Congressmen, our editors, our columnists, who the enemy is. The enemy is not labor; the enemy is not social reform, the enemy is not bureaucracy and not the New Deal. The enemy is the Nazis and the Japanese and the Italians, the enemy is fascism. And the beginning of wisdom in war is to know who is the enemy.

We shall win. Of that, there can be very little doubt. But within

sight of victory, a haunting question arises. It is the question of whether we shall enjoy the fruits of victory or whether they will turn to dust and ashes in our mouth. Curiously enough, the very things that have brought us within sight of victory—the Russian successes and our invasion of North Africa—have also underlined the problems we shall face in a postwar world, for the Russian successes have stirred up again the embers of the never absent fears on the part of powerful American groups—fears that the Russians will use the war and the victory primarily to Bolshevize Europe. And the American occupation of North Africa, as we all know, has raised the grave problem of our collaboration with those who once collaborated with our enemies.

This may be a very good time for us to look back a bit to see what light the past can shed on the future—on the postwar world. To start with, it is a ravishing thought that we escaped doom only by the slightest margin. We came within a hair's breadth of destruction! We were saved ultimately by forming a common front with our allies. But think of what might have happened if that common front had not been formed. If England had fallen in 1940 after the desperate days of Dunkirk, there would have been no chance to form a common front. If Russia had fallen in the desperate days of June, 1941, before American production had got under way and before England had built up its huge offensive air power, the chances of destroying the fascist enemy might have been lost. But in both countries a great leadership helped to wake the greatness of the people, and a great fighting people helped to shape the greatness of its leaders. In America, as well, leaders and people have shown qualities of greatness in this war crisis. The question now is whether we will show similar qualities of greatness in the peace crisis.

Wars are fought with men and machines, but they are also fought with ideas. Ideas without weapons are empty, but weapons without ideas are blind. If a weapon does not have behind it the passion of belief, if those who wield that weapon do not know what they are wielding it for, what kind of world they are trying to hew with it, then those weapons become blind.

The biggest weapon that the Nazis have had to use against us all through the past decade was the myth of Nazi invincibility, the myth that the future belonged to the Nazis, that they alone knew how to win that future and how to organize it, the myth that they

knew what to do with the postwar world. That myth of invincibility is now shattered.

The question now is: What have we to put in the place of that myth? What vision can we offer strong and persuasive enough to win and hold the future? If ideas are necessary weapons in winning a war, they are even more necessary in making certain of the fruits of victory. Only with ideas can we win one of the most important struggles of our time, the struggle for the hearts and minds and the allegiance of our young people, the struggle to keep those hearts and minds and that allegiance fixed on democracy and its potentialities, and the kind of world it can create.

I think I know something about these young people. I know how they felt during the whole decade of the thirties. They were faced, on the one hand, by the internal collapse of their economies, by bread lines, by unemployment rolls, and, on the other hand, by a passive acquiescence in aggression on the international front. They grew up in an atmosphere of corroding cynicism and opportunism. And as a result they came close to losing their faith in the whole system that permitted this internal economic collapse, that permitted passive acquiescence on our part to the destruction of humanity by the enemies of humanity, that permitted the cynical ease with which we watched the onward march of Nazi power.

In a sense, the real crisis of the past decade was a crisis that can be summed up as follows: There was a failure of knowledge on our part. We did not seem to know how small the world was. We thought that America could secede from the world. We thought that somehow we could build a fortress on our island that would separate us from the rest of the world. We learned that we were wrong, but it took us a long time to find it out.

There was a failure of belief on our part. We gave only lip service to our democratic heritage. There was not a real fanaticism of conviction about our own way of life.

There was a failure of action. Even those groups that believed deeply were incapable of formulating national policy and applying it on an international scale. We wafted a sympathetic kiss across the ocean to the Chinese as they struggled with Japan, to the Spaniards as they struggled with the fascists, to the Abyssinians as they struggled with the Italians, to the Czechs as they struggled with the Nazis. But we let it go at that.

It was that failure of knowledge, of belief, of action which brought us so perilously close to doom. It was only by action at the last moment that we were able to win back these young people—action on a national plane, by a New Deal that strove mightily to tame the forces of chaos—action on an international plane by the great emerging fact of the United Nations.

But the job of winning back the allegiance of the young people is not completed. And if the New Deal is scrapped, if it is lost or beaten, if, by a slackening of effort all along the line, it turns out to be only the dream we lost, if we give up what we have so laboriously built in the structure of the United Nations, then we shall have to wage all over again the struggle for the allegiance of the young people of this country and of the world. And that may mean not only fighting a Third World War, but also fighting a Third War in the minds and hearts of our young men.

Everything depends on what we do now and in the next two or three years. Time is an unremitting master. It sets the pace for our acting and our believing and our thinking. I still believe, as I believed five years ago, that it is far, far later than most of us think. At that time it was later than we thought to prepare for a war against fascism. Now, five years later, it is later than we think to prepare to consolidate the results of that war and to prevent its repetition.

It is certainly not too late to think about the postwar world. Peacemaking is not just a matter of ending hostilities. Peace does not begin when the bombs end. Peacemaking requires the release of great social energies, the overcoming of traditional rivalries and hostilities between nations. Peacemaking involves the breaking of the age-old habits of imperialism and colonialism and power politics. Unless we show now during the war that we can rise above petty natural interest we shall never be able to undertake the task after the war.

There are people who say to me, "Why do you talk about postwar problems now? Why do you liberals and intellectuals talk about a postwar world when there is still a war to win?" I answer that unless we think and act and talk about it now, the war that will be won will not give us the victory.

The fact is that the reconstruction of the world has already begun. Whether we know it or not, every decision that we make now in North Africa, every commitment we make now to Spain in order

to insure its neutrality, every statement that our ambassador in Moscow makes about the Russians, every decision we make about lend-lease to the Allies, every speech our Congressmen make about our future relations with Great Britain, every attack that is made, whether by heroes or non-heroes, on labor and on the internal structure of the social order within our country, every one of those is some kind of move toward reconstructing the postwar world. It may be a good move, or a bad move, but it is a move.

It is as if we had a blackboard of history upon which we are drawing the outlines of the world to come. Every decision we make during the war draws the outlines of the future on the blackboard of history.

The crucial questions to ask ourselves about these decisions are whether they are being taken with or without a plan; whether that plan is a cynical plan or a constructive one; whether it is built on an understanding of the revolutionary character of the era we live in, or whether it looks toward the past; whether it is democratic, or whether it seeks to fashion a world in the image of the fears of an elite that fear the people and what they will do.

Our foreign policy, as the State Department seems to be drawing it on the blackboard of history, had its origin in the military needs of our troops in North Africa. Since that time it has been extended in scope until it reaches beyond military exigencies. Its outlines are no longer puzzling. They have become all too startlingly clear. It begins to form an intelligible and somewhat sinister pattern.

What is that pattern? As far as questions of relief and rehabilitation in the occupied and ravaged territory go, I am not too deeply worried. Americans have the technical capacity to do a first-rate job in the strategies of comradeship and the strategies of mercy, of food and clothing, and seed crops for the soil, the job of replenishing the soil of Europe and the Far East, the job of rebuilding the cities and the factories, the job of repairing the ravages of war. But the real problems that should give us anxiety are the political problems. The question is what the purpose is for which we will use our enormous technical capacity, and on whose side we will use our strength, our armies, our enormous prestige.

It looks now as though we are committing ourselves to the creation and strengthening of a group of European regimes that represent the conservative and even the reactionary and fascist forces of Eu-

rope. That is true in North Africa, where we side with those who once collaborated with Hitler in preference to the Fighting French; where we seem to be building on a regime based narrowly on a small group of army leaders and a reactionary administrative corps.

It is as if we had told those who have been fighting for us alone among the French for the past two years that the mistake they made was that they had been on our side all along, that they had therefore lost their bargaining power with us. The mistake that they made was that they were not summer soldiers and sunshine patriots who could wait to see which way the wind blew, and then demand an exacting price for coming over.

In Spain, also, our ambassador has praised the "works of peace" of Franco, and thereby immeasurably strengthened fascist propaganda throughout Latin America. It seems fantastic that we should so quickly have forgotten the hundreds of thousands of dead Spaniards for whom Franco is responsible, the half million of imprisoned Spaniards who are today in concentration camps, the whole face of the country, ravaged by starvation, destitution, and cruelty.

In Austria we seem to be treating with the Hapsburgs, and for a time even compelling Austrians who do not believe in the Hapsburgs to serve alongside them in their Legion in the American Army.

In Hungary we seem to be making overtures toward a feudal group under Tibor Eckhardt. In Italy, if the Free Italians read the signs of the time correctly, we seem headed toward a reactionary clerical and monarchical regime.

Any single case of this sort could be explained away by the exigencies of the military situation; together, I do not see how they can be explained away. Together they form a pattern of a Europe built on conservatism, on political clericalism rather than on genuine religious feeling, on a feudal group of big landowners rather than small farmers and peasants, on fascist generals rather than on the ordinary soldier, on reactionary industrialists rather than on professional and intellectual groups.

The people of Europe are tired to death of reactionary regimes. They are tired of feudal landowners and of fascist industrialists, tired of the small elite groups that think they can govern the people indefinitely without giving any kind of expression to their aspirations.

And if we intend to build this kind of Europe, then we shall be building a structure that cannot survive, and we had better know it now. We are building a structure that we shall have to bolster up against the people of Europe by continuing to maintain armies to strengthen it, and to hold those armies in readiness for another world war.

Perhaps we are taking this cue out of fear of Russia and what she will do in the postwar world. If we are, then we are building very badly for the future, because a new Europe and a new world will not be shaped by fears, whether they be American fears or anybody else's fears. It seems to me that the relationship between Russia and America is central to everything else, for both countries are young and strong powers, and it is upon them primarily that the structure of world peace will depend. If they cannot get along together, the world will not get along. If they find it necessary to struggle in a competitive way, the world will find it necessary to struggle in a competitive way.

Russia has three courses of action open: One is to stop at her own boundaries after she has expelled the Nazi armies from her soil, and then let us do the rest. There are many people who think the Russians will do that. I find it extremely unlikely, because Russia cannot be secure so long as the Nazi armies remain undestroyed, whether they are in Russia or in Germany. Russia cannot be secure so long as fascism as a system of power remains in Europe.

The second course of action is to coöperate with America in a real United Nations setup, in which Russia and America and Great Britain and China will act as trustees for the building of a tolerably democratic world order. I am convinced that the leaders of America would like to do this. I am convinced that the leaders of Russia would like to do it. But our foreign policy thus far has been calculated to raise Russia's fears as to our own intentions in Europe, and our part in a United Nations setup for the postwar world.

The third course of action is for Russia to seek national security by strengthening her boundaries and making economic arrangements with friendly European governments, and especially with Great Britain. As things stand now, unless America makes clearer moves toward a real United Nations organization, that is the course Russia may follow. There are those who fear that Russia will Bolshevice Europe. I think it extremely unlikely that Russia, which

for two decades has abandoned the idea of world revolution, should now resume it. But if we try to ring the Russians around with a group of hostile regimes, Russia may be left with no course of action to follow except to think in terms of her boundaries, to play power politics, and to build up an aggressive military and ideological machine.

To my mind, the choice lies with us. What the Russians will do in the postwar world depends only partly on Stalin, and the ruling group around him. It depends to a great extent on what America will do. To those who fear the Bolshevizing of Europe, may I say that the clearest and straightest course to insure such action is to set up reactionary regimes in Europe which will inevitably be swept away.

If we want to prevent the regrowth of fascism and to avoid Bolshevizing Europe we must be certain that we do not leave a vacuum in Europe; for if we leave a vacuum, almost anything can go into it. Our task is to lay the foundations for a unified, democratic Europe, a Europe with which both Britain and Russia can coöperate. That brings the problem right home where it belongs.

So many of us pass our time worrying about the British, or worrying about the Russians, when we ought to do some serious worrying about ourselves. For us the most important question is: "What will America do?"

Right now, we are caught in a wave of reactionary opinion that has two aspects. One aspect is on the plane of internal policy, where a movement is gaining momentum to whittle away the social gains that we have laboriously achieved over a decade. The other aspect is on the plane of international policy, and that is the movement back to a narrow nationalism, a narrow pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism.

The issue before us is whether this reactionary mood will triumph in America. That issue will be decided between now and the election in 1944. It is an issue that is today splitting both parties. The Republican party is split into two factions, one headed by Willkie; the other, by the present Republican National Committee. There is a third possible group of Republican candidates—the generals and other heroes created by the war—who are as yet indefinable political quantities but with whom we may have to reckon. Their social and world outlook is likely to be also on the reactionary and isolationist side. In the Democratic party the struggle is likely to

take the shape of a fight over the question of a fourth term for President Roosevelt.

We must remember that what happens in 1944 will shape not only American policy, but also the outlines of the whole postwar world. An isolationist America, an isolationist President with neither world perspective nor world experience, a President who does not understand the need for continuing and strengthening the United Nations, means a world given over to power politics. An America over which the ghost of Warren Harding presides will mean a world that seeks to go back to a "normalcy" that cannot exist in this revolutionary era.

I am very troubled about this whole question of a return to normalcy. The desire for some kind of passivity, the desire to slacken, the desire to relax after the intolerable tensions of the war is as common today as it was in World War I. It is one of the enemies we shall have to fight; for if the ghost of Warren Harding still walks the land, then America will be incapable of assuming the position of leadership in the postwar world.

The heartening side of the picture is that we have at our hand all the materials for building a decent postwar world. We do not have to invent them. It is not a question of starry-eyed idealism. It is not a question of neglecting America's interests, or of being philanthropic. It is a question of being realistic—of facing our problem squarely and estimating honestly what tools and skills are available to answer it. What we have already done in the past decade in building a New Deal, and what we have done in the past few years in building a war economy and a war society give us the material that we need to build a good society in peace.

There used to be a time when we were told that we did not know how to create a going economy that would maximize income. There was a time when we were told that if we put all the economists in the country end to end, they would not reach a conclusion. That is not true any longer. We know the techniques. We know what it takes. The question is whether we have the wisdom and will to apply them.

We know how to organize production, end unemployment. We are today an organized war economy. We have put our men to work building battleships, planes, tanks—all the instruments of war and destruction. After the war we must put men to work in the same

way, but for different ends—to build roads and hydroelectric power dams, to clear slums and to create new housing, to extend educational opportunity to young people everywhere, and to extend preventive medicine and public health services, and to build school-houses and community and recreation centers.

Mr. Roosevelt has recently submitted to Congress a report from the National Resources Planning Board giving an American Beveridge Plan that goes far to make the kind of postwar world we have been discussing a reality. It has three major parts. First, it plans for a transition from a war to a peace economy; a transition that must be necessarily slow, that does not involve breaking all the ration and price controls that we have now.

Second, it plans for the development of an expanding economy through the coöperation of government and private enterprise, and the coöperation of government means that government must have a role in the control of private enterprise. It means bureaucracy, if you wish. I do not know whether Americans are going to allow themselves to be cheated of a decent postwar world by the semantic device of having the administrative groups that would make it possible called "bureaucracy." I hope not.

Third, it plans for social security, and notice what some of these social security objectives are: to assure jobs, with decent pay to all who are able to work; to develop a universal program for medical care; to establish a permanent public works administration, so that the unemployed will be assured of socially desirable work; to broaden the coverage and increase the payments of unemployment compensation; to assure the security of those serving in the armed forces and of their families. People may say that Mr. Roosevelt is playing politics when he presents this plan. I say that he is fighting the war.

You must remember that President Wilson's Fourteen Points were worth many divisions to the Allies in the struggle against the Germans in World War I. You must remember that the Beveridge Plan has been worth many divisions to the United Nations in today's struggle. The plan of the National Resources Planning Board is worth any number of divisions against the Nazis and the Japs. Here, finally, we have an idea which we can use as a fighting faith for our young men who are today wielding the weapons of destruction. The question is whether we will use that idea.

We can have a postwar world free of depression. But there can

also be, if we do not know what to do, an uncontrolled boom after the war followed by an uncontrolled depression, followed by armament rivalry, followed by another war again. We can have the same tragic recurrence that we had a decade or two ago. What we do with our internal economy, what we do with our foreign policy, will affect the whole course of the postwar world. If we allow a plan like that of the National Resources Committee to go by default, if we allow it to be whittled away, if we allow it to be defeated by a Congress that calls it socialism, or to be blasted by a press that calls it bureaucracy, then I say America deserves to have the kind of postwar world that will follow.

But if we have the greatness as followers to follow the greatness of those among our leaders who have the vision to see what a postwar world and a postwar America can be, then we cannot be licked in the peace and we cannot be licked in the war. The choice is with us.

There is something dying in our world; that something is the idea that a democracy has to be weak to remain a democracy; the idea that a democracy has no social responsibility for its people; the idea that a democracy cannot use the techniques that are necessary in order to create full employment, the full utilization of investment in labor and machines. There is something dying in our world; that something is the idea that a democracy cannot join with other nations to construct an enduring international community.

There is something being born in our world; that something is the idea that a democracy can be strong and still remain free, that it can and must assume the responsibility for creating social security and economic opportunity; the idea that freedom for the many is more important than freedom for the few. There is something being born in our world; that something is the idea of a United Nations with strength enough to create international police force, to put down aggression, which understands that the only basis of an enduring peace is a union of peoples, each of which has a healthy economic and social system. It is a United Nations that has room and to spare for the kind of society that America is, for the kind of society that Britain is, for the kind of society that China is, for the kind of society that Russia is.

But the things that are dying will not die unless we help to usher them out. The things that are being born will not be born unless we bring them in once again.

THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL WORK TO POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

By HUGH R. JACKSON

IT IS obviously impossible at this stage of the world's history for anyone to know precisely the scope and the exact character of the problems which will face us during the remainder of this war and at its conclusion as we help to meet the needs of the millions of suffering peoples now held in bondage by the enemy throughout the Continent of Europe and in the Far East. The speed of the success of our armed forces, the degree of devastation actually wrought in driving the Axis forces from the captive areas they now hold, and the extent to which these ruthless enemies continue and extend their planned and cold-blooded extermination of helpless and innocent peoples will all constitute factors in the ultimate determination of the exact job to be done and the steps which will need to be taken for the doing of it.

Although our blueprints and our strategic plans will undoubtedly have to be modified in the light of more precise information than that which is now available from the occupied areas and in the light of developments and actions yet to come, we know enough today to realize that the coming humanitarian task of relief and rehabilitation will be the most gigantic that has ever faced this world. We know that there is no war in all our history where such ruthless and deliberate steps have been taken for the disintegration of civilian life, and for the suffering and the death of civilian populations. We know that the enemy has not only slaughtered hundreds of thousands of civilians, but that he has left millions more to a deliberate death by starvation, for the purpose of feeding himself and his war machine. Against the background of these facts there is no

time to be lost in the job of preparing our plans and acquiring our supplies for the relief of these people when the armed might of the United Nations has made their liberation possible. For the winning of the military victory is, in truth, only the beginning of the job which we must do. That victory would certainly be a hollow one indeed if we were not prepared to take immediately those emergency steps that are required to help nourish and clothe and re-establish those whom we liberate.

We know that many countries of Europe were dependent, even in peacetime, on outside sources for a considerable part of their foodstuffs. We likewise know that during this war the Axis has drained off much of the already inadequate supply produced by the captured countries. When we add to this systematic looting the inevitable decrease of production occasioned by loss of manpower, lack of seeds, fertilizers, and machinery, it is easy to see that the whole of the occupied area is now in a desperate plight. We know, for instance, that in one occupied country the prewar food ration of 155 kilograms was reduced by October, 1941, to 79 kilograms and by June of 1942 to 50 kilograms. We have reports that in another country 30 percent of the children have lost weight and that the gain in weight of the remaining 70 percent is about 40 percent below normal.

It is reported that public education in many urban districts is completely disorganized owing to the physical weakness and ill health of an ever increasing number of pupils. Some of the students are too weak to go to school; others go without having eaten breakfast; cases of fainting are frequent, and games and sports have been canceled. The children have neither the physical nor the intellectual energy necessary for any prolonged effort, and tuberculosis and other diseases are increasing at a rapid rate.

It is essential that we recognize now that the quantities of food and other supplies required to prevent starvation and to meet the minimum needs of the occupied areas will be very great. The cost of the supplies required when the whole of the reoccupied sections is liberated will run into hundreds of millions, and perhaps billions of dollars. It is likewise clear that millions of tons of supplies will be required before this job is ultimately finished.

The need for other necessities of life is equally critical. Medical supplies are virtually nonexistent in many places, and bandages

and dressings are reused because of the lack of fresh supplies. Clothing, fuel, and shelter are lacking for thousands throughout Hitler's captive domain.

Another great task is that of reuniting families and repatriating the millions who have been wrenched from their homes and from their families as a result of this war. Many of those who fled from their homes, and others who have left voluntarily or under compulsion, will not return to their previous places of residence, and this group of displaced persons will, in and of itself, constitute one of the great social problems with which we must deal. Millions of others will be anxious to return to their homelands, and the problem of arranging such repatriation in an orderly and humane manner, of reuniting families, and of seeing to it that the movement of these returning peoples does not create additional problems of health and sanitation and does not clog the transportation system to the point where relief supplies cannot be gotten in, represents one of the major jobs to be faced. If we include those now held as prisoners of war, persons who have been drawn into Germany or elsewhere to work for the Axis, as well as those who have fled from war areas and those deported from their homes, we have an estimated total of more than nine million displaced persons in Europe alone. Moreover, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with child welfare problems of great magnitude. No one can forecast the number of homeless and orphaned children who will need to be cared for when this war is over. That there will be need for special programs for homeless children, and for other segments of the population such as the aged and infirm, and the handicapped, is obvious.

It is clear, therefore, that the job which faces us in providing the bare necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care is enormous. Nevertheless, in drawing our plans we cannot limit ourselves to even this gigantic undertaking. After all, our problem is one of helping these people to help themselves, and though immediate palliative relief in huge quantities will be required, we shall need to go beyond this in our efforts if these peoples are to be re-established as participants in a peaceful and stable society of nations. We must extend our aid and our support in the rehabilitation of their economic and social life. This we shall have to do, not only from the point of view of making it possible to reduce the expenditure of huge sums of our funds for the relief of the stricken parts of the

world, but also from the point of view of our long-range self-interest. We are learning the bitter truth, at the cost of the lives of thousands of American boys, that we cannot live in comfort and security in a world of poverty and instability. And so, if we are to build our lives in this nation on a basis of prosperity and of freedom from the terrible debacle of fighting and of death, it is imperative for us that we help to re-establish the economic and the social as well as the political freedom of the oppressed peoples of this earth.

The long-range economic reconstruction of the liberated areas is not the province of a relief and rehabilitation agency, but during the immediate period of readjustment we will have to assume responsibility, along with other United Nations in a position to do so, for help to these nations in such matters as the provision of seeds, fertilizer, machinery, and the like, to aid in the immediate re-establishment of local agriculture.

To do even a part of the task which lies ahead, it is clear that we shall need all the resources which we can possibly bring to bear. The job of meeting the immediate relief needs of the occupied areas and of taking even the first steps toward helping these people to re-establish themselves will require the efforts, not only of this nation, but of all nations of the world that have resources and supplies that may be made available for the undertaking. Consequently, it is to be hoped that agreement will be reached for the creation of a United Nations relief and rehabilitation agency, so that the resources and personnel of all the governments may be welded in a single and unified organization.

The immediate job is not only one of planning for future activities, but one of operating in areas now occupied by our armed forces. The entrance of American and British troops into North Africa has been followed by the first field mission of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, headed by the President of the National Conference of Social Work, Fred K. Hoehler. A program of milk distribution to the children of Algeria and Morocco is now being carried on by representatives of the American Red Cross under the direction of Mr. Hoehler. A relief and rehabilitation program for refugees in North Africa is also under way. Plans are likewise being laid and supplies are being stockpiled for the much larger relief and rehabilitation program which will be required when our troops have ousted the Axis from Tunisia.

One of the most important immediate tasks is that of acquiring at least a part of the supplies which will be required for the first emergency period of reoccupation and liberation. It is not enough that we should desire to aid the suffering captives of the Axis. A substantial part of the foodstuffs, the clothing, the medical supplies, the seeds, the fertilizer, the machinery and equipment must be secured in advance and be ready for immediate shipment to the war-torn areas when the hour of liberation is at hand.

The provision of all these supplies represents one of our greatest problems, for it involves the necessity for forward buying and the development of adequate reserves as well as other contingencies of a military or civilian character at a time when our productive facilities are taxed to the utmost to meet the needs of our armed forces, our allies, and our civilian economy. Despite the difficulties, we must proceed, for the feeding of these civilian groups behind the lines is an absolutely essential part of our military requirements, as well as the deepest obligation upon our war aims and humanitarian impulses. The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations is already at work with the appropriate agencies of the Government to see to it that some reserves of essential commodities are established to meet these essential requirements.

The acquisition of supplies, their warehousing at strategic points, and arrangements for their transportation are the primary tasks of the moment, for without such supplies we shall be unable even to make a start at meeting the job ahead. In addition to supplies, we must be ready with specific plans for the distribution of these goods and for the administration of relief and rehabilitation in foreign countries. To this end the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations is now at work through its Division of Program and Requirements in the establishment of plans and programs. Much of what will be done cannot be blueprinted in advance, but will have to be left to the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the field staffs. However, we are committed to the policy of trying to foresee our problems to the greatest possible extent, and to work out our problems in advance as much as we can.

Finally, we shall need a sizable staff, specifically trained to do the many jobs which must be done abroad. In this connection there has been some talk of many thousands of Americans being required for postwar relief and rehabilitation. Many persons have an alto-

gether exaggerated notion of the amount of outside staff that will be required. Let us remember that we are constantly aiming to help these enslaved peoples to help themselves, and that despite the degree of death and dislocation, there will still remain some considerable local leadership which must be built up, encouraged, and assisted to do the job.

The outside staff required will depend, of course, upon the extent to which the political and social forces of the various captive nations shall have disintegrated, but, in most cases, we shall be using American or other foreign personnel only for supervision and direction, and not for the doing of the total administrative job. With regard to personnel, it is also appropriate to point out that this task has elements far different from those involved in the usual process of American welfare administration. We shall need social workers, yes; but we shall need, perhaps in even greater numbers, persons who are skilled in matters of transportation, warehousing, food distribution, agricultural development, and the like.

The job is full of pitfalls and difficulties. It is one of Herculean proportions which will demand the support and aid of all nations—and all groups, both public and private—which can contribute to its solution. The meeting of this great challenge is essential to the well-being of all of us. We cannot fight successfully in the midst of a starving civilian population. We cannot expect men with empty stomachs to join in the creation of a lasting peace. We cannot expect children who have been wracked by hunger and ravaged with disease to build the new free world for which we fight. We cannot expect to achieve stability and prosperity for ourselves at home in the midst of this sort of world. The first great challenge of the peace will be our capacity to re-establish the integrity and dignity of the human body as well as the integrity of the spirit. It is a task which will require the best of all of us and further sacrifice and contribution by all our people. It is a job in which we cannot and must not fail.

THE POSTWAR ROLE OF SOCIAL WORKERS

By MARY E. HURLBUTT

AT THIS stage it requires temerity to speculate on the possible role of social workers in postwar foreign relief and reconstruction. So many factors in the situation are unknown that even official policy cannot yet be fully determined. Yet social workers across the country are asking questions, and it is well that they should be giving thought to the work ahead, whether or not there is an opportunity for them to participate.

Although the work of reconstruction will reach into every continent, I shall refer mainly to the European scene, because such international experiences as I have had in the last twenty-five years have been limited to that part of the world.

First, it is necessary to realize how many fragments of information must be brought into some sort of coherence—like the parts of a vast picture puzzle—in order to think at all about social problems in the postwar period. Basic for any attempt to envisage the way in which a country will deal with its own needs is a knowledge of what Lyman Bryson calls “the road it has traveled thus far.” If one considers the differences between European countries only in terms of the roughest classification, the contrasts come clearly into view. In some countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark, parts of Czechoslovakia, and even parts of Germany, we can assume that deeply imbedded beneath layers of fearful submission to Nazi tyranny there exist traditions of participation in highly developed large-scale action toward social ends. This will, I believe, be true not only of large cities, but also of the towns and country districts. Thus, even if national institutions and leaders have been demolished, one may count on a practiced response to proposals for reconstruction.

On the other hand, in regions like Yugoslavia, Greece, and parts of Poland modern technology and complex forms of social organization have penetrated only slightly. Primitive populations often amaze one by their capacity to keep alive and help each other, but where their lands have been utterly denuded and their accustomed village economy breaks down, there may start a vast exodus. For example, we hear from Greece of the country people streaming into the cities in the vague hope of food and protection. Actually, this only intensifies the already terrible urban problems. To re-establish country folk, knowledge of their former way of life must be used. Country by country, the study of its people and their life is an essential preliminary. There is published material available, but often it is more helpful to consult with representatives of different nationalities who are now living in the United States. The United Nations Information Office in New York City is an excellent source from which to get suggestions for contacts.

Other fragments of the picture puzzle are to be found in the news items which seep out from under the Nazi blackout. These are published, not only in the daily press, but in bulletins of information issued by each of the United Nations that has offices in this country. These give some inkling of the changes in the ways of the people which are coming about under Nazi tyranny. We know that many forms of adaptive behavior have developed which are likely to be projected into peacetime. Some of these will not seem attractive, nor even be easily acceptable to those of us who have enjoyed the luxury of living securely and decently in the last years. Must we not be ready to recognize that years of peaceful living will have to pass before fear and hatred can work themselves out?

To the above sources of insight we should add, I believe, some of the wisdom forged out of the blitz in Great Britain during the last two years as to what human beings really need and want when they are living under great deprivation and danger. Interesting technical reports may be obtained from the British Library of Information in New York City.

Many practical implications are to be gathered from the experiences of World War I. In so far as these were deposited in reports, they are being assembled at the Russell Sage Foundation. Two bibliographies will soon be published. Furthermore, the Foundation expects to publish short records of relief operations. One must re-

member, however, that the last twenty years saw many developments in social welfare institutions throughout Europe which were not present in World War I.

In the foreground of our picture puzzle are the preliminary views and policies of the Foreign Relief and Reconstruction Office. We have also the foreshadowing of some sort of joint United Nations action, of which little is known except the proposal for a conference on future economic needs. Then there are a number of voluntary international agencies with funded experience and connections derived from years of international partnerships, many of which go back to World War I or even earlier. A few of the principal agencies which it is hoped will enlarge their operations after this war are the American Friends Service Committee; the American Red Cross; the International Migration Service; the Joint Distribution Committee; the Near East Relief; the Young Men's Christian Association; and the Young Women's Christian Association.

There is a possibility that those private agencies which, it is recognized, will supplement official action may be invited to form a consultative council. In so far as American social workers are to have a role in relief and reconstruction, it will, as things look at present, be mainly through these bodies, official and private. However, much depends on the terms in which the problems are grasped as the situation unfolds. Moreover, by the very nature of their work, some of these international organizations are not in close touch with social workers in American communities and, therefore, have little basis for judging how far our skills would be useful. Some are dubious about the high degree of specialization in our professional tradition. They question whether we know what is involved in adapting ourselves and our methods to other cultures and to wartime conditions.

Personally, I think much would be gained if social workers with experience in child welfare, delinquency, family welfare—especially under rural conditions—could be drawn in along with experts in the international field and representatives of foreign countries to determine the data that need to be assembled in order to appraise postwar social needs, and at what points existing internal agencies might supplement their resources. Analogous data have been assembled on a large scale, region by region, regarding requirements for food, agricultural stocks, medicines, and also regarding the professional skills of doctors, sanitary engineers, and agronomists. How-

ever, the place for the entity of social work is less clearly established. No central body, so far as I know, has been called on to assemble data in this area.

One hears it said that during the first six months immediately after hostilities cease the need for materials will be so overwhelming that other services will have to be deferred. Most obvious, certainly, is the sheer immensity of the amount of supplies that will be needed—the food, the clothing, the medicines, the farm stock, the seeds, the implements—and the apparatus required to secure, ship, allocate, and establish this material. Is there any danger that this overwhelming demand for things will fill our entire horizon? Are physical requirements so urgent that they must exclude consideration for all other needs at the start?

There are other needs which are revealed in time of crisis. The British experience with children evacuated from bombed areas showed that many of the children could not eat at all until their fears had been allayed somewhat by loving and skillful handling. Responsible London officials have concluded that it is less dangerous for the child's future for him to go through a blitz than to be suddenly, without understanding and reassurance, separated from his parents and home and sent to live with strangers. In other words, physical safety is not much good, as child welfare workers well know, unless with it can be given understanding service for the child's whole being. Much was done in England in this direction, even in blitzed London, by the skillful use of expert child welfare workers acting as consultants for much larger groups of teachers and volunteers. Such a plan places right at the center of administration someone who knows what children have to have.

Again, judging by reports from London, much confusion was avoided when people were suddenly evacuated if experienced social workers insisted on a registration system. In the temporary shelters where laymen were put in charge as relieving officers, many adjustments needed by the very old, by mothers with small children, by seriously disturbed people, were brought about when trained workers worked side by side with officials.

Many of the old people evacuated from London succeeded in outwitting their would-be rescuers, leaving the comfortable quarters to which they had been assigned to return to their old haunts—dismal to a stranger and in imminent danger of being bombed, but to these

old folk holding all the intangible associations without which they would have no reason to go on living.

A woman experienced in work with refugees was consulted about a plan to resettle a group of Poles who succeeded in reaching India. The plan as outlined included consideration of clothing and shelter, but the adviser remarked succinctly: "These refugees won't eat the food unless you provide for a Mass they can go to first."

Shortly after World War I a group of Armenian refugees was sheltered and fed in a camp for some months. Consideration of other needs had been deferred for the time being and they simply huddled there like lost sheep. Because of the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, it was decided to break up the camp. Other places were found for most of the women and girls by the relief staff. However, the group refused to be moved. Fear had demoralized them, and they preferred to cling to known surroundings and to such security as they had in each other. It is interesting to read in the report what was done to overcome that state of mind and to move toward a termination of the relief program. Classes and recreation were organized; a workroom was set up and small wages paid; some language lessons were given. These were necessary measures to restore the capacity for normal living.

Compare this with the policy of the Polish Army during the Russian-Polish hostilities in 1919 and 1920. The military commander at Lvov, and later the one at Wilno, requested the Y.W.C.A. to establish canteens and rest rooms for women, even while the fighting was going on. Consultation services, where individual problems could be talked out and individual adjustments could be arranged for, became part of each center.

There is an incident which occurred in a foyer in France during World War I. A woman came into the rest room and sat down, rocking back and forth silently. She was asked what her needs were. "Oh, just to sit here," she replied, "where I don't have to be treated as if I were a mere number."

These incidents occurred while war was waging, but I think we must assume that in many regions of Europe, especially if a Western Front is established or revolution breaks out, the disorganization of civilian life in the period following the armistice will be just as serious. Some will say that I must be still unaware of the staggering dimensions of the loss of things necessary for life if I continue to

stress the importance of dealing with nonphysical needs immediately after the armistice. It was Madariaga, the brilliant Spanish writer, who said:

Far be it from me to suggest that the study of things should be neglected. Yet their importance should not make us forget that ultimately the solution of political problems depends on the human element. It is in men that we shall find the true resistance and it is in men we shall find power to overcome them. . . . If things must be studied in order to show the way out of political labyrinths, men must be studied to move actually out of them.

In this connection there are several pieces of evidence I find illuminating. Dr. R. S. Lyman spent several years, first in Russia and then in China, investigating relationships between psychic factors and nutritional physiology. Whole masses in those two countries, Dr. Lyman points out, have lived and worked well on rations which are below what is considered by authorities as a bare subsistence level. Dr. Lyman relates this to the stake which these people have in what they are fighting for and which they clearly understand and with which they are identified.

The British psychiatrists have reckoned with the fact that if people's anxieties can be released through purposeful activity, the bad effects will be greatly lessened. This insight was utilized in the treatment of the men evacuated from Dunkirk; they were given definite things to do which helped to allay the tension under which they were living. Planned activity takes leadership—a leadership which understands the incentives which have meaning to the group.

Uprooted people, separated from their families and scattered across the globe, will be one of our major problems. The estimated numbers are horrifying. Nine million persons in Europe alone are said to have been forced from their homelands. These seething masses may have to be held temporarily in detention camps, if only in the interest of controlling disease.

There has, unfortunately, been a great deal of experience with internment in recent years, as, for example, the relocation centers for Japanese Americans, and camps in southern France. Much has perforce been learned about the social problems such camps present and about the skilled services needed to ameliorate the lot of internees, as well as concerning the technical puzzles of establishing nationality, preparing documents required for immigration visas,

searching for lost relatives, appealing cases to Government authorities, or working for the intergovernmental agreements necessary before there can be any hope of group resettlement, of reuniting families, or at least of re-establishing for individuals the inestimable privilege of civilian status somewhere.

Obviously, these latter difficulties can only be met through international resources—a network of interlinked services that often make possible coöperative action in several countries simultaneously for the solution of each case. Moreover, in each case technical difficulties are inextricably tied up with the emotional and social complications in each family situation, and these must be taken into consideration if any plan is not to unravel as soon as it is made.

If this evidence has served any purpose, it shows that the complexities of human needs are not suspended until a period of crisis is over but that they are always present and are even heightened by crisis. Therefore, it seems to me that even in the earliest measures taken, long-range goals should inform policy and shape administration. Some provision for individualization of need, however rapidly arrived at, is implied. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that social workers are not without experience in adapting their methods to disaster conditions.

A policy which I hear has already been formulated in Washington provides that the wholesale importation of American personnel and American systems is to be avoided. So far as is practical, relief requirements are to be made available to local authorities and civilian groups in each country. One can only heartily agree with this recognition of the right of each country to find its own solutions.

However, if the disorganization of civilian life and the extermination of leaders have gone as far as we fear, must we not face the likelihood that qualified workers will be very few? It has been the declared policy of the Nazis to eliminate the educated classes. I have heard no figures on social workers, but for other professional groups there are statistics from which one may make deductions. In Poland it is thought that 25 percent of the priests may still be alive. In Czechoslovakia 50 percent of the physicians are thought to have survived. The universities have been closed for three years, so there can be no replacements. The indications are that social workers, in the sense of trained or educated people, will be scarce just when the immense need is evident.

There are, I believe, other grounds for thinking that imported workers will be needed to supplement local leadership in achieving desired results. This was clearly shown in a report by E. E. Hunt on work in World War I in Belgium. Mr. Hunt told how Belgians at that time still feared their fellow Belgians. War exaggerated certain of their suspicions instead of allaying them. "Some of our group," he says, "had to take control . . . the machine could not run smoothly from the start. There was a period of necessary readjustment, even of revolt, in which the role of Americans was to fight for independence from political influence and for administrative unity." If this was true in Belgium, is it not likely to be true of some of the other countries of Europe where minority groups are numerous and hostilities are immemorial?

Those who go over must, I think, be prepared for the hatreds that have been aroused and which may take years to subside; must be prepared for resentment, evasion, suspicion. These are the forms of adaptive behavior which Nazi rule has stimulated. It seems likely that they may be reactivated all too easily when foreign workers cannot meet all the demands.

We must remember that children will for years have won approbation by their ability to outwit authority. Many families will be completely disorganized, their members become enemies one to the other. Youth groups integrated to national socialist goals must accept their defeat and denouncement. Children will have kept families alive by stealing necessary foods.

Patriotism of subjected people has had to resort to malingering to gain the only attainable ends. Ridicule slyly turned against the invader has preserved sanity and kept terror down, but it may be invoked against us as foreigners. Sympathetic understanding for all this aftermath of terror will be essential. Surely there never has been such a need for all we know that can help human beings to find their way back to the capacity for normal living!

In the meantime we must clearly realize that there are men and women in every country who have survived and grown incredibly strong through their resistance—workmen, peasants, schoolteachers, priests. There is no doubt that they will have plans as to how their new world is to be built. To find these people and to learn to work with them will be our purpose.

Can imported workers ever be sensitive enough to work through

local people toward the achievement of their goals? One is already aware of a sensitiveness on the part of Europeans to the danger of being patronized or managed by a new invasion of foreigners. If political sovereignties have to be modified for the sake of collective security, I believe that cultural sovereignty will seem the more precious and vulnerable. I want to quote Madariaga once more, from his penetrating study *Englishmen, Frenchmen and Spaniards*. He refers to "idea—sentiment—forces" peculiar to each people, constituting for each the "standards of behavior," the "key to emotion," the "springs of thought." Are these the most important assets of each country that must be fostered and renewed?

Even here I believe that imported workers, if rightly chosen, can add rather than destroy. A former leader in European social work, now a refugee, from her experience in the last war felt convinced that for people who have for years been cut off from all contact with the outside world, whose lives have been forced down by fear and deprivations to the lowest ebb, one of the most important sources of restored vitality—equal to physical nourishment—would be invigorating companionship, an exchange of ideas, and the feeling of moral support that might derive from others who come from the outside where they have been privileged to maintain health and security.

Turning again to the experiences of World War I, one remembers so many requests coming from European leaders, not only for relief in goods, but for the help of American social workers. Many mistakes were certainly made, but wherever Americans put themselves and their skills at the disposal of the countries to which they were sent, the collaboration was fruitful and, I think, welcome; summer camps, city playgrounds, recreational centers, a court system to handle juvenile delinquency, some demonstration of case work methods, a clearinghouse based on the social service exchange system in this country—these are simply a few of the instruments for constructive social building in which American experience was accepted and, with some modifications, permanently incorporated.

Imported social workers may not be necessary in every European country. Perhaps the only way to find out where, would be for highly experienced workers, preferably those who already know Europe and have former contacts there, to be flown in for preliminary conferences with local leaders.

Finally, we need to remind ourselves that many European countries preferred even before the war to substitute philosophy and programs of mutual security for the older traditions of philanthropy and public relief. The extension of coöperatives in all the Eastern European countries, as well as the greater extension of social insurance programs, is evidence of these trends. There are European authorities on these subjects who refer to the desirability of eliminating as far as possible all traces of older relief psychology.

Although analogous trends are appearing here, I believe that if we are to be true to the present historical situation in its broader issues and if we are to be acceptable in these more progressive countries abroad, it is necessary to cleanse our attitudes and our vocabulary of all implications that we are the bearers of gifts. Perhaps we can find the keynote for our approach in a story told by Mme. Chiang. To illustrate the pride of her people, she spoke of hungry peasants who were too proud to accept the free rice offered them until they were told that they must eat in order to gain strength to work at the common task.

It is my conviction that the work of trained foreign social workers would be useful in some, though probably not in all, countries to supplement local resources. If an effectively prepared pool of resources is to be available, there is need for joint appraisal and planning between foreign representatives, experts in international services, and social workers experienced in special areas and training schools. Finally, if American social workers do go over and are not to be detrimental, both in the immediate situation and in the long-range relations between nations, they must hold their skills lightly, recognizing how much they have to learn if they are to serve those who have thus far carried the brunt of our common struggle.

OVER-ALL POSTWAR COMMUNITY PLANNING

By *ELWOOD STREET*

THE DAYS of peace which will follow the war will bring to every American community tremendous problems of human adjustment and readjustment. They must be handled effectively, for the security and well-being of our people. Plans to handle them must be made quickly, too, for peace may come sooner than we think; and no matter how unhappily long it may be delayed, we never can anticipate completely its effect.

Fundamentally, many of these problems revolve around the question of how our communities, in the days following the war, can produce enough goods and services to earn their appropriate shares of the national income. We are assured by economists that it is quite possible for our nation to produce an income which will provide economic and social security for all—and pay for the war as well. Superficially, this may appear to be just a matter of keeping everyone employed at the job he best can do, consistent with the effective demand for the goods and services he can produce. This is a big enough task.

The task of postwar planning is not so simple as this. The end of the war will present to every community almost innumerable problems which interlock, one with the other. Purposely, these suggested problems are not classified as pertaining to business and industry, to government, or to educational, health, and welfare agencies. Manifestly, no partitions can be set between these problems, and no one type of agency can handle completely any one of them. They overrun all barriers and affect every aspect of community life. The efforts of all available agencies of the community are required to handle them. Among these problems are:

1. Provision of jobs and retraining for demobilized servicemen, and for employees of demobilized local war industries
2. Absorption of former residents and of others who come to the community from war industries elsewhere
3. Redistribution, to other communities and rural areas, of employees no longer needed in war industries
4. Provision of work and training for the employable aged and physically handicapped
5. Displacement of workers in industry as a result of new technological processes
6. Redirection of industry and the retraining of workers in the use of these processes
7. Re-establishment of industries and businesses closed by priorities and rationing
8. Readjustment of returned servicemen and returned and re-aligned workers to family and community life and of the family and community to them
9. Rehousing, and new housing, of the population
10. Reorganization of the structural pattern of the community, of its facilities for transportation, of its utilities, of its educational, recreational, and health and safety services, in terms of new modes of transportation and new concepts of housing layout
11. Reorientation and re-equipment of educational and social services, both public and private, to meet the challenges of new concepts of vocational education and training, of new and extended types of social security legislation, of a mobile national population, and of a redistributed urban population
12. Effective participation in organized community life of returned servicemen and of the new citizen leadership which has found an outlet in civilian defense activities
13. In a sense, the reconstruction, the retooling, and remanning of the whole community life to meet changed conditions, attitudes, processes, and population problems, while operating that community as a continually going concern

To meet these problems, many bodies are already planning. Among them are Federal agencies, such as the National Resources Planning Board, the Federal Security Agency, the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, etc. On a national scale, also, private business and industry have made a bold beginning with the Na-

tional Committee for Economic Development, which is organizing regional, state, and local committees. The United States Chamber of Commerce has begun to issue bulletins on the subject. The National Resources Planning Board has set up a regional organization to promote local planning. State planning boards are actively at work on postwar planning. These and other agencies are available to help local communities in their planning and action.

Local planning is vitally necessary. Federal agencies of social security, public works, etc., cannot do the whole job for the local community. Moreover, national committees cannot handle local situations. A state planning board can be vitally important, but it cannot get down to the grass roots. Local attack by local groups is necessary.

Local government alone is not sufficient to handle this problem of planning and action, for government is only one of the organized bodies through which citizens act. All groups, public and private, concerned with business, industry, government, education, health, and social welfare must unite in the local community, to plan and to act in meeting these problems. They affect each of these areas of group interest. Moreover, these problems are interrelated; they can only be handled by interlocking treatment.

We cannot, perhaps, do much about state, national, and international affairs beyond influencing our Congressmen and other leaders toward constructive decisions by letter and personal contact. We can do a great deal by ourselves in our own communities if we will unite. A community need not be completely a chip floating helplessly along on the stream of national and international events. We can, in a large measure, determine what our communities will be and how we will achieve our communal desires by united planning and acting. Moreover, such planning cannot be limited to the city alone but must cover its adjacent urban and suburban territory. The community is not contained within the city's limits, but extends throughout the trade area which focuses primarily upon the city.

The history of American communities has shown repeatedly that they have the capacity to overcome handicaps of disaster proportion. Such results have been achieved, however, primarily by the action of energetic, intelligent, and resourceful individuals. The day of such individual action has gone by, to a large extent. This is an age of group research, group planning, and group action. The intelli-

gence, the creativeness, the skill, and the knowledge of the citizens of our communities must now unite for group attack upon the complex problems which are already rushing upon us.

Much of the discussion of postwar planning has been in terms of economic security. Certainly, such security is vital to provide "freedom from want and freedom from fear." Economic security, however, provides only the minimum basis of life. It is perfectly possible to have an economically secure race of barbarians, as the Nazis have demonstrated.

We cannot, then, think only in terms of the physical structure and lay-out of our communities, of public works, and of jobs for all who are capable of holding jobs, vital as are these considerations. They furnish, as has been said, the floor of the economic life of the community, below which no one should be allowed to fall. Above such a floor, we should erect, however, structures of adequate and satisfactory community life. We must, therefore, think in terms of the total life of our communities; of what we want them to be in terms of adequate living for all, and of how to attain these goals.

In order to march toward these goals, therefore, we must provide for synthesis and interrelationship of all local planning. Our chambers of commerce already have shown concern for postwar planning. Local branches of the National Committee for Economic Development are being organized in many communities. City and county planning commissions are already thinking in long-range terms of the structural pattern of the metropolitan community of the future. Community councils of social agencies are working on the patterns of educational, health, and welfare services for the communities that are to come. These planning activities should be integrated; but even that is not enough. Into our community planning must be fused the knowledge and judgment of all possible interested groups.

Leadership in over-all postwar community planning should be exercised by an agency which represents no group exclusively, neither government, capital, labor, party, class, nor creed. This planning body should have no other concern than the welfare of the community broadly conceived; and it should have enough prestige to command the support of all responsible agencies and groups in the community.

No such agency is now in existence in most American communities. A few communities have made a beginning, however, of such

over-all planning, generally with the advice of the National Resources Planning Board staff. Among them are the Niagara Frontier (Buffalo and Niagara Falls, New York); Rochester, New York; Baltimore; Philadelphia; Detroit; Denver; and Corpus Christi, Texas. Syracuse, New York, has been selected by the *Time* group of magazines for a demonstration which Time, Inc., will help to finance. These are distinguished examples which council and chest executives should watch carefully and should suggest for consideration and emulation in their own communities.

In a typical community, the chamber of commerce, the city planning commission, and the council of social agencies, or a similar federation, together might be held to represent the chief interests. They might unite in calling a meeting of representatives of implicated groups to discuss the possible desirability of setting up an over-all postwar community planning council. The council or chest executive might well take the initiative in promoting such a movement.

The planning council would not create a large overhead organization, but, rather, would coördinate the plans of various groups. It would allocate responsibility for research and study and for the development of various aspects of the over-all plan; and then would consider the relationship of each subplan to the total plan which would thus develop.

This planning council might be made up of representatives of the chamber of commerce, of city and county planning bodies, of organized labor, of educational, health, and welfare agencies, of service clubs, of agricultural and rural groups, of racial groups, of organized religion, of other local groups which might be helpful, and of Federal and state agencies interested in the area.

The postwar planning council might be made up of two representatives of each of the interested bodies and groups, plus individuals invited from the community at large. There would be a chairman, one or more vice chairmen, and a secretary, appointed by the chairman of the planning council. These officers would be members of an executive committee of perhaps eleven which would also include the chairmen of three main committees—business and industrial planning; public works; and health and welfare services. Each committee would select its own secretary from a leading agency in its field. No central financing should be necessary. Secretarial costs could be handled by the agencies which supplied the secretaries.

The expense of surveys and research, which should be coördinated, would be borne by the agencies equipped to render such service, as part of their regular, if reoriented, work.

All possible suggestions should be made by groups and individuals as to ideas to be worked into a master plan. It would be possible to take the Postwar Agenda, recently published by the National Resources Planning Board, and check off those items which might be partly handled by agencies in the local community. All available advice and help should be secured from Federal and state agencies.

Planning need not begin at once on every conceivable subject. One or more important subjects, such as housing, might be starting points. Other projects could be developed, as interest, knowledge, and urgency increased. Into this growing master plan should be woven all desired aspects of the physical structure of the community, of its population content, and of the economic, social, and cultural life of that population.

The results of such planning should be reported to the public from time to time as progress was made and as public understanding was necessary. Information should be supplied to the participant groups as it became available. Both immediate and long-time goals should be set. Definite measures should be worked out for the methods of realizing these goals. The postwar community plan should be put on a scheduled basis and a constant check-up made to ascertain progress toward the agreed goals. The plan itself should be subject to periodical consideration and revision in the light of further knowledge and experience and of changing conditions.

These proposals are not new in principle. They represent merely the administrative techniques and practices already worked out in community chests and councils throughout the country, applied to the problem of over-all postwar planning for the local community. Surely, in respect to this problem, our community chest and council administrators have a vital responsibility.

We must do all we can to win the war. That is our first responsibility. But what we do to win that war is largely determined by authorities outside ourselves. It is quite clear, however, that for the average American community the peace to follow the war will be harder than the war itself, for although many Federal restrictions may remain, many will be removed. Communities will be more dependent on their own resources than they have been in the face of

tremendous economic and social problems. Moreover, the unity and common purpose which animate us in the war will largely dissolve in the completion of the war effort and in the inevitable controversies over domestic political issues and over the character of the world adjustment which will follow the peace. There will be a tendency to revert to the programs and activities of the days before the war without realization that those days can never return. We face a new life in a new world. Before us lie vast dangers of depression during the demobilization of war industry and of our armed forces, and of tremendous demoralization within our communities, which may have disastrous effect on human well-being and health and character, and on the integrity of our community life.

Unquestionably, vast state and Federal plans will be developed and measures will be taken to handle these problems. Yet the resources of state and Federal governments are relatively small compared with the combined resources of business and industry. Moreover, we want our own kinds of communities, whose characters we will determine and will help to create.

Such creative activity will benefit all groups and individuals in our communities, for it will mean communities made up of more producers and more consumers; of better workers; of better citizens; of fewer dependents; of more contented, and of fewer discontented, souls. Thus our communities may be better able to pay for the good things of life than otherwise would be possible. They can be communities unified in common purpose and in mutual concern for their own welfare.

Over-all postwar community planning is the natural enlargement and fruition of all that we have learned through years of peace and war in social welfare planning. Such planning represents to us, as administrators, a tremendous opportunity to be useful to the communities and to the society to whose service our lives are dedicated.

APPENDIX A: PROGRAM¹

GENERAL SESSIONS

Opening Address

The Most Reverend Bryan J. McEntegart, Bishop of Ogdensburg, Vice President of the National Conference of Social Work. See Index.

A Nonprofessional View of the Opportunities and Mission of Social Work
Chester I. Barnard, President, United Service Organizations, New York City. See Index.

The Mobilization of Manpower: Its Social Implications

Watson Miller, Chairman, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C.

Problems of the Postwar World

Max Lerner, Professor of Political Science, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass. See Index.

The Beveridge Report on Social Services in Britain after the War

Herman Finer, Reader in Public Administration, University of London, and International Labour Office, Montreal, Canada. See Index.

The Report of the National Resources Planning Board

Eveline M. Burns, Chief, Economic Security and Health Section, National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D. C. See Index.

What Makes Wartime Morale?

Max Lerner, Professor of Political Science, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

The Mobilization of Manpower

William Haber, Director, Bureau of Program Requirements, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C. See Index.

The Impact of the War on British Social Services

J. J. Mallon, Headworker, Toynbee Hall, London, England. See Index.

¹ The Program as printed here is a composite of all three programs, as held or as planned.

SECTIONAL MEETINGS

1. The Impact of the War on Family Life

Florence Hollis, Editor of Publications, Family Welfare Association of America, New York City.

Elma Ashton, Assistant Director of Home Service, Eastern Area, American Red Cross, Alexandria, Va.

Marguerite Galloway, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D. C.

William T. Kirk, Executive Director, Provident Family and Children's Service, Kansas City, Mo.

Maude T. Barrett, Acting Commissioner, State Department of Public Welfare, Baton Rouge, La.

Jeannette Hanford, District Superintendent, United Charities of Chicago, Chicago.

Esther Twente, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

2. The Mobilization of Manpower

Alvin Roseman, Assistant to Deputy Chairman, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C.

Charlotte Carr, Deputy Chairman, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C.

Robert C. Goodwin, Regional Director, War Manpower Commission, Cleveland.

3. Social Problems Created by the Mobilization of Manpower in a War-Industry Community

W. Earl Prosser, Secretary, Council of Social Agencies and Welfare Division, Bridgeport Defense Council, Bridgeport, Conn. See Index.

Myron Gwinner, Assistant Director, Social Planning Council, St. Louis.

Kenneth I. Wood, Associate Secretary, Council of Social Agencies, Dayton, Ohio.

4. The Impact of the War upon Community Welfare Organization

Joanna C. Colcord, Director, Charity Organization Department, Russell Sage Foundation, New York City. See Index.

Paul L. Benjamin, Executive Secretary, Buffalo Council of Social Agencies, Buffalo, N. Y.

Max Silverstein, Director, Health Division, Council of Social Agencies, Los Angeles.

Robert H. MacRae, Managing Director, Council of Social Agencies of Metropolitan Detroit, Detroit.

5. Health Insurance

John P. Peters, M.D., John Slade Ely Professor of Medicine, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, Conn. See Index.

6. Stabilizing Rents in Defense Areas

Alfred A. Benesch, Area Rent Director, Cleveland Defense Rental Office, Office of Price Administration, Cleveland.

7. Some Psychological Effects of the War

Nathan W. Ackerman, M.D., Jewish Board of Guardians, New York City.

Eleanor Clifton, District Secretary, Community Service Society, New York City. See Index.

Margaret C. L. Gildea, M.D., Department of Neuropsychiatry, School of Medicine, Washington University, St. Louis.

Frieda Romalis, Executive Director, Jewish Social Service Bureau, St. Louis.

8. The Problem of Integrating Public Opinion in a Democracy

Thomas M. French, M.D., Associate Director, Institute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago.

9. Children in Wartime

Katharine F. Lenroot, Chief, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.

Frank J. O'Brien, M.D., Associate Superintendent, Board of Education of the City of New York, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Harold Matthews, Executive Secretary, DePelchin Faith Home and Children's Bureau, Houston, Texas.

Lois Benedict, Assistant Director, Children's Bureau, State Department of Public Welfare, Richmond, Va.

10. Defense Councils

T. J. S. Waxter, Director, Department of Public Welfare, Baltimore. See Index.

Catherine M. Dunn, Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, Washington, D. C.

Parke M. Banta, Administrator, State Social Security Commission of Missouri, Jefferson City, Mo.

Emil G. Steger, Director, Social Planning Council, St. Louis.

Ralph Blanchard, Executive Director, Community Chests and Councils, New York City.

Margaret Yates, Executive Secretary, Council of Social Agencies, Fort Worth, Texas.

11. The Problems of the Alien in Wartime
Earl G. Harrison, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, United States Department of Justice, Philadelphia.
Edward J. Ennis, Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. See Index.
12. Progress in Interracial Relationships
Edward S. Lewis, Executive Secretary, New York Urban League, New York City. See Index.
Charles P. Browning, Assistant Adviser, Interracial Relations, National Youth Administration, Washington, D. C.
Beulah Whitby, Executive Secretary, Emergency Welfare and Evacuation Committee, Detroit Area, Office of Civilian Defense, Detroit.
13. Youth in Wartime
Charles E. Hendry, Director, Research and Statistical Service, Boy Scouts of America, New York City.
Five panel participants.
Nathan Cohen, Director of Program, Jewish Welfare Board, New York City.
Fritz Redl, Wayne University, Detroit.
Helen Rowe, Group Work Consultant, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.
14. Social Security: Safety Net or Featherbed?
Jane M. Hoey, Director, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D. C.
15. National and State War Funds
Robert O. Loosley, Associate Executive Vice President, National War Fund, New York City.
Virgil Martin, Special Field Representative for State and Local War Chests, Community Chests and Councils, New York City.
16. Labor and Social Work
Robert MacRea, Managing Director, Council of Social Agencies of Metropolitan Detroit, Detroit.
Monroe Sweetland, National Director, National C.I.O. Committee for American and Allied War Relief, Washington, D. C.
17. Problems of Adolescent Girls in Wartime
Dorothea F. Sullivan, Director of Group Work, National Catholic School of Social Service, Washington, D. C.
Marguerite Marsh, National Information Bureau, New York City.

Pearl Case Blough, Secretary, Services for Women and Girls, United Service Organizations, New York City.

Elsa Castendyck, Director, Social Service Division, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. See Index.

Prudence Kwiecien, Director, Girls' Bureau of Cleveland, Cleveland.

18. Day Care for Children of Working Mothers

Mrs. Donald J. Hurley, Chairman, Boston Day-Care Committee, Boston.

Lucretia B. Cunningham, Case Work Secretary, Council of Social Agencies, Hartford, Conn.

Leonard W. Mayo, Dean, School of Applied Social Sciences, Western Reserve University, Cleveland; President, Child Welfare League of America. See Index.

Jerome N. Sampson, Secretary, Family and Children's Divisions, Social Planning Council, St. Louis.

Ruth Flater, Consultant on Child Care Projects, Bowie County Child Welfare Board, Texarkana, Texas.

Irene E. Murphy, Council of Social Agencies of Metropolitan Detroit, Detroit. See Index.

Louise Noble, Supervisor, Day-Care Section, Children's Unit, State Department of Public Welfare, Columbus, Ohio.

19. The Role of Social Agencies in the Total Mobilization of Manpower

Anna Rosenberg, Regional Director, War Manpower Commission, New York City.

Harry M. Carey, Executive Director, Greater Boston Community Fund, Boston.

William H. Stead, Dean, School of Business and Public Administration, Washington University, St. Louis.

J. Wesley McAfee, President, Union Electric Company of Missouri, St. Louis. See Index.

Raymond E. Baarts, Secretary, Council of Social Agencies, Kansas City, Mo.

Robert C. Goodwin, Regional Director, War Manpower Commission, Cleveland.

Peter Barno, Employment Manager, Thompson Aircraft Products Company, Euclid, Ohio.

Henry L. Zucker, Secretary, Case work and Children's Councils, Welfare Federation of Cleveland, Cleveland.

20. Organizing the Community for Health Protection in Wartime
Dean A. Clark, M.D., Chief, Emergency Medical Section, United States Public Health Service, Washington, D. C. See Index.
Elin L. Anderson, Director of Health Study, Farm Foundation, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr. See Index.
21. The Social and Economic Problem of Depressed Areas
P. G. Beck, Regional Director, Farm Security Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, Indianapolis.
Irwin L. Shannon, Department of Sociology, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
22. Operating the Social Agency under War Conditions
Clark L. Mock, Executive Secretary, Family and Children's Society, Baltimore.
Margaret Steel Moss, Executive Director, Dauphin County Board of Assistance, Harrisburg, Pa.
William T. Kirk, Executive Director, Provident Family and Children's Service, Kansas City, Mo.
Irene F. Conrad, Executive Secretary, Council of Social Agencies, Houston, Texas.
Louis Kraft, Executive Director, National Jewish Welfare Board, New York City.
Mary C. Raymond, Executive Secretary, Council of Social Agencies, New Orleans.
23. Civilian Morale
Nine panel participants.
24. Unmarried War Mothers
Maud Morlock, Social Service Division, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.
Adelaide Johnesse, Chicago Chapter, American Red Cross, Chicago.
25. Day Care for Children of Working Mothers.
Discussion leaders:
Helen M. Harris, Executive Director, Mayor's Committee on Wartime Care for Children, New York City.
Elizabeth Woodruff Clark, Social Planning Council, St. Louis.
Elsie M. Bond, Chairman, Committee on Child Care, Development and Protection, State War Council, Albany, N. Y.
Ann Howard, Executive Secretary, Missouri Association for Social Welfare, St. Louis.
Bernice E. Orchard, Executive Secretary, State Committee on Care of Children in Wartime, Indianapolis.

Paul L. Benjamin, Executive Secretary, Council of Social Agencies, Buffalo, N. Y.

26. Meeting Health and Welfare Needs of Industrial Workers
Charles P. Taft, Assistant Director, Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, Washington, D. C. See Index.
27. The Role of Social Agencies in the Total Mobilization of Manpower
Discussion leaders:
Emilie T. Strauss, Placement Secretary, Kennedy Employment Service, New York City.
Oliver A. Friedman, Executive Secretary, National Association of Goodwill Industries, Milwaukee.
Sanford Bates, Commissioner, Board of Parole, State Executive Department, New York City.
Marian McBee, Executive Secretary, New York City Committee on Mental Hygiene, State Charities Aid Association, New York City.
Helen Wood McLaughlin, Director, United Service Organizations Club for Women War Workers, St. Louis
Alberta Chase, Executive Secretary, Missouri Society for Crippled Children, St. Louis.
John Thornberry, Director, The Canteen, Kansas City, Mo.
Edward Gildea, M.D., Department of Neuropsychiatry, School of Medicine, Washington University, St. Louis.
Elizabeth Magee, General Secretary, National Consumers' League, Cleveland.
Harry H. Howett, Director of Social Service, National Society for Crippled Children, Elyria, Ohio.
Charles L. Sherwood, Director, State Department of Public Welfare, Columbus, Ohio.
28. The Work of Labor-Management Committees
William Sentner, General Vice President, United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, C.I.O., St. Louis.
J. Raymond Walsh, Research Director, C.I.O. National Office, Washington, D. C.
29. Administrative Problems Created by the War Situation in Various Kinds of Agencies
Discussion leaders:
Clara A. Kaiser, Professor of Social Work, New York School of Social Work, New York City.

Stanley P. Davies, Executive Director, Community Service Society of New York, New York City.

Edward E. Rhatigan, Acting First Deputy Commissioner, Department of Welfare, New York City.

Elwood Street, Director, Community Council and War and Community Fund, Richmond, Va. See Index.

Gilbert Harris, Executive Director, Young Men's Hebrew Association, St. Louis.

Frieda Romalis, Executive Director, Jewish Social Service Bureau, St. Louis.

Parke M. Banta, Administrator, State Social Security Commission of Missouri, Jefferson City, Mo.

Emil G. Steger, Director, Social Planning Council, St. Louis.

W. T. McCullough, Research Secretary, Welfare Federation, Cleveland.

Ralph Bennett, Executive Secretary, Family and Children's Bureau of Franklin County, Columbus, Ohio.

Fred Hoke, President of Board, State Department of Public Welfare, Indianapolis.

Terrance L. Webster, Executive Secretary, Community Fund of Columbus and Franklin County, Columbus, Ohio.

30. Counseling in Various Settings

Gordon Hamilton, Professor of Social Work, New York School of Social Work New York City. See Index.

Howard A. Wilson, Director, Military and Naval Welfare Services, North Atlantic Area, American Red Cross, New York City. See Index.

Jane F. Culbert, Consultation Service, Vocational Service for Juniors, New York City.

Frances Schmidt, Public Relations Secretary, Family Consultation Service, Associated Charities, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Caroline L. McGowan, Chief, Employee Adjustment Section, Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. See Index.

Julia Alsberg, Director, Counseling and Employment Service, St. Louis Chapter, American Red Cross, St. Louis.

Callman Rawley, Case Supervisor, Jewish Social Service Bureau, St. Louis. See Index.

Madeline L. MacGregor, Director, Program Department, National Travelers Aid Association, New York City.

Evelyn Millis Duvall, Executive Director, Association for Family Living, Chicago.

Edward Rosenthal, Field Director, American Red Cross, United States Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Ill.

31. How Trade-Unions Can Assist Social Agencies in Developing Broad Community Programs

Abraham Bluestein, Executive Director, Labor League for Human Rights of the A.F. of L., New York City.

Newman Jeffrey, Director, Labor Division, Office of Civilian Defense, Washington, D. C.

32. The Coördination of Health, Case Work, Education, Recreation, and Employment Services for Child Care

Howard W. Hopkirk, Executive Director, Child Welfare League of America, New York City.

Five panel participants.

Paul T. Beisser, Secretary and General Manager, Children's Aid Society, St. Louis Provident Association, St. Louis.

Four panel participants.

Leonard W. Mayo, Dean, School of Applied Social Sciences, Western Reserve University, Cleveland.

Five panel participants.

33. What is Involved in the Selection and Training of Paid Untrained Workers?

Agnes Van Driel, Chief, Division of Technical Training, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D. C. See Index.

Ruth O. Blakeslee, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.

Emma Ashton, Associate Director of Home Service, Eastern Area, American Red Cross, Alexandria, Va.

Helen R. Wright, Dean, School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, Chicago.

34. Supplementing Personnel in Group Work Agencies

Dorothea Sullivan, Director of Group Work, National Catholic School of Social Service, Washington, D. C.

Panel participants.

Kurt Lewin, University of Iowa, Iowa City.

Three panel participants.

Ann Elizabeth Neely, National Board, Young Women's Christian Association, New York City.

Four panel participants.

35. The Organization of Community Forces for the Prevention and Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency in Wartime

Mary L. Gibbons, Deputy Commissioner of Social Welfare, New York City. See Index.

Elsa Castendyck, Director, Social Service Division, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. See Index.

Basil Henriques, Chairman, Development Committee, National Association of Boys' Clubs; Chairman, East London Juvenile Court, London, England.

36. The Role of Federal and State Government in Helping to Meet the Needs of Youth

Helen Rowe, Group Work Consultant, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.

Jerome H. Bentley, Program Director, Young Men's Christian Association, New York City.

Willard E. Goslin, Superintendent of Schools, Webster Groves, Mo.

Walter J. Robinson, Hadley Technical High School, St. Louis.

Paul A. Rehms, Superintendent, Lakewood Public Schools, Lakewood, Ohio.

Eugene T. Lies, Executive Secretary, Occupational Planning Committee, Cleveland.

37. The Fair Employment Practice Committees: a Summary of Work in Protecting the Rights and Claims of Minorities

Lawrence W. Cramer, Executive Secretary, President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C. See Index.

Harry I. Barron, Chief, Compliance and Analysis Division, President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C.

38. Special Welfare Services to Men in the Armed Forces and Their Families

Commander John L. Reynolds, Chief, Division of Welfare, Bureau of Personnel, Department of the Navy, Arlington, Va.

Robert E. Bondy, Administrator, Services to the Armed Forces, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C. See Index.

39. Social Case Work in Relation to Selective Service and the Rejectee

Cornelius Utz, Community Service Society, New York City.

Ethel L. Ginsburg, Secretary, Selective Service Case Work Program, New York City Committee on Mental Hygiene, New York City.

Sam Parker, M.D., Psychiatrist-in-charge, Division of Psychiatry, Kings County Hospital, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Luther E. Woodward, Field Director, Liaison with Selective Service, National Committee for Mental Hygiene, New York City. See Index.

Allan Stone, Chairman, Selective Service Screening Program; Research Director, Department of Research and Statistics, Amherst H. Wilder Charity, St. Paul, Minn. See Index.

40. Manpower in War Industries

Charles T. Schrage, Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Training, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C.

John J. Tessari, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C. See Index.

41. The Effect of the Citizens Service Corps on Volunteer Service

Mrs. Winthrop Pennock, Director, Office of Civilian Mobilization, New York State War Council, Albany, N. Y.

Ray Johns, Director of Field Operations, United Service Organizations, New York City.

42. Professional Training in the Light of Wartime Shortages

Elizabeth Wisner, Director, School of Social Work, Tulane University, New Orleans. See Index.

43. Group Work Resources for Helping Youth in Personal Problems

Clara A. Kaiser, Professor of Social Work, New York School of Social Work, New York City.

Four panel participants.

Donald Stier, Grace Hill Settlement House, St. Louis.

Four panel participants.

Mildred Esgar, Secretary, Group Work Council, Welfare Federation, Cleveland.

Seven panel participants.

44. The Social Treatment of the Prostitute in Wartime

Raymond F. Clapp, Associate Director of Social Protection, Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, Washington, D. C.

Four panel participants.

45. The Social Aspects of the Treatment of Venereal Disease

Morris S. Wortman, Department of Sociology, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.

46. Americans of Japanese Ancestry

Selene Gifford, Public Welfare Consultant, War Relocation Authority, Washington, D. C.

Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Secretary, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia. See Index.

John Powell, Director of Community Activities, War Relocation Authority, Poston, Ariz. See Index.

Homer Morris, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia.

Mike M. Masaoka, National Secretary, Japanese American Citizens League, Salt Lake City.

Anne Clo Wilson, National Board, Young Women's Christian Association, New York City.

47. The Potential Contribution of Social Work to Postwar Reconstruction in the War-devastated Countries

Hugh R. Jackson, Special Assistant to the Director, Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, United States Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Mary E. Hurlbutt, Associate Professor of Social Work, New York School of Social Work, New York City. See Index.

48. Needed Changes and Expansion of Social Security

Arthur J. Altmeyer, Chairman, Social Security Board, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D. C. See Index.

49. Social Work in New Settings

Charles Nison, National Director, Personal Service Department, United Seamen's Service, New York City.

The Rev. Almon R. Pepper, Executive Secretary, National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, New York City.

Genevieve Chase, Chief, Employee Service Section, Office for Emergency Management, Washington, D. C.

Ruth Zurfluh, Case Supervisor, Family Service Society, St. Louis.

Elizabeth Cosgrove, Examiner in Charge, Public Social Services Unit, United States Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C.

Mildred T. Faris, Director, Franklin County Chapter, American Red Cross, Columbus, Ohio.

50. The Employment of Minors in Wartime

Courtenay Dinwiddie, General Secretary, National Child Labor Committee, New York City.

Beatrice McConnell, Director, Industrial Division, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C. See Index.

51. The Work of Labor-Management Committees

Wendell Lund, Director, Labor Production Division, War Production Board, Washington, D. C. See Index.

52. The Beveridge Report on Social Services in Britain after the War
Herman Finer, Reader in Public Administration, University of London and International Labour Office, Montreal. See Index.
53. Social Work Action on the National Resources Planning Board Security Report
Joanna C. Colcord, Director, Charity Organization Department, Russell Sage Foundation, New York City. See Index.
54. The Process of Community Organization in Rural Child Welfare Services
Benjamin E. Youngdahl, Associate Professor of Social Work, Washington University, St. Louis. See Index.
Florence L. Sullivan, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.
Mary Lois Pyles, Director, Division of Child Welfare, State Social Security Commission of Missouri, Jefferson City, Mo.
Luella A. Smith, Scioto County Child Welfare Services, Portsmouth, Ohio.
55. The Civilian War Services
Thomas Devine, Chief, Defense Council Division, Office of Civilian Defense, Washington, D. C. See Index.
Wilmer Shields, Chief, Volunteer Offices Section, Office of Civilian Defense, Washington, D. C.
56. Labor Participation in Social Work
Charles Livermore, Assistant National Director, National C.I.O. Committee for American and Allied War Relief, Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX B: BUSINESS ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE FOR 1943

OFFICERS

President: Fred K. Hoehler, Chicago
First Vice President: The Most Rev. Bryan J. McEntegart, Bishop of
Ogdensburg (N. Y.)
Second Vice President: Elizabeth Wisner, New Orleans
Third Vice President: Colonel Archibald Young, Pasadena
Treasurer: Arch Mandel, New York City
General Secretary: Howard R. Knight, Columbus, Ohio

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Ex officio: Fred K. Hoehler, President; The Most Rev. Bryan J. McEntegart, First Vice President; Elizabeth Wisner, Second Vice President; Colonel Archibald Young, Third Vice President; Shelby M. Harrison, Past President; Arch Mandel, Treasurer. *Term expiring 1943:* Pierce Atwater, Chicago; Ruth O. Blakeslee, Washington, D. C.; Charlotte Carr, Washington, D. C.; Joanna C. Colcord, New York City; H. L. Lurie, New York City; Margaret E. Rich, Pittsburgh; Josephine Roche, Denver. *Term expiring 1944:* Martha A. Chickering, Sacramento, Calif.; Ewan Clague, Washington, D. C.; Evelyn K. Davis, Boston; Gordon Hamilton, New York City; Wayne McMillen, Chicago; Agnes Van Driel, Washington, D. C.; Gertrude Wilson, Pittsburgh. *Term expiring 1945:* Charles J. Birt, Minneapolis; Loula Dunn, Montgomery, Ala.; Martha M. Eliot, M.D., Washington, D. C.; Ruth FitzSimons, Olympia, Wash.; Lester B. Granger, New York City; Kenneth L. M. Pray, Philadelphia; George L. Warren, New York City

CONFERENCE COMMITTEES

COMMITTEE ON NOMINATIONS

Rose J. McHugh, Washington, D. C., Chairman. *Term expiring 1943:* Frankie V. McAdams, Atlanta, Ga.; Mary E. Austin, Washington, D. C.;

Frederick I. Daniels, Brooklyn, N. Y.; Sophie Hardy, San Francisco; Rose J. McHugh, Washington, D. C.; C. F. McNeil, Omaha, Nebr.; the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Thomas J. O'Dwyer, Los Angeles. *Term expiring 1944*: Paul T. Beisser, St. Louis; Sara A. Brown, Denver; Evelyn P. Johnson, Milwaukee; Clara A. Kaiser, New York City; Malcolm S. Nichols, Boston; Rose Porter, Salt Lake City; Mary C. Raymond, New Orleans. *Term expiring 1945*: Florence R. Day, Northampton, Mass.; Edgar M. Gerlach, Danbury, Conn.; Frank Hertel, Minneapolis; Louis E. Hosch, Chicago; Ruth E. Lewis, St. Louis; Margaret Steel Moss, Harrisburg, Pa.

COMMITTEE ON PROGRAM

Ex officio: Fred K. Hoehler, Chicago, Chairman; Shelby M. Harrison, New York City; Howard R. Knight, Columbus, Ohio. *Term expiring 1943*: Ruth O. Blakeslee, Washington, D. C.; Mrs. Chester Bowles, Essex, Conn. *Term expiring 1944*: H. M. Cassidy, Berkeley, Calif.; Mary L. Gibbons, New York City. *Term expiring 1945*: Clara A. Kaiser, New York City; Kenneth W. Miller, Springfield, Ill. *Section Chairman*: Charlotte Towle, Chicago; Charles E. Hendry, New York City; Arthur Dunham, Detroit; Robert K. Lamb, Washington, D. C.; William Hodson, New York City (deceased)

COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS

Rev. John J. Butler, St. Louis, Chairman. F. E. Andrews, New York City; Lucille Batson, Indianapolis, Ind.

COMMITTEE ON TIME AND PLACE

C. W. Areson, Industry, N. Y., Chairman. *Term expiring 1943*: C. W. Areson, Industry, N. Y.; Harry M. Carey, Boston; Louise M. Clevenger, St. Paul; Helen W. Hanchette, Cleveland; Charles I. Schottland, Washington, D. C.; Marietta Stevenson, Chicago; Walter W. Whitson, Houston, Texas. *Term expiring 1944*: Douglas Falconer, New York City; the Rev. A. T. Jamison, Greenwood, S. C.; Fred R. Johnson, Detroit; Rhoda Kaufman, Atlanta, Ga.; the Rev. Walter McGuinn, Boston; Merle E. MacMahon, Dayton, Ohio; Richard M. Neustadt, San Francisco. *Term expiring 1945*: Vilona P. Cutler, Oklahoma City; Agnes S. Donaldson, Lincoln, Nebr.; Lynn D. Mowat, Los Angeles; Randel Shake, Indianapolis; Jean Sinnock, Denver; Herbert L. Willett, Jr., Washington, D. C.

ORGANIZATION OF SECTIONS

SECTION I. SOCIAL CASE WORK

Chairman: Charlotte Towle, Chicago

Vice Chairman: Lucille N. Austin, New York City

Term expiring 1943: Marcella Farrar, Cleveland; Alta C. Hoover, San Francisco; Ruth E. Lewis, St. Louis; Mary E. Lucas, New York City; Louise Silbert, Boston. *Term expiring 1944*: Grace A. Browning, Chi-

cago; Elizabeth McCord de Schweinitz, Washington, D. C.; Elizabeth L. Porter, New Orleans; Helaine A. Todd, Washington, D. C.; Anna Budd Ware, Cincinnati. *Term expiring 1945*: Aleta Brownlee, San Francisco; Ruth Gartland, Pittsburgh; Gordon Hamilton, New York City; Florence Hollis, New York City; Ella Weinfurther Reed, Chicago

SECTION II. SOCIAL GROUP WORK

Chairman: Charles E. Hendry, New York City

Vice Chairman: Philip Schiff, New Orleans

Term expiring 1943: Harrison S. Elliott, New York City; Charles E. Hendry, New York City; Mary Ellen Hubbard, Philadelphia; Annie Clo Watson, New York City; Margaret Williamson, New York City. *Term expiring 1944*: Dorothy I. Cline, Detroit; Margaret Day, Syracuse, N. Y.; Neva R. Deardorff, New York City; John C. Smith, Jr., Boston; Harleigh Trecker, Los Angeles. *Term expiring 1945*: Ray Johns, New York City; Alma Elizabeth Johnston, Richmond, Va.; Clara A. Kaiser, New York City; Helen Rowe, Washington, D. C.; Dorothea Spellman, Pittsburgh

SECTION III. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

Chairman: Arthur Dunham, Detroit

Vice Chairman: Margaret Yates, Fort Worth, Texas

Term expiring 1943: Ralph H. Blanchard, New York City; Arthur Dunham, Detroit; Anita Eldridge, San Francisco; Josephine Strode, Ithaca, N. Y.; Martha Wood, Washington, D. C. *Term expiring 1944*: Helen M. Alvord, Greenwich, Conn.; Isabel P. Kennedy, Pittsburgh; W. T. McCullough, Cleveland; Wayne McMillen, Chicago; Earl N. Parker, New York City. *Term expiring 1945*: James T. Brunot, Washington, D. C.; Ruth FitzSimons, Olympia, Wash.; Lester B. Granger, New York City; Philip E. Ryan, Washington, D. C.; Mrs. DeForest Van Slyck, New York City

SECTION IV. SOCIAL ACTION

Chairman: Robert K. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

Term expiring 1943: Mary Anderson, Washington, D. C.; Roger N. Baldwin, New York City; John S. Bradway, Durham, N. C.; Paul H. Douglas, Chicago. *Term expiring 1944*: John A. Fitch, New York City; Marion Hathway, Pittsburgh; T. Arnold Hill, New York City; Sidney Hollander, Baltimore; Lea D. Taylor, Chicago. *Term expiring 1945*: Ewan Clague, Washington, D. C.; Myron Falk, Baton Rouge, La.; Elizabeth S. Magee, Cleveland; Josephine Roche, Denver; J. Raymond Walsh, Washington, D. C.

SECTION V. PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION

Chairman: William Hodson, New York City (deceased)

Vice Chairman: Benjamin Glassberg, Milwaukee

Term expiring 1943: Charles H. Alspach, Needham, Mass.; Robert W. Beasley, Honolulu, Hawaii; William Haber, Washington, D. C.; Florence

L. Sullivan, Washington, D. C.; Ernest F. Witte, Seattle, Wash. *Term expiring 1944*: Fay L. Bentley, Washington, D. C.; Elsa Castendyck, Washington, D. C.; Ruth Coleman, Chicago; Dorothy C. Kahn, New York City; Eunice Minton, Jacksonville, Fla. *Term expiring 1945*: Robert E. Bondy, Washington, D. C.; William W. Burke, St. Louis; E. R. Goudy, Portland, Oreg.; Martha E. Phillips, Chicago; Louis Towley, St. Paul, Minn.

APPENDIX C: BUSINESS ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE FOR 1944

OFFICERS

President: Elizabeth Wisner, New Orleans

First Vice President: Stanley P. Davies, New York City

Second Vice President: Louise Cottrell, Portland, Oreg.

Third Vice President: The Rev A. T. Jamison, Greenwood, S. C.

Treasurer: Arch Mandel, New York City

General Secretary: Howard R. Knight, Columbus, Ohio

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Ex officio: Elizabeth Wisner, President; Stanley P. Davies, First Vice President; Louise Cottrell, Second Vice President; the Rev. A. T. Jamison, Third Vice President; Fred K. Hoehler, Past President; Arch Mandel, Treasurer. *Term expiring 1944:* Martha A. Chickering, Sacramento, Calif.; Ewan Clague, Washington, D. C.; Evelyn K. Davis, Boston; Gordon Hamilton, New York City; Wayne McMillen, Chicago; Agnes Van Driel, Washington, D. C.; Gertrude Wilson, Pittsburgh. *Term expiring 1945:* Charles J. Birt, Minneapolis; Loula Dunn, Montgomery, Ala.; Martha M. Eliot, M.D., Washington, D. C.; Ruth FitzSimons, Olympia, Wash.; Lester B. Granger, New York City; Kenneth L. M. Pray, Philadelphia; George L. Warren, New York City. *Term expiring 1946:* Mildred Arnold, Washington, D. C.; Harry M. Carey, Boston; Lucy P. Carner, Chicago; Elizabeth Cosgrove, Washington, D. C.; Ralph G. Hurlin, New York City; Leonard W. Mayo, Cleveland; Frances Taussig, New York City

CONFERENCE COMMITTEES

COMMITTEE ON NOMINATIONS

Malcolm S. Nichols, Boston, Chairman. *Term expiring 1944:* Paul T. Beisser, St. Louis; Sara A. Brown, Denver; Evelyn P. Johnson, Milwaukee; Clara Kaiser, New York City; Malcolm S. Nichols, Boston; Rose

Porter, Salt Lake City; Mary C. Raymond, New Orleans. *Term expiring 1945:* Florence R. Day, Northampton, Mass.; Edgar M. Gerlach, Lewisburg, Pa.; Frank Hertel, Minneapolis; Louis E. Hosch, Chicago; Ruth E. Lewis, St. Louis; Margaret Steel Moss, Harrisburg, Pa. *Term expiring 1946:* Ralph Bennett, Columbus, Ohio; Samuel Gerson, St. Louis; Frank Z. Glick, Lincoln, Nebr.; Anna E. King, New York City; Robert F. Nelson, Indianapolis; Ruth Smalley, Pittsburgh; Anna D. Ward, Baltimore.

COMMITTEE ON PROGRAM

Ex officio: Elizabeth Wisner, New Orleans, Chairman. Fred K. Hoehler, Chicago; Howard R. Knight, Columbus, Ohio. *Term expiring 1944:* H. M. Cassidy, Berkeley, Calif.; Mary L. Gibbons, New York City. *Term expiring 1945:* Clara A. Kaiser, New York City; Kenneth W. Miller, Springfield, Ill. *Term expiring 1946:* Myron Falk, Baton Rouge, La.; Helaine A. Todd, Washington, D. C. *Section Chairmen:* Gladys Fisher, Albany, N. Y.; Joe R. Hoffer, Washington, D. C.; Irene Farnham Conrad, Houston, Texas; Benjamin E. Youngdahl, St. Louis; Benjamin Glassberg, Milwaukee

COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS

Martha Allis, Little Rock, Ark., Chairman. Marie S. Baber, Columbus, Ohio; Selma J. Sampliner, Detroit.

COMMITTEE ON TIME AND PLACE

Merle E. MacMahon, Dayton, Ohio, Chairman. *Term expiring 1944:* Douglas Falconer, New York City; the Rev. A. T. Jamison, Greenwood, S. C.; Fred R. Johnson, Detroit; Rhoda Kaufman, Atlanta, Ga.; the Rev. Walter McGuinn, Boston; Merle E. MacMahon, Dayton, Ohio; Richard M. Neustadt, San Francisco. *Term expiring 1945:* Vilona P. Cutler, Oklahoma City; Agnes S. Donaldson, Lincoln, Nebr.; Lynn D. Mowat, Los Angeles; Randel Shake, Indianapolis; Jean Sinnock, Denver; Herbert L. Willett, Jr., Washington, D. C. *Term expiring 1946:* W. Herbert Bartlett, New Orleans; Grace A. Browning, Chicago; Norman B. Finch, Toledo, Ohio; Albert H. Jewell, Kansas City, Mo.; Oscar W. Kuolt, Rochester, N. Y.; Claire McCarthy, Richmond, Va.; Mary B. Stotsenberg, Louisville, Ky.

ORGANIZATION OF SECTIONS

SECTION I. SOCIAL CASE WORK

Chairman: Gladys Fisher, Albany, N. Y.

Vice Chairman: Perry B. Hall, Peoria, Ill.

Term expiring 1944: Grace A. Browning, Chicago; Elizabeth McCord de Schweinitz, Washington, D. C.; Elizabeth L. Porter, New Orleans;

Helaine Todd, Washington, D. C.; Anna Budd Ware, Cincinnati. *Term expiring 1945:* Aleta Brownlee, San Francisco; Ruth Gartland, Pittsburgh; Gordon Hamilton, New York City; Florence Hollis, New York City; Ella Weinfurther Reed, Chicago. *Term expiring 1946:* Amy W. Greene, Baltimore; Isabel Burns Lindsay, Washington, D. C.; Lena Parrott, Augusta, Maine; Ethel Verry, Chicago; Henry L. Zucker, Cleveland

SECTION II. SOCIAL GROUP WORK

Chairman: Joe R. Hoffer, Washington, D. C.

Vice Chairman: Helen Rowe, Washington, D. C.

Term expiring 1944: Dorothy I. Cline, Detroit; Margaret Day, Syracuse, N. Y.; Neva R. Deardorff, New York City; John C. Smith, Jr., Boston; Harleigh Trecker, Los Angeles. *Term expiring 1945:* Ray Johns, New York City; Alma Elizabeth Johnston, Richmond, Va.; Clara A. Kaiser, New York City; Helen Rowe, Washington, D. C.; Dorothea Spellman, Pittsburgh. *Term expiring 1946:* William H. Bartlett, New Orleans; Laura M. McKeen, Santa Barbara, Calif.; Helen U. Phillips, Philadelphia; Mrs. Paul Rittenhouse, New York City; Douglas E. H. Williams, Ann Arbor, Mich.

SECTION III. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

Chairman: Irene Farnham Conrad, Houston, Texas

Vice Chairman: Earl N. Parker, New York City

Term expiring 1944: Helen M. Alvord, Greenwich, Conn.; Isabel P. Kennedy, Pittsburgh; W. T. McCullough, Cleveland; Wayne McMillen, Chicago; Earl N. Parker, New York City. *Term expiring 1945:* James T. Brunot, Washington, D. C.; Ruth FitzSimons, Olympia, Wash.; Lester B. Granger, New York City; Philip E. Ryan, Washington, D. C.; Mrs. DeForest Van Slyck, New York City. *Term expiring 1946:* Mrs. Linn Brandenburg, Chicago; Louis W. Horne, Lincoln, Nebr.; Virginia Howlett, New York City; Louise Root, Milwaukee; T. Lester Swander, Corpus Christi, Texas

SECTION IV. SOCIAL ACTION

Chairman: Benjamin E. Youngdahl, St. Louis, Mo.

Vice Chairman: Hertha Kraus, Bryn Mawr, Pa.

Term expiring 1944: John A. Fitch, New York City; Marion Hathway, Pittsburgh; T. Arnold Hill, New York City; Sidney Hollander, Baltimore; Lea D. Taylor, Chicago. *Term expiring 1945:* Ewan Calgue, Washington, D. C.; Myron Falk, Baton Rouge, La.; Elizabeth S. Magee, Cleveland; Josephine Roche, Denver; J. Raymond Walsh, Washington, D. C. *Term expiring 1946:* Alvin R. Guyler, Philadelphia; Donald S. Howard, New York City; Edward M. Kahn, Atlanta, Ga.; Robert H. MacRae, Detroit; George D. Nickel, Los Angeles

SECTION V. PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION

Chairman: Benjamin Glassberg, Milwaukee

Vice Chairman: Phyllis Osborn, Kansas City, Mo.

Term expiring 1944: Fay L. Bentley, Washington, D. C.; Elsa Castendyck, Washington, D. C.; Ruth Coleman, Chicago; Dorothy C. Kahn, New York City; Eunice Minton, Jacksonville, Fla. *Term expiring 1945:* Robert E. Bondy, Washington, D. C.; William W. Burke, St. Louis; E. R. Goudy, Portland, Oreg.; Martha E. Phillips, Chicago; Louis Towley, St. Paul, Minn. *Term expiring 1946:* Amy B. Edwards, Vancouver, B. C., Canada; John F. Hall, Seattle; A. E. Howell, Boston; J. Milton Patterson, Baltimore; James Hoge Ricks, Richmond, Va.

APPENDIX D: REPORT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY

DUE to the cancellation of the Cleveland meeting the usual annual Business Session was not held. A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Conference was called immediately following the cancellation, and the administrative committee reports that should have been presented were either presented to the Executive Committee or other provision was made for them. The financial statements as of April 30, as they would have been presented to the annual Business Session, are submitted herewith.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK RECAPITULATION AND FORECAST

Receipts

Total Balance and Receipts, January 1 to April 30, 1943:

Operating Account.....	\$26,970.13	
Annual Meeting Account.....	8,853.19	
Total actual receipts.....		\$35,823.32

Estimated Budget Receipts, May 1 to December 31, 1943:

Operating Account.....	\$18,515.18	
Annual Meeting Account.....	5,393.00	
Total estimated receipts.....		\$23,908.18
Total Actual and Estimated Receipts.....		\$59,731.50

Expenditures

Total Expenditures, January 1 to April 30, 1943:

Operating Account.....	\$18,444.13 ^a	
Annual Meeting Account.....	8,326.04	
Total expenditures.....		\$26,770.17

Estimated Budget Expenditures, May 1 to December 31, 1943:

Operating Account.....	\$26,753.92	
Annual Meeting Account.....	3,173.96	
Total estimated expenditures.....		\$29,927.88
Total Expenditures and Estimated Budget Expenditures.....		\$56,698.05

^a Includes bill for 1942 *Proceedings*.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK
FINANCIAL STATEMENT*Operating Account, January 1-April 30, 1943*

Operating balance, January 1, 1943..... \$ 3,225.31

Receipts, Budget:

Memberships.....	\$20,967.85
Sales of <i>Bulletins</i>	4.40
Sales of <i>Proceedings</i>	136.23
Refunds.....	89.09
Miscellaneous.....	1.25
Attendance fees.....	2,546.00

Total receipts, Operating Account..... \$23,744.82

Total receipts, Annual Meeting Account..... 8,732.00

Total receipts..... \$32,476.82

Total Receipts and Balance..... \$35,702.13

Expenditures, Budget:

Salaries.....	\$ 6,870.09
Travel.....	668.17
Printing.....	2,421.46
Postage.....	999.46
Supplies.....	67.63
Telephone and telegraph.....	318.68
Rent.....	300.00
Equipment and repair.....	182.49
Miscellaneous.....	498.10

Total expenditures, Operating Account..... \$12,326.08

Total expenditures, Annual Meeting Account..... 8,326.04

Bill for 1942 *Proceedings*..... 6,118.05

Total Expenditures..... \$26,770.17

Balance..... \$ 8,931.96

Functional Distribution of Expenditures:

General administration.....	\$ 4,680.48
Membership promotion.....	...
Program Committee.....	175.09
<i>Proceedings</i>
<i>Bulletin</i>	1,055.20
Office operation.....	5,917.21
Other.....	498.10

Total..... \$12,326.08

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK
FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Annual Meeting Account, January 1-April 30, 1943

Operating balance, January 1, 1943..... \$ 121.19

Receipts, Budget:

Attendance fees.....	\$6,832.00	
Booths.....	1,185.00	
Printing.....	627.50	
Miscellaneous.....	87.50	
	<hr/>	
Total receipts.....		\$8,732.00
		<hr/>
Total receipts and balance.....		\$8,853.19

Expenditures, Budget:

Salaries.....	\$ 396.25	
Travel.....	3,044.30	
Printing.....	1,823.00	
Postage.....	
Supplies.....	985.12	
Telephone and telegraph.....	224.03	
Miscellaneous.....	1,853.34	
	<hr/>	
Total expenditures.....		\$8,326.04
		<hr/>
Balance.....		\$ 527.15

Functional Distribution of Expenditures:

General administration.....	\$3,641.31	
Publicity and press service.....	447.46	
Booths.....	760.00	
Program and <i>Daily Bulletin</i>	1,623.93	
Other.....	1,853.34	
	<hr/>	
Total.....		\$8,326.04

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK
BUDGET STATEMENT

Operating Account, January 1-April 30, 1943

(Contains Only Net Receipts and Expenditures Properly Credited and Charged to the
1943 Budget)

<i>Receipts</i>	<i>Budget Estimate</i>	<i>Budget Receipts</i>	<i>Budget Difference</i>
Memberships.....	\$37,360.00	\$20,967.85	\$16,392.15
Attendance fees.....	2,400.00	2,546.00	+ 146.00
Miscellaneous.....	2,500.00	230.97	2,269.03
Total.....	\$42,260.00	\$23,744.82	\$18,515.18

<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>Allowed</i>	<i>Expended</i>	<i>Balance</i>
Salaries.....	\$20,630.00	\$ 6,870.09	\$13,759.91
Travel.....	3,150.00	668.17	2,481.83
Printing.....	10,100.00	2,421.46	7,678.54
Postage.....	1,850.00	999.46	850.54
Supplies.....	600.00	67.63	532.37
Telephone and telegraph.....	400.00	318.68	81.32
Rent.....	1,200.00	300.00	900.00
Equipment and repair.....	400.00	182.49	217.51
Miscellaneous.....	750.00	498.10	251.90
Total.....	\$39,080.00	\$12,326.08	\$26,753.92

*Functional Distribution
of Expenditures*

General administration.....	\$14,800.00	\$ 4,680.48	\$10,119.52
Membership promotion.....
Program Committee.....	1,000.00	175.09	824.91
Proceedings.....	6,650.00	...	6,650.00
Bulletin.....	3,100.00	1,055.20	2,044.80
Office operation.....	12,780.00	5,917.21	6,862.79
Other.....	750.00	498.10	251.90
Total.....	\$39,080.00	\$12,326.08	\$26,753.92

REPORT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK
BUDGET STATEMENT*Annual Meeting Account, January 1-April 30, 1943*(Contains Only Net Items of Receipts and Expenditures Properly Charged to the 1943
Annual Meeting Account)

<i>Receipts</i>	<i>Budget Estimate</i>	<i>Budget Receipts</i>	<i>Budget Difference</i>
Attendance fees	\$ 6,500.00	\$6,832.00	\$+ 332.00
Booths	3,125.00	1,185.00	1,940.00
Printing	3,000.00	627.50	2,372.50
Miscellaneous	1,500.00	87.50	1,412.50
Total	\$14,125.00	\$8,732.00	\$5,393.00

<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>Allowed</i>	<i>Expended</i>	<i>Balance</i>
Salaries	\$ 1,000.00	\$ 396.25	\$ 603.75
Travel	4,000.00	3,044.30	955.70
Printing	2,000.00	1,823.00	176.00
Postage	200.00	...	200.00
Supplies and equipment	2,000.00	985.12	1,014.88
Telephone and telegraph	300.00	224.03	75.97
Miscellaneous	2,000.00	1,853.34	146.66
Total	\$11,500.00	\$8,326.04	\$3,173.96

<i>Functional Distribution of Expenditures</i>			
General administration	\$ 5,200.00	\$3,641.31	\$1,558.69
Publicity and press service	1,300.00	447.46	852.54
Booths	1,500.00	760.00	740.00
Program and <i>Daily Bulletin</i>	1,500.00	1,623.93	- 123.93
Other	2,000.00	1,853.34	146.66
Total	\$11,500.00	\$8,326.04	\$3,173.96

The report of the Committee on Time and Place, Clinton Areson, chairman, and the Committee on Tellers, Margaret Johnson, chairman, are also published herewith:

The Committee on Time and Place was scheduled to meet at the Cleveland Regional Meeting. The cancellation of the meeting made it impossible. At the suggestion of the chairman of the committee, the committee voted by mail to instruct the chairman to report to the Executive Committee that it was their recommendation that the question of time and place of the 1944 meeting of the Conference be placed in the hands of the Executive Committee for later decision and with power.

I therefore do so suggest.

CLINTON W. ARESON

Chairman, Committee on Time and Place

It was voted to hold in abeyance until the fall meeting of the Executive Committee any definite decision as to the 1944 meeting. It was also agreed that some kind of a meeting should be held if at all possible.

The report of the Committee on Tellers is as follows:

President: Elizabeth Wisner, New Orleans; *First Vice President:* Stanley P. Davies, New York City; *Second Vice President:* Louise Cottrell, Portland, Oreg.; *Third Vice President:* the Rev. A. T. Jamison, Greenwood, S. C.

The candidates elected to the Executive Committee for a three-year term are: Mildred Arnold, Washington, D.C.; Harry M. Carey, Boston; Lucy P. Carner, Chicago; Elizabeth Cosgrove, Washington, D.C.; Ralph G. Hurlin, New York City; Leonard W. Mayo, Cleveland; Frances Taussig, New York City.

The names of candidates elected to the Sections are printed in the July, 1943, *Bulletin* and will also be found in the business organization of the Conference printed in the *Proceedings* as Appendix C.

A detailed statement indicating the number of votes cast for each person listed on the ballot, as well as the write-in candidates, has been submitted to Howard R. Knight, General Secretary of the Conference, and will be filed with other Conference records so that it will be available in case reference to it is desirable.

Respectfully submitted,

MARGARET JOHNSON

Chairman, Committee on Tellers

Due to the fact that the Committee on Nominations had no opportunity to meet prior to the scheduled Cleveland meeting and since that meeting was canceled, the Executive Committee authorized the chairman of the Committee on Nominations to appoint two members of that committee to prepare with her a tentative slate and submit it to all members of the Committee on Nominations. As soon as agreement had been reached the report was to be published in the July *Bulletin* as the final report of the Committee on Nominations. The chairman of the committee, Rose McHugh, appointed Malcolm Nichols, of Boston, and Clara Kaiser, of New York City, to work with her, and these members worked June 10, 11, and 12 in the preparation of a tentative slate, which in turn was submitted to the Committee on Nominations.

Agreement has been reached and the report of the Committee is published herewith. (The Section nominations are published in the July *Bulletin*.)

President: Ellen C. Potter, M.D., Director of Medicine, State Department of Institutions and Agencies, Trenton, N. J.; *First Vice President:* Linton B. Swift, General Director, Family Welfare Association of America, New York City; *Second Vice President:* Lea D. Taylor, Head Resident, Chicago Commons, Chicago; *Third Vice President:* Anita H. Faatz, Assistant Director, State Department of Public Welfare, Baltimore.

Members of the Executive Committee: Seven to be elected. Maude T. Barrett, Division of Social Service, Department of Public Welfare, Baton Rouge, La.; Chester R. Brown, Welfare Secretary for New England, Salvation Army, New York City; Harry M. Cassidy, Director, Department of Social Welfare, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.; Rudolph T. Danstedt, Division Secretary, Federation of Social Agencies of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, Pittsburgh; Hedley S. Dimock, Director of Training, United Service Organizations, New York City; Mary B. Holsinger, Secretary, New York State Conference on Social Work, Albany, N. Y.; Helen R. Jeter, Secretary, Family Security Commission, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D.C.; Lillian J. Johnson, Director, Ryther Child Center, Seattle; Faith Jefferson Jones, District Supervisor, Cook County Bureau of Public Welfare, Chicago; the Rev. Lucian L. Lauerman, Director, National Catholic School of Social Service, Washington, D.C.; Elizabeth S. Magee, Executive Secretary, National Consumers League, Cleveland; Eunice Minton, Director of Public Assistance, State Welfare Board, Jacksonville, Fla.; Mary G. Moon, Chief Regional Supervisor, Federal Works Agency, WPA, Chicago; Clyde Murray, Head Worker, Union Settlement, New York City.

Members of the Committee on Nominations: Seven to be elected. Rollo Barnes, State Department of Public Welfare, Boston; Fern L. Chamberlain, Chief of Public Assistance, State Department of Social Security, Pierre, S. D.; the Rev. John J. Donovan, Director, Division of Families, Catholic Charities, New York City; Gertrude Dubinsky, Director, Department of Foster Home Care, Association for Jewish Children, Philadelphia; Mrs. Edwin Eells, Executive Director, Sunset Camp, Chicago; Genevieve Gabower, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Val M. Keating, San Antonio, Texas; Dora Margolis, Director, Jewish Family Welfare Association, Boston; Beth Muller, Washington, D.C.; Lillie Nairne, Director, New Orleans Department of Public Welfare, New Orleans; Ann Elizabeth Neely, Executive Leadership Division, National Board of Young Women's Christian Associations, New York City; A. L. Schafer, Manager, Pacific Branch, American Red Cross, San Francisco; Edith D. Smith, Executive Secretary, Family Welfare Association, Omaha, Nebr.; Emil M. Sunley, Head, Department of Social Work, West Virginia University, Morgantown, W. Va.

Respectfully submitted,

ROSE McHUGH

Chairman, Committee on Nominations

The only other committee that would have reported in Cleveland is the Committee on Resolutions. This committee did not meet and therefore has no report.

The final registration at the New York Regional Meeting of the National Conference of Social Work was 4,908, and for the St. Louis Regional Meeting it was 1,901.

Under the Constitution of the Conference the Executive Committee has the administrative power between annual meetings. This power has been used in an approximation of the annual Business Session with all reports submitted to the membership through the *Bulletin*.

Respectfully submitted,

HOWARD R. KNIGHT

General Secretary

APPENDIX E: CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK

CONSTITUTION AS REVISED

PREAMBLE

The National Conference of Social Work exists to facilitate discussion of the problems and methods of practical human improvement, to increase the efficiency of agencies and institutions devoted to this cause, and to disseminate information. It does not formulate platforms.

MEMBERSHIP

An individual or organization interested in the purposes and work of the National Conference may, upon payment of the prescribed membership fee for their membership classification, become a member of the Conference. Membership in the Conference shall be of the following classes: (1) honorary members, to be selected and elected by the Executive Committee; (2) active members; (3) sustaining members; (4) institutional members; (5) contributing members; and (6) state members. State boards and commissions supporting the Conference through subscription to the *Proceedings*, the enlistment of memberships, or otherwise financially, shall be designated "state members."

OFFICERS

The officers of the Conference shall be a President, First, Second, and Third Vice Presidents, a General Secretary, six or more Assistant Secretaries, and a Treasurer.

The President and Vice Presidents shall be elected annually by the Conference; the Assistant Secretaries shall be appointed by the General Secretary; and the remaining officers shall be appointed by the Executive Committee.

COMMITTEES

The Executive Committee shall consist of the President, First, Second, and Third Vice Presidents, the President of the preceding year, and the Treasurer ex officio, and twenty-one other members who shall be elected

by the Conference, seven each year for a term of three years. Vacancies shall be filled in like manner. The Executive Committee shall hold all the powers of the Conference between meetings, not otherwise reserved or delegated. It may enact rules supplementing the By-Laws and not in conflict with them. The President shall be the ex officio chairman. Seven members shall constitute a quorum at all sessions of this committee.

The President shall appoint the committees named in the By-Laws and such other committees as may be ordered by the Conference or the Executive Committee from time to time.

ANNUAL MEETINGS

The Conference shall meet annually at such time and place as may be determined by the preceding Conference, as provided in the By-Laws. The Executive Committee shall have authority to change the time or place of the Annual Meeting in case satisfactory local arrangements cannot be made or for other urgent reason. The first day of the annual session shall be defined to be that day on which the first regular public meeting of the Conference is held.

GENERAL SECRETARY

The General Secretary shall be the executive officer of the Conference and shall perform his duties under such rules as may be prescribed by the By-Laws or by the Executive Committee.

AMENDMENTS

This Constitution and the By-Laws under it may be amended at any business meeting of the Conference, provided such amendment shall have been first submitted to and acted upon by the Executive Committee, and published to the membership of the Conference in a regular issue of the Conference *Bulletin* together with the Executive Committee's action thereon.

BY-LAWS

I. MEMBERSHIP FEES

Membership fees for the following classifications shall be: for active members with the *Proceedings*, \$5.00; without the *Proceedings*, \$3.00; for sustaining members, \$10.00; for institutional members, \$25.00 (no individual shall be entitled to hold institutional membership, this membership being reserved solely for agencies, organizations, and institutions); for contributing members, \$25.00 or over. (Contributing memberships may be limited to individuals contributing \$25.00 or over and to such organizations as may contribute any sum in excess of the membership fee for an institutional membership and which shall elect to be classed as contributing rather than as institutional members.) Sustaining members, institutional members, and contributing members shall be entitled

to receive both the *Bulletin* and the annual volume of *Proceedings*. All members shall be entitled to receive the *Bulletin*.

II. DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The President shall be chairman ex officio of both the Executive and the Program Committees. He shall appoint all committees except the Executive Committee unless otherwise ordered by the Conference or by the Executive Committee.

The Treasurer shall keep the funds of the Conference in such banks as may be designated by the Executive Committee. He shall keep his accounts in such form as may be prescribed by the Executive Committee and pay out funds on voucher checks in form to be prescribed by the Executive Committee, and his accounts shall be audited annually by a firm of certified accountants appointed annually by the Executive Committee. He shall give bond in an amount approximating the largest amount of Conference funds held at his disposal at any one time, the expense of the bond to be paid by the Conference.

The General Secretary shall have charge of the office and records of the Conference, and shall conduct its business and correspondence under the direction of the Executive Committee. He shall make arrangements for the Annual Meeting. He shall direct the activities of the Assistant Secretaries. He shall be the official editor of the volume of *Proceedings*, the periodical *Bulletin*, and other publications of the Conference. He shall develop the membership of the Conference and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Executive Committee. He shall receive such compensation as shall be fixed by the Executive Committee.

III. FINANCE

The financial management of the Conference shall be vested in the Executive Committee. No final action involving finances shall be taken by the Conference unless the question shall have first been submitted to and acted upon by the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee may accept donations for purposes germane to the work of the Conference, provided that no endowment funds shall be accepted in perpetuity; but all such funds must be subject to change of objects or to immediate expenditure; but such change or expenditure must be authorized by a three-fourths vote of the members of the Conference present at a regular meeting, and such proposition must first have been submitted to and acted upon by the Executive Committee.

IV. COMMITTEES

1. *Committee on Nominations*.—There shall be a Committee on Nominations of twenty-one members, seven elected each year for terms of three years. The members of the Committee on Nominations shall be nominated by the Committee on Nominations and elected by the official ballot submitted by mail to all members of record of the Conference as

hereinafter provided. The President of the Conference shall within thirty days after the Annual Meeting appoint the chairman of the Committee on Nominations from members serving their third year.

In order to establish the Committee on Nominations, the Executive Committee at its first meeting following the Annual Meeting of 1941 shall elect the Committee on Nominations of twenty-one members, seven to serve terms of one year, seven to serve terms of two years, and seven to serve terms of three years. At its first meeting following the Annual Meeting of 1942, the Executive Committee shall elect seven members for terms of three years in place of the one-year members whose terms of office will have expired as provided above.

2. *Committee on Program.*—There shall be a Committee on Program which shall consist of the President-elect, the retiring President, the General Secretary, six members, two to be elected each year by the Executive Committee of the Conference for terms of three years, and the chairmen of all continuous sections.

The said committee shall have the following functions:

a) To receive suggestions from Conference members, various section, special topic, and associate group committees, social workers, social agencies, and others interested, for subjects or speakers for the National Conference program.

b) To canvass the social work field continuously, to discover material that could be used advantageously on the Conference program.

c) To determine, from year to year, various major emphases for the program as a whole.

d) To recommend to section and special topic committees subject matter or methods of presentation of subject matter for their meetings to be used at the discretion of the section and special topic committees.

e) To arrange where desirable, more than a year in advance, for material to be prepared for the conference topic committees. Where such commitments are made for section programs, such commitments are to be made only upon the request of the section involved or with its hearty coöperation and consent, and for not more than one third of the number of sessions allowed at each Annual Meeting.

f) To arrange the schedule for joint sessions of sections.

g) To have sole responsibility for the evening General Sessions programs.

h) To establish such regulations as are needed from time to time for the control of the extent of the program as a whole.

i) To provide adequate ways and means for active participation of associate groups in the construction of the program as a whole.

j) To execute such other functions from time to time as may be assigned to it by the Executive Committee or the Conference membership.

k) To arrange, with the approval of the Executive Committee, such consultations and other meetings as may be necessary to carry out its functions.

l) To establish, either upon its own initiation or upon request, such committees on special topics as may be desirable. When establishing such committees on special topics, the Committee on Program shall also determine definitely the term of service of the committee on a special topic and such other regulations as to frequency of meeting, number of sessions at any Annual Meeting, and so forth as may be desirable.

3. *Committee on Time and Place.*—There shall be a Committee on Time and Place which shall be composed of twenty-one members to be selected by the Executive Committee, seven each year for a term of three years. In the year 1938 twenty-one members shall be selected, of whom seven shall be chosen to serve for three years, seven for two years, and seven for one year. Thereafter, the Executive Committee shall select seven members each year, each for a term of three years.

This committee in conjunction with the General Secretary shall stimulate invitations from acceptable cities and shall announce to each Annual Meeting the acceptable cities from which invitations have been received for the meeting two years from that date. In conjunction with the General Secretary, the committee shall be empowered to conduct inquiry and negotiations leading to the final selection of the place of the meeting.

The committee shall report its findings to the Executive Committee not later than the fourth day of the meeting, and the Executive Committee shall transmit this report to the Conference with its approval or other findings thereon. Action on the report of the Executive Committee shall be by a rising vote. The city receiving the highest vote shall be selected.

In the event of a negative vote upon the Executive Committee's recommendation, the question shall be referred back to the Executive Committee with power to act; but no selection shall be made in contravention of the vote of the Conference membership taken at such Annual Meeting. The criteria used by the Committee on Time and Place in selecting acceptable cities for places of meeting of the annual session shall be established by the Executive Committee.

4. *Committee on Resolutions.*—A Committee on Resolutions of three members shall be appointed by the President within three months after the adjournment of the Annual Meeting, to which all resolutions shall be referred without debate. No final action shall be taken on any resolution involving a matter of policy at the same session at which it is reported by the Committee on Resolutions.

V. SECTIONS

a) The programs of the Conference shall be grouped under sections, of which the following shall be continuous: (I) Social Case Work; (II) Social Group Work; (III) Community Organization; (IV) Social Action.¹

b) Other sections may be created for a period of one or more years by

¹ This should be generally defined as covering mobilization of public opinion, legislation, and public administration.

the Executive Committee or by the membership at the Annual Meeting, provided the proposal therefor shall have been first submitted to and acted upon by the Executive Committee. All sections shall be reconsidered by the Executive Committee at intervals of not more than five years and recommendations for such modifications as may be desirable presented at the Annual Meeting for action by the Conference membership.

c) Each continuous section shall be in charge of a committee of not less than nine members nominated one year in advance and elected by the same method as the officers and Executive Committee of the Conference. One third of the members of the section committee shall be elected each year to serve terms of three years each. Persons nominated for officers or section committee members should, so far as possible, be members of the Conference or on the staffs or boards of member agencies. No person shall serve on more than one section committee. So far as possible, related professional groups shall have representation on section committees.

d) Each other section not continuous shall be in charge of a committee appointed by the Executive Committee, or, if created by the membership, in such manner as the membership shall determine at the Annual Meeting.

e) Each section shall have power to arrange the annual Conference programs coming within its field, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee upon recommendation by the Conference Program Committee.

f) Each section shall annually nominate one year in advance a chairman and vice chairman to be elected by the same method as the officers and Executive Committee of the Conference. Their chairman may be re-elected once. The section committee shall each year elect a section secretary.

g) Vacancies in the section committee shall be filled at the Annual Meeting in the same manner as the election of new members. Vacancies in the office of chairman or secretary between meetings shall be filled by the section committee, subject to the approval of the Conference Executive Committee.

h) The Conference Executive Committee shall have general supervision over the work of all section committees with the final power to pass on all programs, in order to insure the harmonious conduct of all parts of the work.

VI. ASSOCIATE GROUPS

Independent associations may arrange with the National Conference Executive Committee for meetings to be held immediately before or during the Annual Meeting of the National Conference. The Executive Committee shall make such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary from time to time for such meetings.

VII. SUBMISSION OF QUESTIONS

Any section or group desiring to submit any question to the Conference shall present it to the Executive Committee for preliminary consideration, at least twenty-four hours before the final adjournment of the Conference, and the Executive Committee shall report on such questions with its recommendation before final adjournment.

VIII. BUSINESS SESSIONS

At the Annual Meeting at least one session shall be held at which only matters of business shall be considered. The time of this session shall be announced in the last issue of the *Bulletin* preceding the meeting. The officers of the Conference shall endeavor to concentrate on this occasion as much as possible of the business of the Conference.

Any person may vote at any Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Social Work, provided (1) that he is a member in good standing at the time of such meeting, and (2) that he was a member in good standing at the last preceding Annual Meeting. However, if he was not in good standing at the time of such meeting by reason of nonpayment of dues, then subsequent payment of such dues shall satisfy the requirements of this subsection.

Any institutional member, or any institution which is a contributing member as defined in Article I of these By-Laws, may cast its vote at any Annual Meeting of the Conference by designating any member of its board or staff who shall appear personally to cast the said ballot.

IX. VOTING QUORUM

At any business session, fifty members shall constitute a quorum.

X. SECTION MEETINGS

All meetings of the Conference except general sessions shall be arranged so as to facilitate informal discussion. The chairmen of sections shall preside at the meetings of their sections or shall appoint presiding officers in their stead.

XI. MINUTES

A certified copy of the minutes of the business transactions of the Annual Meeting, except official documents, shall be posted by the General Secretary on the official bulletin board at least three hours before the final meeting of each annual session, in order that the said minutes may be corrected by the Conference, if any question of accuracy be raised before adjournment.

XII. LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

All local arrangements for the Annual Meetings shall be subject to the approval of the Executive Committee of the Conference.

XIII. NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF OFFICERS

1. The Committee on Nominations shall have the function of nominating one or more persons for each of the officers of President, First Vice President, Second Vice President, and Third Vice President, and at least twice as many persons for members of the Executive Committee as there are vacancies in that body. It shall also have the function of nominating one or more persons for the offices of chairman and vice chairman and at least twice as many persons as are to be elected for the committee of each constitutional section of the Conference. It shall further have the function of nominating at least twice as many persons as there are vacancies in the Committee on Nominations.

2. Suggestions of names of persons for any of these positions may be submitted to the Committee on Nominations by any members of the Conference at any time following the committee's appointment and up to the time of the committee's announcement of the list of nominations.

3. Within ninety days of its appointment, the Committee on Nominations shall, through the *Bulletin*, solicit suggestions of names of persons for the offices to be filled, and shall renew such solicitation in each succeeding *Bulletin* up to the time of announcing the list of nominations. It shall use such other means of soliciting an expression of opinion from Conference members relative to proposed nominations as it deems feasible. The committee shall appoint a place at or near headquarters on the first day of the Annual Meeting and shall announce the same, at which suggestions for nominations shall be received by them up to 1:00 P.M. of the fourth day of the Annual Meeting.

4. After taking into consideration the names suggested by the Conference members, but not necessarily confining their consideration to these names, the committee shall draw up a list of nominations as previously specified, and the same shall be announced at the general session on the evening of the sixth day of the Conference one year in advance of the Conference at which they are to be elected. The list of nominees shall be published in the next succeeding issue of the Conference *Bulletin* following the announcement.

5. Additional nominations may be made by petition of not less than twenty-five members, properly addressed to the chairman of the Nominating Committee and filed at the Conference office not later than January 1, preceding the Conference at which they are to be elected.


6. A final list of all nominations shall be published in the first issue of the Conference *Bulletin* published after January 1.

7. The official ballot shall be sent by mail, to their address of record in the Conference office, to all members of the Conference entitled to vote, or who may become entitled to vote, by the renewal of membership or otherwise, not later than sixty days before the date designated each year for the closing of the polls.

Ballots may be returned by mail to the Conference office but must be

received in said office not later than the tenth day preceding the announced date of the first session of the annual Conference; or they may be deposited at the registration desk provided at Conference headquarters, at any time during the period which said registration desk is officially open, but not later than the end of the third day of the Conference. Ballots returned by mail must be signed by the voter, and shall be discarded as invalid if received without such signature.

8. The President shall appoint a committee of three tellers to whom the General Secretary shall turn over all ballots cast by mail as provided in Section 7 of By-Law XIII. The General Secretary shall at the close of the registration desk at the end of the third day of the Conference turn over to the Committee of Tellers all ballots that shall have been filed at the registration desk as provided in said Section 7. The ballots shall be counted by the tellers and the result shall be announced at the next general session of the Conference. Election shall be by a majority of the ballots cast.



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